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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with an examination of 
consumer purchases of life insurance. The problem is 
tackled in three main areas: first a theoretical 
examination of consumption, saving and bequest, based 
on the Yaari 'life-cycle' model of lifetime consumption. 
Secondly an analysis is developed to split new premium 
income into its two components : new savings and payments 
for protection against the financial effects of premature 
death. This analysis is then applied to the UK new 
business ordinary non-group renewable premium in order 
to derive figures for aggregate expenditure on savings- 
based and protection-based life insurance for the years 
1946 to 1968. Thirdly, econometric techniques are applied 
to the aggregate data to explain the demand for both new 
and in force life insurance business:. a study of the former 
is based on a single Demand and Supply model for new 
business (using the Two Stage Least Squares method); the 
analysis of contracts in force is undertaken by 
examining their Surrender Rates. 
The major concern of this thesis is to differentiate 
between the savings and protection elements of life 
insurance. The results in later chapters show that the 
demand for these elements is determined by different 
explanatory factors although some variables (notably 
permanant income) strongly influence both elements. 
Notably, Demand(in the form of premium expenditure) is not 
affedted by market price in either the savings-based or 
the protection-based case (although the same cannot be 
viii 
said for supply). 
Attention is given to the role of inflationary 
expectations in the purchase of life insurance. Though 
the period under study was one of comparatively mild 
inflation, expectations are found to have a negative 
effect both on Demand and Supply and Surrender Rates: 
interesting conclusions can thus be drawn about the 
structure of long-term inflationary expectations. 
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f. y 
CHAPTER ONE : AN INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Importance of Life Insurance 
-Ever since Income Tax was first introduced in, the`- 
United Kingdom by William Pitt (the Younger), life insurance 
has been accorded special privileges. Successive govern- 
ments have encouraged the individual to purchase life 
insurance for two main reasons: first, to provide protection, 
for heirs and dependents. against the.;. financial consequences 
of the breadwinners premature death and secondly, to encourage 
long term saving and the-provision for retirement. The 
purchase of life insurance thus provides the individual with 
a method of securing the future well-being of himself and his 
family without undue reliance on the various State welfare 
schemes. 
In the course. of the provision of their services, the 
life insurance companies, of necessity, build up large'funds 
of invested assets which represent the present value of their 
future liability to policyholders. Over the post-war years, 
these assets have grown at an annual rate of around 10%, which 
is faster than the growth of Gross National Product, National 
Savings and the assets of the London Clearing Banks but not 
as rapid as the assets of the Building Societies'or Unit Trusts 
(see S. Wynn (12) Ch. 1). In 1950, the total assets of the 
life insurance companies were third in the 'league-table' of 
-2- 
UK Financial Institutions (with National Savings second and 
the London Clearing Banks first). By 1970, however, the 
life insurance companies were at the top of the table although 
they were subsequently deposed by the Building Societies in 
1976.. Table 1.1.1 shows the size. of funds for various UK 
financial institutions. 
Another indicator of the size and importance of the UK 
life insurance industry is the volume of its new business 
in comparison with that of its nearest competitors. 
-Table 
1.1.2 compares the new business figures of the major institu- 
tions with Total Personal Saving for selected years. 
It is apparent then that the UK life insurance industry 
has developed in size and importance over the post-war period. 
Moreover, to some-extent, the figures of Tables 1.1.1 and 
1.1.2 under-estimate the worth of life insurance. This is 
because the payments represented in Table 1.1.2 are the first 
in a series of contractual payments thus providing consider- 
able stability to the savings so generated. According to 
R. L. Carter (2) Ch. 3, this contractual saving has benefitted 
the post-1945 UK Economy: 
"Over most of the post-war period since 1945 
Britain has enjoyed a very low rate of unemployment 
and economic opinion has generally been in favour 
of raising the level of saving relative to Gross 
National Product in order to provide for higher 
levels of investment. Thus life insurance can 
claim to have played a valuable role in the economy. " 
This view is endorsed by A. R. Threadgold (11) who tentatively 
concludes that inflows into life insurance and pensions funds 
have resulted in a net addition to personal sector saving. 
Moreover, the Tables give no real idea of the amount of 
'protection' provided (against the financial consequences of 
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premature death) by the purchase of life insurance. The 
existence of this protection obviously has a significant (but 
generally unquantifiable) effect on the welfare of benefic- 
iaries with a consequent cushioning of the State 
- 
provided 
social services. 
-6- 
1.2 Why the 
_ 
Demand for Life Insurance? 
Following on from the previous section, a study of the 
demand for life insurance is of interest for three main 
reasons: 
i) to investigate the behaviour of households 
particularly with respect to the provision of 
protection and contractual saving; 
ii) to determine the total sales and changing 
structure of the home business for life insurance; 
iii) to explain the role of life insurance in the 
context of the UK Economy. 
An investigation of the life insurance purchases of 
households are of particular interest for a variety of reasons. 
First of all, various individual economic characteristics 
such as household income, wealth, liquidity and expectations 
etc., are known (or are hypothesised) to affect the purchase 
of life insurance. These factors may have differing effects 
on the purchase of protection-based and saving-based life 
insurance. Thus Chapters Two and Three will be concerned 
with hypo hesýsing the determinants of Protectio based e 
insuranpe_(a definition will be deferred until then) while 
Chapter Four is concerned with the influences on saving in 
general and saving-based life insurance in particular. 
Broadly speaking, the analysis of Chapters Two and Three is 
based on the life-cycle models of Menahem Yaari (13) while 
Chapter Four reviews a number of existing studies, many of 
which are detailed in C. Ferry (3) and J. F. Lee and W. M. 
Whitaker (6). Later Chapters attempt to examine in detail 
_7_ 
the actual influence of these individual economic character- 
istics on the purchase of life insurance in the UK. 
Secondly, institutional factors such as social security 
and State pensions provisions influence the household's pur- 
chase of life insurance (eg. see J. Revell (10) ). " The State 
can also affect the purchase via its taxation policy and its 
general succes in controlling the Economy (eg. its influence 
over inflation, interest rates, unemployment etc. ). An 
examination of these factors is of particular interest and 
special emphasis is placed upon the role of-inflationary 
expectations. The effects of the social security arrange- 
ments unfortunately proved much more difficult to investigate. 
Any study of household behaviour is limited, however, 
by the quality of data available. Ideally cross-section 
studies providing information on households purchasing life 
insurance are the most useful (eg. see D. R. Anderson and 
J. R. Nevin (1) ). Unfortunately time'series studies (such 
as those undertaken in Chapters Eight and Nine) are not 
entirely successful because they cannot observe data pertain- 
ing only to those purchasers of life insurance. For example, 
household income must be approximated by aggregate Personal 
Disposable Income per capita: this figure, of course, includes 
the income of those households not purchasing insurance and 
so is not entirely appropriate. This aggregation problem is 
common to many time series studies. 
A study of the demand for life insurance also reveals 
interesting results about the role and performance of those 
life insurers operating in the UK market. In particular the 
determinants of the level of sales (both demand and supply 
sides) and also the structure of those sales (eg. the relative 
-8- 
importance of saving and protection-based policies). Some 
view can also be formed about the state of competition in 
the life insurance market: however, this study-specifically 
excludes any examination of often the most recently competi- 
tive products: single premium policies and equity-linked 
business. Naturally enough, the life insurance industry is 
also concerned with the reaction of demand to variations in 
market price and the various economic indicators (income, 
unemployment, inflation etc. ). - Because we are now concerned 
with the potential market for life insurance the aggregation 
problems are not so severe. 
Finally, a study of the demand for life insurance also 
has repercussions for the management of the Economy. In 
particular, the behaviour of contractual saving and the pro- 
vision of protection strongly influences (and is influenced 
by) business investment and the social security system. The 
life-insurance companies are also large purchasers of Government 
debt, and these purchases depend on the term and interest 
structure of new life insurance business. 
-9- 
1.3 Methodology 
Any study of the demand for life insurance must cover 
the two major aspects of new business and (contractual) 
business in force. Generally, when we speak of demand it 
is premium income that concerns us since it represents the 
most accurate measure of the quantity of life insurance 
purchased by a household. The other possible measures of 
demand (number of policies, sums insured or change in invested 
assets) are subject to a variety of disadvantages which pre- 
clude their use: the number of policies purchased gives no 
indication of the size of those policies and consequently 
throws no light on the amount of protection or saving involved. 
Sums insured, on the other hand, overestimate the importance 
of the protection-based policies where the probability of 
making a claim is relatively small. The change in invested 
assets depends on a number of factors as well as new business 
(eg. interest income and claims experience) and in addition 
cannot be properly broken down into savings and protection 
elements. Thus premium income has been chosen as the rele- 
vant proxy for quantity demanded because, by and large, it 
adequately reflects the size and importance of the various 
components of life insurance business: it has also. the 
advantage of measuring actual household expenditure on life 
insurance. 
Although a study of new business premium income presents 
no real difficulties, an analysis of business in force involves 
more problems because of the strong trend elements involved: 
not surprisingly, the pattern of these continuing contractual 
savings remains particularly stable over time (eg. S. Neumann (8) 
- 
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Ch. 7 p. '198,, obtains R2 ,=0.9998 in a regression of in force 
premium income on a number of explanatory variables 
- 
one-of 
which was the lagged dependent variable). An alternative 
would be to examine the change in premium income in force 
(ie. first differences) but it is questionable whether this 
is really a worthy subject of enquiry since it represents 
the aggregate of new business (already investigated), claims 
and voluntary terminations (which are variable at the dis- 
cretion of the policyholder). This study's examination of 
the demand for contractual in force business is devoted to- 
an examination of those contractual savings-that have been 
prematurely liquidated by voluntary termination. This 
approach seems reasonable because terminating his insurance 
is the only way in which the policyholder can express dissat- 
isfaction with his in force contract (and hence his Demand for 
that contract). Of the three methods of voluntary termina- 
tion (surrender, lapse and becoming paid-up) the Surrender 
Rate has been chosen as the best representative of the demand 
for in force life insurance for the reasons explained in-the 
course of Chapter Nine. 
It has already been intimated that life insurance is 
purchased for two broad reasons: to'provide protection (for 
dependents) against the financial consequences of premature 
death and as a method of long term contractual saving. In 
order to qualify for income tax relief on premiums UK life 
insurance contracts must include an element of protection. 
The most popular contracts (Endowment and Whole of Life) 
typically have both savings and protection elements. Con- 
sequently a rigorous analysis of the demand for life insurance 
is not really possible unless some method is devised to 
-'11 - 
separate out the protection and savings elements of new 
business premium income. An analysis of the different types 
of contract is a gross simplification. For similar reasons 
it is not really possible to use the change in life office 
assets as a measure of demand because those assets include 
a small reserve to cover the protection element. Conse- 
quently, care has been taken to distinguish between the sav- 
ings and protection elements and further discussion is taken 
up especially in Chapters Two, Five and Six. 
A large variety of contracts are marketed by the life 
offices in the UK representing a great diversity of reasons 
for purchase. The scope of this study has been limited to 
the traditionally most important element of life office busi- 
ness - ordinary life insurance not including annuities. 
Single premium and group life insurance have also been excluded 
because of their peculiar characteristics (single premium 
business is very volatile and largely dependent on the taxa- 
tion structure). Membership of group life insurance schemes 
is generally for reasons related to the nature and conditions 
of employment (see S. Wynn (12) and B. Reitz (9)). Unit or 
equity linked contracts have also been excluded where ever 
possible (again because of their peculiar nature); in any 
case they are conducted largely on a single premium basis 
and are a comparatively recent phenomenon (not becoming 
important until the mid-1960's). (1) 
0)"A feature of this class of business which is more important 
in linked life assurance than in life assurance as a whole 
is the large amount of single premium investment. " (Life 
Offices Association (7), 1969-73). 
The prevalence of single premium linked business can be 
observed from the breakdown of new business reported in (7): 
(FIM) 1969 1970 -971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
New yearly premiums 32 25 28 28 38 40 45 
New single premiums 27 53 104 296 346 125 84 
- 
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The statistical life insurance data for this study was 
obtained from three main sources: 
a) company returns to the Department of Trade (as 
reported, in aggregate, in the Annual Abstract 
of Statistics (4)); 
b) company returns to the Life Offices Association 
and Associated Scottish Life'Offices (as reported, 
in aggregate, in (7)); 
c) a survey, undertaken by the author, of fifteen 
of the largest life offices'based in the United 
Kingdom. 
The available data unfortunately limits this study in 
a number of significant respects, the most important being 
caused by a major discontinuity in the DOT returns in the 
year 1968/69 when the 'Insurance Companies (Accounts and 
Forms) Regulations 1968' substantially altered the reporting 
requirements. In particular much overseas business that had 
previously been included was excluded from 1969 onwards. 
Additionally, the post 1969 figures include capital redemption, 
long term personal accident business and deferred and immediate 
annuity business (new business figures) which were all shown 
separately before. Consequently the multiple regression 
analysis conducted in the later chapters uses data over the 
period 1946-1968 inclusive. Of course, there are other 
problems of data compatibility and these are reported in 
Chapter Six. 
- 
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1.4 Chapter Structure 
r.. rr 
This study can be subdivided into three main parts: 
first, Chapters Two, Three and Four are concerned with a 
theoretical treatment of the purchase of protection and 
savings-based life insurance. In the second part (Chapters 
Five and Six) consideration is given to the problems of-, 
splitting UK new business premium income into its saving and 
protection elements. Thirdly, Chapters Seven, Eight and 
Nine constitute a statistical analysis of the data produced 
and hypotheses formulated in the earlier Chapters. The last 
Chapter (Ten) forms the Conclusion and pulls together the 
various results. 
Chapter Two is concerned with developing a theoretical 
background to analyse consumption, lifetime and non-lifetime 
saving and bequest. The theory is based on the 'lifecycle' 
model of M. Yaari (13): this theory is extended and developed 
to handle a variety of situations, including the possibility 
of surrender of the protection-based life insurance contract. 
Chapter Three uses some of the theory developed in 
Chapter Two to analyse the specific effects of anticipated 
and unanticipated inflation on the purchase of protection- 
based life insurance. 
Chapter Four summarises some of the existing work on 
the determinants of saving, saving via life insurance and 
the demand for life insurance in general. Conclusions are 
drawn relating to the factors, variables and models that might 
be applied to explain the purchase of UK life insurance. 
Chapter Five discusses the savings and protection con- 
tent in standard life insurance contracts and develops a 
-'14 - 
formulation to split these two elements of new business 
premium income. Chapter Six then applies the theory of the 
preceding Chapter to derive actual series for financial saving 
via life insurance, and the demand for protection-based and 
savings-based life insurance in the UK over the period 1946- 
1968. 
Chapter Seven details the models and variables to býeý 
used in the multiple regression analysis of the purchase of 
UK life insurance. Some discussion is devoted to the deriva- 
tion of an inflationary expectations variable: however, the 
extent that this variable can be tested is severely restricted 
by the sample period. Unfortunately, 1946-68 was a period 
of comparatively mild inflation (with the exception of the 
years of the Korean War): the most drastic inflation of the 
early 1970's is, therefore, 
, 
excluded. ' Consequently the -effects 
of inflation expectations on the purchase of life insurance 
are almost certainly less than they would-have been had a 
longer sample period been possible. 
Chapter Eight is a summary of the results obtained by 
running the multiple regression analyses of the new business 
premium income outlined in Chapter Seven. Two main models 
are attempted: first using the Financial Saving Ratio (new 
saving via life insurance as aýpercentage of-Personal Disposable 
Income) as the dependent variable and secondly a Demand model 
(incorporating Supply equations and using the technique of 
Two Stage Least Squares). 
Finally, Chapter Nine describes the results of an analysis 
of the demand for in force business by looking at the Surrender 
Rate for Ordinary (savings-based) life insurance. 
- 
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CHAPTER TWO :A THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE 
PURCHASE OF PROTECTION-BASED 
LIFE INSURANCE 
2.1 Introduction 
The objective of this Chapter is to describe a number 
of theoretical models which throw some light on the consumer's 
motives for purchasing protection-based life insurance. The 
underlying assumption behind the models is that the individ- 
ual arranges his consumption and bequest expenditures so as 
to maximise the expected utility attainable from consumption 
over his lifetime and the estate remaining and bequeathed 
upon his death. The cardinal utility analysis so developed 
is thus based on the expected utility postulates of J. von 
Neumann and 0. Morgenstern (32). 
The models are used to develop hypotheses about an indiv- 
idual's purchase of protection-based life insurance: in 
particular to investigate how his decision depends on his 
age and his subjective estimation of his own mortality exper- 
ience. Later Sections of this Chapter attempt to explain 
the conditions under which a consumer may wish to Surrender 
his life insurance arrangements. A discussion of the influ- 
ence of inflationary expectations 
- 
and the resultant effect 
on the purchase and subsequent surrender of protection-based 
life insurance 
- 
is deferred to Chapter Three but uses the 
theory developed here. 
- 
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Chapter Two is divided into four main parts: Section 
2.2 introduces and defines the concepts and works through 
a simplified two-period model as an illustration. Sections 
2.3,2.4 and 2.5 further define and investigate the role of 
the bequest in a consumer's decision process. Sections 
2.6 and 2.9 develop a continuous lifetime consumption model 
(along the lines first introduced by M. Yaari (33)) which is 
then used to analyse the structure conditions. Finally 
Sections 2.10 to 2.12 extend the theory of the previous 
Sections to analyse the consumer's decision to surrender his 
life insurance contract. 
A key to the notation of each Section is provided in 
Appendix 2.2. 
- 
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2.2 Consumption and Lifetime Saving 
Wherever possible, notation will be used that corres- 
ponds with that agreed in 1898(1) and described in P. F. 
Hooker and L. H. Longley-Cook (16) (pp. 270-279). 
The age of the consumer will be specified by the lower 
case letter x where x lies in the range (0, oo), and ZX will 
be used to denote the number of individuals who expect to 
attain exact age x (according to any particular mortality 
table). 
We will assume that the consumer expects to live T years 
(following the work of D. Moffet (22) and (23), S. F. Richard 
(29), S. Fischer (8) and N. H. Hakansson (14)) where clearly 
T is a stochastic variable with probability density function 
Zx+T ux+T / Zx ( Ux+T is the force of mortality) as described 
by M. Yaari (33) and K. Borch (3). 
At time t (ie. at age x+t) the consumer's income stream 
is given by y(t) and his consumption expenditure, c(t) both 
real-valued, non-negative functions of t on the interval (0, T). 
The residual y(t) 
- 
c(t) then represents the traditional def- 
inition of saving, but this can be divided into a further 
two parts: 
y(t) - c(t) = s(t) + b(t) (2.2.1) 
where c(t) ?0 (2.2.2) 
b(t) denotes that part of the residual that the consumer 
does not intend to dissave in his lifetime. That is, b(t) 
is the deliberate process of laying income aside in order 
that there may be unrealised savings stock on the death of 
the consumer. b(t) will be called a 'bequesting flow$ and 
By the Second International Actuarial Congress, May 1898. 
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the bequest left to the consumer's heirs, should he die at 
the time t will be denoted by B(t). 
s(t) denotes that part of the residual that the con- 
sumer intends to dissave sometime in his lifetime and will 
be termed 'lifetime saving flow', s(t) is used to build up 
'lifetime savings stock' S(t) and 
S(t) 
= eöt oft e-ST ýs(T) dT 
(2.2.3) 
where 6 is the force of interest (which for simplicity is 
assumed constant over the range (0, T) ). Differentiating 
through Equation (2.2.3) by t, we have 
S'(t) = SS(t) + s(t) 
(2.2.4) 
where S' (t) = dS(t)/dt Thus the change in Savings 
Stock (S') is simply the sum of interest P(t)) and new 
saving (s(t)). Both s(t) and S(t) are usually allowed to 
be negative although in order to build a workable model of 
consumer consumption and saving, it is always necessary to 
constrain S(t) and s(t) in some way. 
However, the definition of 'lifetime' saving implies a 
'built-in' constraint to the effect that the consumer saves 
and dissaves in order to make his discounted value of life- 
time savings stocks at death (at time T) equal to zero. This 
- 
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can be represented asý2ý 
+++ 
oe 
aT 
. 
S(T). (Zx+T ux+T)/Zx dT 
(2.2.5) 
where Zx+T denotes the consumer's own subjective estimate 
of the mortality table. Zx+T will be represented by the 
equation 
x+t = 
L(t). X+t 
(2.2.6) 
where L(O) =1 and L (t) is assumed to be a differentiable 
function of time t. 
Unfortunately, we shall see in the analysis of Section 
2.6 that Equations (2.2.5) and (2.2.6) above are incompatible 
in the sense that the standard calculus of variations calcu- 
Tations cannot be resolved when both Equations are utilised. 
F. Modigliani and R. Brumberg (21) list four motives for 
saving: 
(i) the desire to add to the estate for the benefit 
of heirs; 
(ii) to 'straighten out' the pattern of income and 
(2)The 
structure of Equation (2.2.5) and in fact the entire 
notation in this Chapter implies that all the consumer's 
decisions are taken at age x. Equation (2.2.5) can be 
simplified to obtain: 
of eat 
++ 
(ZX+t' 1). s(t) dt 
x 
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consumption; 
(iii) the precautionary motive 
- 
in order to meet 
possible emergencies; 
(iv) because of the presence of uncertainty, it may 
be necessary to have an equity in certain kinds 
of assets (such as houses and consumer durables) 
before an individual can receive services from 
them. 
Motives (ii) and (iii) refer to lifetime saving, however 
while (ii) is fairly straightforward, it is difficult to 
reconcile (iii) with Equation (2.2.5) since emergencies may 
be expected throughout the consumer's lifetime. Friedman 
(11) has pointed out that the higher the ratio of non-human 
wealth to permanent income, the less need there is for any 
additional reserve (ie. saving). Thus the consumer may be 
in most need of an additional reserve when lifetime savings 
stocks are zero or negative. Consequently, if we include 
precautionary saving as part of 'lifetime' saving Equation 
(2.2.5) must be modified as follows: 
+++ 
of -6T 
dT 
. 
S(T). ( Zx+T 
'ux+T)/Zx dT =A 
(2.2.7) 
where AL0 
Equation (2.2.7) can be interpreted to mean that the 
consumer expects to have non-zero (and most likely positive) 
savings stocks at his eventual death. These savings stocks 
will thus contribute towards the consumer's bequest but arise 
not because of any bequest motive (in fact A> 0 in the absence 
- 
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of a bequest motive although an attempt to minimise A would 
be made) but because of the uncertain situation of the con- 
sumer. Note that we have implicitly assumed that the con- 
sumer's money income stream y is known in advance; however 
we shall see in a later Chapter that although money income 
may be known with certainty, the same may not be said about 
real income. If the consumer has a non-zero bequest motive, 
this does not necessarily mean that A will be maximised since 
any utility attaching to consumption will tend to reduce A. 
Although A is not a function of x (since there is no a priori 
reason why the possibility of emergencies should depend on 
age), A is dependent on the risk aversion of the consumer, 
so that we might expect the more cautious consumer to have a 
greater value of A. This facet of A's behaviour may cause 
difficulties later on, however Modigliani and Brumberg (21), 
p. 428, have indicated that the third and fourth motives for 
saving appear not to be significant because of the consumer's 
tendency to accumulate assets at a rapid rate during the 
early income earning years which are therefore-later avail- 
able as a general reserve against emergency. Consequently 
precautionary saving can initially be disposed of without 
much loss of generality either by ignoring it altogether or 
by analysing it in conjunction with the bequest motive. 
Even in the absence of precautionary saving it is not 
inconceivable that lifetime savings stocks will be non-zero 
at death. This phenomenon arises because the consumer does 
not know his exact age at death. In this case S(t) forms 
part (although an unintended part) of the consumer's bequest. 
By including b(t) in the residual y-c we have implicitly 
indicated that b(t) is one of the components of saving. 
- 
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Indeed, Modigliani and Brumberg include the bequest motive 
as the first of their four 'motives for saving' and Moffet 
(22) p. 19, concludes that, in the absence of insurance, 
"one can say that the existence of a bequest motive creates 
an incentive to save". However, there is a strong case for 
arguing that the process of bequesting (ie. allocations out 
of income) constitutes elements of both consumption and saving: 
this is particularly true of the purchase of temporary life 
insurance rzhose case will be more fully described in Chapter 
Five). 
The standard type of definition to be found in any basic 
economics textbook states that consumption is "the combination 
of goods and services to produce satisfaction for the consumer". 
(3) 
This definition may be interpreted in two main ways: first, 
with the emphasis on the 'combination' of goods and services 
and second on the fact that this combination produces 'satis- 
faction'. There can be no doubt that consumption involves 
both 'combination' of goods and services and also the produc- 
tion of 'satisfaction'. However, if we want to define saving 
in terms of deferred consumption then it becomes important to 
determine exactly which element of consumption is deferred: 
'combination' or 'satisfaction'. If it is decided that 
saving occurs when satisfaction is deferred to a later time 
period, then it is possible to argue that any activity produc- 
ing immediate satisfaction must be classed as consumption. 
Initially it is possible to give a definition of consump- 
tion, with emphasis on the 'satisfaction' element, to the 
effect that consumption results from any activity that produces 
(3)For 
example see W. W. Cochrane & C. S. Bell (5) p. 4. 
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utility. A. Marshall (20) p. 54, envisages much the same 
type of explanation: 
"Just as man can produce only utilities, so he can 
consume nothing more. He can produce services 
and other immaterial products and he can consume 
them. But as his production of material products 
is really nothing more than a rearrangement of 
matter which gives it new utilities so his con- 
sumption of them is nothing more than a disarrange- 
ment of. matter, which diminishes or destroys its 
utilities. " 
However, this definition does not differentiate clearly be- 
tween consumption and (lifetime) saving. Since lifetime 
saving will eventually be used to produce satisfaction for 
the consumer, it could be argued that consumption is synon- 
omous with income, ie. there is no saving component at all. 
Thus we need to say that consumption results in any activity 
that produces immediate (rather than deferred) satisfaction. 
This is the type of definition envisaged by I. Fisher (9) 
P. q: 
"Spending and (saving) differ only in degree, 
depending on the length of time elapsing between 
the expenditure and the enjoyment. To spend is 
to pay money for enjoyments which come very soon. 
To (save) is to pay money for enjoyments which 
are deferred to a later time. " 
The above definition of consumption introduces one 
further problem in that there is usually some type of time 
lag between consumption expenditure and the satisfaction that 
is the counterpart of consumption. Thus the peculiar situa- 
tion arises that unless consumption occurs simultaneously 
with expenditure, saving will result because the enjoyments 
have been deferred to a later time. Consequently, the 
definition of consumption must be modified to say that con- 
sumption results in any activity that produces satisfaction 
- 
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within a reasonable period after acquisition. 
One of the consequences of defining consumption as a 
satisfaction producing activity results in a change in the 
treatment of certain activities that might have been regarded 
as saving. Thus, another motive for saving that was not 
included in Modigliani and Brumberg's list arises if a man 
wishes to have assets merely for the sake of possessing those 
assets: that is, if satisfaction is derived from the mere 
act of saving rather than from the future consumption that 
the saving will generate. 
(4) The new definition would then 
classify this behaviour as consumption rather than saving. 
However it is obvious that this treatment contradicts the 
result obtained by defining consumption as a reduction in 
the net present value of wealth. 
Another, much more interesting consequence of the defi- 
nition of consumption (as a satisfaction producing activity) 
is that it produces strong justification for including be- 
questing flow as an element of consumption rather than saving. 
Although the reasoning is taken up more fully in Section 2.3 
it can be argued that if the consumer gains immediate satis- 
faction from the knowledge that his dependents will not suffer 
from the financial consequences of his uncertain death, then 
the payments that provide this protection (the bequesting 
flow b(t)) will constitute consumption. 
At this point it might be constructive to introduce a 
simple utility maximising model along the lines indicated by 
M. W. Jones-Lee (19) Ch. 4, and especially Moffet (22) and 
analogous to several of those of H. A. J. Green (13). This 
(4)This 
case if mentioned by J. S. Duesenberry (6) p. 34. 
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model has the advantage that the concepts already introduced 
can be further elaborated while some interesting results can 
be obtained. 
The ensuing model is a two-period discrete time one 
where it is assumed that the consumer dies in one or the other 
of the two time periods. We say that, from a given mortality 
table, 1k denotes the number alive at the beginning of the k 
period, then note that Zk 0 for k>3 Income, consump- 
tion and bequesting flow decisions are assumed to be made at 
the beginning of each period and are all taken to be positive 
( ie. yk, ck, bk >0; k=1,2 ) Any bequest to be made by 
the consumer is undertaken solely through the medium of a 
two-period temporary life insurance (with office premiums 
bI and b2) where the bequests (B1 and B2) are paid out at 
the end of the period of death. The balance of income not 
allocated (ie. lifetime savings flows s, and s2) are assumed 
to be saved with a banker at rate of interest (per period) -i 
(the same rate as used by the insurer in premium calculations). 
s, and s2 are used to build up lifetime savings stocks S, and 
S2 (determined at the beginning of each period): all four 
components of saving may be negative. The consumer derives 
satisfaction from both consumption and the bequest provided 
by the life insurance and this can be denoted by the instan- 
taneous utility functions u(c) and w(B). Finally we assume 
that in the first instance the utility assigned to the arbi- 
trary consumption and bequest plans is given by(S): 
T 
U(c, B) =E( u(ck) + w(Bk) ) 
k=1 (2.2.8) 
(5)This form for U(c, B) implies that preferences for consump- 
tion and bequest are independent. Furthermore inter- 
temporal independence is implicitly assumed. 
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However since T is a stochastic variable, we need to find 
the expected utility of the lifetime consumption and bequest 
plans; this is given by 
2T 
t(c, B) =EE( u(ck) + w(Bk) ). p(T) 
11 
(2.2.9) 
where p(T), the probability density function of T, is given 
by 
p(D _( Z1-Z2 ) /Zl 
p(2) =12/1]. 
(2.2.1 0) 
Equations (2.2.9) and (2.2.10) can then be combined to give 
2 
ll(c, B) =E( 111/). ( u(ck) + w(Bk) 
k=1 
(2.2.11) 
The objective of the consumer is therefore to maximise 
D(c, B) by varying c and B subject to certain conditions. 
The restrictions that lifetime savings must be zero at expected 
time of death can be written 
p(1). S1 + v. p(2). S2 =0 
(2.2.12) 
where v (1 + If the consumer's initial wealth at 
the start of period one is assumed to be zero then we have 
SI = S1 
S2 = sl(l+i) + S2 (2.2.13) 
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so that (2.2.12) can be rewritten 
Zl. s1 + v. Z2. s2 =0 
(2.2.14) 
(incorporating Equations (2.2.10), (2.2.12) and (2.2.13)). 
Note that we have assumed that the consumer's subjective 
estimate of mortality is given by the equation Zk = Zk 
(see Equation (2.2.6)): it would not be sensible to do 
otherwise because of the initial assumption that the con- 
sumer dies sometime in the two periods. 
Using the principle of equivalence (see Borch (3)) 
- 
where the present value of expected premiums is equated to 
the present value of expected claims 
- 
the relationship 
between b and B is as follows: 
11. b1 + v. Z2. b2 = k. ( v. ( Z1 
- 
Z2 ). B1 + v2. Z2. B2 ) 
(2.2-15) 
where k >1 is the loading on the pure premium to allow 
for insurer's expenses and profit. 
The relationship between y, c, b and s is of 
course: 
yk = Ck + bk + Sk ;k=112 
(2.2.16) 
since income (yk) can either be consumed (ck), used to 
provide a bequest (bk) or 'lifetime' saved (sk). Now 
equations (2.2.14), (2.2.15) and (2.2.16) can be combined 
by substituting for s1 and s2 in (2.2.14) ie. 
Z1. ( yl 
- 
cl 
-b1 )+v. Z2. ( y2 
- 
c2 
- 
b2 )=0 
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ie. by rearranging 
Zl. ( yl 
- 
cl )+v. Z2. ( y2 
- 
c2 (Zl. bl + v. 12. b2 ) 
so that we get 
Z1. ( yl 
- 
cl )+v. Z2. ( y2 
- 
c2 )=k. ( v. ( Z1 - Z2 ). B1 + v2. Z2. B2 ) 
(2.2.17) 
by substituting into-Equationw(2.2.15). 
Following the methodology of Moffet (22), we set the partial 
derivatives of (2.2.11) equal to zero, in order to obtain 
Zl. u'(cl) + Zl. w'(B1)IBl/öcl 
zl. w'(B1)ý B1/ßc2 + z2. u'(c2) 
Zl. u'(cl)ýclAB1 ±11'. w'(B1) 
Zl. u' (cl)adAB2 
-- -I 
+ 42. w'(B2AB2/öcl = cl 
+ 12. w'(B2)»B2/ac2 =o 
+12. u' (c2Ac2AB1 
+ Z2. u' (c2)öc2AB2 + Z2. w' (B2) 
(2.2.18) 
Noting that the partial derivatives can be found from Equation 
(2.2.17) we get the final solution 
u'(cl) 
------ _ 
(1 + i) 
u'(c2) (2.2.19a) 
wl (BI) 
w'(B2) 
=o 
= 0' 
(2.2.19b) 
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Equation (2.2.19a) provides no real surprises in that 
it corresponds with previously existing results (eg. see 
Moffet (22)): thus as the rate of interest i increases 
the consumer will prefer second to first period consumption 
(ceteris paribus). In order to, correctly interpret Equation 
(2.2.19b) it must be remembered that the mortality rates 
involved are those used by the insurer and are usually not 
closely related to the individual characteristics of the 
consumer. Thus Equation (2.2.19b) indicates that the older 
of two, otherwise identical, consumers (ie. the one with the 
lower value of Z2) will prefer a Period Two to a Period One 
bequest (remember that it has been assumed that death occurs 
in one or the other of the two periods). Similarly, the 
younger of the two (ie. the one most likely to die in Period 
Two) will prefer a Period One bequest (ceteris paribus). 
There are two elements in the explanation of this phenomenon: 
i) a change in the budget constraint: concen- 
tration of bequest on those ages with the 
lowest probability of death will reduce the 
cost of life insurance protection; 
ii) it could be argued that greatest protection 
is needed (ceteris paribus) for those ages 
where the probability of death is lowest. 
This is because death, if it does occur at 
these ages, will be more unexpected. 
To finish off this simplified two-period example, it 
is of interest to examine the assumptions behind the con- 
struction of U(c, B) (Equation 2.2.8). Essentially, (2.2.8) 
indicates that the consumer derives immediate satisfaction 
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from the process of bequesting (and therefore protecting 
dependents from the effects of unexpected death) irrespec- 
tive of the timing of his death. Most other studies of 
the process of bequest 
- 
based on the Yaari 'Life Cycle' 
Model (see Yaari (33) and Moffet (23))- assume that the 
derivation of utility from making a bequest is contingent 
upon the death of the consumer. In this case the utility 
of bequest must represent the discounted value of the heir's 
and dependent's utility of consumption functions given that 
the consumer dies. Consequently, since utility is only 
derived at the time of death, the "Life Cycle' construction 
of the utility function assigned to consumption and bequest 
plans is of the form: 
T 
U(c, B) u(ck) + w(BT) 
k=1 
(2.2.20) 
The expected value of lifetime consumption and bequest is 
then 
2T 
U(c, B) =E(E u(ck) + w(BT).... ). p(T) 
T=1 k=1 
(2.2.21) 
2 
=E( Zk/Z1 ). u(ck) +C ZZ Z2) 
. 
w(B1) + (Z2/11). w(B2) 
k=1 
-- 
Z 
(2.2.22) 
If we maximise D(c, B) by differentiating Equation (2.2.22) 
while applying the same conditions as before the final solutions 
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so obtained are: 
u'(cl) 
u'(c2) 
(1+i) (2.2.23a) 
w'(B1) 
w'(B2) 
(1+i) (2.2.23b) 
Clearly, these solutions are difficult to explain in 
the context of the provision of protection for the benefit 
of heirs and dependents: we would intuitively expect that 
provision to depend on the age of the consumer. Further- 
more, the more uncertain the consumer is about the possib- 
ility of death, the greater the amount of protection we 
would expect him to require; consequently our model 
(Equations(2.2.19)) predicts that, in the absence of other 
information, a consumer will require more protection at 
younger (rather than older) ages. 
It will be seen in the next Section that the conventional 
'Life Cycle' Model (Equation (2.2.23b)) is more useful in 
explaining those benefits that do not provide for the pro- 
tection of dependents ie* non-lifetime saving. In this 
context the statement that the bequest is invariant to age 
is easier to understand. 
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2.3 The Bequest Motive 
Convention demands that b(t) (the bequesting flow) and 
B(t) (the bequest at time t) are always positive for sever- 
al reasons: 
i) we normally assume that the consumer will 
prefer to leave his dependents with an estate 
rather than with debts although the legal/ 
taxation system determines the extent of the 
transference of wealth. Thus to quote Alfred 
Marshall (20) p. 228: 
"were it not for family affections, many 
who now work hard and save carefully would 
not exert themselves to do more than sec- 
ure a comfortable annuity for their lives"; 
ii) rthe structure of a rational capital market should 
ensure that loans are not available to individ- 
uals who are highly likely to die before the 
repayment; 
iii) we do not normally allow individuals to sell 
insurance on their own lives (this is a feature 
of several of the works on the lifetime allo- 
cation of consumption eg. Fischer (8)). 
However, it will not normally be necessary to impose an ex 
ante restriction on b(t) and B(t) since the pull of any 
bequest motive should guarantee that b(t) and B(t) turn out 
to be positive for all values of t. In the absence of a 
bequest motive it may indeed prove necessary to introduce 
some form of constraint; for example, Yaari (33) stipulates 
S(T) = 0, where T is the age at death, while Moffet (22) 
stipulates the local constraint that the consumer must 
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always be solvent (ie. S(t)> 0 for all t). 
We now return to the argument in the middle paragraphs 
of Section 2.2 to show that the process of bequesting con- 
stitutes some element of consumption as well as saving. 
If consumption is defined as a satisfaction producing event 
then the bequesting allocation out of income would count 
entirely as saving if the consumer obtained no immediate 
satisfaction from laying aside b(t). (Note that this 
would also be true if the 'combination' definition of con- 
sumption was used). Satisfaction would then be deferred 
and would accrue only after death with the ultimate consump- 
tion of the bequest by heirs and dependents. This is the 
type of situation envisaged by most of the authors who have 
discussed the lifetime allocation of consumption eg. Yaari, 
Moffet, Borch, Fischer and Hakansson. However, it can be 
argued that the consumer gains immediate satisfaction from 
the knowledge that his dependents will not suffer from the 
financial consequences of his premature death. Thus 
bequesting flow b(t) can be regarded as payment for protec- 
tion (against the uncertainty of death) which realises 
immediate satisfaction and is therefore classed as consump- 
tion. But, this is obviously not the end of the argument 
since, although we have indicated that bequesting was not 
entirely saving, it must also be noted that neither is it 
entirely consumption. Consequently, it is necessary to 
examine the process of bequesting in greater detail. 
Alfred Marshall (20) p. 190, details two main reasons 
why the consumers may have a bequest motive: first, family 
affections lead to a desire to protect dependents against 
the consequences of premature death. Secondly, to leave 
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the dependents 'better off' financially than they were in 
his lifetime: 
"A man can have no stronger stimulus to energy 
and enterprise than the hope of rising in life, 
and leaving his family to start from a higher 
round of the social ladder than that on which 
he began". 
To this list, we may add a third minor reason to cover 
gifts to charities and the like, however the problems caused 
by altruistic behaviour will be ignored in this context. 
Thus the first of Marshall's reasons for bequest is to 
provide protection for heirs and dependents and the second 
reason is basically to provide a bequest that is in excess 
of an amount needed to provide adequate protection. 
Intuitively, we might expect that 'adequate protection' 
would result if the dependents were able to continue at more 
or less the same standard of living after the death of the 
consumer as they had attained before. Another similar but 
more rigorous definition would equate a bequest providing 
'adequate protection' with the expected discounted cash 
value of the consumer's future lifetime earnings less that 
part which would be consumed by the consumer himself (ie. 
the-consumer's human capital). Both these definitions aim 
at a situation analagous to the Principle of Indemnity 
(although we note that the legal Principle of Indemnity 
has not applied to insurances on human life since 1854(6)). 
Consequently, a bequest that provides protection of depend- 
ents against premature death will be defined as having an 
upper bound determined according to the indemnity principle, 
Bequesting flow to provide a bequest in excess of the 
Dalby v. India and London Life (1851+) 15CB 365 
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upper bound cannot be used to provide protection for depend- 
ents: it must therefore be classified as saving rather than 
consumption. This, of course, is not lifetime saving, but 
consumption by heirs and dependents that is deferred until 
the individual's death 
- 
this will be termed 'non-lifetime' 
saving. 
To sum up, bequesting flow b(t) can be divided into two 
main classes: to provide protection against premature death 
and to provide more than adequate protection. The former 
can be classed as consumption and the latter as saving since 
consumption is deliberately deferred until a later date. 
Obviously, the second class cannot exist until the first 
reason for bequesting has already been fully satisfied. 
Should the consumer die at age x+t, then in the second 
case above, the bequest that he makes to heirs and dependents 
ie. B(t) 
- 
B*(t) where B* is the upper bound on protection 
can just be classified as realised savings stocks. Simi- 
larly, there seems to be no a priori reason why B*(t) should 
not be classed as realised savings stocks except that it has 
already been argued that B*(t) is connected with consumption 
and not saving. However, this is not a problem since 
bequesting for protection purposes is essentially just a 
method of paying in advance for known future consumption. 
Thus the realisation of B*(t) is akin to the consumption of 
say, a consumer durable and is therefore more closely con- 
nected with consumption than with saving. 
The classification of bequesting flow into consumption 
and saving has interesting implications when applied to the 
purchase of temporary life insurance. Theoretically, 
since the Principle of Indemnity does not apply to life 
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insurance, the budget constraint is the only restriction on 
the amount of temporary life insurance that can be purchased 
by an individual. ' Thus, subject to his budget constraint, 
it is possible for the consumer to purchase life insurance 
in excess of the upper bound mentioned above. This would 
imply that part of the temporary life insurance premium 
would be classed as saving and this is contrary to all 
current opinions on the matter. 
(? ) 
It must be pointed out, however, that although theoret- 
ically theconsumer can purchase unlimited amounts of temp- 
orary life insurance, it is possible that the insurer might 
suspect moral hazard (ie. that the individual influences the 
possibility of loss) unless the consumer can demonstrate a 
valid reason for the large sum insured. 
(8) Thus the insurer 
may effectively impose an untenable budget constraint on the 
consumer by increasing the calculation mortality rates (see 
Section 2.5). 
'Adequate protection' has already been defined in terms 
(? )For 
example, see: J. S. Duesenberry (7) and S. Neumann (26). 
This type of saving would,, of course, be classed as 'non- 
lifetime' saving. 
(8)For 
example, to quote from Peter Edwards "Life Assurance 
Financial Underwriting" Planned Savings November 1978, 
Wootten Publications Ltd: 
"In underwriting any proposal, we not only have to 
look at the medical aspects but we have to satisfy 
ourselves that the sum assured can be justified, 
whether there is financial need and more importantly 
perhaps, we must know the reasons for effecting the 
policy. " 
"To help the underwriter, we therefore have to apply 
a rule of thumb in deciding what is reasonable by way 
of sum assured. If any individual wishes to pay more 
than 20% of total income in the provision of life 
assurance then great care should be taken before 
acceptance. " 
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of the amount of the bequest at any one time, but there is 
also a 'time-scale' problem. This arises because it is 
unlikely that protection for dependents will be needed 
indefinitely. After the consumer has reached a certain 
age (for instance, if he has outlived his spouse and the 
children have left home) then protection for dependents 
may no longer be required. This does not mean however, 
that the consumer has no bequest motive. The time-scale 
consideration has an interesting application to whole of 
life insurance: this arises since we can reasonably assume 
that protection for dependents will not be needed indefinitely. 
Thus obviously, whole of life insurance premiums cannot be 
classified as solely consumption but also include an element 
of 'non-lifetime' saving. This problem will be further dis- 
cussed in Chapter Five. 
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2.4 The Utility of Bequest 
It is the consequence of Section 2.3 that the instan- 
taneous utility of bequest function associated with the 
amount of bequest at any time is a hybrid composed of two 
parts. The first is associated with the immediate satis- 
faction obtained from the knowledge that dependents are 
protected against the effects of premature death. This 
utility function has the form: 
wl(B(t)) 
, 
B(t) < B'-(t) 
Utility at age (x+t) 
0, B(t) > B*(t) 
(2.4.1) 
where B*(t) is the upper bound on protection defined by the 
indemnity principle at age x+t and wl(B(t)) >0 where 
wt (B) _d w1(B) 
The second part of the utility of bequest function is 
associated with the deferred utility of heirs and dependents 
resulting from the consumption of bequests in excess of B* 
ie. 'non-lifetime' saving. This utility has the form: 
Deferred utility 
_ at age (x + t) { 
0 B(t) < B*(t) 
w2(B(t)-B*(t)) 
, 
B(t) < B*(t) 
(2.4.2) 
The use of utility function w2(B) is slightly misleading 
in that it seems to imply that the consumer gains immediate 
satisfaction from the non-protecting consumption of heirs 
and dependents (the situation mentioned before and noted 
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by Duesenberry (7)). However, (because of our definition 
of consumption) w2 (B(t) - B*(t)) is really only a simpli- 
fication representing the discounted value of the heirs' and 
dependents' utility of consumption functions given that the 
consumer dies at age x+t. ie. 
W2( B(t) - B*(t)) _ 
. 
tJ 0lhýT). uh(Ch(T)) dT 
(2.4.3) 
where the consumption stream of heirs and dependents %(T) 
is generated by the bequest B(t) - B*(t). ie. 
B(t) 
- 
B*(t) = of eat. %(T) dT 
(2.4.4) 
and %(t) is the discounting factor (ie. measure of the 
impatience of heirs and dependents). 
(9) 
w, (B) and w2(B) may be combined to produce the hybrid 
utility of 
_ 
bequest function w(B) where: 
w(B) 
w1(B) 
,B< Bs'l 
wl(B*) + w2(B) 2B> B* 
(2. k. 5) 
The hybrid instantaneous utility function of Equation 
(2.4.5) is illustrated below in Figure 2.4.1 for the case of 
a risk-averse consumer (so that the function is concave to 
the origin): 
(9) 
W2 is just a 'utility related' form of the utility function 
for an altruistic consumer, (see, for example, D. Collard, 
"Altruism and Economy" p. 
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Figure 2.4.1 The hybrid instantaneous utility of bequest 
function. 
W 
w2CB) 
B 
The main problem with the use of the hybrid instantaneous 
utility function w(B) arises when considering an expression 
for the expected utility derived from Consumption and Bequest 
plans Ü(c, B) (this is highlighted in the difference between 
Equations (2.2.8) and (2.2.20)). Thus w, is associated 
with immediate satisfaction while w2 is dependent upon the 
death of the consumer as in the Yaari 'Life Cycle' Models 
(ie. Equation (2.4.3) is only well-defined if the consumer 
dies at time t). At this point, it is appropriate to note 
also that the instantaneous utility of bequest function is 
also a function of the age of the consumer (this phenomenon 
has been referred to as the 'time-scale' problem in Section 
2.3). Thus, after some sufficiently large time (say after 
t*) the consumer does not require a bequest for protection 
purposes since, for example, all his former heirs and depend- 
ents are no longer dependent on his income. Consequently 
we require that 
w1(B(t)) =0 for all t> t* 
0 Býý 
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To conclude this section, the discrete time model of 
Section 2.2 can be generalised to show the effects of the 
hybrid instantaneous utility of bequest function (of Equation 
(2.4.5)). We assume again that bequests are made solely 
via life insurance. The utility derived from the instan- 
taneous consumption and bequest plans u(c), w, (B) and 
w2(B) can then be denoted by 
T 
U(c, B) (u(ck) + wl(Bk) )+ w2(BT 
- 
BT) 
k=1 
(2.4.6) 
The expected utility from consumption and bequest plans is 
then 
2 
Ü(c, B) =E (Zk/Z1). ( u(ck) + wl(Bk) +.. ( 1. -. Z2 ). w2(BI Bl) k=1 
---Z 
11 
+ (Z2/Zl)w2(B2-B'2) 
(2.4.7) 
Before we can proceed, it is necessary to determine expres- 
sions for Bj* and B2* since it is unrealistic to assume that 
they are both constant. In Section 2.3 it was suggested 
that B* might be given by the expected discounted cash 
value of the consumer's future lifetime earnings less that 
part which would be consumed by the consumer himself. 
(10) 
O)"The 
most important piece of information the underwriter 
needs relates to the estimated net worth of the life 
assured. " Peter Edwards, Planned Savings, November 1978. 
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But in this discrete-time model, the consumer was assumed 
to die in one or the other of the two periods; this, in 
conjunction with the assumption that bequests are made at 
the end of the year of death yields: 
B1 
11-Z2. (y2-c2) 
- Zý 
B= 0 (2.4.8) 
Combining (2.4.8) with Equation (2.4.7) and using the 
method of relative maximum values (See Allen (1) Ch. 14) 
we note that the function f(x, y) is maximised subject 
to the side relation O(x, y) =0 when 
r_ 
-Y 
r 
etc., 
From Equation (2.2.17), we can write the side relation as 
0=k. (v(Z, 
- 
Z2)B1+v212B2) 
- 
Z1(3'1-c1) 
- 
v12(3r2-c2) 
(2. L+. 9) 
Thus iJ(c, B) is maximised when 
Z? 
u' (c2) + (Z 1Z 
42)2 
w2(B, 
-B*) 
u'(cl) 
z --- = vZ2 
(ZZ Z2 w1(B1) +) w2(B, 
-BI) 
12 
W11 (B2) + 
.. 
w2(B2) 
11 
k. v 12 
(2.4.10) 
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Now Equation (2.4.10) is principally of interest when 
B1 > B, * and B2 > B2 (otherwise w2(B1 - Bl*) 
w2(B2) = 0) so that, as w1(B1) is constant, we 
have wA(B1) = 0. Noting that w1(B2) =0 (because 
B2 = 0) we can simplify Equations (2.4.10) to obtain: 
Z 
u'(c1) 
Z22 
w2(B1-Bý) vu'(c2) +V 11 12 
I 
w2 (Bý-Bý) 
i W2(B2) (2.4.11) 
Equations (2.4.11) can be then solved to obtain: 
U, +i) 
u' (c2) 01_12) 
(2.4.12a) 
I 
-k. Zl. Z2 
w2(B1-B, *) 
w2(B2) -(I+ 
i) (2.4.12b) 
The solution of Equations (2.4.11) is especially inter- 
esting because, in certain circumstances, 
n'(cl) 
uc 
may 
2 
be negative. In particular, if k>I is large or if 
Z2 is small relative to Z, (ie. that the consumer has 
a low probability of surviving the first year) then 
u'(c1) could be negative. 
u' c2 
It is difficult to visualise why this may be the case but 
it may be that, in order to make a bequest of the size 
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denoted by Equations (2.4.8), the consumer must cut back 
on consumption to an extraordinary extent. Alternatively, 
Equation (2.4.12a) may be interpreted by assuming that the 
marginal rate of substitution 
uI(Cj) 
should always be 
u 
positive. Then, a side condition for bequests of the 
size B1 > B* and B2 > B2 is that 
k. ( l1-Z2)2 
<1 
Z1. Z2 (2.4.13) 
Thus Equation (2.4.13) indicates that the consumer must 
have a sufficiently low probability of dying in Year one 
(ie. that 12 is sufficiently large in relation to Z, ) 
before a bequest of the size indicated by Equations (2.4.8) 
becomes feasible. Thus we can conclude that the elder of 
the two otherwise identical consumers is less inclined to 
make a saving-type bequest (ceteris paribus). 
Table 2.4.1 gives the maximum age at which savings- 
type bequests will be made for various values of the load- 
ing factor k: that age obviously falls as k increases. 
Table 2.4.1 Maximum Age at which Savings-type 
Bequests are Made. 
k Maximum Age 
1 51 
2 44 
3 40 
4 37 
5 35 
(Mortality rates from Institute of Actuaries (17)) 
The calculations for Table 2.4.1 assume that a policy- 
holder at inception age x, is certain to die before he 
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attains age 109: this maximum lifetime is then divided 
into two equal periods of length -3(x + 109) which 
correspond to those of the preceding model. The above 
Table shows that, in practice, Equation (2.4.13) can 
impose a major constraint on the consumer's type of be- 
quest. For example, if k>3 then a policyholder 
exceeding age 40 cannot afford a bequest in excess of 
B? 5; any bequest he then makes will provide a sum less than 
that needed to compensate his family for the financial 
loss resulting from his death. 
In Section 2.6, more formal models of the lifetime 
allocation of income are constructed on a continuous-time 
basis. A number of simplifying assumptions will be made, 
the chief of which is that bequests will be made for pro- 
tection purposes only (so that there is no element of non- 
lifetime saving): under these circumstances, the utility 
of bequest function w2(B) is identically equal to zero 
for all values of B. This assumption represents a sig- 
nificant departure from the usual statements of Yaari's 
'Life Cycle' model (Yaari (33) and Moffet (23)) which 
instead assumes that w, (B) = 0. The reasons for this 
departure have been developed in the preceding Sections. 
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2.5 The Vehicle of Bequest 
For the purposes- of this lifetime consumption model, it 
is convenient to initially assume that all bequests are made 
through the medium of an insurer. This assumption is 
obviously slightly unrealistic since most consumers (with a 
non-zero bequest motive) plan to leave personal assets such 
as their house, jewellery, bank accounts etc., in addition 
to any sums insured. Obviously, the vehicle for bequest 
varies according to the motives for bequest. For example, 
we would expect the consumer to be more risk averse (in 
relation to the amount of the bequest) when bequesting for 
protection purposes than for other motives. Thus if the 
consumer is bequesting for protection purposes, we would 
expect him to choose the least risky vehicle for bequest ie. 
the one that best guarantees the amount of his desired be- 
quest (earning presumably a lower expected return). Con- 
sequently, temporary life insurance is the ideal vehicle for 
bequest from the protection point of view since: 
a) it is 'risk-free' from the point of view that 
the planned bequest will always equal the 
actual bequest at any age (assuming no risk 
of insolvency for the insurer); 
b) in comparison with, say, the banker the 
insurer is much cheaper when providing a 
guaranteed level of bequest (see Table 2.5.1 ); 
c) the problem of 'time-scale' is automatic- 
ally solved in the insurance case. 
If, however, the consumer wishes to provide a bequest for 
non-protection purposes, then temporary life insurance may 
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not necessarily be the best vehicle for that bequest since 
first, a better rate of return may be obtained from an 
institution that does not guarantee the amount of the be- 
quest and second, the consumer may not want to take the 
risk that any money 'tied-up' with the insurer would be lost 
should he survive (this will be called the 'survival risk'). 
A similar type of situation may arise in connection 
with bequesting for protection purposes if the consumer is 
uncertain of the time-scale involved (for protection pur- 
poses) (see Section 2.3): there would then be the risk 
that money tied up in an insurance contract would be 'wasted' 
once the consumer reaches a certain age (x + t* in Section 
2.4). 
In order to analyse the effects of 'survival risk' on 
the behaviour of the consumer, a single one-period model 
has been developed to give an indication of the conditions 
under which the insurer will be preferred to the banker 
using the assumption that the consumer maximises his expected 
utility of bequest. It is assumed that the consumer is 
risk-neutral in relation to the amount of the bequest. 
Budget constraints and consumption possibilities will also 
be ignored. The resulting analysis is based on that of 
Professors M. Friedman and L. J. Savage (12) and is similar, 
although not identical, to that of P. Fortune (10). 
We assume that the consumer at age x, has an uncertain 
lifetime and this is characterised by the probability 
qx(< 1) that he will die before attaining age x+1. it 
will also be assumed that the consumer prefers to leave a 
large rather than a small bequest 
- 
therefore the utility 
of bequest function w(B) has positive first difference. 
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w(B) represents the utility associated with the certain 
bequest B. 
We now go on to give the consumer a choice of two 
alternatives, both providing certain bequests at the end 
of the year: a one-year temporary life insurance or a 
bank deposit. These will be termed Alternatives I and 
II respectively. Alternative I incorporates an element of 
'survival-risk' in that the policyholder is not certain to 
die at age x- if he survives he will obtain no monetary 
return on his initial outlay. Alternative II is riskless 
in that the amount B2 is not contingent on the death of the 
consumer. 
Thus, if the consumer purchases the life insurance, 
his estate will either increase by the sum insured B, with 
probability qx or remain unaltered with probability I-qx. 
For this alternative the policyholder has to pay a premium 
equal to the actuarial present value of B, plus a loading 
to cover the insurer's expenses. This payment is then 
given by: 
P= k1. gq. v. B1 
(2.5.1) 
where the loading kl ?1 and v= (1+i)-l where i is the 
rate of interest earned by both the life office and the 
banker. 
If the consumer uses the second riskless Alternative 
and makes the same payment P, he will obtain an amount B2 
at the end of the year whether he dies or not. B2 is given 
by: 
B2 = k2. P. (1+i) (2.5.2) 
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This equation assumes that the expenses loading charged by 
the banker is represented by k2 <1 
Note that for reasonably young ages, B, is greatly in 
excess of B2; alternatively, if B, and B2 were constructed 
to be equal then the premium for the insurer would be much 
smaller than the payment to the banker. These points are 
best illustrated in the following Table 2.5.1 where k1 
and k2 are assumed (for simplicity) to be equal to unity 
(see Equation (2.5.4)). 
able 2. 
.1A Comparison of Bequests provided by the Insurer BI and the B2 with 
equivalent out-Lay 
. 
(11) 
Age B1(F, ) B2(Fj) 
25 1000 0.7 
50 1000 4.8 
100 1000 412.3 
In order to proceed along the lines suggested by 
Friedman and Savage, it is convenient at this point, to 
return to some notation described early in Section 2.2, in 
connection with the consumer's own subjective estimate of 
his mortality rate (which will be termed qX It is an 
instance well-known to actuaries that persons who have a 
shorter expectation of life (ie. higher mortality rates) 
(1ý)The Mortality Rates are taken from the A1967/70 Tables 
for Assured Lives (17) (ultimate). 
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than average (independent of their medical condition) are 
aware of the fact from some sixth sense and, therefore, tend 
to prefer policies such as temporary life insurances or 
family income benefits where the sum insured is high for a 
given rate of premium. 
(12) Fischer (8) refers to such 
phenomenon as 'intimations of mortality' and R. D. C. Brackenridge 
(4) p. 13, notes that: 
"it is not altogether surprising that an applicant (for life insurance) who has some reason to believe 
that he might be suffering from a mortal condition 
would wish to insure his life for as large a sum as 
possible at as little cost to himself provided that 
any defect could go undetected at medical examination". 
The expected utility of the first alternative is given 
by: w(I) 
_ 
ýX. w(B, ) and that of the second by: 
W(II) 
= w(B2). If we let r3j be the actuarial expected 
value of the benefit in the first alternative then: 
13.1 
= 
(2.5.3) 
The relationship between B, and B2 is obtained by 
solving Equations (2.5.1) and (2.5.2) to give: 
B2 k, ý. k2. q C. Bl (2.5.4) 
Thus from Equation (2.5.3) 
_. 
B2 
qx. 
, (2.5.5) 
(12)See for example, the Chartered Insurance Institute Tuition 
Service Manual No. 61 "The Mathematical Basis for Life 
Insurance" Lesson VI, para. 12. 
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and so if x=1, the insurance is 'fair'. Other- 
x: 
k1k2 
wise, the insurance is unfair and gl > B2 if and only if 
qx / qX) > kl. k2 
Thus an immediate result is obtained to the effect that it 
is possible for a temporary life insurance to be actuarially 
fair even though it carries a positive loading. This is 
because of the offsetting effect of 4X. 
Let Bj* be the certain benefit equivalent to Alter- 
native I so that: 
w(Bý*) = w(I) = 
. 
w(B1) 
(2.5.6) 
Then if fil"< B1 the consumer is a 'survival' certainty 
preferrer (so that he prefers the banker) and is willing to 
pay up to Bi Bj to obtain certainty in preference to the 
risky situation. Similarly, if B? > El the consumer is a 
survival risk preferrer and is willing to pay up to B1'- Bl 
for his life insurance contract. 
Suppose initially that B1*< 9l (ie. the consumer is 
a certainty preferrer), then the insurer will only be used 
if the price to be paid for 'survival' certainty is too high 
ie. if B2 <Bi"' As has been seen already, since X 
is 
the only variable, this situation is possible if and only 
if ýx exceeds k1k2gq by some sufficiently large amount. 
Let +qX be the value of ýx that equates B2 with Bl*: 
ie. w(B2) = +gx. w(B1) (2.5.7) 
Then any value of qX > qX will be sufficient to persuade 
the survival risk-averse` consumer to purchase temporary 
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life insurance. 
Note that +q+X depends only on w, kl, k2, qx and B, 
and of these, only w is at the discretion of the policy- 
holder. Also, since w is assumed to have positive first 
difference, any combination of q, X, k, and k2 that pro- 
duces kl. k2.9x ?1 will imply that the survival risk averse 
consumer will always choose the banker, irrespective of his 
subjective mortality rate L. This situation would be very 
unusual however, because of the relatively small values of 
gx except at high ages. Finally, we note that the larger 
the value of 
, 
the more likely it becomes that the consumer 
will purchase insurance in preference to the banker. 
If we suppose that there is now a situation of risk 
preference (ie. B1* > B1) then the consumer will only use 
the banker if the price he has to pay for risk is too high 
ie. if B2 > BlThis situation is only possible if 
qX 
< qx < klk2"gx 
Choosing as an example, the particular utility of be- 
quest function w(B) = ß"Bß where c is a constant and 
o< ß<l(3 then can be obtained from Equations (2.5.4) 
and (2.5.7) to give qX =(k. gq)ß 
Results for selected values of ß are set out in Table 
2.5.2 below with mortality rates from the latest mortality 
table published by the Institute of Actuaries (17). 
(13)This type of utility function is also used for illustra- 
tory purposes by Fischer (8) and Moffet (22). 
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Table 2.5.2 A comparison of ''% using the utility 
of bequest function w(B) = cBa. 
(k1 
=1 
. 
5, k2= 1) 
CIX VC]. 
Age 20 0.25 0.00089 0.19112 214.9 
0.50 0.00089 0.03653 41.1 
0.75 0.00089 0.00698 7.8 
Age 50 0.25 0.00479 0.29113 60.8 
0.50 0.00479 0.08454 17.7 
0.75 0.00479 0.02467 5.2 
Age 100 0.25 0.41229 0.88680 2.2 
0.50 0.41229 0.78640 1.9 
0.75 0.41229 0.69738 1.7 
The results in the above Table show that with the particular 
utility function, the ratio gX/qx is very sensitive to 
changes in ß; t /qx was found to be insensitive to changes 
in k1k2 within the range (1-5,3-0. ). As expected, high 
values of ß which are associated with decreased survival 
risk aversion 
-produce smaller values of 
gx_/q 
" x 
The theory developed for the one period model can quite 
easily be extended to an n-period analysis. In the n-period 
analysis Equations (2.5.1) and (2.5.2) become: 
P= kl. Bl 
. 
AX. ni 
and B2 = k2. P. ('I+i)m 
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where AX. nj is the single pure premium on an n-period 
temporary life insurance and m denotes the number of years 
before the death of the consumer (unknown). 
The n-period analysis shows that the survival risk- 
averse consumer is even more willing to choose the insurer 
than he was in the one period analysis. This situation 
is particularly noticeable when n is large in relation to 
me 
Finally, it must be pointed out that if the sum insured 
was sufficiently large for the insurer to suspect moral 
hazard (see Section 2.3) then it would be reasonable to 
suppose that the insurer would calculate the premium P using 
a rate of mortality closely corresponding to ýX. Thus 
Equation (2.5.1) would become: 
P= kiýX. v. B, 
and Equation (2.5.4) B2 = kj. k2. . Bj 
Thus T3, becomes 
B 
Bý = 2/klk2 and it is immediately 
obvious that if kl. k2 >1 the risk-averse consumer will never 
purchase insurance (since B, and B2 cannot be varied). 
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2.6 An Anticipated Model of Lifetime Consumption, 
Saving and Bequest. 
Borch (3), Yaari (33), (34), (35) and Moffet (23) 
have dealt quite comprehensively with the problem of con- 
sumer income allocation over time by using the continuous 
time model (pioneered by R. H. Strotz (30)) and applying 
the calculus of variations that was first introduced by 
F. P. Ramsey (27). Other authors such as Moffet (22), 
Hakansson (14), Fischer (8) and Richard (29) have chosen 
to use a discrete time model sometimes allied with dynamic 
programming techniques. 
(14) 
In this section, a continuous-time model will be dev- 
eloped on the assumption that the constants y(t) can be 
anticipated with certainty at age x (ie. time zero) and the 
optimal level of variables c(t), B(t) remain fixed once 
they have been determined. I have called this an antici- 
pated model of lifetime consumption. 
In order to develop the anticipated model a number of 
(conventional) assumptions have to be made. Most of these 
assumptions are very much in line with those made by other 
writers on the subject although significant differences 
have been noted below. 
First of all, it is assumed that the consumer's 
objective is to maximise expected utility from consumption 
and bequest. 
Second, the force of interest a is assumed known 
and constant throughout the consumer's lifetime. We also 
assume that the individual can lend and borrow at the same 
rates 
. 
(14)See, for example, R. Bellman (2) and J. Mossin (24). 
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Third, the individual's potential future income stream 
is exogenously determined and is known with certainty at 
age x (ie. at time zero). 
Fourth, it is assumed for simplicity that there are 
no transactions costs involved in the usage of either the 
banker or insurer (ie. that the k,, and k2 of the pre- 
ceding Section both equal unity). The relaxation of this 
assumption would simply introduce these constants into the 
arithmetic in a very simple way and no benefit is gained 
from this complication. 
We will need to use the following relationships (which 
were described in Section 2.2): 
y(t) = c(t) + s(t) + b(t) (2.2.1) 
S(t) 
= eat 
. 
Oft e-ÖT 
. 
S(T) dT 
(2.2.3) 
s'(t) = a. s(t) + s(t) (2.2.4) 
s(o) =o (2.6.1) 
and since bequests (for protection purposes) are provided 
through the medium of an insurer, we have: 
ofCo e-8t. Zx+t. b(t) dt = of e-dt. Zx+tux+t"B(t) dt 
(2.6.2) 
(by the principle of equivalence, eg. see Borch (3)). 
Equation (2.6.2) can be rewritten by incorporating Equations 
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(2.2.1) and (2.2.4) to obtain 
öIý e-dt. lx+tux+t. B(t) dt o1°° e-St. lx+t. ( y(t) - c(t) + 
S. S(t) 
- 
S'(t) ) dt 
and integrating e-St, Zx+t. S'(t) by parts we obtain 
ofoo e-öt. tx+t. S'(t) dt = 
-Zx. S(0) + o! ° S(t). ( e-öt. Zx+tux+t 
+ ö. ZX+t"e : 
a, 
xt ) dt 
ie. 
ofý e-öt. lx+t'S'(t) dt of" e-St. Lx+tux+t'S(t) dt + 
5. o/co S(t). ZX+t"e-St dt 
since S(O) = O. 
Thus we obtain 
0f00 e-St"Ix+tPx+t"B(t) dt = ofco e-6t"Zx+t"( y(t) - c(t) ) dt 
- Of 00 e_St'Zx+tux+t0S(t) dt 
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ie. 
ofm e-dt. tx+tux+t. ( S(t) + B(t) ) dt 
ofoo e_6t. Zx+t'( b(t) + S'(t) - 6. S(t) ) dt 
(2.6.3) 
If we follow the method of Borch (3), we find that the 
prospective reserve for this insurance is given by 
Z 
V(t) = eSt. tj 
00 
e-STZx+T ux+TB(T) + uX+TS(T) 
- 
b(T) 
x+t 
- 
s'(T) + 6. S(T) ) aT 
(2.6.4) 
where V(O) = 0. 
From which we obtain: 
výctý = ca + uX+t). V(t) + b(t) + S'(t) 
-(+ ux+t). s(t) 
- 
ux+tB(t) 
(2.6.5) 
The next three Sections will be concerned with two 
types of Anticipated model: in the first type, we make 
the simplifying assumption that the consumer deposits his 
lifetime savings with a banker (say) and makes his bequest 
(for protection purposes only) through the sole medium of 
a life insurance contract. Consequently, the premium pay- 
ments are synonymous with the bequesting flows b(t) and the 
saving flows s(t) represent lifetime saving only (as 
defined in Section 2.2). The second type of Anticipated 
model drops the constraint that s(t) represents only 
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lifetime saving (so that Equation (2.2.5) will no longer 
hold). 
Thus the first Anticipated model type of Sections 
2.7 and 2.8 effectively assumes that the consumer intends 
to have dissaved his entire savings stocks by the date of 
his death. Thus the consumer does not intend that any of 
his savings S(t) should remain after the time of his 
eventual death. In practice, this assumption seems open 
to criticism since savings stocks tied-up in consumer 
durables and particularly owner-occupied housing often 
remain unliquidated at the time of death. There are, how- 
ever, a number of factors which can explain this phenomenon 
without invalidating the initial assumption. First of 
all, many elderly people do actually 'run-down' their savings 
stocks both by spending liquid assets and by moving into 
smaller houses. Secondly, we have already noted that 
savings stocks are sometimes retained for precautionary 
motives since the consumer does not know the date of his 
eventual death. 
(15) Thirdly, we may in fact be able to 
define stocks of property and consumer durables as 'fully 
depreciated' consumption 
- 
not savings stocks at all. 
The first Anticipated model then proceeds by assuming 
that the consumer's objective is to maximise his expected 
lifetime utility from consumption and bequest. Thus the 
consumer must vary his consumption pattern c(t) and his 
bequests B(t) so as to maximise the function: 
(15) 
It has been demonstrated by Borch (3) and Moffet (22) 
that the consumer can avoid the need for precautionary 
saving by paying over his entire income to the insurer. This optimal solution then requires the insurer to pro- 
vide a flow of money for consumption purposes and a bequest at each age: the consumer then has no need for further saving. 
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Ü(c, B) = oJoo ( oJT ( a(t)u(c(t)) + ß(t)w(B(t)) )dt). x+T x+T dT 
x 
(2.6.6) 
which can be simplified to produce 
Ü(c, B) = oje x+t. ( a(t)u(c(t)) + ß(t)w(B(t)) ) dt Ix 
(2.6.7) 
a and ß may be defined as the, consumer's subjective dis- 
count function for utility of consumption and bequest res- 
pectively. Thus a and 0 represent the consumer's 
'impatience', that is his preference for early rather than 
later utility. 
(16) 
a is normally a decreasing function 
of time t, while Yaari (33) argues that a should be 'humped'. 
No constraints need to be imposed on Equation (2.6.6) 
except that c be positive, bounded and measureable. 
(17) 
Note, however, that (2.6.6) implicitly assumes that con- 
sumers' preferences are independent over time. 
If the standard Yaari 'Life Cycle' model had been used 
then, of course, Equations (2.6.6) and (2.6.7) would take 
the alternative form given by the following: 
Gu 
lly(c, B) = ot"O ( ofT a(t)u(c(t)) dt + ß(T)w(B(T)) ), 
x+T x+T dT 
tx 
(2.6.6a) 
which can be simplified to produce 
(16)Irving Fisher's concept of impatience is further 
explained in (9) Ch. IV. (17)For 
a further description, see Yaari (34) 
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t 
UY 
6X (c, B) = of . ý- ý+t_. C a(t)u(cCt)) +u x+tß(t)wCB(t)) ) dt 
(2.6.7a) 
Equation (2.6.7) is then maximised subject to the 
constraint given, in Equations (2.2.1) 
- 
(2.2.4). Addi- 
tionally, we impose the lifetime saving constraint given 
by Equation (2.2.5) 
ie. 
l. 
olý e 
ST. S(T). 
+T'ux+T 
dT =0 tx x (2.2.5) 
However if we substitute for 
t 
+T and 
üx+T (using 
Equation (2.2.6) 
- 
so that 
t 
+T - 
L(T). tx+T and 
ux+T = ux+T - L'(T)/L(T) ) we obtain: 
of 
00 
e 
ST. S(T). L(T). ZX+T'( ux+T 
- 
L'(T)/L(T) ) dT =0 
(2.6.8) 
since 
tX is independent of T. 
Equation (2.6.8) can be rewritten as 
of e 
dt. S(t). L(t). Zx+tux+t d= of e 6t. S(t). L'(t). Zx+t dt 
(2.6.9) 
and a comparison with Equation (2.6.3) shows that the con- 
straint given in Equation (2.2.5) can only be incorporated 
if L(t) =I for all t (ie. if tx+t = 1x+t for all t). 
Consequently, since in the first Anticipated model, we are 
especially concerned with lifetime saving, the generalised 
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constraint (Equation (2.2.5)) must be dropped in favour 
of the simpler version: 
of e 
St. 
S(t). lx+tux+t dt =0 
(2.6.10) 
The second type of Anticipated model drops the assump- 
tion that all saving is of the 'lifetime' variety. Con- 
sequently, we do not assume that the expected present value 
of future savings stocks is zero at time t=0. Addition- 
ally the form of the consumer's expected lifetime utility 
function must be altered to allow for the fact that the 
consumer now gains satisfaction from unrealised savings 
stocks at the time of death. We continue to assume, how- 
ever, that all bequests are for the purpose of protecting 
dependents against the financial consequences of premature 
death. The expected utility function is then of the 
following form: 
tü 
Ü(c, B) = of ( oIT ( a(t)u(c(t)) + ß(t)w(B(t)+S(t)) ) dt ). X+TX +T dT 
x 
(2.6.11) 
which can be simplified to produce 
Ü(c, B) = oj00 
x+t. 
( a(t)u(c(t)) + ß(t)w(B(t)+S(t)) ) dt t 
x (2.6.12) 
By substituting into Equations (2.6.7) and (2.6.12) 
for c(t) and B(t) in terms of b(t), S(t), S'(t), V(t) 
and V'(t) we can obtain an expression for U(c, B) of the 
following form: 
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t 
U(c, B) = t21 
1f (t 
, 
S, VA S' 
, 
V' 
, 
b) dt 
so that the problem can be solved using the Calculus of 
Variations. The solution to the problem must therefore 
(18) 
satisfy the Euler Equations 
af/öS 
= d/dt ( of/öS' ) 
(2.6.13a) 
öf/öV 
= d/dt ( af/AV' ) 
(2.6.13b) 
and 
a(t)u' Cc(t)) 
_I (2.6.13c) 
ß(t)w'(B(t)) ux+t 
Equation (2.6.13c) indicates that the marginal utility of 
consumption ( a(t)u' (c(t)) ) is equal to the marginal utility 
of bequest ( ß(t)w' CB(t)) ) multiplied by a factor of 
1/ux+t (which is >1). Furthermore, since ux+t is 
generally an increasing function of x (for example see 
(17)), Equation (2.6.13c) indicates a preference for con- 
sumption as inception age x or time t increases. 
(18)See R. G. D. Allen (1) Ch. XX 
Note that S'(t) 
= 
dS t 
and V'(t) 
dV t 
=t 
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2. ý The Anticipated Model : Lifetime Saving Only 
The simplest case for the solution maximising Equation 
(2.6.7) is obtained by making the following assumptions: 
i) that +t = Zx+t for all t (see Equation (2.2.6)). 
ii) Equation (2.6.10) 
ie. of- eat. S(t). lx+tux+t dt =0 
so that the expected discounted value of life- 
time savings is zero at death. 
The above assumptions have a simplifying effect on Equation 
(2.6.3) to produce 
of 
00 
e -6t Zx+tux+t. B(t) dt = of e 
at"lx+t'( b(t) + S'(t) 
- 
6. S(t) ) dt 
The prospective reserve for this insurance then gives 
v' (t) 
_ 
{a + 11 X+t} ; v(t) + b(t) + s' (t) 
- 
s. S(t) 
- 
11 X+t 
B(t) 
(2.7.1) 
where V(0) =0 (note that the terms V and V' are 
different from those used in Equation (2.6.5)). 
Thus we can use Equations (2.2.1), (2.2.4) and (2.7.1) to 
rewrite Equation (2.6.7) as 
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Ü(c, B) = of a(t). 
Zx+t. 
u(y(t)+6. S(t)-b(t)-St(t)) ät + 
Zx 
of ß(t). 1. wCl/ux+t. C(5+ux+t). V(t)-V'Ct)+b(t)+S'(t)-S. S(t))) dt 
x 
(2.?. 2) 
Equation (2.7.2) is maximised if the following Euler 
Equations are satisfied 
X+t 
.( a(t). u'(c(t)). S - ß(t). w'(B(t)). d/ux+t) 
x 
Z 
.( -a(t). ue(c(t)) + ß(t). w'(B(t)). l"lx+t )) 
x (2.7.3) 
and 
'x+t 
ß(t). w'(B(t)). (1+S/ux+t) dC 
ix+t" 
ß(t). w'(B(t)). 1/ux+t 
xx 
(2.7. ß-) 
Equations (2.7.3), (2.7.4) and (2.6.13c) produce an optimal 
solution satisfying: 
c'(t) 'u'(c(t)) =a 
-S) 
utt(c(t)) a (t) (2.7.5) 
and 
Bt(t) = 
__ 
" 
("'x+t ^.. _ -S) 
w"(B(t)) UX+t ß(t) (2.7.6) 
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There are several points of interest in Equations (2.7.5) 
and (2.7.6): 
1) Equations (2.7.5) and 
in the sense that the 
B(t) and the latter 
Thus the consumer can 
consumption decisions 
decisions; 
2) There are an infinite 
(2.7.6) are independent 
former does not involve 
foes not involve c(t). 
locally separate his 
from his bequest 
number of ways in which 
the insurance premiums b(t) may be arranged 
(because s(t) and b(t) are co-determinant). 
However we would normally expect institutional 
factors to constrain the b(t) in some way 
(eg. b(t) 
=b (a constant) for all t: in 
this case, a unique value for b can be 
obtained); 
3) The inclusion of 
üx+t 
in (2.7.6) prevents 
x+t 
Equations (2.7.5) and (2.7.6) from being sym- 
metrical in the sense described by Yaari (33). 
Thus (2.7.5) describes a different behaviour 
to (2.7.6); 
I 
The inclusion of the term 
üxx+t 
in (2.7.6) has several 
+t 
interesting repercussions(19): 
4) Since u' /U is positive for the majority of adult 
ages (all ages over 30 in (17)) it has the effect 
of slowing down the rate of increase (quickening 
(19)Note that the presence of this term is the only difference between the present results and those that would have been 
obtained using the Yaari 'Life Cycle' Equation (2.6.7a) 
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the rate of decrease) of the bequest plan; 
5) However, for certain age ranges, u'/u may be 
negative (for example 0-12 and 17-29 in (I? )). 
Consequently, if the inception age is say, in 
the 17-29 age range then, ceteris paribus, 
the bequest plan will initially increase be- 
fore 'flattening out' later on. (Since w' 
is commonly assumed to be positive while w" 
is < 0) ; 
6) For (17) there is some evidence that u'/u passes 
through a point of inflexion in 'middle age'. 
Consequently, after this point, the rate of 
decrease in the bequest plan (after accelerat- 
ing initially) begins to decelerate (ceteris 
paribus). 
The latter three points above indicate that the bequest plan 
will broadly tend to be 'humped' shaped: initially 
6 but as t increases ,( u' /u - V/ß ) 
increases in size. (Note that ß'Iß will be positive for 
small t but getting smaller as t increases). However, 
the greater the inception age x, the more likely a downward 
sloping bequest plan becomes. In practical terms, this 
result makes more sense than that obtained by using the 
standard 'life cycle' model (where the bequest plan does 
not contain the term u'/u and is therefore independent of 
the inception age). (20) This is because increased 
(20) We note that the standard life-cycle theory of consum tion has been criticised (by L. C. Thurow (31), K. Nagatani 
, J. Heckman (15) and I Irvine (18))because empirical studies indicate that household consumption over the lifetime is not a 
steadily increasing or decreasing function (as in Equation (2.7.5) but is 'humped' in the middle years. 
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protection is provided at younger ages where that protec- 
tion is most needed (when uncertainty over the timing of 
death is greatest and when premature death would do most 
harm to dependents, eg. see L. C. Thurow (31) p. 328: 
"There is no a priori method to determine when 
risk is highest. Risks may be higher when old 
since the probability of death and sickness is 
higher, but they might equally well be higher 
when young since fewer assets have been accumu- 
lated and there are more dependents who would 
suffer for a longer period of time. " ). 
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2.8 The Anticipated Model : Lifetime and Precautionary 
Saving. 
In this model we keep the assumption that tx+t = 
x+t but introduce a new second assumption to deal with 
the problem of precautionary saving mentioned in Section 
2.2, ie. 
1) x+t=Zx+t for all t 
ii) Equation (2.2.7) ie. 
c 
f° e_6t. Zx+t 
x+t. 
S(t) dt =A 
iii) A is totally independent of time t. 
Again the assumptions have a simplifying effect on Equation 
(2.6.3) to produce: 
0fß e 
St. Zx+tux+t. B(t) dt +A= of e 
st"Zx+t. (b(t)+S'(t)-S. S(t)) dt 
The prospective reserve for this insurance then gives: 
V'(t) 
_ 
(d+uX+t)"V(t) + b(t) + S'(t) 
- 
6. S(t) 
- 
UX+t. B(t) 
- 
A. cs+uX+t 1) 
(2.8.1) 
where V(O) =-A. 
Following the method of Section 2.7, Equation (2.8.1) can 
be used to derive an expression for B(t) which can then 
be used to rewrite Equation (2.6.7). Maximisation of 
ll(c, B) then produces the same Euler Equations as before 
(ie. (2.7.3) and (2.7.4)) because the coefficients of S(t), 
- 
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S'(t), V(t) and VI(t) are identical for Equations 
(2.7.1) and (2.8.1). 
Since Equations (2.7.5) and (2.7.6) are independent, 
this implies that the optimal consumption pattern in this 
model will be identical to that of Section 2.7. It is 
immediately obvious (by comparing (2.7.1) and (2.8.1)) 
that the consumer makes a smaller bequest for each age in 
this model although the pattern of bequests (as dictated 
by Equations (2.7.6)) will be identical. 
There are other points of interest in Equation (2.8.1): 
1) the amount by which the bequest in Section 
2.7 exceeds that in this Section is not 
constant but depends on the age of the 
consumer and the force of interest S; 
2) the greater the value of A, the smaller 
the bequest; 
In one sense, the inclusion of Precautionary saving in 
this Chapter is unnecessary since the consumers future 
income stream is assumed to be known with certainty (ie. 
the consumer behaves as if future income were known with 
certainty) although, of course, the time of death is unknown. 
However it has been argued that uncertainty about future 
price levels produces precautionary saving on the part of 
the consumer: consequently the results of this Section will 
be needed in later Chapters. 
The results of this Section are also important in 
another respect. The first Anticipated model of this 
Chapter makes the assumption that bequests planned by the 
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consumer can only be provided by life insurance. Conse- 
quently 'lifetime savings' are defined as those savings 
destined for future spending. Thus, there seems to be 
no room in the model for the purchase of consumer durables 
which would be expected to survive the consumer (and would 
not be sold to finance future consumption). This Section 
suggests two ways of circumventing the problem: 
a) to treat the purchase of consumer durables as 
consumption. This contradicts the Friedman 
(11) and Modigliani (21) definition of consump- 
tion which includes only the real consumption 
of goods and services rather than monetary 
expenditures; durables are consumption expend- 
itures only to the extent that they are depre- 
ciated in a particular period, not the amount 
spent for their acquisition. However, this 
treatment is in line with the description of 
PIA saving in Chapter Five (which is described 
as more akin to consumption than financial saving). 
Thus it could be argued that the consumer has no 
positive intention of saving when he purchases 
a durable: he is constrained to make the pur- 
chase in order to enjoy the services that the 
durable will yield; or 
b) if the purchase of durables must be considered 
as saving then these savings stocks will remain 
after the consumer's death (and be represented 
by the quantity A). However, these durables 
do not yield the consumer any utility of bequest 
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and can, therefore, be treated in the same way 
as precautionary saving. Thus, the interest- 
ing conclusion to be drawn is that the greater 
the accumulation of consumer durables (ie. the 
larger the value of A) the smaller the level 
of any bequest: this result ties in exactly 
with Fortune's (10) Theorem 4. 
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2.9 The Anticipated Model : The Generalised Case. 
This Section illustrates the completely generalised, 
model with no restrictions on the behaviour of ý+t or 
on lifetime savings. 
The Equation (2.6.4) is used without any modifications 
to obtain Equation (2.6.5) and hence an expression for 
B(t). Then B(t) and c(t) can be substituted in 
Equation (2.6.12). Maximisation of (2.6.12) produces 
the pair of simultaneous Euler Equations: 
+t'( a(t)"S. u'(c(t)) - ß(t). WI(B(t)+S(t)). S/ux+t ) 
dt x+t'( ý(t). u'(c(t)) + ß(t). w'(B(t)+S(t)). 1/ux+t 
(2.9.1) 
and 
t 
+t. a(t). w'(B(t)+S(t)). (1+ö/uX+t) - d't ( -tx+. (t). w'(B(t)+S(t)). 1/ux+t 
(2.9.2) 
solving Equations (2.9.1) and (2.9.2) produces an optimal 
solution of the form(21): 
S'(t) + Bt(t) = W')+S(t)) ( 
ux+t 
-w 
"(B(t)+S(t)) Ux+t ß(t) L(t) 
2.9. 
21 See Appendix 2.1 for a proof of this result. 
. 
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and 
cl(t) u'(c(t)) ( 
-S - a'(t)_ L'(t) 
u"(c(t)) a(t) L(t) (2.9.4) 
It is interesting to examine the effects of the sub- 
jective rate of mortality by examining Equation (2.9.3): 
if L'/L is positive this will accentuate the 'humped' 
shape of the bequest plan (ie. defer the decline of the 
plan to a later age/time) while if L'/L is negative, the 
bequest plan will start to decline at an earlier time. 
Now we can associate a negative figure for L'/L with 
the consumer who is pessimistic about the course of his 
future mortality: he will therefore concentrate his con- 
sumption and bequests towards the younger ages. 
Several authors have noted that institutional con- 
straints generally prevent an individual from dying with 
negative net worth (eg. see Yaari (33) and Moffet (23) ). 
Consequently, since our lifetime savings constraint is no 
longer applicable, the constraint that (S(t) + B(t)) ?0 
should be imposed. Moffet has shown that this constraint 
implies the existence of a local constraint on borrowing 
and the same argument applies in this case. 
Before we progress to the Unanticipated Models, it is 
constructive to point out that the income stream y(t) was 
assumed to be known in advance for all time at t=0. 
While this assumption is necessary in this theory to avoid 
undue complications, it does have some connection with 
economic theory as well. In particular the assumption 
that y(t) is known in advance is a good approximation 
to the Permanent Income Hypothesis of Professor Milton 
- 
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Friedman (11). Essentially the theory of Sections 2.2 
to 2.9 treats all income as permanent income (with no 
transitory income component). Consequently, all con- 
sumption expenditures must also be regarded as permanent. 
A central hypothesis of the Friedman theory is that 
that proportion of permanent income saved by the consumer 
unit is independent of its income in a particular period. 
This fits in very well with the results developed so far. 
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2.10 An Unanticipated Model of Consumption, Lifetime 
Saving and Bequest. 
For the purposes of the anticipated model, it was 
assumed that y(t) could be predicted with certainty at 
time zero and that the original level of variables c 
and B would remain fixed once determined. In the un- 
anticipated model it is assumed that the consumer exper- 
iences a once-and-for-all change of circumstances at time 
T that could not have been foreseen at time zero. For 
simplifying purposes, circumstances are assumed to alter 
once and once only. The consumer therefore has to recon- 
sider his consumption and bequest decisions at time T where 
the same assumptions as before (Section 2.6) apply. The 
only complication involves the surrender value of any life 
insurance that the consumer contracted at time zero. Again 
for simplification only changes of circumstances directly 
involving the possible surrender of the life insurance 
contract are considered. Thus at time T, Equations 
(2.2.1) and (2.2.4), (2.6.2) and (2.6.3) must be rewritten: 
YT(t) = CT(t) + ST(t) + bT(t) 
ST(t) 
= 
d. ST(t) + sT(t) 
Tfý 
e StolX+t. bT(t) dt 
= 
Tf 
(2.10.1) 
(2.10.2) 
e 
dt. Zx+tux+t-BT(t) dt 
(2.10.3) 
for tT 
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The reasons why the consumer may wish to surrender his 
existing life insurance are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Nine; however, they can be summarised under 
three main headings: 
1) The policyholder has no further use for his 
life insurance. 
2) A cash lump sum is required for consumption. 
3) To avoid the expenditure on premiums, 
The three reasons can be summarised, using utility func- 
tion notation as follows: 
Case One : w(B(t)) =0 for all t>T 
Case Two : ST T) = S(T) + SV where SV 
is the surrender value. 
Case Three yTCt) < y(t) for all t>T 
It is immediately obvious that unless the Surrender Value 
is very large and negative, Case One above implies that 
the consumer will immediately cease to make any further 
bequesting payments, ie. 
bT(t) =0 for all t>T 
However, before the two remaining cases are discussed, 
some further evaluation of the Surrender Value SV is 
necessary. 
The Surrender Value at time r is a direct function 
of the retrospective reserve of the insurance contract 
after T years. 
This is given by: 
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V(T) = ofT eat. ( Zx+t"b(t) - Zx+tux+t"B(t) ) dt 
so that the Surrender Value is given by 
SV = a. V(T) +g 
where 
0<a<1 and g<O 
(2.10.4) 
(2.10.5) 
If a=I and g=0 in Equation (2.10.5), the position 
of the consumer at time T could remain unchanged should 
he surrender. This results from the fact that if the 
Surrender Value was 'ploughed back' into bequesting the 
consumer could still continue with his original bequesting 
plan, ie. 
V(T) +Tfe st. ZX+'t. b(t) dt =Tfe st. ZX+tuX+t. B(t) dt 
implies 
of 
CO 
e 
Stotx+tb(t) dt = of e 
St. Zx+tux+toB(t) ät 
ie. the original bequesting plan is attainable. But if, 
a# 1 and gý0 then the old bequesting plan is not 
available and furthermore it is more than probable that 
the level of bequests originally planned (ie. B(t) for 
t? T) cannot be maintained by the original level of 
planned bequesting flows (ie. b(t) ;t>T) 
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ie. 
Tf e 
6t"Zx+t"b(t) ät < TI' e 
dt"Zx+tux+t"B(t) dt 
Thus, because the consumer had originally entered into a 
contractual arrangement-with the insurer, he is to some 
extent tied to his original consumption and bequest plans 
(R. H. Strotz (30)has referred to similar actions as 
'strategies of precommitment'). 
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2.11 The Unanticipated Model : Case Two 
In Case Two, the consumer's, utility of consumption 
is either up-valued at time T so that uT(c(t)) > u(c(t) ) 
or the consumer's impatience function a(t) changes 
( for t>T)" Thus the consumer must readjust his 
optimal consumption and bequest plans. Furthermore, 
the Surrender Value paid on the old insurance arrange- 
ments acts as an additional incentive for surrender. 
The Case Two Equations can be stated as: 
y(t) = cT(t) + sT(t) + bT(t) (2.11.1) 
ST (t) = 6. ST(t) + sT(t) (2.11.2) 
S(T) = S(T) + SV (2.11.33) 
-st 
x+tux+t 
e. Z .S (t) dt =0 X+T 
and 
T' e-St' 
x+t. bT(t) dt =T j°° e St. IX+tux+tBT(t) dt (2.11.5 
for t> T" 
In the case of a change in u., we seek to maximise the 
expression 
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UT(C, B) 
= Tr a(t). 
T-. 
uTCcT(t)) dt + 
, ßf00 
ß(t). ý. w(BTCt)) dt 
x+T x+T 
(2.11.6) 
for t>T, 
(22) 
Then we can proceed in the same manner as that used to 
derive Equation (2.6.3) to obtain (from Equation (2.11.5)): 
e at 
.Z . 
(b (t)+S'(t)-S. S (t)) dt +e 
aT. 
Z S (T) 
T X+t TTT X+T T 
Tfý e 
6t'Zx+tux+t-(ST(t)+BT(t)) dt 
Incorporating Equation (2.11.4), we get 
TI e 
St. Zx+tux+t. BT(t) dt 
_ TIC 
e St. Zx+t. (bt(t)+ST(t)-S. ST(T)) dt 
+e 
ST. Z 
.S (T) X+T T 
(2.11.7) 
The prospective reserve for this insurance is given by: 
Z 
VT(t) 
- edt .e 
Szx+z(ux+z. BT(z) 
- 
bT(z) 
- 
ST (z) t 6. ST(W ) )'dz 
x+t 
-e 
at. 
ZX+T. ST(T) 
for t? T. 
(2.11.8) 
(22)It 
should be noted that this behaviour is basicall 
different from the myopia propounded by Strotz (30L In particular, Strotz makes a (and by implication $) 
a function of Ct-ri : no benefit is to be derived 
from an extension in this case. 
- 
84 
- 
and from Equation (2.11.8), we obtain by differentiation 
VT(t) (d+ux+t)"VT(t) + bT(t) + ST(t) 
- 
S. ST(t) 
ux+t. BT(t) + (6 +ux+t+1). e aT. Zx+t. STCT) 
(2.11.9) 
Now Equations (2.11.9) and (2.7.1) are identical so far 
as the coefficients of V, Vol S, S' and b are 
concerned and so the calculus of variations (which max- 
imises Ür(c, B) will produce Euler Equations analogous 
to Equations (2.7.5) and (2.7.6) (fort > Tr ) 
ie. 
u'(c (t)) 
c'(t) =TT( -a'(t)/a(t) -S) T 
u"(cT(t)) 
(2.11.10) 
and 
w'(B (t)) 
B'(t) =T( pt 
X+t/uX+t 
ß1(t)Iß(t) 
-S) 
T Wtý(B(t)) 
(2.11.11) 
Finally, in order to decide whether to surrender his exist- 
ing insurance arrangements the consumer, must compare the 
maximised value of Ü T(c, B) so obtained from Equation 
(2.11.6) with the value of expected lifetime utility at 
time T had the existing insurance arrangements been con- 
tinued but with the new instantaneous utility functions 
uT (to be termed UT(c, B) ). 
Thus the consumer will surrender if Ü> UT where 
- 
85 
- 
ZZ 
UT(c, B) = Tt a(t), ZX+t. T(cýý(t)) dt +TI ß(t). 
+t, 
w(B(t)) dt 
X+T X+T 
B(t) is the optimal bequest plan, determined at time zero 
(age x) by solving Equation (2.?. 6) and c*(t) is the bal- 
ance available for consumption (in the new circumstances) 
after meeting the insurance premiums for the existing 
bequest plan allocated in an optimal way. 
Although it is not possible to proceed any further 
with the comparison of UT and UU- , the following points 
can be made: 
1) The surrender does not alter the basic pattern 
of consumption and bequest; 
2) As expected, the larger the Surrender Value, 
the greater the value of T (substitute BT(t) 
from Equation (2.11.9) into (2.11.3) and then 
into (2.11.6))and hence the greater the proba- 
bility of Surrender; 
3) Any deterioration in the health of the consumer 
between ages x and x+T will make the new 
insurance arrangements more expensive (ie. 
make the b's larger in relation to the B's); 
4) In any case, unless the b(t), t>0 are mono- 
tonically increasing, Equation (2.11.5) will 
produce smaller levels of bequest per unit pre- 
mium than Equation (2.6.3) for time t? T 
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(because of the effects of mortality); 
5) Because the maintenance of the original be- 
quest also involves b(t), t >-r remaining 
unchanged this severely limits the extent to 
which income can be redistributed towards 
consumption. Consequently, surrender is 
quite likely to occur unless only a redistri- 
bution of consumption is required: in this 
case u would remain unchanged but a(t) 
would alter. 
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2.12 The Unanticipated Model : Case Three 
In Case Three the only change of circumstances at 
time T is a downward revaluation of the future income 
stream y(t) < y(t) for all t>T. Neither the util- 
ity of consumption nor bequest functions are altered. 
Thus the Case Three Equations can be formulated as 
yT(t) = CT(t) + ST(t) + bT(t) 
(2.12.1) 
ST(t) = S. ST(t) + sT(t) (2.12.2) 
S (T) = S(T) + SV (2.12.3) T 
T 
fý e StZx+tux+t'ST(t) dt =0 (2.12.4) 
TP e 
Styx+t. bT(t) dt = TIC e 
-6t. Zx+tux+t 
. 
BT (t) dt (2.12.5) 
and 
llT(c, B) = Tr a(t). 
Z 
Zx+t. u(cT(t)) dt + Tr ß(t). Z 
X+t. w(BT(t)) dt 
X+T X+T 
The solution maximising u yields the same Euler 
Equations as before (Equations (2.11.10) and (2.11.11)) 
but before comparing T and UT , some further assump- 
tions must be made about the existing insurance contract. 
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Suppose that the existing arrangements (undertaken 
at time zero) were those described in Section 2.7 but with 
the additional constraint that the insurance premiums b(t) 
are constant throughout the consumer's lifetime (ie. b(t) 
_ 
b for all t). 
The original optimal consumption and bequest plans 
were obtained by integrating Equations (2.7.5) and (2.7.6) 
ie. 
c(t) ft u'(c(z)). ( -a'(z)/a(z) -d) dz 
u"(c(z)) (2.12.6) 
t w'(B(z)) B(t) ý1 (uX+z/ux+z - ß'(z)/ß(z) -d) dz 
wt'(B(z)) (2.12.7) 
Now, from Footnote (2), the original lifetime savings 
constraint can be written as: 
or eat. l +t's(t) dt =0 
and by substitution, we get 
of 
e öt. zx+t'(y(t)-c(t)) dt = b. of e 
6t"ZX+t dt 
(2.12.8) 
Since y(t) and c(t) are known for all t we can there- 
fore derive the unique value for b. 
The maximised value for T must then be compared 
with that of UT where 
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ZZ 
U* = TI a(t). 
X+t. 
u(cT(t)) dt + TI ß(t). 
+tw(B(t)) dt 
X+T X+T 
(2.12.9) 
B(t) is obtained from Equation (2.12.7) and cc(t) 
_ 
YT (t) - sT(t) -b (where b is determined by Equation 
(2.12.8)) allocated in some optimal way but constrained by 
Equation (2.12.4) and c*(t) >0 for all t. (23) 
The obvious conclusions to be drawn from this analysis 
are that, first, if b> YT M for all t>T then 
surrender of the existing insurance arrangements is the 
only alternative. Secondly, the larger the existing pre- 
mium (b) the more likely surrender becomes in this case 
(although a large value of b will be associated with a 
large value of SV). Thirdly, as in the previous case, 
the decision to surrender obviously exhibits some 'sticki- 
ness' since UT must exceed UT before such a decision 
would be taken. 
(23)Maximisation 
of U* by varying c*(t) is just a simple 
business because tie second term in Equation (2.12.9) 
remains fixed. 
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2.13 Conclusion 
This Chapter has attempted to examine consumers' 
motives for the purchase of protection-based life insur- 
ance. We have seen that the consumer's disposable income 
can be divided into three elements 
- 
consumption, life- 
time saving and bequesting flow. Bequesting flow contains 
both consumption and savings elements but for the purposes 
of this Chapter - where most bequests are made via the 
purchase of protection-based life insurance - bequesting 
flow and therefore the life insurance premium is taken to 
be analogous to consumption. 
Section 2.5 examines the consumer's choice for the 
vehicle of bequest. In particular, he is assumed to be 
able to choose either a life insurance policy or the ser- 
vices of a banker. His actual choice will depend on a 
number of factors including the 'survival risk' (which 
reduces as the policy term increases) and his subjective 
estimate of mortality. The longer the consumer's lifetime 
horizon, the more likely he is to use life insurance as 
the preferred bequesting method. 
Sections 2.6 
_to-2.12 
(with the exception of 2.9) 
then assume that all bequests are made via the purchase of 
life insurance. Furthermore these bequests are for the 
purpose of protecting dependents against the financial 
risks of premature death (Sections 2.4 and 2.9 briefly 
examine the situation if this is not the case). 
The shape of the bequest plan 
- 
as discussed in 
Sections 2.6 to 2.9 
- 
is affected by a number of factors 
including preferences, the force of interest, age, impatience 
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and the passing of time. In general, we might expect 
the bequest plan to be 'humped' in shape although the 
greater the inception age x, the more likely a downward 
sloping bequest plan becomes. 
The purchase of consumer durables 
- 
which might be 
expected to survive the consumer and therefore contribute 
to his bequest 
- 
was analysed in Section 2.8. The analy- 
sis predicted that the greater the accumulation of consumer 
durables, the smaller the level of any bequest (although 
the general shape of the bequest plan remained unaltered). 
Section 2.9 examines the effect of the consumer's 
subjective estimate of mortality and reveals that a con- 
sumer who is pessimistic about the course of his future 
mortality will concentrate his bequests towards the younger 
ages. 
The remaining Sections 2.10 to 2.12 attempted to 
analyse what the consumer would do if, at some time T, 
a once-and-for-all change of circumstances occurred which 
could not have been foreseen at time zero. Although the 
result in part depends on the nature of the change in 
circumstances, the analysis reveals that there is always 
a certain 'stickiness' - in that a change of circumstances 
does not automatically imply that the consumer will surrender 
his life insurance arrangements. The larger the Surrender 
Value paid, the more likely is the consumer to Surrender. 
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)endix 2.1 :A Derivation of E uations (2.10. 
and (2.10.4). 
From Equation (2.6.5) we obtain 
ux+t'B(t) _ (d+ux+t)"V(t) 
- 
V'(t) + b(t) + S'(t) 
- 
(S+ux+t)"S(t) 
Consequently from Equations (2.6.7) we have the Euler 
Equations (2.9.1) and (2.9.2). 
Additionally we note that if 1X+t = L(t). ZX+t then 
ux+t 
- 
ux+t L'(t)/L(t) 
(A2.1.1) 
Then using the notation of Equation (2.6.13) we note 
that 
4fAS 
= 
dt(af/IS') 
=d ZX+t"a(t). uý(c(t)). (-1) + 
d 
tx+t' $(t). w'(B(t)+S(t)). 1/uX+t 
But 
dt x+t. 
(t). w' (B(t)+S(t)) 
"l/ux+t -d (, f/IV') _ -af/ýV 
So 
öf/öS + öf/öV = dt ( 
-tx+t'a(t). u' (c(t)) ) (A2.1.2) 
However 
of/öS + afAv = tX+t. a(t). S. uf(c(t)) + tX+t 
. 
ß(t). w'(B(t)+S(t)) 
(A2. ß. 3) 
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Equating Equations (A2.1.2) and (A2.1.3), we have 
x+t. a(t). 6. u'(c(t)) + 
tX+t* ß(t). w'(B(t)+S(t)) _ 
- x+t' u'(c(t)). (al(t) - a(t). 
Px+t) 
- 
tx+t"a(t). 
u"(c(t)). c'(t) 
Substituting in Equation (A2.1.1) and simplifying we get 
ß(t). w'(B(t)+S(t)) = u'(c(t)). ( 
-6. a(t) - a'(t) + ux+t'a(t) - 
a(t). L'(t)/L(t) )- a(t). u"(c(t)). c'(t) 
and dividing through by a(t) 
ß(t). w'(B(t)+S(t))/a(t) = u'(c(t)). ( 
x+t -6- al(t)/a(t) - 
L'(t)/L(t) ) 
- 
u"(c(t)). c'(t) 
Then noting from Equation (2.6.13c) that 
ß(t). w'(B(t)+S(t)) = uX+t'a(t). u'(c(t)) 
we get 
u'(c(t)) 
c'(t) _(-d- a'(t)/a (t) - L'(t)/L(t) ) 
u"(c(t) ) 
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Appendix 2.2 A summary of Notation 
Section 2.2 
x The Inception Age of the Consumer (at time t= 0). 
Zx+t The number of people alive at exact 
age (x+t) according to a particular 
mortality table. 
T The time at death (a stochastic 
variable). 
ux+t The 'force' of mortality. 
y(t) Disposable Income at time t. 
c(t) Consumption at time t. 
s(t) Lifetime Saving at time t. 
b(t) Bequesting Flow at time t: 
later assumed to be equivalent to 
the life insurance premium paid. 
S(t) Accumulated savings stocks at time t. 
S'(t) The change in S(t). 
The continuously compounded 'force 
of interest'. 
tx+t 
= L(t). Zx+t The consumer's subjective version 
of 
B The amount of the bequest. 
u(c) The instantaneous utility of 
consumption. 
w(B) The instantaneous utility of 
bequest. 
U(c, B) The expected utility of the life- 
time consumption and bequest. 
Section 2.3 
B*(t) The upper bound on bequests for 
protection purposes. 
- 
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Section 2.4 
w1(B) Utility function for bequests for 
protection purposes. 
(B) Utility function for bequests for w2 
savings purposes. 
Section 2.5 
qx Probability of death between ages 
x and x+1. 
- 
w(B) Utility of bequest function. 
B, Sum insured (Bequest via Life 
Insurance 
- 
one year temporary). 
B2 Amount of bequest via bank deposit 
for equivalent outlay to life 
insurance premium. 
P 
ki >1 
k2 <1 
ýc 
w(I) 
w(II) 
$l 
B I* 
+q+ 
I 
-I Tl 
Section 2.6 
Life Office premium on one year 
temporary policy. 
Loading for Life office expenses. 
Loading for Banker's expenses. 
Consumer's subjective version of qx. 
Expected utility in 'Life Insurance' 
Alternative. 
Expected utility in 'Banker' 
Alternative. 
Expected value of sum insured (B1). 
Certain benefit equivalent of 
'Life Insurance' Alternative, ie. 
w(B1*) = w(I). 
That value of that equates B2 
with Bý* ie. w(B2) +q+ (B1) 
The discount factor. 
Largely Section 2.2 with the 
addition of: 
a (t) Consumer's subjective discount 
function. ('impatience') for the 
utility of-Consumption. 
O(t) Consumer's subjective discount 
function-for the utility of Bequest. 
-96- 
B(t) The amount of the Bequest at time 
t (for protection purposes only 
solely through the purchase of 
Life Insurance). 
V(t) The prospective reserve for the 
Life Insurance at time t. 
V'(t) The change in V(t) (= U V(t)) 
Section 2.10 
The subscript T( 'tau' ) represents 
the value of the article after the 
once-and-for-all change at time T 
Thus eg. 
yT(t) Disposable income at time t for 
t>T 
Section 2.11 
UT(c, B) The expected utility of lifetime 
consumption and bequest after the 
once-and-for-all change in circum- 
stances at time T 
UT (c B) The expected lifetime utility at 
time T, given the new arrangements 
at that time, but still under the 
'old' (ie. at time zero) pattern 
of bequest with consumption arranged 
in a new optimal fashion. 
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CHAPTER THREE : INFLATION AND PROTECTION=BASED 
LIFE INSURANCE 
3.1 Introduction 
0 
Before the effects of inflation on the demand for 
life insurance can be quantitatively examined, it is of 
interest to investigate the theoretical effects of infla- 
tion on the purchase of life insurance bought for protec- 
tion purposes. Consequently, this Chapter will use the 
theory developed in Chapter Two to analyse the effects of 
inflation expectations on the consumption element of life 
insurance- (The effect of inflation on saving will be 
surveyed in Chapter Four)., Chapter Three is not concerned 
with the formulation of a consumer's price or inflation 
expectations (these are examined in greater detail in 
Chapter Seven): we begin with the assumption that the 
rational purchaser of life insurance will make some kind 
of estimate of future price levels (even if the eventual 
estimate turns out to be 'no change'). 
Section 3.2. describes the difference between 'antici- 
pated' and 'unanticipated' inflation and develops some of the 
notation that will be used in later Sections. The concept 
of 'money illusion' is introduced although it will be 
explained in greater detail in Chapter Four. 
- 
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Section 3.3. attempts to clarify the notation and 
concepts developed in Chapter Two in order that the 
analyses of the later Sections may proceed. This clari- 
fication is necessary because the theory of Chapter Two 
implicitly assumes that first, there is no inflation and 
second, that the consumer has perfect foresight. Thus 
the real value of future income streams ( y(t) ) and future 
real rates of interest are known with certainty. These 
rigid assumptions are relaxed a little and an artificial 
construction is introduced to circumvent the problems 
caused by unanticipated inflation. 
Section 3.4. develops a simple two-period model along 
the lines first suggested in Section 2.2., and Section 3.5. 
then uses the corresponding continuous-time model to analyse 
how lifetime consumption and protection-based bequests are 
influenced by the existence of inflation expectations. 
Finally, Section 3.6. uses the Unanticipated Continuous- 
Time Model to throw more light upon the unanticipated 
nature of inflationary expectations. 
The notation of this Chapter is based on that developed 
in Chapter Two and thus Appendix 2.2. serves as a suitable 
'key'. The only major addition is the symbol P which 
denotes the 'certain equivalent' expected rate of price 
changes. 
-102 - 
.2 Anticipated and Unanticipated Inflation 
Originally, unanticipated inflation was defined to 
occur if price levels were expected to remain constant 
whereas, in fact, they rose. Thus R. A. Kessel and 
A. A. Alchain (9) comment that: 
"AntiQipate inflation-is characterised by 
market 
_phenomena 
implied by the postizl ate 
that prices_are-expected_to=rise. Unantici- 
pated inflation is characterised by market 
phenomena implied by the alternative postulate 
that the contemporaneous level of prices is 
expected to persist. " 
More modern definitions emphasise that unanticipated 
inflation is purely the difference between the actual and 
the expected price increases. 
- 
Thus, to quote from J. A. 
Trevithick and C. Mulvey (19) p. 110: 
"The current rate of inflation (P) can be 
divided into two ports: that part Which is 
fully anticipate. Pe and that part which is 
unanticipated P_petr. 
Research into the methods that consumers and savers 
use to make their price expectations has taken two distinc- 
tive paths: the first (see, for example, P. Cagan (2) and 
R. M. Solow (17) ) says that inflation expectations adjust 
by a constant fraction of the difference between the most 
recently recorded actual inflation rate and the previously 
formed expectation. (This is known as the 'error learning' 
or 'adaptive expectations' hypothesis). A slightly more 
sophisticated second order error learning mechanism has 
been postulated by D. Rose (15): this specifies that the 
consumer takes account of both the recent rate of infla- 
tion and its rate of change. 
The second main area of research into expectations 
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has led some investigators to attempt to estimate infla- 
tion expectations directly. In particular J. A. Carlson 
and J. M. Parkin (3) have constructed a series for the UK 
based on observations of the percentage of the population 
who believe inflation will fall as compared to the 
percentage who believe it will rise. 
Criticisms of the use of arbitrary weighting schemes 
to generate expectations from past values of actual 
inflation have been summarised by D. E. W. Laidler and J. M. 
Parkin (10), Trevithick and Mulvey (1), Carlson and 
Parkin (3) and IS. Flemming (6). In particular there 
is no guarantee that expectations are formed in the way 
that the error-learning process suggests; and secondly, 
it is not at all clear whether the error learning process 
should be applied to the price level P, the rate of infla- 
tion P or even the change in the rate P. The advan- 
tage of the error learning mechanism is, of course, that 
it is very convenient from the point of view of econometric 
estimation. If the mechanism must be disregarded then, 
in the absence of any direct accurate information on price 
expectations (such as those derived by Carlson and Parkin) 
it becomes almost impossible to include a price expecta- 
tions variable in any statistical analysis. Fortunately, 
the results generated by Carlson and Parkin (and similar 
studies (see Trevithick and Mulvey p. 115) )have served to 
restore confidence in the error learning models because of 
the similarity in the results produced: 
"To summarise, these results suggest that when inflation is rapid, expectations approximate 
a second-order error-learning process, whilst 
when inflation is mild, expectations approxi- 
mate an autoregressive scheme. In the sample 
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period, the only additional variable to have 
had any significant impact on the expected 
inflation rate is the devaluation of the 
exchange rate. " Carlson and Parkin (3) p. 135 
Before we consider unanticipated inflation in greater 
detail, it is beneficial to return to a question that was 
formulated by Laidler and Parkin (1C) p. 770 : 
"what precisely is the expected rate of infla- 
tion, is this a unique variable or may several 
measures of it coexist? ". 
Laidler and Parkin note that expectations can vary over 
at least three important dimensions and these are partic- 
ularly critical when we come on to consider the expecta- 
tions of purchasers of life insurance. First, 
"different individuals and other agents will, 
in general, form different expectations of the 
same variable over the same future time 
horizon". 
In particular, we must ask if the expectations of life 
insurance purchasers are different from those of other 
consumers. Second, 
"Different price indices will be relevant to 
different decisions and to different indiv- 
iduals". 
Third, 
"the time horizon over which an expectation is 
formed will depend on the problem for whose 
solution it is necessary to form the expect- 
ation, and the same person may easily have 
very different expectations about the course 
of the prices over, for example, the next 
year and the next decade". 
This problem is especially relevant for life insurance 
where long term contracts are involved. The only way 
that these problems may be answered in the life insurance 
case is by an examination of market behaviour and by 
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analysis of the replies to the few life insurance market 
surveys that have been undertaken (and made public) (such 
as those by E. V. Morgan (12), 'Which' (4) and Southern 
Television (18) ). 
It has already been stated that the actual level of 
the variable of concern (whether it be the price level P, 
the rate of change of these prices P or even some higher 
order of price level) can be split into two component parts, 
the anticipated and the unanticipated. From the point of 
view of the consumer (or saver) this can be interpreted 
as meaning that the anticipated rate of inflation (say) 
is anticipated with complete certainty and any uncertainty 
surrounding future inflation rates manifests itself in 
the unanticipated part (which may be either positive, 
negative or zero). Furthermore, the anticipated rate of 
future inflation is known to the consumer to be the best 
possible estimate that can be made at that moment of 
estimation. 
Thus we are able to say that, as far as future infla- 
tion rates are concerned, the consumer, if he reacts at 
all, responds to his anticipated rate of inflation (Pe). 
However, the degree to which he responds to any expected 
inflation rate Pe will depend on the extent of his money 
illusion (see A. Deaton (5) and F. T. Juster and P. Wachtel 
(8) ). Thus, if we assumed that consumption C. depended 
on both Money Income at time t (Yt) and the expected 
rate of change of Prices during year t (Pt) then we 
might formulate the simplified model: 
-4 
Yt 
Ct 
Pt-, 
'(I + jo. Pt) I C3.2. ß) 
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where 0<0<1. Then if 0=I (ie. no money illusion) 
consumption in year t depends on anticipated real income 
Y 
in year t (ie. 
P_ (ýt+ "e) 
If, on the other hand 
t 1 F; ) 
there is complete money illusion (ie. JO = 0) then expected 
price increases are completely disregarded for consumption 
purposes. Various empirical studies to determine the 
general level of money illusion in the UK economy have 
produced differing results: Solow's calculations (17) 
indicate substantial money illusion, while others (such 
as P. G. Saunders and A. R. Nobay (16), J. M. Parkin, M. T. 
Sumner and R. Ward (14)) imply a value of 0 much nearer 
to unity. 
However, just because the consumer reacts according 
to the level of anticipated inflation does not mean that 
he regards that anticipated level as the correct rate of 
future inflation. We assume that the consumer is con- 
scious of the existence of possible unanticipated inflation, 
or deflation (although not, of course, its size) and that 
consequently there is some degree of uncertainty as to 
the actual level of future prices. The size of this 
variation about the mean predicted value will therefore 
affect the reactions of the consumer, (especially as the 
variation itself will be difficult to estimate); Flemming 
argues that the size of this variation about the mean 
predicted value will increase as the expected rate of 
inflation increases ((6) P-105). 
Theoretically, the existence of unanticipated infla- 
tion can be illustrated by allocating a probability distri- 
bution to the rate of future inflation P. This proba- 
bility distribution relates to the state of the individual's 
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belief about the size of (and not to the actual, correct 
level of P- thus it is immaterial whether estimates of 
P are unbiased or not). Thus the rate of anticipated 
inflation is given by: 
E(P) Pe = ýt P. f (P) dP 
(3.2.2) 
where 'f(P) is the subjectively formed probability density 
function of the value of future inflation. Similarly, 
the variation caused by unanticipated inflation is shown 
up by the standard deviation Q(P) where 
Q2(P) = 
_.. 
/0 (P-Pe)2. f(P) dP 
(3.2.3) 
Any uncertainty about the correctness of the estimate Pe 
is therefore reflected in a wider confidence interval 
surrounding 
je (which, of course, is reflected in turn 
by the value of a(P) ). Furthermore, the existence of 
unanticipated inflation is not the only factor affecting 
a: for example, it is most likely that the further the 
consumer is required to predict into the future, the 
greater is the uncertainty about the accuracy of the pre- 
dictions (ie. that a is an increasing function of the time 
period involved). 
With the introduction of Equations (3.2.2) and (3.2.3) 
it should be possible to indicate how the consumer (or 
saver) is influenced by both anticipated and unanticipated 
inflation. In the above context unanticipated inflation 
will have an important effect if the individual is 
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particularly susceptible to the variations produced by 
that inflation. 
The effects of price level uncertainty have been 
discussed by Flemming (6) who mentions particularly the 
influence on life insurance and pensions contracts. He 
points out that because of their uncertainty about future 
price levels, individuals may save more than is strictly. 
necessary in the earlier part of their lifetime so that 
sufficient savings stocks be available to tap later on. 
Thus Flemming effectively_argues that unanticipated infla- 
tion affects directly the consumer's precautionary motive 
for saving and that therefore, unanticipated inflation 
will alter the behaviour discussed in Section 2.1. Con- 
sequently, it becomes of interest to examine the theory of 
Chapter Two in greater detail in the light of the consumer's 
inflationary expectations. 
A 
- 
log 
- 
3.3 Some Clarifications 
At this stage it is necessary to clarify the exact 
meaning of some of the variables used in Chapter Two. 
From Chapter Two we have the following Equations: 
y(t) = c(t) + s(t) + b(t) (2.2.1) 
S(t) = eSt. Oft e 
öt. 
s(T) dT (2.2.3) 
and 
of e-. 
tl 
+tb(t)dt = of e-atlx+t ux+tB(t)dt 
(2.6.3) 
These were used, in conjunction with a particular expected 
utility function, to produce expressions describing the 
optimal consumption and bequest plans (c*(t), B* (t)_, ) under 
differing circumstances. The whole analysis was worked 
on the assumption that: 
a) money income flow y(t) was known in advance 
with certainty (although not necessarily with 
accuracy); 
b) decisions relating to future consumption and 
bequest were made at time zero (ie. age x) 
and once determined. c(t) and B(t) remained 
unchanged; 
c) the ruling market rate of interest was con- 
stant and known throughout the consumer's life- 
time and was denoted by force of interest 6. 
The only modification made to make some allowance for 
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reality was the inclusion of the sections entitled 'The 
Unanticipated Case'. Here it was assumed that at time 
T, the consumer perceived that his initial assumptions 
had been wrong in some way. Consequently he altered the 
content (although not the structure) of his basic assump- 
tions and then proceeded as before: the only difference 
being that he had to take into account the existence of 
a contractual agreement between himself and his insurer. 
Once the existence of inflation is allowed for, it becomes 
necessary to re-examine the assumptions of Chapter Two. 
First of all, the assumption that money income is 
known in advance and with certainty cannot and must not be 
altered: once we allow the consumer to be uncertain of 
his future income, the whole tenor of the analysis changes. 
Consequently, in some way we must still assume that the 
consumer knows his money income in advance (and with 
certainty). Initially, this would seem to rule out the 
existence of unanticipated inflation; however, it is pos- 
sible to circumvent this difficulty by making an artificial 
construction. To this end, we define that rate of infla- 
tion which is known in advance (at time zero) and expected 
with certainty as 
p, 
where 
P= Pe + gý Q2(P) ) 
(3.3. ß) 
pe 
and o2 are obtained from Equations (3.2.2) and (3.2.3): 
for the sake of simplicity we assume that the future 
expected rate of inflation Pe is constant and does not 
depend on time. 
(') 
This is no worse than assumin that the force of interest 
is constant. As M. Yaari (205 shows, the relaxation of 
this assumption can be easily accommodated. 
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P can be interpreted as the 'certain inflation equivalent' 
of expected inflation Pe; consequently the function g 
(which is a function of the level of possible unanticipated 
inflation) indicates the consumer's viewpoint on the 
uncertainty of future inflation. 
p therefore incorporates 
both the level of anticipated inflation Pe and also 
unanticipated inflation. If the consumer is risk averse 
or just pessimistic about the course of future inflation 
then the existence of uncertainty penalises the consumer 
so that g is positive (ie. the individual is prepared to 
trade a higher certain level of inflation p against the 
possibility of unanticipated inflation or deflation: this 
view is supported by Juster and Wachtel (8) p. 87). The 
greater the level of uncertainty, the higher the correspond- 
ing certain inflation equivalent, ie. g' '> 0. However, if 
the consumer is optimistic about unanticipated inflation 
then g may well be negative: again we would expect 
9 '>0. 
Equation (3.3.1) can easily be adapted to allow for 
the possible existence of money illusion: 
0 (Pe +g (Q2(P)) 
(3.3.2) 
where 0<0: 1. If 0=I (ie. no money illusion) then 
expected prices are fully taken into account in consump- 
tion and bequest decisions whereas if 0=0 (ie. complete 
money illusion) then no account is taken of future inflation. 
It is now possible to rework some of the theory of 
Chapter Two by assuming that the consumer 'weighs' all his 
decisions in real (with allowance made for partial money 
illusion) rather than in money terms. Values are converted 
-1 12 - 
from money into real terms by utilising Equation (3.3.2). 
Again we assume that all decisions relating to 
future consumption and bequest are made at time zero; 
however, when we come to examine the 'Unanticipated Case' 
at time T, we have to include the possibility that the 
consumer could have been wrong in his initial assumptions 
about the rate of inflation. 
Finally, when it comes to considering Equation 
(2.6.3) we assume that the form of this expression is 
determined by the insurer and not by the consumer. In 
particular, since life insurance is arranged in money terms 
with no allowance made for the progress of inflation, we 
will assume that Equation (2.6.3) remains unaltered, being 
part-and-parcel of the contractual agreement between 
insurer and consumer. 
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3.4 A Simple Two-Period Example 
Essentially, the ensuing example follows the same 
methodology as that of Section 2.2 with appropriate allow- 
ances made for the existence of inflation. 
The consumer is assumed to maximise the expected 
utility of the real-valued consumption and bequest plans 
cR and BR. ie. the consumer wishes to maximise 
, 
2 
ll(cR, BR) =E (Zk/11) 
.( u(ck) + w(BR) ) k=1 
(3. L+. 1) 
where 
cl = c1 BR t= 
Bi / (1+ ) 
c2 = c2 B2 = B2 / (1+P )2 
and P is obtained from Equation (3.3.2). (Note that 
income and consumption flows are assumed to accrue at the 
beginning of the period while bequests are paid at the 
end). 
Following the methodology of D. Moffet (11), the 
partial derivatives of Equation (3.4.1) are then set 
B. 
equal to zero. Values for a 
i, j 
= 
1,2 are again 
obtained from Equation (2.2.17) ie. 
Z1(yl c1) + v. Z2(y2-c2) = K. ( v. (11-12). B1 + v2Z2B2 ) 
(2.2.17) 
The four resultant equations are therefore: 
Zl. u'(ci) + Zl. w'(BR). a Bi/öcl + Z2. w'(B2). öBl/öcl =0 
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l. wl (B1). 
aB1/äc2 
+ Z2. ut (c2) + z2. wl (Z) AB /ý C222 
l. u, ( 1) . aCRABR + zl. w' (Bl) + z2. ul (c2) ACRABl =0 
Zl. u'(cl). öcRAB2 + Z2. ul(CR2 2 ). öCRAB 2+ Z2. wt(B2) =0 
Noting that 
BR 
=I 
aB'i 
Cl (I+ P) 
BR 
_ 
aB 
c2 öc2 
B2 'I aNB 
C(a ci 
and B2 =Ia B2 
c2 (i+ p) c2 
we get the final solution 
u'(cR) 
u' (c2) (1+P ) 
w' (BR) 
_ 
(1+i) 21_12 
w' (B2) (1+P) 
u' (cR) (1+i) 2. Z 
w' (BI) ('I+P) K. i ZI-Z2) 
(3.4.2) 
(3.4.3a) 
(3.4.3b) 
(3.4.3c) 
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Equations (3.4.3) indicate that as the level of the certain 
inflation equivalent P. increases, the Marginal Rate of 
Substitution decreases. So Equation (3.4.3a) shows that 
if P rises, then real Period One Consumption will rise 
at the expense of that for Period Two. ie. that the con- 
sumer will bring forward his consumption. Equation (3.4.3b) 
gives a similar result for the level of bequests in the 
two Periods. 
Equation (3.4.3c) indicates that if the certain infla- 
tion equivalent P rises then the real Period One bequests 
will fall in favour of consumption. However, if the rise 
in the rate of interest is greater than that for P, then 
Period One bequests will increase. 
Additionally, it can be seen from Equation (3.4.3b) 
that the effect of inflation (both anticipated and unantic- 
ipated) is to increase the real size of B, relative to 
B2. This can be interpreted to mean that, ceteris paribus, 
the bequest level at younger ages will be increased relative 
to that for older ages. 
If the assumption of a constant certain inflation 
equivalent is revised to allow for the possibility of dif- 
ferent rates P., and P2 respectively (for Periods One 
and Two) then Equations (3.4.3) can be reworked to obtain: 
u'(cI) 
_ 
(1 +i) (3.4.4a) 
wl(BI) (1+i) 
-- 
Zl Z2 (3.4.4b) 
w(B (1 +p 
and u' (c 
R) 
-ý 
-- 
-. __- 
(3.4.4c ) 
w' (Bý) (1+Pi) K. (Z I-Z2) 
- 
116 
- 
where B2 = 
B2 
(1+P1) 
. 
(I 
-ip2) 
This complication allows us to accommodate the fact 
that the uncertainty surrounding future levels of inflation 
may increase as the time scale involved increases. If 
this is the case, then a risk-averse consumer (who is 
pessimistic about the effects of inflation) will have 
P>P even though Pe e= P2 e 2. Consequently we can infer 
from Equation (3.4.4b) that, even if the expected (antici- 
pated) rate of inflation is the same for the two periods, 
the real bequest plan will decline at a greater rate than 
real consumption. We also note that the differences 
between bequest and consumption are further highlighted 
in a comparison of Equations (3.4.3) and (3.4.4). Because 
P was assumed constant (so that it 'averaged out' the 
effects of PI and 2), it must be that P, <P while 
P2 >P. 
If we make the usual assumptions that first the prob- 
ability of dying increases as age increases and second, 
that the rate of interest i is reasonably small, then 
the right hand side of Equation (2.2.17) will reduce in 
size as the bequests are brought forward (ie. B1 gets 
larger relative to B2). This may offset, to some extent, 
the degree of initial borrowing necessary to finance the 
increased consumption in Period One (from Equation (3.4.4a)). 
It may also help to explain why inflation may lead to 
increased (rather than decreased) saving (for example, 
see Morgan Grenfell (13) and Bank of England (1) ). 
- 
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3.5 The Anticipated Continuous-Time Model 
This Section follows the methodology of Section 2.7 
to show how the existence of anticipated and unanticipated 
inflation affects the behaviour of a utility-maximising 
consumer (lifetime saving only). 
The consumer is therefore assumed to maximise the 
expected utility of the real-valued consumption and be- 
quest plans cR and BR, ie. he wishes to maximise: 
U(cRD 1: ) 
, 
BR) 
= ofý 
Z(a(t)u(cR(t)) 
+ ß(t)W(BR(t)) )dt 
x (3.5.1) 
where cR(t) = c(t). e Pt 
BR(t) 
= 
B(t). e-Pt 
ie. c(t) and B(t) refer to the money values of con- 
sumption and bequest and P is obtained from Equation 
(3.3.2)" (Note that P now represents the 'instantan- 
eons' certain inflation_equivalent). 
The prospective reserve for the insurance is given 
by Equation (2.7.1), ie. 
v' (t) 
- 
(a-W X+t)v(t) + b(t) +sI (t) -as(t) -u X+tB(t) 
(2.7.1) 
and this is substituted back into Equation (3.5.1) to 
obtain 
- 
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5(cR, BR) = o1'°° a(t) 
Zx+t 
u(e 
Pt(y(t) 
+ SS(t) 
- 
b(t) 
Zx 
- 
s' (t) ))at + o/°° ß(t). ZX+t , (e-Pt(ý ((6 +ux+t)V(t) Z 'Px+t 
-v'(t) + b(t) + s'(t) -a s(t) )) at 
(3.5.2) 
Equation (3.5.2) is maximised if the following Euler 
equations are satisfied: 
CL(t) 
. 
u' (c(t)) 
_I 
O (t) 
. 
w' (B(t)) ux+t 
(2.6.7c) 
with 0 
Zx+t 
. 
e- 
pt. ( a(t). u'(cR(t)). d 
- 
ß(t). w'(BR(t)). d/ux+t ) 
IT 
-Pt 
= d/dt ( Zx+t. e" "( a(t). u'(cR(t)). (-1) + ß(t). w'(BR(t)). 1 )) 
l ux+t 
(3.5.3) 
and 
Zx+t"e Pt" ( ß(t). w'(BR(t)). (l+S/ux+t) 
x 
Y 
d/dt ( Zx+t. e Pt 
"( ß(t). w'(BR(t)). (-1/ux+t) 
x 
(3.5.4) 
Equations (2.6.7c), (3.5-3) and (3.5.4) produce an optimal 
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solution satisfying 
CRI (t) ° ul (c 
R 
____) 
(' a& (t) 
- 
(S--P) ) 
u" (c W) a (t) 
(3.5.5) 
BRA fit) 
_ 
w' (BR(t) )( ux+t 
- 
ß' (t) ' 
W, 9 1(B (t)) ux+t (t) 
(3.5.6) 
Thus we observe that, in general, an increase in the 
level of the certain inflation equivalent P has the 
effect of decreasing 
(2) 
the rate of increase in real con- 
sumption (cR(t)) and real bequest (BR(t) ). However, 
total real consumption will not decrease over time unless 
the rate of impatience (at ) is greater than the real 
rate of interest (d-P ). Similarly the total real be- 
quest level will not decrease over time unless x+t - 
ß't 
u x+t t 
exceeds (d-P). Note that since ä is commonly 
assumed to be positive (for example see Yaari, (20) ), total 
real consumption will certainly decrease over time if P >6 
However, because the quantity 
u 
x+t is positive for most 
x+t 
adult ages (in fact, for all x+t ? 30; see A1967/70 Tables 
of Assured Lives C7) ), Equation (3.5.6) shows that for 
a given level of P, the total level of real bequests 
are less resistant to the effects of inflation than the 
corresponding levels of real consumption. However, notice 
that, under the circumstances mentioned above, inflation 
will not decrease the level of bequests (this point has 
(2 )Since 
u' and w' are normally assumed positive while 
ul' and w" are negative. 
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also been made by Flemming (6) p. 106). 
A comparison of Equations (3.5.6) and (2.7.6) is 
interesting in that the certain inflation equivalent p 
reduces the 'humped' shape of the real bequest plan, ie. 
the real bequest plan will start to decline at an earlier 
time the higher the rate of P. Consequently, we are 
able to deduce that inflation will certainly reduce the 
real level of bequests made at older rather than younger 
ages with the 'substitution' effect of inflation. The 
actual situation may be complicated by the existence of an 
'income' effect because a reduction in the level of money 
bequest made at older ages effectively reduces the overall 
'price' of the bequest plan which can be illustrated by 
reference to the single premium 
. 
It follows that it is 
not possible to quantify the effects of inflation on the 
amount of money bequest at time t until this 'income' 
effect has been further examined. 
Later Chapters will be concerned with the effects of 
inflation on the consumer's initial purchase of life 
insurance (ie. at time zero/age x) and we will be partic- 
ularly interested in the effects on new premium income so 
generated. Since the concept of 'new premium income' 
cannot be applied to this model, attention must be concen- 
trated on the single premium which, in terms of the notation 
of the preceding Sections, can be written as 
Ax 1 
' °f e 
t. lx+tux+t B(t) dt 
(Note that in practice, most conventional life insurance 
contracts have premiums that are paid annually - or even 
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more frequently. Thus it is not usually possible to 
observe the single premium). 
It turns out that the quantity 
Ax 
_ý, or e 
St. Zx+tux+t-B(t) dt 
x 
is of interest for at least two reasons: 
a) in order to examine the 'income' effects 
of inflation, and 
b) to give an indication of the effects of 
inflation on the demand for new life 
insurance. 
From Equation (3.5.1) we note that BR(t) = B(t) e Pt 
where B(t) denotes the money value of the bequest made 
at time t. Equation (3.5.6) gives an indication of the 
behaviour of the real value of bequests and in order to 
ascertain that of B(t), we must look to 
B(t) 
=ePt. BR(t) 
(3.5.? ) 
Equation (3.5.7) can be substituted into the Single Premium 
formula to give 
0 
Ax =1 of e 
(d-P)t. lx+tux+t. BR(t) dt 
(3.5.8) 
The final stage of the analysis would then be to form the 
expression öA /aP which would enable an examination of the 
responsiveness of Ax to changes in P. Unfortunately, 
Equation (3.5.8) i. 9 very difficult to compute and impossible 
for arbitrary utility of consumption and bequest functions. 
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Consequently, only a very few comments can be made on the 
general behaviour of the Equations: 
. 
Ax 
_Ie tx+tux+t-BR(t) dt 
x (3.5.8) 
BR' (t) = w' 
(BR ).. +t_`ýý_ (d-P)) 
w" (B (t)) ' x+t ß (t) 
(3.5.6) 
t 
i) if we assume that 
+ 
is consistently 
x+t 
positive (ie. x> 30 in (? )) while P is 
greater than 6 then the greater the value of 
P, the more rapid the decline of BR(t). 
Furthermore, BR(t) is declining for all time 
t>0. However, from Equation (3.5.8) the 
decline in the value of BR as t progresses 
is offset by the factor e-(d-P)t"lx+tux+t 
which is positive and increasing. (Note that 
since e -0 -ht increases more rapidly than 
any power of t(3) we might expect this factor 
to outweigh the smaller values of BR(t) for 
large t). Thus we come to the first tentative 
conclusion that if P>6 and x> 30 then 
dAXAP >0 ie. an increase in P will in- 
crease Ax: 
ii) alternatively, if P<S (where S is the 
'long-run' force of interest and P is the 'long- 
run' certain inflation equivalent) while x> 30, 
then the opposite result might be expected if P 
3 For proof, see for example, 'Real Analysis' J. A. Anderson, 
Logos Press Ltd., London 1969. Ch. 9 
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is small enough, ie. an increase in P will 
have little (or a negative) effect on Ax: 
iii) if P<S and, furthermore x< 30 
dote, the inception age 30 corresponds to that 
) age after which u x+t ceases to fall in (7) 
then BR(t) will almost certainly be 'humped' 
shaped. This means that less weight is con- 
tributed by the older bequest levels (since 
Zx+t 11x+t is generally increasing). In this 
case therefore, we might expect an increase in 
P to have a negative effect on Ax (since the 
decline in the level of BR(t) at high ages 
more than offsets the increased weight of these 
-(d-P )t bequests determined by the factor e ). 
iv) in all other cases, the effect of P on AX 
is uncertain: 
v) all inferences about the behaviour of AX 
have been made on the basis of the slope rather 
than the levels of the functions involved (eg. 
BR (t) rather than BR (t) directly); this is 
because it is not possible to derive BR(t) with- 
out solving the full set of simultaneous equations 
involving consumption, lifetime saving and bequest. 
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3.6 The Unanticipated Continuous-Time Model 
This Section follows the methodology of Sections 
2.10,2.11 and 2.12 to show how the consumer will react 
to an unforeseen, once-and-for-all change of circumstances 
at time T that could not have been anticipated at time 
zero. 
We now assume that at time T the consumer changes 
his level of the certain inflation equivalent from P 
to PT where, from Equation (3.3.2) 
T= 
fö. ( PT + g, ý(ct2(P)) 
(3.6. ß) 
and 0 <f 41. 
There are several pertinent features to note about 
PT 
i) we assume that the degree of money illusion 
0 remains unaltered; 
ii) PT may be greater or smaller than the original 
Pe at time zero; 
iii) we would expect the degree of uncertainty 9T 
to be smaller than the original at time zero. 
This is because the consumer will have a smaller 
time horizon over which to anticipate the course 
of inflation 
- 
thus his level of uncertainty 
should decrease as T increases. 
It also seems reasonable to assume that, if the con- 
sumer's inflation expectations have changed, then so too 
have his expectations of future money income and force of 
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interest. We therefore denote the subsequent money income 
by yT(t) (t > T) and force of interest by S, r . 
We now assume that the consumer wishes to maximise 
the expected utility of the real valued consumption and 
bequest plans cR and BR 
, 
ie. to maximise: 
UTcRBR) = TI, 
zT 
.( a(t). u(cR(t)) + ß(t). (BR(t)) ) dt 
X+T (3.6.2) 
for t>T 
where cR(t) = cT(t). e 'Tt 
BR (t) = BT(t). e4 Tt 
and PT is obtained from Equation (3.6.1). 
The prospective reserve for any life insurance (for pro- 
tection purposes) is given by Equation (2.11.9): 
VT(t) 
_ 
(ÖT+pX+t). VT(t) + bT(t) + ST(t) 
-S ST(t) 
- 
11 
X+t 
BT (t) + (ÖT+"X+t+l). e 
6TT. ZX+. ST(T) 
where ST(T) = S(T) + SV 
(3.6.3) 
(2.11.3) 
Now Equations (2.11.9) and (2.7.1) are identical as far 
as the coefficients of V, V', S, S' and b are concerned 
and so the calculus of variations (which maximises 
UT(cR, $T) ) will produce Euler equations analogous to 
Equations (3.5.5) and (3.5.6) for t> T 
u'(cR(t) ) RI(t) 
=T. (t)/a(t) T Ulf (CT(t) )TT 
(3.6.4) 
-'126 - 
and 
BTtctý w'(B 
R (t) 
"c u'X+t/uX+t caTTý 
W (Bl (t) 
(3.6.5) 
In order to decide whether to change his existing 
insurance arrangements, the consumer must compare the 
maximised value of ÜT so obtained from Equation (3.6.2) 
with the value of expected lifetime utility at time T 
had the original insurance arrangements been continued 
(to be termed UT (cRBR) 
Thus the consumer will surrender his old insurance 
arrangements and change his consumption pattern if 
UT > UT where 
UT(C', BR) =TIC 
.( a(t). u(e 
PTt. 
c*(t)) + ß(t). w(e PTt. B(t)) ) dt 
X+T 
(3.6.6) 
B(t) is the optimal money-valued bequest plan determined 
at time zero by solving Equation (3.5.6) and ca(t) is the 
new consumption plan allocated in an optimal way while 
still meeting existing insurance premiums. 
Although it is not possible to proceed any further 
with the comparison of UT and UT 1 the following points 
can be made: 
i) a change in the certain inflation equivalent 
at time T does not alter the basic pattern 
of real consumption and bequest; 
ii) obviously, if the effects of uI and w 
ut? Wt 
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are ignored then a decrease in the real force 
of interest (ST-PT ) will reduce the rate 
of increase in real consumption and bequest 
over time (or alternatively heighten the rate 
of decrease) ; 
iii) if the consumer associates. a rise in infla- 
tion expectations with an increase in the 
force of interest then, provided the same view 
is shared by the insurer, a given pattern of 
premium payments will provide higher real bequests 
than before. Thus, ceteris paribus, a rise in 
inflation expectations provides higher future 
bequest levels on surrender. Conversely, a 
fall in inflation expectations is not so likely 
to cause the surrender of the existing insurance 
arrangements; 
iv) similarly, if the consumer associates a rise 
in inflation expectations with an increase in 
future money incomes (ie. yT(t)> y(t) for t >T) 
then he will be able to increase his life 
insurance premiums. 
v) Equations (3.6.3) and (2.11.3) indicate that, 
as before, the smaller the Surrender Value (SV) 
at time T, the smaller the future potential 
bequest (B T(t) ). It should be noted however 
that, in practice, the Surrender Value paid by 
insurers probably decreases in money terms as 
inflation increases because Surrender Values 
are supposedly funded by the sale of securities 
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(which may decrease in value); 
vi) although it is not possible to draw any con- 
clusions about the size of the real consump- 
tion and bequesting flows of Equation (3.6.2), 
it does seem as if an increase in inflation 
expectations has the effect of concentrating 
consumption and bequest towards the younger 
ages. Thus, ceteris paribus, the more 
'impatient' the consumer (ie. the more down- 
ward sloping are the functions a(t) and ß(t) ) 
the more probable it becomes that [J, r will 
exceed UTf 
. 
In conclusion, we may say that the surrender of exist- 
ing (protection-based) life insurance may take place 
following a change in inflation expectations although 
surrender is more likely after an upward revision in 
expectations. However, the surrender becomes less prob- 
able with a decrease in the size of the Surrender Value 
paid and also if consumers are not highly 'impatient' for 
early consumption and/or bequest. 
We also note that any changes in the certain infla- 
tion equivalent are more probably caused by a revision of 
inflation expectations since an increase in the uncertainty 
caused by unanticipated inflation is offset to some extent 
by the smaller time period involved in estimating future 
inflation. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
After a brief introduction on the meaning and deter- 
minants of anticipated and unanticipated inflation, an 
expected utility maximising model was used to determine 
the various effects of inflation on the purchase of life 
insurance for the purpose of providing protection for 
heirs and dependents (this is implicit in the structure 
of Equations (3.4.1) and (3-5-1)) 
- 
In order to accommodate the requirements of the models, 
a 'certain inflation equivalent' P was used. In the 
construction of P it was found possible to incorporate 
elements of anticipated inflation (Pe), unanticipated 
inflation and money illusion. 
The certain inflation equivalent was then used to 
determine the effects of its three components on the pur- 
chase of protection-based life insurance. In brief, the 
results showed that the consumer who is conscious of the 
effects of inflation on the real value of his consumption 
and bequest would: 
i) bring forward in time his real consumption and 
bequest expenditure; 
ii) actually decrease his real consumption and 
bequest expenditure in certain instances: 
notably if P is greater than the force of 
interest d; 
iii) (under the circumstances described in ii) 
above) decrease in the real value of his be- 
quest over time at probably a greater rate than 
that for real consumption; 
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iv) consider the termination of the existing life 
insurance contract at time T should he find 
that his inflation expectations have changed. 
Surrender'. is more probable if PT >P although 
any decrease in the Surrender Value paid will 
reduce the tendency to surrender. 
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CHAPTER FOUR : INFLATION, FINANCIAL SAVING 
AND THE DEMAND FOR LIFE INSURANCE 
4.1. Introduction 
This Chapter represents a theoretical stepping-stone 
between Chapters Two and Three 
- 
which concentrate on the 
purchase of protection-based life insurance - and Chapters 
Eight and Nine which will attempt some empirical tests. 
Basically there are two elements of financial saving through 
life insurance: lifetime saving and 'non-lifetime' saving. 
Lifetime saving via life insurance will not be discussed 
until Chapter Five - and it is mainly concerned with saving 
through the medium of endowment policies. 'Non-lifetime' 
saving (ie.. bequests for saving purposes) has already been 
mentioned briefly in Chapter Two but will be analysed in 
more detail again in Chapter Five 
- 
it is mainly concerned 
with saving through the medium of whole of life policies. 
The main objectives of this Chapter are twofold: 
first, to survey the major theoretical models of demand 
consumption and saving in order to assess: (a) their 
applicability for use in later Chapters and (b) to see 
whether they yield any a priori indications on the 
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behaviour of lifetime financial savings via life insurance 
(which has not previously been discussed); and second, 
to make allowances both in the models of (a) above and 
also of those in Chapters Two and Three, for the institu- 
tional constraints affecting life insurance. These con- 
straints are centred on the view of life insurance as a 
method of long term saving. 
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4.2 Models of Consumption and Saving 
Models of aggregate consumption (and saving)-and 
consumer demand functions have been recently summarised 
by R. Ferber (15) and J. Brown and A. Deaton (7) respect- 
ively. These two syntheses describe the major theories 
and developments in the field of consumer economics and 
provide the basic framework for this Section. The object- 
ive of this Section is therefore to briefly summarise the 
major theories of consumption (and saving) so that a later 
attempt can be made to assess their relevance to the study 
of life insurance. 
a) The Keynesian. Theory 
The original concept of a consumption function relat- 
ing current consumption to current disposable income was 
described by J. M. Keynes in his 'General Theory' (30) and 
was later to be known as the absolute income hypothesis. 
Keynes' propositions were basically that first, there is 
a break-even level of income at which the average propen- 
sity to consume equals unity. Below this level APC is 
greater than unity and above it, APC is less than unity. 
Second, the marginal propensity to consume is greater than 
zero but less than unity for all levels of income. A 
corollary of these two hypotheses is that the marginal 
propensity to consume is always less than the average 
propensity to consume. 
Many statistical studies have confirmed the existence 
of some type of relationship between current income and 
current consumption. However, for several reasons, doubt 
has been cast on the usefulness of the absolute income 
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hypothesis: 
i) a large number of other variables were also 
found to affect consumption 
- 
this could 
make the consumption function unstable; 
ii) the theory proved unable to'predict post- 
1945 aggregate consumption behaviour; and 
iii) the proven existence of two distinct forms 
of consumption function: for the short and 
long-runs (for example see R. G. Lipsey (36)'). 
Evidence from U. S. aggregate consumption data 
indicated that the long-run APC had been 
virtually constant (since 1870) while the 
short-run APC had been declining as incomes 
rose. 
It would be fair to say that the above criticisms of 
the absolute income hypothesis were derived from analysis 
of aggregate consumption (and therefore savings) data. 
However, all three criticisms also apply to the consump- 
tion of (demand for) individual goods and services. In 
particular we would expect the prospective purchaser of 
life insurance to take account of some longer term concept 
of income since life insurance is essentially a long-term 
contractual commitment. The only conceivable situation 
where the purchase of life insurance might be directly 
linked to current income is in the case of life insurance 
allied to the purchase of a house: in this case, the 
amount of the mortgage required is frequently determined 
by current income (and so therefore, will be the life 
insurance). 
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b) Relative Income Hypothesis 
The foundation of the relative income hypothesis is 
that the propensity to consume depends on relative income, 
that is, income relative to some prior standard (in the 
case of time-series) or relative to income of a reference 
group (in the case of cross section data). Ferber (15) 
reports that this hypothesis was first suggested by 
D. Brady and R. Friedman (5) who suggested the following 
relationship: 
St 
Yt 
y 
a+b. t y (4.2.1) 
where st and yt 
and income and y 
represent current individual saving 
represents average income. 
The relative income hypothesis was further supported 
by J. S. Duesenberry (13) who argued that the preferences 
of individual consumers are not independent (as they form- 
ally were assumed to be). Duesenberry concludes that in 
periods of steadily rising income, the aggregate savings 
ratio tends to be independent of current income. Further- 
more, this savings ratio (s/y) is principally dependent 
on the ratio of current income to the previous peak income 
(yo) 
ý (i e. ýt =a+b. t yo (4.2.2) 
Although the relative income hypothesis might well 
apply to the purchase of certain goods and services (and 
especially consumer durables), it does not intuitively 
relate to the purchase of life insurance. It is difficult 
to imagine that a consumer's purchase of life insurance 
- 
138 
- 
(whether for protection or financial saving) could be 
determined by the size of his income relative to that of 
his contemporaries. The only way in which this could 
conceivably occur is via the salesman of that life insur- 
ance who might provide information on amounts purchased 
by the consumer's contemporaries. 
c) Permanent Income and Life Cycle Hypotheses 
The basic idea underlying these theories is that the 
consumer plans his consumption not on the basis of the 
income received during the current period but rather on 
the basis of his long-run or lifetime income expectation. 
In the Life Cycle Hypothesis of Franco Modigliani (39 a-d), 
this income is that which the household expects to earn 
over its lifetime, ie. the maximum amount the household 
could spend on consumption each year without accumulating 
debts that are passed on to future generations. In the 
Milton Friedman theory (19), permanent income is the amount 
the household could consume forever without increasing or 
decreasing its present stock of wealth. 
The central hypothesis of both theories is that the 
household's actual consumption is related to its permanent 
rather than its current income. Thus a change in a house- 
hold's current income will affect its actual consumption 
only so far as it affects its permanent income. Any change 
in current income that is thought to be temporary will 
have little or no effect on permanent income, and hence 
on consumption. 
Note that in both the approaches of Friedman and 
Modigliani, consumption is defined to include the real 
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consumption of goods and services rather than monetary 
expenditures. Consumer durables are expenditures only 
to the extent that they are depreciated in a particular 
period, not the amount spent for their acquisition: the 
balance therefore constitutes saving. 
The theory of Chapter Two provides some justification 
for applying the Modigliani and Friedman theories to the 
study of life insurance. In Chapter Two, it was assumed 
that income was known perfectly in advance so that there 
was 
. 
effectively no transitory component. Furthermore, 
the construction of the model of Chapter Two fits in neatly 
with the Modigliani definition of permanent income. 
Intuitively as well, the theories should repay appli- 
cation to life insurance because of the long-term contract- 
ual nature of the contracts (especially renewable premium 
ones). In undertaking an annual premium life insurance, 
the consumer must pay regard to future income levels as 
well as current income. 
Additionally, the element of lifetime saving in life 
insurance dovetails nicely with Modigliani's concept of the 
'life cycle' of consumption, ie. saving at young ages to 
be followed by dissaving at older ages (eg. after retire- 
ment). 
d) Stock Adjustment Theories 
As Ferber describes, originally, the many stock adjust- 
ment models (which assume that current decisions are 
influenced by past behaviour) seemed to be split into two 
camps: one approach was to view stocks in the form of 
tastes and habits which conditioned human behaviour over 
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a long period of years and which accounted to a large 
extent for the positive autocorrelation in consumer 
purchases of many non-durables and similar goods and 
services. This approach lends itself to the purchase 
of life insurance in at least two respects: 
i) if we wish to analyse the amount of premium 
income paid by consumers, then the existing 
stock of life insurance will obviously be 
very important because of the long term con- 
tractual (habit-forming) nature of the 
premium payments. 
ii) of course, i) above will not necessarily 
apply to new premium income. However the 
theory would be applied to the purchase of 
new life insurance if it could be demonstrated 
that it was common for life insurance policy- 
holders to hold more than one policy (as is 
certainly the case for industrial life 
insurance). 
The second approach sought to explain why consumer 
purchases of many durables followed an opposite pattern 
to that described above. This approach viewed stocks as 
a physical accumulation of goods desired by consumers which 
led to additional purchases as desired stocks deviated from 
actual stocks, and thus explained any negative autocorre- 
lation between purchases. This second approach could also 
be applied to the purchase of life insurance since it 
could be argued that the existence of a life insurance 
policy in force, will discourage further purchases. 
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The two approaches have been combined in one single 
theory by H. S. Houthakker and L. D. Taylor (26), who pro- 
posed, in its simplest form the following relationship: 
qt =a +6"st +y 
. 
Yt (4.2.3) 
where qt denotes purchases (demand) at time t, st is 
the stock and y+ is income. If ß is positive, this 
denotes that the purchases are habit forming (first 
approach); if 0 is negative then the stock adjustment 
effect is predominant (second approach). 
Houthakker and Taylor then proceed to eliminate st 
(which, in the majority of cases is not observable) by 
relating it to purchases and depreciation. However, for 
life insurance purchases, st can be estimated directly 
by observing the relevant In Force figures (either sums 
insured or numbers of policies). 
In a later chapter, Houthakker and Taylor discuss 
the possibility of adapting Equation (k. 2.3) to include 
Friedman's Permanent Income Hypothesis (this combination 
is also attempted by K. Hilton and D. H. Crossfield (23)) 
and they suggest the following: 
q(t) =a+ ßs(t) + YPyp(t) + YTyT(t) 
(4.2.4) 
where yp is permanent income and yT is transitory 
income. However, since the permanent income is not 
directly observable, Houthakker and Taylor include an 
additional assumption (which is much in line with Friedman's 
own ideas) that the change in permanent income is 
-142- 
proportional to the change in current income, ie. 
ýPCt) 
_k (t) (4.2.5) 
Equation (4.2.4) can then be rewritten as 
q(t) =0 (9. (t) -6 s(t) )+ (ypk + y, 2(1-k) ) ý(t) 
(4.2.6) 
where 6 represents the constant rate of depreciation. 
Naturally, when examining the new purchases of life 
insurance, we would wish to test both the Houthakker and 
Taylor and Milton Friedman models. Thus Equation (4.2.6) 
(in its discrete time form) represents a useful method of 
approach. 
It should be pointed out that in all four models so 
far under discussion, whenever aggregate time series 
expenditure or income data has been used, it has always 
been deflated by some relevant price index (for example 
see Houthakker and Taylor (26) p. 54, Duesenberry (13)p. 90 
and Friedman (19) Ch. V). This has been done on the 
plausible assumption that consumers are influenced by 
variables in real rather than monetary terms. However, 
evidence is accumulating which indicates that consumers 
are in fact subject to money illusion. This view (which 
will be the subject of the next Section) has been supported 
by various authors such as W. H. Branson and A. K. Klevorick 
(6), J. T. Juster and P. Wachtel (28), D. H. Howard (27) and 
A. Deaton (12a and 12b). 
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Finally it should be noted that all four models refer 
to saving in the aggregate sense rather than to the 
'product' of any individual savings institution in partic- 
ular. It is not our intention to delve deeply into the 
theory of portfolio selection; however M. Hamburger (20) 
and R. S. Headen and J. F. Lee (22) provide a good example 
of the concepts involved while J. Revell (47) describes 
the effects of inflation on individual assets. The basic 
difference between the models of Hamburger and Friedman, 
Houthakker etc., is the inclusion of a 'yield' variable 
for the individual assets: this proves difficult to cal- 
culate for life insurance anyway (and its omission from 
the Hamburger model leaves the basic models of this Section 
remaining). 
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4.3 Models of Inflation and Saving 
This Section is concerned with two further develop- 
ments of the consumption/saving models of Section 4.2. 
In the first place, models will be examined that specif- 
ically include inflation as an independent variable and 
secondly we provide a brief description of those, compara- 
tively recent models that attempt to explain the relation- 
ship between rises in the savings ratio and increases in 
the rate of inflation (these have been summarised in Bank 
of England (3) ). Again the basic objective is to ascer- 
tain whether these models can throw any light on the pur- 
chase of life insurance. Note that several specific 
models of life insurance and inflation have been formulated 
by other authors (notably S. Neumann (44) and P. Fortune 
(18) ), but we shall defer an examination of these until 
Section 4.5. 
Money illusion has been defined by Don Patinkin (46) 
p. 22, to occur if an equiproportionate change in all account- 
ing prices 
- 
including that of paper money 
- 
produces some 
change in the amounts of commodities demanded by the con- 
sumer. Thus the economic behaviour of an individual free 
of money illusion depends solely on money prices, it does 
not depend solely on relative prices. An individual who 
is suffering from money illusion also reacts to changes 
which affect only the absolute level of accounting prices: 
his economic behaviour does not depend solely on the money 
prices(). 
In Patinkin's notation (p. 16), the accounting prices of an 
economy of n goods are represented by P1, 
..,, 
P, where the 
nth good is paper money. The respective money prices are 
therefore P/P /Pýp 
... , 
The relative prices of the (n-1) 
commodities in terms of the first one are 5 
P_i /P 
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Branson and Klevorick (6) represent money illusion 
in a more specific form. They argue that, for a consump- 
tion function of the form 
Ct 
= 
bo(St)b1 
" 
(wt) 
b2 
(Pt)b3 
(4.3.1) 
money illusion exists (in the Patinkin sense) if b3 >0 
while money illusion is absent if b3 =0 (where Ct 
represents real consumption, yt real net labour income 
and wt real consumer net worth, all on a per capita 
basis). Branson and Klevorick go on to test a distri- 
buted lag model 
I 
lnCt = ß0+ E 
i=O 
where the lags 
with the basic equation: 
JK 
y.. ]n yt_i + jE 0 
Sj. ln wt_ +E nk. ln Pt-k 
k=0 
(4.3.2) 
for income, wealth and prices are I, J and 
K quarters respectively. They come to the conclusion 
that, since k-O 
'1k- >0 
, 
consumers exhibit money illusion 
via a distributed lag adjustment to the price level. 
In order to explain this phenomenon, Branson and 
Klevorick argue that where prices, money income and money 
wealth all increase proportionately, consumers notice the 
income and wealth increases more than they do the price 
level rise and therefore increase their real consumption. 
Deaton (12) and Juster and Wachtel (28) all agree 
with Branson and Klevorick on the existence of money 
illusion but disagree on the direction of its effects. 
In particular, Deaton objects vehemently to 
K 
their conclu- 
sions since his own results confirm that E nk is 
ne ative ie. that the 
k=0 
gý presence of money illusion has a 
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positive effect on saving rather than on consumption. 
Deaton (12) disputes the traditional economic theory 
which assumes money illusion to occur when individuals 
are more conscious of changes in nominal incomes than of 
changes in prices (so that identical changes in incomes 
and prices lead to higher consumption and therefore lower 
saving). Deaton argues that, because goods are purchased 
sequentially, the consumer will have accurate information 
only on the goods actually bought. Additionally, because 
generally price indices are always out of date, at least 
in the first instance, individual consumers have no pos- 
sible means of distinguishing relative price changes from 
absolute price changes. Consequently, in times of gen- 
erally rising prices there is a mass illusion that all 
goods are relatively more expensive so that, as each con- 
sumer attempts to adjust his purchase, consumption falls 
and saving rises. If inflation continues to accelerate 
while expectations lag behind reality then consumers never 
fully adjust and the saving ratio remains abnormally high. 
The Deaton and Juster and Wachtel models are similar 
in that they both rely on the effects and interactions of 
anticipated (expected) and unanticipated inflation. 
Deaton argues that the consumer confuses unanticipated 
inflation with a rise in absolute (rather than relative) 
prices.: this induces a rise in the saving ratio. Sim- 
ilarly, unanticipated rises in permanent income are con- 
fused with transitory income which again induces saving 
(and this view is partially supported by the results of 
Bank of England (3) ). 
On the other hand, Juster and Wachtel concentrate on 
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the uncertainty generated by unanticipated rises in income 
and prices. They argue that high rates of inflation have 
been historically associated with variable rates of infla- 
tion, so that if money income is not expected to match this 
variation, real income will be subject to greater uncertainty 
in times of high inflation. Furthermore, a wider disper- 
sion of possible real incomes may not have symmetrical 
effects on behaviour, in that the prospect of declining 
real income may carry more weight on consumer decisions 
than the (equally likely) prospect of rising real income. 
Thus consumers would attempt to curtail spending in an 
attempt to guard against declining real income. 
In their model, Juster and Wachtel include the var- 
iables CPI and CPI* where CPI denotes the 
change of consumer prices and CPI* refers 
rate of change of consumer prices derived 
produced by the Survey Research Center at 
of Michigan. Thus, if these variables a 
the model in the form 
a, CPI + a2 CPI* 
actual rate of 
to the expected 
from survey data 
the University 
re included in 
where ai and a2 are regression coefficients, then 
(a, + a2) is interpreted as the effect of anticipated 
inflation and a, is interpreted as the effect of 
unexpected inflation. From their results, Juster and 
Wachtel tentatively conclude that unanticipated inflation 
has a negative effect on consumption (which supports their 
hypothesis). Fully anticipated inflation, however, raises 
consumption expenditures on non-durables (and services) 
atihe expense of both saving and expenditure on durable goods. 
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The implications to be drawn from these models, when 
investigating the purchase of life insurance, are fairly 
clear: 
a) there is definite justification for the inclu- 
sion of both anticipated and unanticipated 
inflation as explanatory variables (this, 
of course, is one of the main conclusions of 
Chapter Two). However, it is not certain 
whether the level of prices or the rate of 
change of prices should be used. Furthermore, 
the effect of inflation on saving is uncertain 
with Deaton arguing that the effect is positive; 
b) again, both transitory and permanent income 
variables prove useful (Deaton, and Juster and 
Wachtel used both). Furthermore, these 
studies give some indication on the method of 
calculating permanent income, should it prove 
necessary (we have already noted one alternative 
method in Equation (4.2.5) ); 
c) although the fact has not been mentioned explic- 
itly, it has been found that certain advantage 
is to be gained by splitting up (or analysing 
separately) the different sources of income. 
Thus Hilton and Crossfield (23) comment that the 
distinction between human and non-human income 
is a useful one. M. J. C. Surrey (51) splits 
personal income into three components (wages and 
salaries, current grants from public authorities, 
and all other personal income); 
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d) Juster and Wachtel (28) also find some support 
for introducing both the level of unemployment 
and the change in unemployment as explanations 
of the saving ratio. The reasoning is that 
when unemployment is at high levels, consumers 
dissave to maintain consumption. Additionally, 
when unemployment is rising, fear of unemploy- 
ment is probably rising too: this leads to a 
building up of reserves on the part of people 
who continue to hold jobs (ie. increased saving). 
Finally, we close this Section with an examination of 
the various (new) models designed specifically to justify 
the high levels of the saving ratio in the mid-1970's. A 
survey of these various models was undertaken by the Bank 
of England (3). In its introduction the paper states that 
weak evidence was found to support the Deaton model; no 
evidence at all could support the model of Juster and 
Wachtel but strong evidence was found to support a theory 
proposed in the Morgan Grenfell Economic Review (42). 
This was the view that the value of liquid assets held by 
the personal sector, when adjusted for the effects of infla- 
tion, has had a significantly negative effect on the personal 
saving ratio. (Note that the idea of liquid assets as 
an explanation of consumption goes back further than 1975, 
eg. Hilton and Crossfield 1969 (23) and D. B. Suits 1963 (50)). 
Holdings of liquid assets can affect savings patterns 
either because of their absolute size (a 'wealth effect') 
or because of their relative size (a 'portfolio balance 
effect'). Thus individuals may regard their holdings of 
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liquid assets as the most important part of their avail- 
able resources when planning expenditure. Alternatively, 
consumers may have a preferred amount of liquid balances 
to satisfy both precautionary and transaction motives, 
and any reduction below this amount may cause expenditure 
to be restrained (and saving increased). 
In his study, Ferber (15) concludes that the weight 
of evidence favoured the inclusion of liquid assets in 
the consumption function. However, liquid assets could 
only directly affect the purchase of life insurance through 
the 'portfolio balance effect' described above since 
expenditure on new life insurance takes place over a long 
period of time. Thus we expect the effect of liquid assets, 
if any, to be negative in that a rise in liquid assets will 
reduce new purchases of life insurance. 
Similarly, Howard (27) concludes that holdings of 
liquid assets have a significantly negative effect on the 
savings ratio and that this relationship is particularly 
important in the United Kingdom. A number of reasons are 
advanced for this behaviour relying on the role of liquid 
assets as transactions balances and as a 'buffer-stock' 
against unexpected short-falls in income. Howard has also 
something to say about the effects of inflation: 
"in two countries 
- 
Japan and the United States - 
unexpected inflation is positively related to 
personal saving, and in Canada, the United 
Kingdom and the United States expected inflation 
has a similar effect. In addition, in Japan, 
inflation expectations may discourage personal 
saving, but the evidence is mixed. (In the UK 
equation the effects of a nominal long rate of interest may be capturing the effects of long` 
run inflation expectations. If so, the positive 
sign of d1 (the coefficient of the relevant 
interest rate) reported for the UK also constitutes 
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evidence of a positive relation between such 
expectations and personal saving). " (27) p. 554 
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4.4 Special Characteristics of Saving Through 
Life Insurance 
Virtually all of the models described in Sections 
4.2 and 4.3 are concerned with a description of aggregate 
saving or the savings ratio (Saving divided by Personal 
Disposable Income) rather than saving via any particular 
savings institution. The main purpose of Sections 4.2 
and 4.3 was to examine these models so that their possible 
application to a study of life insurance could be assessed. 
However, there are several unique features of both life 
insurance saving and the saver/policyholder that deserve 
some comment; these must also be borne in mind when it 
comes to drawing up a model of the purchase of life insur- 
ance. 
In the first place, the vast majority of saving via 
life insurance is long-term saving. The average term on 
endowment contracts is around 20-25 years (an average of 
231 years was reported by Southern Television Ltd., (49) 
p. 126 in Dec. 1975) and tax relief on premiums is only 
available for contract terms exceeding ten years (see 
R. L. Carter (9) p. 2.1.4 
-09). Furthermore the construc- 
tion of the reversionary bonus system encourages savings 
via longer term policies. Consequently, the prospective 
purchaser of new life insurance is encouraged to take a 
long term view of future real income and prices. Obviously, 
for whole of life policies, the consumer must make a deci- 
sion on real income throughout his lifetime: this lends 
great weight to the 'life-cycle' hypothesis as an explana- 
tion of the purchases of life insurance. 
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Secondly, the majority of life insurance (and certainly 
the types of interest in Chapter Six) is on a contractual 
basis. This means that: 
i) premiums must be paid regularly, and 
ii) savings cannot be readily liquidated without 
penalty. 
The objective of contractual saving is to make that saving 
habit forming: this is encouraged by the granting of tax 
relief on these types of policies. Furthermore, the con- 
tractual element of life insurance is further emphasised 
because a large proportion of premiums are paid by Bankers 
Order so that the policyholder does not even have to remember 
to pay them. 
It has been argued that contractual saving (and con- 
tractual payments) exhibit slower and smaller fluctuations 
than savings (and payments) that are discretionary (for 
example see G. Katona (29) p. 15, and P. L. Cheng (10)). 
Similarly, contractual saving is less responsive to factors 
like inflation (for example see Midland Bank (38) p. 12 and 
Barclays Bank (4) p. 4). 
It has been demonstrated in Chapters Two and Three 
that the penalty for breaking the life insurance contractual 
agreement can play a considerable role in the decision on 
whether to do so or not. Not surprisingly, it turns out 
that the smaller the penalty, the more 'liquid' life insur- 
ance savings become (it must be pointed out that, in prac- 
tice, the penalty is fairly substantial). The factors 
affecting the surrender of life insurance contracts will 
be explained in greater detail in Chapter Nine. 
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However, it must be noted that although life insurance 
is basically long term, contractual saving, the decision 
to purchase a new life insurance is not a contractual 
one but discretionary: 
"The decision to purchase a new life insurance 
policy is thus a genuine one; however, once 
the first or second annual premiums have been 
paid, the periodic decision involved in paying 
renewal premiums is of a routine nature. 
Renewal premium is a contractual outlay which 
does not necessarily depend on developments 
during the period of the payment. " Neumann (44) p. 112 
Consequently, the effects of inflation on the purchase 
of life insurance must be examined in two areas: 
a) the effects on discretionary saving and consumption, 
b) the effects on contractual saving and consumption 
payments. 
The effects of inflation on the discretionary part of life 
insurance form the major part of this study and Chapters 
Two 
- 
Eight are devoted to it. Chapter Nine examines the 
effects of inflation on contractual saving and consumption 
combined by looking at Surrenders of life insurance. 
The third feature of life insurance in the United 
Kingdom has already been mentioned: that 'qualifying 
policiesaý2) receive income tax relief, therefore effect- 
ively reducing the 'price' of life insurance. This tax 
relief has been at half the basic rate of income tax for 
many years and therefore can be assumed to be dependent 
entirely on the level of income tax (for the consumer who 
pays such tax). Thus the basic rate of income tax should 
(2)See Carter (9) p. 2.1.4 
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be applied as another variable to explain the purchase of 
life insurance. 
As the fourth point, we reiterate the question posed 
by Neumann (44) p. 92, namely "Is life insurance really a 
Saving Medium? ". While this question might have some 
relevance in the U. S. A. (where the majority of life insur- 
ance is protection based) it seems intuitively obvious that, 
in the UK., a vast amount of saving is undertaken via life 
insurance. However, some doubt has been sown by Money 
Which? (40) who undertook a survey of over 500 Consumer 
Association members. This survey investigated the main 
reasons for buying the (latest) insurance policy and found 
that, for those respondents who wanted protection only, the 
vast majority (66%) purchased savings-type life insurance. 
The results are set out in Table 4.4.1 below: 
Table 4.4.1 Reasons Consumer Association members gave 
for buying life insurance and what they 
bought. 
Main reason 
for buying 
Number of 
members 
giving 
this reason 
Proportion of members 
giving each reason 
who bought 
Protection Saving- Other 
ba ed type s 
To protect depend- 
ents against members 221 31 66 3 
premature death 
To provide lump sum 
later on 1 41 4 92 4 
To pay off mortgage 122 24 75 1 
Other (eg. to get 
tax relief) 30 7 87 6 
Source: honey wniCn Dec. '75 
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The results of Table 4.4.1 would seem to indicate that some 
policyholders have purchased 'savings-type' life insurance 
('Money Which 'define this as endowment plus whole-life) 
when they should have purchased 'protection-type' ('Money 
Which '- temporary life insurance). However, the theory 
of Chapter Five clearly indicates that both endowment and 
whole-of-life insurance have a protection element so that 
the results of Table 4.4.1 can, to some extent, be under- 
stood. 
The next point of interest is the very close connec- 
tion between the purchase of life insurance and the purchase 
of a house or property. A large proportion of protection- 
type life insurance is associated with mortgage protection 
while saving-type life insurance is often used as a method 
of repaying the loan to a building society. Additionally, 
life insurance is not a homogeneous product: there are 
considerable variations in the type of product, the quality 
of service and the performance of the various ordinary (as 
opposed to industrial) life insurance companies (this aspect 
is monitored in publications like 'Planned Savings' (Wootten 
Publications Ltd. ) and in an annual review in 'The Economist'). 
The last point is concerned with the state of knowledge 
of the average purchaser of life insurance: it would be 
fair to say that the average consumer does not have an 
intimate understanding of life insurance (eg. see Southern 
Television Ltd. (49) p. 75) and, in particular, coot 
accurately assess the price or rate of return offered. 
However, a considerable proportion of ordinary life insurance 
is purchased by better educated consumers from the higher 
social groupings (see E. V. Morgan (41) Section II). 
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Furthermore, a significant amount of ordinary life insurance 
purchases are undertaken under the aegis of some kind of 
insurance adviser. In their survey, Southern Television 
Ltd. (49) P"53, reported that 44% of insurance purchasers 
(ordinary and industrial life insurance combined) obtained 
their information from an 'Insurance Representative' (this 
figure must be treated with caution, however, because a 
larger proportion of Industrial Branch business is con- 
ducted via an 'Insurance Representative'). 
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4.5 Studies of Life Insurance and other forms of 
Contractual Saving 
The objective of this final section of Chapter Four is 
to review those studies that investigate contractual saving 
specifically: again with the intention of making an assess- 
ment of their relevance to this particular study of life 
insurance. These studies fall into two main groups: non- 
insurance contractual saving and saving through life insurance. 
Alan R. Roe (48) defines contractual saving as saving 
flow "which is predetermined in the sense of being dependent 
on a decision of a previous period". In practice, only two 
financial transactions are normally defined as contractual 
saving; these are the payment of life insurance premiums 
(including contributions to pension schemes) and the repay- 
ment of capital sums in respect of house-purchase loans. One 
of the outstanding features of these contractual savings is 
their stability when examined over a period of time. 
But, this conventional definition of contractual saving 
is inaccurate. First, to take up Neumann's point in Section 
4.4, life insurance premiums paid in respect of policies taken 
out in the current period are rather different from premiums 
paid in respect of policies taken out in some past period. 
Roe comments that, 
"The former will be contractual in respect of 
subsequent periods, but are scarcely contractual in respect of the current periods since they are 
not predetermined as the result of a savings decision of a previous period. " 
In Chapter Nine, these initial premiums will be further exam- 
ined (in the context of surrendering policyholders) and will 
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be redefined as 'Not Yet Contractual' payments. 
The second deficiency of the conventional definition 
of contractual saving is that it excludes a number of smaller 
but significant items like the accumulation of shares and 
deposits in building societies, unit trusts and National 
Savings Treasury Securities (eg. SAYE) over a number of years 
at some pre-agreed rate of accumulation. In his article, 
Roe proceeds to examine building society shares which involve 
a commitment to regular saving (these shares generally amount 
to around 3% of total building society shares outstanding). 
Unfortunately, Roe's conclusions are not encouraging, 
or indeed very helpful. It would appear that over the 
period of his study (1958-67) building society shares involv- 
ing a contractual commitment exhibited greater instability 
than those without any contractual commitment. Roe 
advances a number of explanations of this absurd phenomenon 
and concludes that "the possibilities for making use of the 
contractual nature of the saving inflow for forecasting may 
be non-existent". 
Although his study of the consumption of non-durable 
goods is not explicitly concerned with contractual payments, 
Cheng (10) hypothesises that these payments (contractual 
savings plus durable goods financing) have surreptitiously 
affected consumption expenditures for non-durable goods and 
services. Allowance is made for these contractual pay- 
ments by deducting them from current disposable income to 
give the actual income available for expenditure on non- 
durables. Cheng concludes that, 
"The increased contractual commitments of con- 
sumers' disposable income has increased the 
income elasticity of demand for non-durables, 
and the demand for non-durables has become 
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more cyclical than in the past. " 
The second (and major) group of works studying contractual 
savings/payments comprises those empirical studies of the 
purchase of life insurance, the majority of which have been 
summarised by C. Ferry (16) and J. Finley Lee and W. M. 
Whitaker (33). The remainder of this Chapter will be 
devoted to an illumination of the major features of these 
studies (which relate, without exception, to the U. S. A. life 
insurance industry). Note however, that all these models 
are open to the criticisms of A. Deaton (11) Ch. 2, especially 
the problems involved in aggregation over consumers. Essen- 
tially, there is no guarantee, even if every single consumer 
in the economy behaved according to the predictions of some 
utility theory, that their aggregate behaviour will likewise 
conform. Deaton also points out that certain aggregative 
models of demand do not conform to the basic propositions 
of utility theory (which he describes as homogeneity, symmetry, 
negativity and budget constraint). 
The following models of the purchase of life insurance 
fall into two clear-cut groups: those concerned with the 
'demand' for life insurance and those attempting to explain 
the importance of saving via the medium of life insurance. 
All the models are, however, subject to the same criticism: 
that, by failing to distinguish clearly between the saving 
and protection (consumption) elements of life insurance, 
they oversimplify the analysis. This is especially true 
of the second group of models where a failure to strip out 
the expenses loadings from office premiums can result in a 
gross overestimation of the importance of saving flow in the 
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so-called 'savings-based' policies (this point will become 
more obvious in Chapter Six). 
An additional major criticism of the first group of 
models is that they all neglect any possible identification 
problems caused by the exclusion of the Supply equation 
from the model. Thus it is conceivable that, instead of 
measuring a Demand relationship, they are measuring Supply 
instead (this point will be taken up more fully in Chapter 
Seven). 
We note that only the models of the second group are 
properly aimed at an analysis of Contractual Saving since, 
by their very nature, the Demand models are concerned with 
new purchases of 'Not Yet Contractual' Life Insurance. 
One of the first studies investigating the effects of 
inflation on life insurance seems to have been undertaken 
by D. B. Houston (25) in 1960. Houston's objective was to 
determine the existence and extent of any empirical relation- 
ship between changes in the price level and the pattern of 
savings through life insurance (which were defined as the 
net increase in life insurance company reserves in any given 
year). In particular, Houston related the proportion of 
premiums devoted to saving to the Consumer Price Index and 
determined the following relationship for 1946-58: 
Change in reserve x 100 
= 92.5 - (0.5277) CPI Premiums 
(k. 5.1) 
He therefore concludes that since 1946, there has been a 
steady decrease in the relative importance of saving through 
life insurance. Houstons results are difficult to 
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interpret however, because of a number of criticisms, the 
major one from our point of view being that he does not 
differentiate between renewal premium income and new 
premium income (and so confuses contractual and non- 
contractual elements). His results are also open to 
doubt because of the extreme simplicity of his model. 
A. E. Hofflander and R. M. Duvall (24) consider that 
inflation would have two separate effects on the demand for 
life insurance: first, an 'income effect' which causes 
the total purchases of insurance to decrease because real 
income has decreased. Secondly, there might be a 'sub- 
stitution effect' where term insurance (protection-based) 
may increasingly be substituted for part of the savings- 
based life insurance. However, as Neumann (44) p. 125 
points out, the Hofflander/Duvall indifference analysis 
can have a number of interpretations entirely unconnected 
with inflation. In particular, the Hofflander/Duvall 
analysis depends on at least two critical factors: 
i) that higher anticipated rates of future 
inflation increase the price of real pro- 
tection but not that of Other Goods and 
Services; 
ii) that the income consumption curve (between 
sales of protection and savings-based 
insurance) has positive first and second 
derivatives. 
Hofflander and Duvall then proceed to derive a model to 
explain the 'total issuance of savings-based life insurance' 
(Yt) 
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k 
ie. Yt 
= 
A0 + A1 Xlt+s + 
1E 
AiXit + Ut 
(4.5.2) 
where the A's are unknown coefficients, xýt+s is the 
anticipated price level at time t+s and the other Xi 
include population, births and per capita income. Two 
different models of expected price level were used: 
i) where the price level at time t+s consists of 
a trend term plus a function of the current 
difference between the actual price level and 
the trend ie. 
XIt+s 
= 
b0 + b1(t+s) + b2(Xit-bO-bit) 
where X1t denotes the Consumer Price Index. 
ii) where the price level at time t was given by a 
weighted average of past levels(3) ie. 
Xýt 
= 
bXit + b(1-b)Xit-'I + b(1-b) 2X'It-2 + 
... 
In both models, the coefficient of CPI was negative (however 
the results of the second model must be treated with caution 
as the model was misspecified by the omission of other lagged 
explanatory variables). 
Both models were then repeated for sales of protection- 
based life insurance and similar results were obtained. They 
therefore conclude that the 'income effect' has been stronger 
than any 'substitution effect'. 
The model of J. Hammond, D. Houston and E. Melander 
(21) differs from the others because it is based on cross- 
section rather than time-series data. An attempt is made 
(3)This type of model was first introduced by L. M. Koyck (32) in 1954. 
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to examine the relationships between life insurance premium 
expenditures and various economic and demographic character- 
istics of households. This is achieved by postulating a 
model of the form: 
k 
P=a+E b1X. 
i=1 
where P refers to the amount of money expended by house- 
holds for life insurance premiums, and the various explana- 
tory variables include income, net worth, education, age, 
marital status and occupation. 
The Hammond, Houston and Melander results are, however, 
unsuitable for comparison with the present ones because 
i) a cross-section study measures long-run 
elasticity coefficients while a time-series 
study examines the short-run; 
ii) new premium income and renewal premium income 
are aggregated; 
iii) premium income on all types of life insurance 
(both saving and protection based) are aggre- 
gated; and 
iv) the model produces poor results in any case. 
The work by Neumann (44) and (4-5) seems to be the most 
rigorous examination to date of the purchase of life insur- 
ance. The hypothesis tested is that there was no signifi- 
cant effect of the post-war American inflation on saving 
through life insurance: time series data was used from 
1946 to 1964. 
Neumann introduces a price expectations variable into 
his analysis which incorporates the basis of the adaptive 
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expectations approach of M. Nerlove (43). A Koyck model 
is then utilised to produce: 
n 
LT 
= a0 + a, PT + a2LT_, + biXiT + UT 
i=1 
(4.5.3) 
where LT is 'some measure of saving through life insurance', 
PT is the price level (Consumer Price Index) at time T and 
the XiT are additional explanatory factors such as births, 
disposable income and marriages. At first sight, it would 
seem that Neumann's model is subject to the same specifica- 
tion error as the model of Hofflander and Duvall: to quote 
Fortune (17), 
"(Neumann) uses the 'adaptive expectations' model 
of the expected price level in an appropriate 
manner which gives rise to a specification error 
in the form of excluding the lagged values of all 
non-price level explanatory variables in his 
demand function. " 
However, Neumann comments in a later footnote that these 
lagged explanatory variables had in fact been included but 
their coefficients were found not to be significant. More- 
over, the omission of the lagged explanatory variables did 
not change the coefficients of Equation (4.5.3). 
Neumann undertook several different investigations 
using the model of Equation (4.5.3) with various measures 
of the dependent variable LT. The model was also tested 
in a first difference form. The objective of these differ- 
ent approaches was to test whether inflation not only caused 
a contraction of the total purchases of life insurance but 
also whether there was a shift from savings-based to 
protection-based life insurance. In general, Neumann's 
models confirmed his original hypothesis that inflation 
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(over the period of the study) had no discernable effect 
on saving through life insurance. 
In his critique of Neumann's study, Peter Fortune (17) 
hypothesises a model that makes allowance for the effects 
of both higher price levels and also higher expected rates 
of inflation. Thus, denoting the implicit nominal yield 
on 'saving through life insurance' asp 
, 
Fortune suggests 
a model of the following kind: 
Z= a0 + a1 P+ a2RINF* + a3(p-R) + a4(R-RINF*) 
+ a5Y* + a6W_1 
(L. 5.4) 
where R denotes the market rate of interest on financial 
assets; 
RINF* 
- 
the expected rate of inflation; 
Y* 
- 
'permanent' real disposable labour income 
of households, ie. the amount of income 
lost if the individual should die; 
W-1 
- 
the initial real financial assets of 
households other than wealth in insurance; 
and L- life insurance policy reserves per dollar 
of insurance. 
Fortune then assumes that the expected rate of future 
inflation is formed through the adaptive expectations mech- 
anism, and then tests his model over the period 19531 to 
19671V. He comes to the following conclusions: 
a) an increase in Y* reduces the ratio L by a 
small amount; 
b) the coefficient of W_1 is not significant; 
c) L is positively related to the level of 
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expected future prices; and. 
d) the impact of RINF* on L through its effects 
on expected future price levels is also positive. 
The basic objective of the G. Mantis and R. Farmer 
(37) paper is to facilitate quick and easy predictions of 
the demand for life insurance. The basic features of their 
model are similar to those of preceding models except in 
the one respect: instead of using marriages and births as 
explanatory variables, the 8-year period lag of marriages 
and 2-year lag of births were used (the lags being deter- 
mined by maximising simple correlation with the dependent 
variable). Other independent variables were: 
Price of life insurance relative to other consumer 
prices (this figure was computed by comparing the 
CPI to a composed price index for life insurance); 
Personal income; 
Population; and 
Employment. 
The dependent variable was described as 'Sales of Life 
Insurance' and it is supposed that this refers to sums 
insured in force each year. Consequently, the conclusions 
of this model cannot really be of value to this present 
study. In addition, the model must be regarded of dubious 
value because öf the negative coefficients of the Births, 
Marriages and Employment variables as well as a positive 
coefficient of Relative Prices (which were not explained 
by Mantis and Farmer). 
The first model of J. Lee and W. Whitaker (34) is 
especially interesting because of the inclusion of an 
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explanatory variable that no previous study had considered: 
"Life insurance in force was incorporated in 
order that the effect of the existing stock of 
life insurance on additional purchases might 
be measured 
- 
in other words, to test for sig- 
nificant market saturation. " 
This inclusion of the 'stock' of life insurance fits exactly 
with the stock adjustment model of Houthakker and Taylor 
(26). It is interesting to note that this variable turned 
out to be insignificant for all types of life insurance 
except industrial life (where multiple-policy purchases are 
fairly common 
- 
at least in the UK). 
Lee and Whitaker then proceed to build a simultaneous 
equation model in order to explain sales of ordinary, group 
and industrial life insurances. The parameters were then 
estimated by the method of three-stage least squares. The 
main conclusions were that there was not a great deal of 
inter-industry competitiveness(between the different types 
of life insurance). Income was found to have a positive 
effect on purchases while the CPI had a negative effect. 
The second model of Lee and Whitaker (35) attempts to 
measure the income elasticity of new life insurance sums 
insured by fitting a time-series model of the form: 
Z= P 01 
.Yß. C 
where 
L- Life insurance purchases 
P- Population 
y- Disposable personal income, and 
C- Consumer Price Index. 
The results confirm those of their previous study and the 
method throws no new light on methodology. 
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In his study of optimal life insurance, P. Fortune 
(18) develops a theoretical framework based on the expected 
utility hypothesis. This theoretical model implies that 
the optimal amount of net life insurance for protection 
purchases (defined as life insurance in force less policy 
reserves) depends on three key variables: the amount of 
real per capita wage and salary income, the amount of real 
per capita non-human wealth (W) and the real rate of discount 
(R). Fortune's model predicts (as do the results of 
Section 2.8) that the coefficient of W be negative. 
The actual model tested by Fortune is linear/logarithmic 
using quarterly time-series data from 19641 to 1971 IV 
log(NINS/Np) = A0 + A1 logICS + A21og(W/Np) + 
A3log(WAGE/Np) + A4log(R-XINF) 
(4.5.5) 
where NINS/Np denotes the amount of real per capita net 
insurance ; 
ICS 
- 
an index of Consumer Sentiment; 
W/Np 
- 
real per capita net worth; 
WAGE/Np 
- 
real per capita wage income; 
R-XINF 
- 
the yield on corporate bonds less the 
expected rate of inflation (derived 
from the study of M. Feldstein and 
0. Eckstein (11))" 
Fortune used the Almon polynomial distribution lag tech- 
nique (see S. Almon (1)) to capture lags in the response to 
changes in W, WAGE and R. Furthermore, inflation has 
a significantly negative effect on demand via its influence 
on the Index of Consumer Sentiment. 
- 
170 
- 
The model of Headen and Lee (22), like that of Hamburger 
(20) concentrates on the purchase of life insurance as part 
of the household's portfolio behaviour: "life insurance 
demand may be determined, at least partially, by household 
financial asset decisions". Headen and Lee (22) then pro- 
ceed to use a cost model of the process of portfolio adjust- 
ment where the household is assumed to purchase a combina- 
tion of four assets (Yk): corporate stocks and bonds, 
money, time deposits and ordinary life insurance (measured 
by new sums insured). The 'target' level of any given 
asset is assumed to be principally dependent on variables 
influencing the household's portfolio behaviour (Zi): net 
savings, consumer sentiment, market yields and a stock 
market price index. These hypotheses are combined into a 
model of the form: 
44 
Ykt =E biZit +E aYt-, + Ut k=1, .. 14 
i=1 j=1 
where Y denotes the consumers' holdings of asset k at 
time t and Zi refer to the dependent variables described 
above. 
The final model described in this Section is one that 
attempts to analyse the determinants of the purchase of life 
insurance by young married couples (D. Anderson and J. Nevin 
(2) ). Information was gathered from a survey of 230 couples 
between 1968 and 1971. The principle results of this study 
suggest that middle income households purchase less life 
insurance than either lower or higher income households. 
Additionally, 'expected income' explained more variation in 
the amount of insurance purchased than did current income: 
this emphasises Friedman's view of the importance of permanent 
income. 
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4.6 Saving and Protection 
There are a number of interesting conclusions to be 
drawn from the preceding Sections and here, we concentrate 
on those relating to the distinction between saving and 
protection in life insurance. 
None of the models examined in Section 4.5 effectively 
distinguish between protection-based and savings-based life 
insurance. Thus some studies aggregated life insurance 
purchases as if life insurance contracts were homogeneous 
(eg. Houston; Hammond, Houston and Melander; Mantis and 
Farmer). Even the more specific studies (such as Hofflander 
and Duvall; Fortune; Neumann) overlooked the fact that 
savings-based life insurance commonly incorporates an ele- 
ment of protection. 
It has already been pointed out near the beginning of 
Section 4.5 that the models of the purchase of life insur- 
ance fall into two fairly clear-cut groups: those concerned 
with the demand for life insurance and those explaining 
saving via the medium of life insurance. Both of these 
models need to clearly establish the difference between 
protection-based and savings-based life insurance because 
these two aspects behave in different ways and are affected 
by different factors. 
The distinction between protection-based and savings- 
based life insurance is of special interest since Hofflander 
and Duvall (24) (and later Neumann (44) ) have hypothesised 
that they are co-determinant. A similar argument (expressed 
in a slightly different form) is taken up by Lee and 
Whitaker (34) where the sales of one type of life insurance 
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product (say ordinary) were possibly determined by the sales 
of other product types (eg. industrial and group). 
It seems possible that protection-based and savings- 
based life insurance could indeed be substitutes as Hofflander 
and Duvall hypothesise. For example, it is immediately 
obvious from the definition of non-lifetime saving via life 
insurance (Section 2.3) that a decrease in either income or 
wealth would cause the consumer to shift his bequesting em- 
phasis from savings-type to protection-type (because of the 
'indemnity' definition of protection). Hofflander and 
Duvall suggest a similar response as an effect of inflation. 
On the other hand, a complementary relationship between 
saving and protection also seems possible given that savings 
and protection elements are often incorporated in the same 
contract. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
There are a number of important additional conclusions 
to be drawn from this review of the various models of con- 
sumption and saving. These conclusions relate principally 
to the factors, variables and models that might be applied 
to explain the purchase of UK life insurance., 
a) Contractual versus Not Yet Contractual 
Although it does not seem to be a universal approach, 
most studies separated the data on new contracts and exist- 
ing contracts. A study of the existing contracts would 
therefore capture the influence of contractual saving, where- 
as an examination of new contracts of life insurance will 
have both elements of discretionary and contractual saving. 
b) Measures of Saving 
There seems to be controversy over how saving through 
life insurance should be defined (eg. see J. Kindahl (31)). 
Additionally there seems to be considerable disagreement 
on how the more basic demand for life insurance should be 
measured. If we are concerned with new life insurance 
purchases then the possible measures include: 
- 
new premium income (eg. Neumann) 
- 
new sums insured 
- 
numbers of new policies 
- 
increases in policy reserves (eg. Fortune) 
Our basic concern is over consumers' expenditure on 
life insurance and therefore the first or the last items 
in the above list are the most relevant. However, both 
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items are subject to measurement difficulties: these will 
be discussed in greater detail in Chapters Five and Six 
where an attempt will be made to modify new premium income 
so as to produce a more relevant measure of consumption and 
saving through life insurance. 
c) Income 
Virtually all the models of Section 4.5 include dis- 
posable income as a determinant of the purchase of life 
insurance. Cheng (10) implies that this should be dispos- 
able income net of contractual commitments. Other authors 
(eg. Anderson and Nevin (2) and Fortune (18) )note that 
this should be Friedman's Permanent Income. Surrey (51) 
notes that the source of the income may be important. 
d) Variables specifically affecting Saving 
Some of the models have variables that specifically 
aim to explain saving through life insurance rather than 
just life insurance purchases in general (which also include 
consumption). These additional variables are derived from 
either simple Keynesian theory (and so include income, 
wealth and the rate of interest) or from portfolio behaviour 
models (relative yields, stock market index, consumer con- 
fidence). 
e) Variables specifically affecting Protection 
Similarly, some models have variables that seek, prin- 
cipally to explain the purchase of protection-based life 
insurance. These include unemployment, births, marriages, 
number of children, age of consumer and wealth. 
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f) Inflation 
The majority of time series models allow partially for 
inflation by discounting monetary values by some price index 
and by calculating market yields in real terms. This pro- 
cedure makes the implicit assumption of zero money illusion- 
in the Patinkin sense. However some studies allow infla- 
tion to directly affect purchases of life insurance (ie. 
assuming some degree of money illusion); however there 
seems to be disagreement on whether the rate of inflation 
(eg. Fortune (18)) or the price level should feature as the 
explanatory variable. 
Expectations 
Of course those models using permanent income as an 
explanatory variable automatically allow for income expec- 
tations. 
Three other authors also include expectations of future 
prices (Hofflander and Duvall; Neumann; Fortune) however 
only Hofflander and Duvall, and Fortune attempt to carry 
these expectations into the future: Fortune attempts this 
by using the expected rate of inflation (rather than the 
current expected price level as used by Neumann). 
Price expectations are mainly formulated by the 'adapt- 
ive-expectations' method although survey-based expectations 
(similar to those generated by J. A. Carlson and M. Parkin 
(8))were used by Fortune (18). 
h) Results 
One of the major features of the results from the pre- 
ceding models (viewed as a whole) is their variability: 
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although most of the studies were conducted over the same 
time period on U. S. A. data they occasionally report widely 
differing results. In addition, many models indicate 
that sales of life insurance are very sensitive to changes 
in the explanatory variables. 
Another feature of the models of Section 4.5 is their 
obvious statistical susceptibility: most models indicate 
considerable multicollinearity between explanatory variables 
as well as a significant degree of autocorrelation of res- 
iduals (in the time-series cases). Alternatively, the 
models have very low R figures (eg. Anderson and Nevin) 
or have poor predictive ability. 
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4.8 Implications 
It has already been stated that this study is con- 
cerned with an analysis of consumers' expenditure on life 
insurance. Later Chapters will attempt to build a demand 
model to explain these purchases of life insurance. As 
a result of this emphasis of the later Chapters, our atten- 
tion will be focussed on the determinants of new life 
insurance acquisitions. Consequently, the models of the pre- 
ceding Section, using new premium income as the dependent 
variable, provide the best examples of existing work on 
similar lines. 
An analysis of the existing models has yielded much 
information on possible relationships and explanatory var- 
iables. This will be of great use when we come to derive 
our own demand model to explain the purchase of new life 
insurance. 
The models of Section Five can be criticised as no one 
of them gives proper consideration to the two main reasons 
for the purchase of life insurance: financial saving and 
protection of dependents. It is important to separate these 
two elements since they will be affected by differing sets 
of factors and some individual factors may well have a 
positive effect on one element but a negative effect on the 
other. Chapters Seven and Eight are concerned with formu- 
lating a demand model of life insurance which distinguishes 
between the two elements: saving and protection. Addition- 
ally we will also be interested in examining the character- 
istics of saving via the medium of life insurance. However, 
before that can be accomplished, the saving and consumption 
elements of new office premium income must be separated and 
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that task is undertaken in Chapters Five and Six. 
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CHAPTER FIVE : CONSUMPTION AND FINANCIAL 
SAVING IN STANDARD LIFE 
INSURANCE CONTRACTS 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Two the generalised distinction between 
consumption and lifetime saving was discussed and it was 
demonstrated that bequesting flow can be classified both 
as consumption and as 'non-lifetime' saving, depending on 
the nature of the bequest. Life insurance was included 
in the analysis as solely a vehicle for bequest and it was 
assumed that any lifetime saving was via a bank deposit. 
In this Chapter, we will be mainly concerned with two 
extensions first, in order to examine contracts of life 
insurance that include elements of lifetime saving (eg. 
endowment and pure endowment contracts) and second, to 
further examine the financial savings content of all the 
standard life insurance contracts (temporary, whole of 
life and endowment). 
Throughout this Chapter we will assume that the sub- 
ject of the life insurance and the policyholder are one 
and the same person. Similarly we will not be concerned 
with joint-life, group-life or 'second-hand' life insurance 
contracts. Whenever specific mention is made of the life 
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insurance industry the emphasis is laid on ordinary life 
insurance rather then industrial life. 
(') 
Particular attention will be paid to the difference 
between financial saving flows and financial savings stocks: 
thus when talking about saving flow we are interested in 
that proportion of the life insurance premium that consti- 
tutes financial saving flow. When referring to savings 
stocks, we mean the capitalised built-up value of saving 
inflow held by the insurer in trust for the policyholder. 
The objectives of Chapter Five are two-fold: first, 
to develop a formularisation of the financial savings/ 
consumption distinction for life insurance premiums and 
funds. Second, to develop the saving/consumption dist- 
inction so that it may be applied to collective life insur- 
ance data. Chapter Six will be devoted to a description 
of the available life insurance data along with its actual 
breakdown into savings and consumption elements using the 
results of this Chapter. 
(')The terms joint-life, group-life, ordinary and industrial 
are further explained in R. L. Carter (ed) (3). The 
second-hand market for life insurance is described by 
J. Gaselee (5). 
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5.2 PIA Saving 
At this point . it seems appropriate to introduce a 
new definition of the type of saving that can result when 
there is a time lag between purchase and consumption. We 
shall say that Payment in Advance (PIA) Saving occurs when 
payment (ie. expenditure on specific goods and services) 
is in advance of anticipated future consumption. Thus 
saving arises not from any positive decision (on the part 
of the individual) to set money aside himself but from 
the method of payment for future consumption (which involves 
acquiring proprietorial rights). The other main form of 
saving, derived from a conscious voluntary decision to set 
money aside, out of income, to cover some form of future 
expenditure will be called 'free' saving. 
Payment in Advance Saving has several peculiar char- 
acteristics: first, while PIA saving can arise from a 
voluntary and intentional decision on the part of the 
individual to purchase some time ahead of consumption (as 
for example, in the building up of stocks/stores of com- 
modities), it can also arise unintentionally. Thus 
unintentional PIA saving often results from an institution- 
alised pattern of payments (in advance of consumption) 
that are beyond the control of the individual. 
Secondly, the main difference between PIA saving and 
all other types of saving is that PIA saving occurs through 
the process of making a purchase: the resultant stock of 
'savings' are thus tied up in goods and services and not 
in terms of money and other fairly liquid financial claims 
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(the money being transferred to the vendor of the goods 
and services). 
Thirdly, the whole of PIA saving is unintentional 
to the extent that the primary objective of the individ- 
ual lies in consumption and not in saving as a means of 
allocating the flow of Disposable Income. Thus PIA 
saving is not trading in commodities: goods and services 
are bought to hold and ultimately to consume. 
Consequently, although theoretically defined as 
'saving', PIA saving will not be viewed as such by the 
individual but as expenditure (as if for current consump- 
tion). Another aspect of PIA saving is that it will 
always be followed by an equal and opposite amount of dis- 
saving if we take a time span long enough for the comple- 
tion of consumption. 
Finally, if we carry the argument of payment in 
advance of consumption to its logical extreme, then it 
would seem that most transactions would involve PIA saving 
because very few goods or services are 'currently consumed' 
to the extent that consumption starts instantaneously 
after purchase. In Keynesian macroeconomics the problem 
does not arise because emphasis is placed on consumption 
expenditure rather than on consumption. However, an 
acceptable alternative is to replace 'instantaneously 
after purchase' with something like 'within a reasonable 
period of purchase'. The problem then boils down to 
defining this reasonable period after purchase: obviously 
the length of this period would depend on the commodity 
in question. Consequently, any expenditure on a good or 
- 
188 
- 
service, not consumed within a 'reasonable period' would 
constitute PIA saving. So, we may split income flows 
in the following way: 
Income 
_ flow 
Consumption 
expenditures (within a 
reasonable 
period) 
+ 
Consumption 
expenditures (not within 
a reasonable 
period) (PIA saving) 
+ Free 
saving 
The second main element in the flow of personal sav- 
ing has already been introduced 
- 
Free saving; this 
arises from a decision to set money aside out of the flow 
of income in order to build up a stock of savings 
- 
held 
in the form of financial claims. 
(2) 
Although there are many different ways of subdividing 
free saving (for example, according to the liquidity of 
the resultant stock of savings), it is convenient (when 
later thinking about applications to insurance) to clas- 
sify by uses of the savings stock. Thus, money from the 
flow of income may be withdrawn completely from the econ- 
omy by the saver and held as coin and notes. Alternatively, 
the saver may intend to hold the equivalent of notes and 
coin (where the interest yield to the saver is zero) but 
in fact, the money is returned to the circular flow (eg. 
through the use of a current account in a joint-stock 
bank). Thirdly, the non-consumption expenditure income 
(2)A financial claim can be defined as 'a claim to the pay- 
ment of a future sum of money and/or a periodic payment 
of money'. J. Revell (25) Ch. 2. 
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may be returned directly to the economy, by the direct 
or indirect purchase of non-money financial claims; in 
this case the saver can expect to receive a positive 
money interest return on his savings. In future, this 
last element will be referred to as 'Financial' saving. 
We can sum up this Section in the following form: 
Income 
flow + +I Free 
saving 
Consumption 
expenditures (within a 
reasonable 
period) 
No interest 
yield. Not 
returned to 
circular 
flow 
Consumption 
expenditures (not within 
a reasonable 
period) (PIA saving) 
No interest 
yield. But 
returned to 
circular 
flow 
'Financial' 
savings 
- interest 
yielding 
Finally, we note from Chapter Two that Financial saving 
can be divided into two further forms: 'lifetime' and 
ninon-lifetime'. 
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5.3 Temporary Life Insurance 
Under a temporary life insurance contract, the pay- 
ment of benefits to the policyholder occurs only if the 
policyholder dies within a prespecified time period 
(called the 'term' of the policy and assumed in general 
to be n years). Thus temporary life insurance is ideally 
suitable for the provision of protection-type bequests 
since the time-scale problem of Section 2.3 can be solved 
by equating n with (x*-x) where x is the inception age 
of the policyholder and x* is the age after which no 
protection for dependents is required. 
Unlike the situation portrayed in Chapter Two however, 
temporary life insurance is normally arranged on a level 
premium basis so that all the premium instalments are 
identical. We will also assume that all temporary life 
insurances have a fixed sum insured. This assumption is 
particularly necessary when examining endowment life 
insurance although, in practice, it is quite common to 
find sums insured that decline throughout the term of the 
temporary life policy. 
As far as temporary life insurance is concerned the 
following table summarises the protection/savings distinc- 
tion: 
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Figure 5.3.1. The Structure of Temporary Life Insurance 
Term 
0..... (x*-x) 
..... 
Protection 
Sum B* Insured 
'Non-lifetime' 
Saving 
'Non-lifetime' 
Saving 
'Non-lifetime' 
Saving 
where B* is the upper bound on the sum insured for pro- 
tection purposes. 
However, it will be assumed for the future that 
temporary life insurance is not purchased for a term 
exceeding (x*-x) (so dispensing with the North-east and 
South-east quadrants). This assumption is not such an 
unreasonable one because: 
- 
it seems unlikely that the need for a saving- 
type*bequest will cease after age x+n; 
- 
it does not seem sensible that the policyholder 
pays money for a saving-type bequest that may 
not be made (if he lives beyond age x+n) (this 
is the 'survival risk' of Section 2.5) ; 
- 
there are other less risky mediums (from the 
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point of view of the preceding comment) 
for saving-type bequests (again, see Section 
2.5). 
Additionally, it will be assumed again that temp- 
orary life insurance is not purchased for a sum insured 
in excess of B*. This assumption, while not necessarily 
having any strong theoretical justification, is a useful 
simplifying one: 
- 
even if the bequest level (ie. sum insured) 
were allowed to vary with age, the need to 
deal with a level premium makes further 
analysis very difficult if the type of be- 
quest varies from age to age. One approach 
however, would be to allocate a part of each 
premium (independent of the size of premium) 
to saving corresponding to the relationship 
between the bequest (B) and B* ; 
- 
the assumption of a constant sum insured 
makes the situation very difficult if it is 
not assumed that the sum insured is less than 
B*(x) for all relevant ages x; 
- 
again it does not seem sensible that the 
policyholder pa3s money for a saving-type be- 
quest that may not be made ; 
_ 
again there are less risky alternatives avail- 
able. 
Essentially, the above points concerning the valid- 
ity of temporary life insurance for saving-type bequests 
relate back to Section 2.5. These points can be taken 
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to mean that in the Friedman and Savage analysis of that 
Section the policyholder is more risk-averse in relation 
to bequests for savings purposes (ie. risk-averse in the 
sense that the policyholder dislikes the possibility that 
the intended provision for bequest will be 'wasted' if 
he survives). Thus it is more probable that a bequest 
for non-lifetime savings purposes will be made via a bank 
deposit rather than by using temporary life insurance. 
The effect of the above assumptions is to preclude 
the purchase of temporary life insurance for any other 
reasons than for the provision of protection for heirs 
and dependents. 
Additionally we note from Section 5.2 that as the 
payment of benefits under temporary life insurance is 
conditional on the occurrence of death within the term of 
the policy, that policy cannot be considered as a finan- 
cial claim: 
"For a contractual right to receive a future 
payment, either of a lump sum or of periodic 
interest, to rank as a financial claim the 
promise to pay must be unconditional. " (Revell (15) p. 31) 
Thus the purchase of a temporary life insurance policy 
cannot be termed ', Free' saving and this reinforces our 
intuitive allocation of temporary insurance to the pro- 
vision of protection. 
In summary we can conclude that any temporary life 
insurance premiums paid by the policyholder are for pro- 
tection purposes and therefore count as consumption. 
Thus since temporary insurance is the basic building 
block of most other life insurances, it is only necessary 
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to separate out the temporary insurance element in order 
to ascertain that part of a particular life insurance 
contract that provides protection: the remainder there- 
fore counts as saving. 
(3) 
However, there is one further issue that arises 
especially if the term of the temporary contract exceeds 
one year. The above analysis and that of Chapter Two 
have allocated the entire temporary life premium to con- 
sumption irrespective of the term of the contract. If 
we assume a level premium system for simplicity (although 
the same arguments apply for non-level premiums) then, 
in most years, the actual risk premium (to cover the risk 
of death in that year) will differ from the overall level 
premium: in the early years of the contract, the level 
premium (which is a weighted 'average' of the risk premiums) 
will exceed the premium for a one-year temporary policy 
while in the later policy years, the reverse applies. 
Thus (in the early years) only a part of the level pre- 
mium actually covers the risk of death in that year and 
it has been argued (eg. by Neumann (14), H. Levy and J. 
Kahane (10) and Kindahl (9) ) that the balance must there- 
fore represent saving. However this is seen to be unhelp- 
ful for two main reasons: 
- 
because payment to cover the risk of death is 
not necessarily identical to payment for pro- 
tection in any one year; 
- 
the balance between the level premium and the 
rising annual premium can be regarded as PIA 
(3)The 
same basic approach is used by other authors such 
as S. Neumann (14) and J. K. Kindahl (9). 
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saving and is therefore more akin to con- 
sumption than financial saving. 
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5.4 PIA Saving and Temp orary Life Insurance 
Although it has been demonstrated that, in practice, 
Free Saving is unlikely in a temporary life insurance 
contract, Payment in Advance Saving does occur: 
"But the term premium includes an element of 
saving as well. Since the probability of death increases with age over a larger range 
of ages, the annual premium ought to rise in 
accordance. Instead, insurers divide the 
premium equally over the whole period to charge 
a level premium. As a result, the policy- 
holder pays in excess of the true premium in 
the first years of the policy and rather less 
in the subsequent years. " (4) 
We can represent the above effect for a level premium 
temporary life insurance pictorially in Figure 5.4.1. C5ý 
We assume that the premiums in Figure 5.4.1 are actu- 
arially fair and also that the rates of interest and 
mortality used in the premium calculation are equivalent 
to those actually experienced by the life office. Note 
that if the imputed rate of interest were zero then the 
two diagonally shaded areas would be equal in size. 
The picture for any generalised temporary life insur- 
ance with non-constant annual premium is more complex, 
but has the basic similarity that the shaded area above 
the rising one-year premium line is equal to the area 
below at zero rate of interest (see Figure 5.4.2). How- 
ever, there is little to be gained from this complication 
and it will hence be assumed that all premiums are paid 
on the level annual premium basis. 
(4) 
Levy and Kahane (9) 
- (5)See G. Clayton and W. Osborn (4) p. 46 
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Figure 5.4.1 Temporary Life Insurance Level Premium 
Pure 
premi ums 
per £1 
sum ins- 
ured. 
T* 
evel Annual 
remi um 
Policy 
Term 
Source : Clayton and Osborn (4) p46 
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Figure 5.4.2 Temporary Life Insurance Non-Level Premiums 
Pure 
premiums 
per fl 
sum ins- 
ured. 
, 
nnual 
remium 
Policy 
Term 
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Now, using our definition of PIA saving it is ob- 
vious that in Figures 5.4.1 and 5.4.2, PIA saving con- 
stitutes that part of consumption expenditure (ac) that 
is not consumed within the (undefined) reasonable time 
period (ie. ab). Similarly when the rising one-year 
premium exceeds the level premium, PIA dissaving occurs. 
The position becomes a little more complicated when 
we come on to consider the PIA savings stock at time oc. 
If we assume that the imputed rate of interest is equal 
to zero, then the PIA savings stock at time oc is given 
by the shaded area to the left of the vertical line ac. 
PIA saving continues till time oT*, where the stock of 
PIA Savings held in trust by the life office for the 
policyholder is at a maximum. After time oT*, PIA dis- 
saving commences until, at the end of the policy term, 
the stock of PIA avings is exhausted. 
Complications arise when the restrictive assumption 
of zero rates of interest is relaxed. The resultant 
situation is pictured in Figure 5.4.3: as soon as a 
positive rate of interest is introduced into the level 
pure premium calculation the resultant PIA savings stock 
cannot be determined diagrammatically. This situation 
arises because the PIA savings stock collected from the 
policyholder (given by the vertically shaded area to the 
left of the line ab, and to be called 'Policyholders PIA 
Savings Stocks') is then supplemented with interest earn- 
ings to give the total PIA savings stock held by the life 
office (to be called 'Office PIA Savings Stocks'). This 
situation is examined in Figure 5.4.4. (6) 
(6)See Clayton and Osborn (4) p. 4$ 
- 
200 
- 
Figure 5.4.3 Temporary Life Insurance Premiums 
(Non-Zero Rates of Interest) 
Pure 
premi ums 
per fl 
sum ins- 
ured. 
'1 premium : 
interest 
'1 premium : 
itive interest 
Policy 
Term 
Note : For simplicity, the rising premium schedule is shown 
unaltered by the difference in interest rates. 
GI^ Ia 
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Figure 5.4.4 PIA Savings Stocks (Temporary Insurance) 
Accumulated 
fund per £1 
sum insured. 
I . Policy Term 
Source : Clayton and Osborn (4) p48 
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From Figure 5.4.4 the accumulated stock of PIA savings 
at time oc is given by cd in the case of accumulation 
without interest (corresponding to the diagonally shaded 
area to the left of the vertical line cd in the Figure 
5.4.3) and ce in the case of accumulation with a positive 
rate of interest. 
It is immediately obvious that the PIA savings stock 
at time oc is equivalent to the reserve value of the 
temporary life insurance at time oc. Since PIA savings 
stocks arise out of an accumulation of past PIA premium 
saving flow, the retrospective reserve valuation method 
should most properly be used to calculate them. 
Let P'x: jj be the level annual premium for a temp- 
orary life insurance of unit sum insured, policy term n 
years, at inception age x. Then using the standard 
mortality table notion, we can say that at inception, 
there were Zx policyholders, dx of whom will die before 
age x+1. 
Let v= (1+i)-1 where i is the imputed calcula- 
tion rate of interest and suppose that time oc is t 
years after inception. 
The rising premiums to provide year to year cover, 
say k years after inception, is then given ( v"dx+k / 
Zx+k), O< k <n where premiums are assumed paid at the 
beginning of each year and claims at the end. 
Then the total PIA saving flow from the Zx+k policy- 
holders alive at age (x+k) is given by: 
Zx+k 
'(P x: R - v'dxx ) per unit sum insured. Z 
x+k 
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Compounding this flow for t years gives the PIA savings 
stocks for each policyholder alive t years after inception: 
t- 1Ei 
1x+k 
' 
(1"x: 
-1 - v"dx+k/lx+k)"('I+')t-k Zx+t k=0 
( 5.4.1) 
Multiplying both numerator and denominator of Equation 
(5.4.1) by vx+t gives 
t-1 
x+ 
, 
x+k+1 1E (v 
"kZx+k'P x: 3 -v 'dx+k) 
x+t Zx+t k=0 
(5.4.2) 
Equation (5.4.2) is identical to the reserve value of a 
temporary life insurance policy (denoted by tV'x: -A) 
calculated retrospectively. This can be rewritten using 
standard commutation function notation to obtain(? 
): 
V' 1, 
-x: = Dx+t (P x: nl. (Nx Nx+t) (Mx Mx+t) 
(5"L. 
"3) 
To make the above analysis slightly more realistic, 
we must allow for the fact that the rates of interest and 
mortality normally used by the life office to calculate 
the pure premiums are fairly conservative. Thus in real 
life, the 'calculation' rate of interest is commonly lower 
than the 'true' rate earned on invested life office funds; 
similarly the 'calculation' rates of mortality are commonly 
(? )See P. F. Hooker and L. H. Longley-Cook (6) p. 110 
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more conservative than the 'true' rates. Until recently 
it has been the practice to regard mortality as generally 
improving over time for all ages, however the most recent 
mortality tables issued by the Institute of Actuaries (8) 
demonstrate that for some ages (notably males between 17 
and 22) this is no longer the case. 
If the balculation' rates of interest and mortality 
(denoted by the presuperscript C) were conservatively 
chosen then the level calculation pure premium will be 
higher than necessary in order to cover future liabilities. 
Then from Equation (5.4.1), the PIA savings stocks at time 
t become: 
TI 
t-1 T Zx+t' CP, 
x: n! -T V" 
T dx+k T lx+k) +Ti t-k 
Zx+t k =O 
(5.4.4) 
where, of course, the rising premium is calculated using 
the true rates of interest and mortality (denoted by pre- 
superscript T). 
Alternatively, Equation (5.4.4) can be expressed as: 
Tv, I (CPO 
. 
(TN TN )- (TM TM )) 
t x: - - TDx+t x: nj x x+t x x+t 
(5.4.5) 
which can be rewritten as 
tV'x: 
I-"x: rýi 
TPýx: & 
'Tax: tý 
(5.4.6) 
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where Täx. "i = 
TNx 
- 
TNx+t 
TD 
X+t 
It is obvious that, at the end of the policy term (ie. 
when t= n), PIA savings stocks are not equal to zero 
when true and calculation rates of interest and mortality 
are unequal. In particular, if the calculation rates 
are conservatively chosen then obviously nV 
x: -nl >0 
(since CPTx: nl >PX: R ) 
The above analysis shows up an important point: 
that by not using true rates of interest and mortality 
to calculate pure premiums, the life office is deliber- 
ately overcharging the policyholder on the pure premium 
basis. However it is also important to examine the 
reasons for this overcharging. In practice, it seems 
likely that life offices deliberately overestimate pure 
premiums in order to provide for surplus, expenses, share- 
holders' profit and a small safety margin to cover 
unexpected fluctuations. This does not appear to be a 
logical procedure since surplus, expenses and shareholders' 
profit can be covered by the loadings in the office Premium. 
(8) 
It will be subsequently assumed that in calculating level 
pure premiums, life offices choose calculation rates of 
interest and mortality that are equal to the best avail- 
able forecast of true (long term) rates of interest and 
mortality at the time of premium calculation. Effectively, 
this is defining the pure premium as that premium just 
(8)It is not current actuarial policy to specifically include a loading to cover fluctuations. This is done by making conservative assumptions on interest and mort- 
ality. I am indebted to Professor R. E. Beard for this 
point. 
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sufficient to cover future liabilities to policyholders 
using the current expected value of long term future 
interest and mortality rates. Any allowance or safety 
margin for deviation between expected and actual rates 
is therefore assumed to be included in the Office Premium 
and not the Pure Premium. Consequently, since TV, 
is the policy reserve based on the pure premium (ie. with 
no loading to cover expenses, profit or a safety margin), 
any excess PIA savings stocks at the end of the policy 
term are purely fortuitous and cannot in any way be re- 
garded as belonging to the policyholder. We will there- 
fore assume that any excess PIA savings stocks are not 
returned to the policyholder in any way but contribute to 
what is sometimes known as the life office's 'Estate'. 
This assumption seems reasonable since, because calcula- 
tion rates are equivalent to the expected future rates of 
interest and mortality, the life office is subject to 
deviation in both directions (so that there is also the 
possibility of negative PIA savings stocks). As we would 
not expect the life office to recover any negative PIA 
savings stocks from the policyholder it seems only fair 
that any excess should not go to the policyholder either. 
One consequence of the above assumption is that pure 
premiums must be regarded as time-specific in the sense 
that the expected long term future rates of interest and 
mortality change with time. Thus when dealing with time- 
specific problems, it is not possible to continue with the 
current industry-wide practice of using out-of-date mort- 
ality tables and conservative interest assumptions since 
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the calculation pure premiums so generated are not truly 
pure but include an element of loading. In Chapter Six, 
when time-specific calculation pure premiums are needed, 
these will be generated with the use of reasonable assump- 
tions about long term future interest and mortality rates 
made at the time of calculation. 
Throughout this Section on temporary life insurance, 
PIA savings generated by pure premiums only have been con- 
sidered; ie. no allowance has been made for the differ- 
ence between pure premiums (as defined) and office premium 
(the amount actually paid by the policyholder). In fact 
the loadings for expenses, profit and safety margin do not 
alter the amount of PIA saving/s inherent in a temporary 
life insurance policy. This is because the payment of 
the loading by the policyholder is widely regarded as con- 
sumption within a 'reasonable' time period: 
"The estimates of consumers' expenditure each year 
on all forms of life assurance are taken to be 
the sum of the expenses of management and share- 
holder's surplus appropriate to life business 
... 
" 
(R. Maurice (12) ) 
and 
"In so far as personal saving consists of individ- 
uals' abstentions from consumption out of income 
it is clear that contributions paid to life 
insurance companies and pension funds are part of 
current savings. But it would be wrong to assume 
that the total saving arising in this way can be 
calculated by simply adding all insurance premiums 
and superannuation payments in a given period. 
The portion of such premiums or contributions 
which are used to pay the costs of administration 
must be allocated to consumption. " (Clayton and Osborn (4) p"26) 
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5.5 Endowment Life Insurance : Saving Flow Theory 
Under an endowment contract the benefits are paid 
either on survival of the life insured to the end of the 
policy term or upon earlier death. Although there is no 
a priori reason why the death benefit and the survival 
benefit should be equal, they will be treated as such 
for the rest of this analysis: in any case most endowment 
business in the UK is undertaken in this fashionC9) 
Thus the n-period non-participating endowment is 
just a combination of an n-period temporary life insurance 
and a fixed lump sum paid out if the policyholder survives 
to the end of the policy term. This fixed sum represents 
lifetime saving stocks while the premium contribution to- 
wards it is simply lifetime saving flow. The non- 
participating endowment life insurance is thus split into 
two parts: protection against premature death (ie. con- 
sumption) and lifetime financial saving. 
If we assume that the lump sum survival benefit is 
fixed(1C) then it automatically follows that the protec- 
tion part of the level pure premium is exactly equal to 
the corresponding temporary life insurance pure level pre- 
mium. Any PIA savings stocks will then be associated 
(9)In fact, endowment life insurance is commonly defined to 
have equal death and survival benefits. For example, 
from P. D. Bacon and L. J. New (2): 
"The sum assured is payable at the expiration 
of a certain period or at earlier death. " 
(1o)This 
assumption is certainly in accord with the normal 
method of calculating the endowment premium, eg. see Hooker and Longley-Cook (6). 
- 
209 
- 
only with the corresponding temporary insurance and can 
be treated in exactly the same way as before. Thus the 
lifetime saving part of the level endowment pure premium 
S. A 
. 
11 
is just given by x: n where A is the symbol for IIx: B X: 
the value of (or the single premium for) a 'pure endowment' 
without return on death within the policy term and S is 
the sum insured. 
However, a non-participating endowment life insurance 
can also be regarded as a combination of a decreasing 
temporary life insurance and an increasing lump sum. This 
viewpoint is taken by Gilling-Smith (3) Section 2.1.2, 
Walter Williams (17) and M. A. Linton (11): 
"because of internal savings resulting from com- 
bining the protection and investment elements 
in one contract, the charge for the (temporary) 
insurance element is lower than the rates on a 
separate policy. " 
This view will be ignored in preference to the more common 
constant lump sum version for several reasons: 
- 
the saving/protection combination of each level premium 
would then not be constant over the policy term; 
= as explained in Note (9) above, the method of 
calculating an endowment premium assumes a con- 
stant lump sum survival benefit; 
- 
in the matter of savings stocks, the two methods 
will produce the same results; 
- 
the former version is much simpler when it comes 
to dealing with actual endowment insurance premium 
statistics. 
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Thus we can say that the corresponding temporary life 
insurance pure premium '6 constitutes the consumption 
expenditure element emanative in the level non-participating 
endowment life insurance pure premium PX:, 
. 
The pro- 
portion of non-participating endowment pure premium contri- 
buting towards financial lifetime saving flow is then 
given by: 
f=1- P`x: R I Px: 1 
C5.5. ß ) 
and using the conventional commutation table notation, this 
can be rewritten as: 
Mx 
- 
Mx+n 
Mx Mx+n + Dx+n 
_ 
Dx+n 
Mx 
x+n 
+ 
x+n 
(5.5.2) 
where x is the age at inception and n is the policy 
term. 
One further complication in dealing with financial 
saving flow arises when we consider the loadings that are 
appended to the level non-participating pure premium in 
order to obtain the Office Premium. 
The level premium per unit sum insured paid by the 
policyholder to the life office can be split up in the 
following manner: 
Office Premium 
= Non-participating Pure Premium 
+ Bonus Loading + Expenses 
Loading. 
(5.5.3) 
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This can be further subdivided by splitting the non- 
participating pure premium into its component parts: 
Pure Premium 
= 
Consumption Expenditure 
+ Financial Lifetime Saving 
where 'Consumption Expenditure' is provided by the tem- 
porary life insurance element (P'.. ) and the financial 
lifetime saving denotes the return of the capital (lump 
sum) element. 
It has already been explained that the expenses load- 
ing of office premium counts as part of consumption 
expenditure. It is not clear, however, in the light of 
Chapter Two, whether the bonus loading on premium should 
be treated entirely as financial saving. Certainly if 
the basic sum insured is more than adequate to provide 
protection for dependents (by the indemnity principle of 
Section 2.3) then the bonus loading can be regarded as 
financial saving. However there are certain forms of 
endowment where the sums insured provide an inadequate 
level of protection with reliance on bonuses to make up 
the difference("). In these cases, it would seem that 
part at least of the bonus loading must be counted as con- 
sumption expenditure. However, in spite of this obvious 
counter example, it will be assumed that the bonus loading 
counts entirely as financial saving flow: 
- 
if it is known that a certain proportion of 
the loading is classed as consumption then the 
(1l)These policies are variously termed 'low-cost', 'build- 
up' and 'bonus-reinforced'. 
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ensuing theory can easily be altered to allow 
for this; 
- 
since bonuses cannot be guaranteed to the 
policyholder as of right (ie. there is some 
default risk involved) it would seem logical 
that the consumer with a risk-averse utility 
of bequest function would prefer not to in- 
clude bonuses as part of his bequest for pro- 
tection purposes. This is because it is 
likely that the consumer would be more (de- 
fault) risk-averse in relation to bequest 
than lifetime saving; 
- 
the rationale for the purchase of a partici- 
pating life insurance is usually couched in 
savings terms. For example, from 'The Book 
of Money' (16) : 
'Regular payments make life assurance easy 
saving, with-profit payments make it profit- 
able saving'; 
- 
although bonus reinforced policies are now quite 
popular their introduction was quite recent and 
therefore will not affect the main bulk of pre- 
mium statistics of Chapter Six. 
Consequently the office premium can be divided up as fol- 
lows: 
Office Premium 
= Consumption Expenditure 
+ Financial Saving flow 
where 
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Consumption expenditures = Expenses loading 
+PX: R 
and 
Financial saving flow = (P - P' x: n1 x: r1i 
+ Bonus loading 
It is therefore possible to determine that the proportion 
of financial saving in a level endowment life insurance 
office premium is given by: 
(x: a P"x: n )+ BL 
oa 
PX., + BL + EL (5.5"ß) 
where BL is the Bonus Loading and EL the Expenses 
Loading. 
Equation (3.5.4) may be rewritten as 
_f+a ä, ß 1+a+ß (5.5.5) 
where f is defined by Equation (5.5.1), a= BL 'ßx, 1 
and 
EL 
x: n7 
In the next Section, the behaviour of the financial saving 
ratios f and 0 will be examined in greater detail; 
however it is possible to make some preliminary comments 
on Equations (5.5.1) and (5.5.4): 
- 
the financial saving ratios are obviously 
affected by the determinants of the pure pre- 
mium viz. mortality, interest, inception age 
and policy term. The next Section briefly 
-2'14- 
investigates how these factors influence the 
ratios; 
- 
in addition, the ratio 0 is also affected by 
the Bonus and Expenses Loadings. Obviously 
the greater the Bonus Loading the larger the 
value of 0 and the larger the Expenses Load- 
ing the smaller the value of O. 
Finally, we note that the financial saving flow (out 
of endowment office premiums) is not the same as expend- 
itures on saving-based life insurance. This is because 
expenditures on saving-based endowment life insurance must 
include some proportion of the endowment expenses loading 
(similarly expenditure on protection-based endowment life 
insurance is not synonymous with consumption expenditures). 
This distinction is necessary when it comes to an examina- 
tion of the reasons for purchasing life insurance (Chapters 
Seven and Eight) when, in order to build a demand model, 
the expenditures on savings-based and protection-based 
life insurance must be differentiated (each with its share 
of the expenses loading). 
It seems reasonable to allocate the expenses loading 
in proportion to the size of PIx: R relative to the Office 
Premium, ie.: 
Expenditure on protection- 
based endowment life 
insurance X: P EL P 
X: 11 
+ OP , 
(5.5.6) 
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and 
Expenditure on savings- 
based endowment life 
insurance 
= 
Px. 3 - P'x., + BL 
+ (OP-P' 
x :, 
) 
. 
EL 
gyp 
(5.5.7) 
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5.6 Endowment Life Insurance : Saving Flow Behaviour 
Figure 5.6.1 shows how the financial saving ratio 
f varies with inception age x for different rates of 
interest and policy terms. The initial simplifying 
assumption of zero Bonus and Expenses Loadings will be 
dropped in due course. 
Figure 5.6.1, like all other diagrams in this Section, 
is based on the Tables of Mortality still most commonly 
used for premium calculations (7). The mortality exper- 
ience expressed in these Tables dates from the period 
1949-1952 and they are therefore very out-of-date. The 
new Mortality Tables published by the Institute of 
Actuaries (8) have recently begun to supercedethe A1949/52 
Tables (7). 
The Shape of the Financial Saving Ratio 
The ratio does not peak, as: in the whole of life case, 
but declines continuously as inception age increases. 
However, the shape of the ratio is still of some interest 
because of the obvious existence of a point of inflexion(12) 
where the curve changes from being concave to the origin 
to being convex\to the origin. 
Thus for a policyholder who wishes to maximise his 
financial saving ratio based on pure premiums, it would 
seem that the earlier the inception age the better; how- 
ever it can be seen from Figure 5.6.1 that for a Policy 
Term of 10 years the curve is so shallow at early incep- 
tion ages that the ratio changes very little in the 10 to 
(12)See R. G. D. Allen (1) Ch. 8. 
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Figure 5.6.1 Endowment Saving Flow by Inception Age 
(Non-participating, Pure Premium) 
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- 12 years following the highest point on the curve. A 
reference to Figure 5.6.3 shows that the same reasoning 
applies for the financial saving ratio based on office 
premiums. 
As inception age increases, the ratio decreases at 
an increasing rate which reaches a maximum at the point 
of inflexion. Thus a change in inception age has the 
greatest effect on the ratio at or around the point of 
inflexion and the least effect at very low and very high 
inception ages. 
The Response to the Rate of Interest 
It is obvious from Figure 5.6.1 that, for any incep- 
tion age and any maturity term, the proportion of pure 
premium contributing to the Financial Saving Ratio decreases 
as the rate of interest assumed in premium calculations 
increases. Appendix 5.1 shows that the response of the 
financial saving ratio to changes in the rate of interest 
is always negative, irrespective of inception age and 
maturity term. It can also be seen from Figure 5.6.1 
that a change in the rate of interest has a greater effect 
for the longer maturity term. 
It is worth examining the effect of the rate of inter- 
est in greater detail. Recalling Equation (5.5.2) we 
have, 
Dx+n 
Mx Mx+n + Dx+n 
(5.5.2) 
which can be rewritten in its more basic form 
vn. Zx+n 
v. dx +v 
"dx+l + 
... 
+ vn. dx+n-1 + vn. tx+n 
(5.6.1) 
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Now unless the policyholder is very old at inception, the 
component (vn"lx+n) will dominate in the endowment pure 
premium Px: I because of the size of Zx+n in comparison 
with the dx's. Similarly any change in the rate of 
interest will have a greater effect the larger is the 
exponent of v (ie. the greatest effect will be on 
vn'Zx+n again): this explains why a change in the cal- 
culation rate of interest produces a greater effect when 
the policy term increases. 
In order to examine the effect on f, three differ- 
ent bands of inception age must be investigated. First, 
at young inception ages the component (v. dx + v2. dx+,, + 
... 
+ vn. dx+n-1) will be comparatively small because of 
the low incidence of death at younger ages. Thus vn. Zx+n 
and (v. dx + 
... 
+ vn. dx+n-1 + vn"Zx+n) will be similar, 
in size and so a change in the rate of interest will have 
small overall effect on f. Second, at middle inception 
ages, the quantity (v. dx + 
... 
+ vndx+n-1) cannot be 
disregarded but is still small in comparison with vn. Zx+n' 
In this case, an increase in the calculation rate of inter- 
est (which reduces vn. Zx+n) will have a greater effect 
on the numerator of Equation (5.6.1) than on the denomi- 
nator. Again the overall effect is a decrease in the 
size of f. Third, at high inception ages, the quantity 
(v. dx + 
... 
+ vn. dx+n-1) will be large in relation to 
vn'Zx+n and thus the ratio f will be small. Because 
vn. Zx+n is small, the numerator again dominates the size 
of f, so that again, a decrease in v 
x+n 
decreases f. 
- 
220 
- 
1 
.C 
Figure 5.6.2 Endowment Saving Flow by Policy Term 
(Non-participating, Pure Premium) 
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The Response to the Maturity Term 
The trace representing the response of the Financial 
Saving Ratio to changes in endowment maturity term is 
shown in Figure 5.6.2 for selected inception ages. it 
can be seen that as the maturity term increases, the 
financial saving ratio decreases. Again there is some 
evidence of a point of inflexion, which is not surprising 
since Figures 5.6.1 and 5.6.2 are similar in their con- 
struction. 
A Note on Loadings 
If the initial assumption of zero expense and bonus 
loadings is removed, the financial saving ratio based on 
office premiums can be expressed by 
f +a 
alß +a +ß (5.5.5) 
where f is the financial saving ratio based on pure 
premiums, 
Expenses Loading 
a_ 
Bonus Loadid 
and ß= 
x: R x: nj 
In the case of a simple reversionary bonus of b per 
unit sum insured per annum 
b. (IA)x: nl 
a= 
x : Ei - ax : iýji' 
=b. 
(Rx 
- 
Rx+n 
- x+n 
+ nx+n) 
Dx 
" 
Px 
:R" ax : REM 
Rx+n 
- 
'x+n + nDx+n) 
(Mx Mx+n + Dx+n 
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For a compound reversionary bonus 
a= 
Aýrý ý-A X: ilt X: Tl 
Px: 
n' ax: ni 
A(r)x: -A. 
x: 2] x_I 
(Mx Mx+n + Dx+n) 
where A(r) X: nl denotes the single premium of an endowment 
policy)term n, calculated at rate of interest r. If 
where i the compound rate of bonus is b, then r=l TTT 
is the rate of interest used in the premium calculations. 
The expenses element ß is given by: 
('I_k)Px" (k . PX. ý +I+ c) 
n x"ý 
where k allows for those expenses which vary in direct- 
proportion to premium (ie. renewal expenses such as 
renewal commission), I represents the excess of initial 
expenses over the renewal expenses (per unit sum insured) 
and c is a fixed loading which allows for those expenses 
which vary in direct proportion to the sum insured (eg. 
the work of the claims and investment departments and of 
higher management). 
The trace illustrating the behaviour of ratios 
0a and 9ýa ß=äß, for a 10 year endow- a, 0 r 
ment, as inception age changes are pictured in Figure 
5.6.3 using a rate of interest of 8%. The rate of bonus 
was chosen to be £+% of sum insured for both simple and 
compound bonuses. For the expenses loadings, the follow- 
ing figures were chosen: 
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k=0.05 
z=0.03 
and c=0.002 
It can be seen from Figure 5.6.3 that the addition of the 
various loadings has some interesting effects on the pos- 
ition of the financial saving ratio. 
The addition of the bonus loading, to form the ratio 
seems to pivot the ratio f in an anticlockwise 
a' p 
direction about its highest point, as well as moving it 
upwards. The addition of the expenses loading, to form 
the ratio 0ß, seems to pivot the ratio 0o in an 
>> 
anticlockwise direction about its lowest point, as well 
as moving it downwards. 
This 'swivelling' of the ratio 0ß in comparison 
with f has some interesting implications for the policy- 
holder who wishes to maximise his financial saving ratio. 
The addition of the bonus loading only makes a real differ- 
ence at high inception ages, while the addition of the 
expenses loading has its greatest effect at low inception 
ages. Thus the younger policyholder should choose a life 
office with low expenses loadings and ignore the size of 
the bonus loadings. Similarly, the older policyholder 
should choose a life office with high bonus loadings and 
not pay much attention to the size of the expenses loadings. 
Simple and compound bonuses have not been separated: 
the trace for the compound bonus lies marginally above 
that of the simple bonus for the same rate of bonus. 
Again, mortality experience is based on (7). 
Finally, an investigation of the ratio f indicates 
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that all three elements of the expenses loading, ie. 
k, I and c)have the effect of pivotting the ratio f 
in an anticlockwise direction about its lowest point. 
Thus whatever the construction of the expenses loading 
(ie. whatever the relative size of k, I and c) an expenses 
loading will always adversely affect young rather than 
older policyholders: this can be important when deal- 
ing with life offices with different expenses ratios. 
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5.7 Whole of Life Insurance : Saving Flow Theory 
Under a whole of life insurance contract, the pay- 
ment of benefits to the policyholder's heirs and depend- 
ents occurs on the death of the policyholder whenever 
that may occur. Thus unlike temporary and endowment 
life insurance, whole of life does not have a fixed policy 
term so that the contract of insurance continues until 
terminated by the death of the policyholder and the pay- 
ment of benefits to his heirs. 
When the timescale problem of Section 2.3 was dis- 
cussed, we commented that it was unlikely that protection 
(of dependents) would be required for the entire fore- 
seeable lifetime of the policyholder so that a whole of 
life insurance includes an element of financial non-lifetime 
saving as well as protection. This saving, of course, 
cannot be lifetime financial saving but is saving for the 
benefit of heirs. 
The timescale problem of Section 2.3 poses an inter- 
esting question in relation to whole of life insurance, 
namely: at what age (x*) does the policyholder cease 
to require protection for dependents? It may be that 
protection is required indefinitely, so that x* effect- 
ively tends to infinity. On the other hand it may be 
that x* is very close to inception age (x) in which 
case, the whole of life policy would be closely connected 
with non-lifetime saving. We note that there is no ques- 
tion of any bequest being 'wasted' (ie. no 'survival risk' 
in the sense that it might not be made). Additionally 
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the policyholder is not troubled by any choice of policy 
term so that it does not matter if the age x* is not 
known with certainty. Because there is no question of 
any bequest being 'wasted' there is then no a priori 
reason why the sum insured should be limited to B* (as 
was argued in Section 5.3). Thus the saving/protection 
split in a non-participating whole of life insurance with 
sum insured B can be described by the following equa- 
tions: 
Whole of Life Pure Premium Consumption expenditure 
+ financial saving (non-lifetime) 
ie. B. P = (B* P' )+ (B. P 
- 
B*. P' ) 
x x: x 
-x x x: x* 
(5.7.1) 
where B* (< B) is the upper bound for protection purposes 
on the sum insured, 
Equation (5.7.1) is not very informative as it stands 
because both x* and" B* are at the discretion of the 
policyholder: the equation is therefore for descriptive 
rather than analytic use. The basic problem with whole 
of life insurance is that the primary determinants of the 
saving/protection split are solely at the discretion of 
the policyholder rather than being mechanically predeter- 
mined (as in the temporary and endowment life insurance 
cases). Thus a solution to the problem involves not only 
a mechanical method of separating the financial non-lifetime 
saving and protection elements but also some assumptions 
about the behaviour of whole of life policyholders in 
general. 
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Intuitively, one would expect that most policyholders 
were underinsured to the extent that B <B*. This obser- 
vation is born out by the findings of a survey organised 
by Money Which? in December 1975 (13), where half of a 
survey of 560 members were judged to be underinsured. 
Therefore, as a first simplification to Equation (5.7.1) 
B and B* will be assumed to be equal for the typical 
policyholder, so that there is no upper bound above which 
bequests are made for savings purposes. 
The other problem with Equation (5.7.1) concerns the 
assumptions about the behaviour of x* which can theor- 
etically vary between inception age x and infinity. 
In order to make practical use of Equation (5.7.1) some 
value for x* must be assumed so that the protection 
element of B. Px can be removed by using the existing 
theory developed for endowment life insurance. 
Given that an assumption must be made about the 
value of x*, it seems reasonable to put x* equal to 
x+ex where ex is the expectation of life of the typical 
policyholder at inception age x. Values of ex for 
the average policyholder can, of course, be obtained from 
standard Mortality Tables. Choosing x* =x+ ex effect- 
ively makes at least two implicit assumptions. First, 
that although the individual's lifetime is uncertain, 
protection for dependents is required over the policyholder's 
expected lifetime. Second, in view of the assumption 
that B= B*, any saving for the purpose of bequest is 
achieved only because the consumer has the chance of dying 
at a later age than x*. 
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The assumption that x* =x+ ex is not such an 
unreasonable one for the typical policyholder since if 
x* was known with certainty (and was less than x+ ex) 
then the consumer would probably be better off with the 
purchase of an (x* 
- 
x) year temporary life insurance 
in conjunction with the use of a bank deposit. This 
argument is a bit more tenuous if the combination temp- 
orary insurance plus bank deposit is compared with a 
participating whole of life insurance rather than a non- 
participating policy. However, if we assume that the 
consumer values the flexibility and liquidity of his 
savings stocks then the temporary insurance/bank combin- 
ation might be preferred to any whole of life policy for 
reasonably small x*. Thus the value of a whole of life 
policy is that it provides protection for dependents, over 
the lifetime of the policyholder, even though that life- 
time is uncertain in its duration. 
Consequently, it can be argued that, like an endow- 
ment policy, whole life policies can be split into three 
parts: a temporary life insurance element, a lump sum 
element and a bonus loading on policies participating in 
bonuses. However, the main differences are that the term 
of the temporary insurance element is not fixed but varies 
according to the lifespan of the policyholder and that the 
lump sum now represents non-lifetime rather than lifetime 
saving. 
Suppose we have a non-participating whole of life 
policy - sum insured equal to unity 
- 
with level pure 
premium P. Now suppose that we have a non-profit 
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endowment policy for the same unit sum insured with level 
premium Py: 
. 
If we assume that the same interest and 
mortality rates are used in both calculations, then if y 
denotes the inception age and m the policy term of the 
endowment, we require values of y and m such that 
Px 
= 
Py, 
-1. Once appropriate values of y and m have 
been chosen, the analysis can proceed as in the previous 
Section using y: j as a surrogate for PX. The analysis 
proceeds in this manner, rather than in the way indicated 
by Equation (5.7.1), in order to correctly ascertain the 
value of the temporary insurance premium (which, of course, 
will be given by P'y:, ). The obvious solution for y 
and m would be to put y=x and m= ex so as to ob- 
tain P'y: 
--. l = P'x: as in Equation (5.7.1). However, 
x 
in this instance, Px: Px so that the temporary 
insurance element of Px has been incorrectly allocated. 
Once both y and m become 'variable' there are 
very many combinations that produce equality between the 
whole life and endowment surrogate premiums. Hence it is 
necessary to choose y and m in a systematic way. 
Now Px = Py: 9 can be written in the usual actu- 
arial notation as 
MX 
_ 
MY 
-+m 
+D Nx y+m 
Ny Ny+m 
(5.7.2) 
and if y+m is equated with a constant, say L, then: 
MX / NX 
Ms ML + DZ 
for a unique value of y. NY 
- 
NL 
(5.7.3) 
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The solution to the problem then boiled down to choosing 
an appropriate value for the constant L- once this 
was done, the unique value of y could be obtained by 
computer simulation. 
It has already been argued that L should be replaced 
by x+ ex, although the above analysis would indeed work 
for any other chosen value of L. 
When L=x+ ex, Equation (5.7.3) produces a unique 
value of y that satisfies 
Px 
- 
Py: 
x+eX (5.7"ß) 
In practice it was found that x-5<y<x-I for most 
rates of interest when calculation mortality rates were 
obtained from the A1949/52 Tables of Mortality (7). (This 
choice effectively gives the value for y in the year 
1950/1: the value for y is, in fact, time specific since 
the expectation of life at each age changes through time). 
Then for a policyholder of inception age x paying 
pure premium Px, the proportion of pure premium that can 
be allocated to financial non-lifetime saving is given by 
DL 
M9 
- 
ML+ DZ 
(5.7.5) 
using the standard actuarial notation, where 
L=Xf ex 
ex is the expectation of life of the average policyholder 
at inception age x; 
and y is the solution to 
- 
232 
- 
MX / NX 
= 
MS 
- 
MZ + DL 
N9 
- 
NL 
(5.7.3) 
In an exactly similar manner to the endowment life insur- 
ance case, it is possible to determine that the proportion 
of financial non-lifetime saving in a level whole of life 
insurance office premium is given by 
g 
(Px 
- 
P'y. 1j )+ BL 
ra10 PX + BL + EL 
(5.7.6) 
where BL is the Bonus Loading and EL is the Expenses 
Loading. 
Equation (5.7.6) may be rewritten as 
f+a 0a, 
ß =I+ a+ 
where f is defined by Equation (5.7.5), a= 
x 
and g= 
p- 
x 
In the next Section, the behaviour of the ratios f and 
OGIS will be further examined while the comments made at 
the end of Section 5.5 apply in the whole of life as well 
as in the endowment case. However, it is necessary to 
emphasise again that the ratio f in the whole of life 
case is time specific in that the value of ex changes 
from year to year. The ratio f in the endowment case 
is only time specific to the extent that the 'calculation' 
rates of interest and mortality change from year to year. 
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5.8 Whole of Life Insurance : Saving Flow Behaviour 
Figure 5.8.1 shows how the financial saving ratio 
f varies as inception age x varies for different rates 
of interest. Figure 5.8.1 uses both calculation mort- 
ality and expectation of life data from the A1949/52 
Table of Assured Lives (7) and therefore really refers 
to the situation in the year 1950/51. The situation 
corresponding to the year 1969 (with calculation mortality 
rates from the A1949/52 Table and average expectation of 
life from the A1967/70 Tables (8) ) is virtually identi- 
cal. The initial simplifying assumption of zero Bonus 
and Expense loadings will be dropped in due course. 
The Shape of the Financial Saving Ratio 
For all rates of interest greater than 2%, the 
Financial Saving Ratio peaks for an inception age greater 
than 20 in Figure 5.8.1. Thus at rate of interest equal 
to 5%, the ratio peaks at age 43, while for 10% the ratio 
is at a maximum at inception age 64. 
Thus in terms of the Financial Saving Ratio, there 
appears in almost every case, to be an optimum inception 
age that maximises the proportion of whole life premium 
devoted to financial non-lifetime saving. However it 
should be noted that the amount of premium saved, ie. FS 
ratio multiplied by PX rises continuously as inception 
age rises. 
The locus of the peak points of the Financial Saving 
Ratio corresponding to the years 1950 and 1969 are given 
in Table 5.8.1. 
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Figure 5.8.1 Whole Life Saving Flow by Inception Age 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0.0 
Inception Age 
Source : Equation (5 7 5) 
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
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Table 5.8.1 Locus of Maximum Whole Life Financial 
Saving Ratio. 
Rate 
of Interest C%) 
Inception 
1950 
Age 
1969 
Maximum of f 
1950 1969 
3 34 38 0.480 0.420 
4 39 41 0.450 0.391 
5 43 45 0.421 0.362 
6 46 52 0.392 0.337 
7 52 58 0.367 0-315 
8 58 61 0.345 0.297 
9 61 64 0.327 0.282 
10 64 66 0.312 0.268 
11 66 68 0.299 0.257 
12 68 70 0.287 0.246 
13 69 71 0.277 0.236 
14 70 72 0.267 0.228 
15 72 74 0.259 0.220 
Source : Equation (5 7 5) 
One of the most interesting features of the shape of 
the Financial Saving Ratio f is that the ratio varies 
with inception age: up to some point, the policyholder 
can increase the proportion of saving in each pure premium 
by delaying the inception of the policy to a later age. 
The higher the rate of interest used in the premium cal- 
culation, the later the inception age corresponding to the 
ratio peak. 
It is interesting to compare Figure 5.8.1 with the 
corresponding case for an endowment life insurance 
(Figure 5.6.1) since the latter does not have the 'humped' 
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shape of the whole of life case. The explanation for 
this behaviour lies mainly in the offsetting effect of 
(x + ex 
- 
y) in Equation (5.7.4) at young inception ages. 
Since the difference between x and y is very slight, 
the quantity (x + ex 
- 
y) is governed by the behaviour 
of ex, which, of course, decreases as x increases. It 
can be seen from Figure 5.6.2 that this, therefore, 
exerts an upward pressure on the f ratio which, in part, 
counteracts the downward pressure of an increasing surro- 
gate inception age y. 
The Response to the Rate of Interest 
It is immediately obvious from Figure 5.8.1 that for 
any inception age, the proportion of pure premium contri- 
buting to Financial Saving decreases as the rate of inter- 
est assumed in premium calculations increases. Similarly, 
the amount of pure premium saved (ie. FS ratio multiplied 
by Px) continues to fall as the rate of interest increases. 
Appendix 5.1 shows that the response of the Financial 
Saving Ratio to changes in the rate of interest is always 
negative, irrespective of inception age x. 
A Note on Loadings 
By assuming initially that the whole of life insur- 
ance is still on a non-participating basis, the office 
premium OPx is commonly represented by the following 
expression: 
oP = CP +I+ c) X 1-k xä 
x 
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where, as before, k allows for those expenses which 
vary in direct proportion to the premium: I represents 
the excess of initial expenses over the renewal expenses 
(I per unit sum insured) and c allows for those 
expenses which vary in direct proportion to the sum 
insured. 
If the participating whole of life policy has bonus 
loadings with assumed rate of sim le bonus b per unit 
sum insured, then the formula for the office premium 
becomes: 
op 
x. 
(P +I+c+ b' 
(IA)x) 
 
-k xa IX 
where (IA)X is the value/single premium of an increas- 
ing whole life insurance where the sum insured during 
the tth year is t. 
If the participating whole of life policy has bonus 
loadings with assumed rate of compound bonus b, then the 
formula for the office premium is given by: 
A(r) 
-A OPx = 11 k" 
(PX +_xa x) +ä+ c) 
x 
where A(X) is the value/single premium of a whole life 
policy calculated at interest rate r, i being the rate 
of interest used to calculate the non-participating 
policy premiums. 
(13) 
If we consider first the case-of a zero expenses 
(13)See Hooker and Longley-Cook (6) Ch. 10. 
Note that if the rate of compound bonus is b per annum, 
then r=+. 
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loading, then the Financial Saving Ratio is given by: 
PX 
- 
PY: m + Bonus Loading 
a, o PP + Bonus Loading 
Dividing both numerator and denominator by Px. 
P- P' 
x :m+ BL 
PX Tx 
0a 
p+ 
x C5.8.1) 
This can be expressed as O= f+0` where a_ 
BL 
aº 0 I+a Px 
and f is the Financial Saving Ratio based on pure 
premiums. In order to examine the characteristics of 
the ratio 0a differentiate Equation (5.7.1) with 
,0 
respect to x, the inception age: then 
öO (1+a). N(f+a) 
- 
(f+a)*S-X 
ax 
o 
(l+a)2 
=12( 
. 
(1+a) +- 
. 
(1-f) ) 
(1+a) (5.8.2) 
Now suppose that 
af 
xl x 
whether the addition of 
the inception age corm 
the f, we need to know 
_x=0; then 
in order to see 
0 
the bonus loading has altered 
sponding to the maximum point of 
the sign of a Q} 
a 
ax x=xo 
Now 0a 
Zýx x=xo 1+ 3-71 IKil-f) x=x 0 
öýa 
and since ý1--ý >0 and f<1o , the sign of -CIX=X 0 
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is determined by S-x 
x= ä 
Now in the case of the simple reversionary. bonus 
b. (IA)x Rx Dx Nx 
a Px 
. 
tx =b. D. N" Mx 
xx 
b. Rx 
MX 
(5.8.3) 
Therefore if we assume that RX and MX are continuous 
variables: 
öa b 
rx- _( Rx 
.D. Ux - Mx . ED +t -u x+t MX t=0 
since 
ýMx 
-D. ux and E MX+t 
ýF-x t=0 
It is immediately obvious that as 2 is positive, the 
MX 
sign of 
x is determined by the expression 
Co 
X. x jux -M tO 
E D+t'ux+t 
(5.8.4) 
which is independent of the rate of bonus b. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine math- 
ematically the parity of 
SOLI 
and consequently a Tx- 
x=xo 
computer simulation was carried out to determine the 
behaviour of the quantity 
00 
R 
co "Do. uXO -0StEOD 
Q+t 
. 
11X0+t 
-240 - 
for values of xo at different rates of interest. This 
quantity proved to be negative for all the combinations 
of interest and inception age given in Table 5.8.1. Thus 
it follows that the function 0 peaks at an earlier 
app 
inception age than does the function f. 
In the case of the compound reversionary bonus 
(A( r) 
- 
AX 
a_ 
x' `x 
= 
DX 
Mx 
where A 
Xr) denotes the single premium on a whole of 
life insurance calculated at the rate of interest r. 
If the compound rate of bonus is b, then r= 
i-b 
where 
i is the rate of interest used in the pure premium cal- 
culations (this is often approximated by r= i-b). 
Therefore, assuming the variables are continuous 
X- 6 
-x x 
and since 
we have 
where 
Ax Ax (11 
x+x S-x 
D 
z-x 
6= loge vx 
(r) (ux+a (r)) 
- uX 
- 
A(r) ( XM .D. (ux+d) + DX. ux ) 
x 
M2 
x 
ý, 
loge (1+i)-x 
and 6 (r) 
_-a loge (1+r)^x Ex- 
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ie. a a/öx = 
Dx 
. 
r) (r) 
_a+ Dxp x/ X) -D. ux/ x Mx 
Now if r=, then 6(r) 
-a =S loge(ý)X 'which 
is independent of the rate of interest i. Consequently 
D 
the expression (ýr) 
-6+ -x) cannot equal zero for 
all rates of interest i and thus Ex- is not independent 
of the rate of compound bonus b. Therefore °` 
x X--X0 
will only equal zero under special circumstances connected 
with the choice of b. 
We are now in a position to consider the case of a 
non-zero expenses loading. In this case, the Financial 
Saving Ratio is given by 
0 
__ 
f+a 
where f and a are defined as above and 0= 
Expenses Loading 
Pure premium 
Now when ß=0, the effect of the 
bonus loading was to increase the Financial Saving Ratio, 
since 
a 
>f. The non-zero expenses loading has the 
effect of reducing the Financial Saving Ratio, since 
" 
c 
'o 
> 
alß 
The trace illustrating the behaviour of the ratios 
f, 0 
a)0 and 
0 
iß 
as inception age changes is pictured 
in Figure 5.8.2 below. Both calculation mortality rates 
and expectation of life figures are obtained from the 
A1949/52 Tables. 
Text cut off in original 
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Figure 5.8.2 Whole Life Saving Flow by Inception Age 
(Participating, Office Premium) 
Interest 8% 
Bonus £4% 
0.9 
o. 1 
O.; 
0. E 
E 
0.4 
o. 
0.2 
0.1 
Inception Age. 
Source : Equation (5 8 1) 
i=0.08 ; b=0.04 ; k=0.05 ; I=0.03 ; c=0.002 
Superscripts :c- compound ;s- simple 
ww I %j ww lw I wl 
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We note from Figure 5.8.2 that first, the effect of the 
simple and compound bonus loadings is to shift the ratio 
f upwards and to the left thus reducing the inception 
age corresponding to the peak in the Financial Saving 
Ratio. Secondly, as before, the effect of the bonus 
loading is more pronounced in the case of the compound 
bonus: the Financial Saving Ratio is shifted higher and 
further to the left than in the simple bonus case. 
Thirdly, the addition of the expenses loading has shifted 
the ratio Oa 
)O 
a south-easterly direction so that 
pp 
the curve 0a ß peaks at a higher inception age than the 
corresponding curve 0a 
30 
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5.9 Policyholder Savings Stocks 
Financial savings stocks at age x+t represent the 
accumulation of saving over the t time periods since 
saving began at age x; this accumulation of saving is 
normally held by some form of financial institution in 
trust for the small saver. This sum may not be the same 
as his readily realisable savings stocks: the difference 
depends on the degree of liquidity of the savings involved. 
When we come to consider the financial savings stocks 
in a life insurance policy at age x+t, there are several 
important points of relevance. First, that unlike premium 
saving flows, financial savings stocks vary according to 
the time elapsed since inception and secondly, for all 
types of policy except the equity linked, the life office 
directly controls the amount of policyholder savings stocks. 
Thus there is a difference between the accumulated savings 
stocks held in trust by the life office and the amount 
available to the policyholder at any time. Thirdly, the 
financial savings stocks available to the policyholder are 
not fully realisable until the end of the maturity term 
or at death: early realisation (or voluntary termination) 
will involve some sort of penalty to the policyholder. 
Fourthly, the difference between the financial savings 
stocks available on death at age x+t and those held by 
the life office at age x+t when no death occurs must be 
highlighted. 
(14) Using standard mortality function 
notation, if tX Policyholders in a particular group start 
(14)This difference is sometimes known as the 'actual death 
strain'. 
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life insurance policies at age x, then at age x+t, 
Zx-Zx+t of those policyholders will have died: when we 
talk of policyholder savings stocks at age x+t, we are 
considering an average policyholder alive at age x+t. 
Those Zx-Zx+t policyholders who died before attaining 
age x+t have already realised their financial savings 
stocks; however, it is still of interest to ascertain 
what proportion of the death benefits received by those 
policyholders constitutes return of savings stocks. 
Following the argument in Section 5.4 for PIA sav- 
ings stocks on a temporary life insurance, it is apparent 
that the financial savings stocks at time t for a non- 
participating n-year endowment with unit sum insured is 
given by 
t 
tFx :I tvx : nj tvx : N-j (5.9. ß) 
where 
tVx:. 
a is the policy reserve value on the n-year 
endowment at'age x+t and 
TVX, is the policy 
reserve value on the corresponding temporary life insurance. 
The pre-superscript T denotes that allowance has been 
made for the 'true' rates of interest and mortality. 
tFx: 
-, represents the accumulation of financial saving 
flow (' 
x: R - 
CPX: 
rR) over t time periods where the pre- 
superscript C denotes the use of 'calculation' rates of 
interest and mortality. Thus the total financial saving 
flow from TZx+k policyholders alive at age (x+k) is 
given by 
TZx+k 
'(CPx: I - CPX: -a) per unit sum insured. 
Compounding this flow for t years using true rates of i. nt- 
erest and mortality gives the accumulated financial savings 
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stocks at age x+t, ie. 
t-i T1T CP T )t-k tFx: rli - TZ ký x+k ' x: x: nl)"(1+ i 
x+t 
(5.9.2) 
Multiplying both the, numerator and the denominator of 
Equation (5.9.2) by TVx+t gives 
TF tý1 TVx+k 
.TZc_c) tx-. nj - TVx+t TZ 
x+t k-0 
x+k 
Px 
-. 
--nj x -. nl 
(5.9.3) 
_ 
TNx 
- 
TNx+t 
MCP 
- 
CP, 
TD x: ri x: r1i 
ý 
x+t (5.9.4) 
= tVx: R - tVX:, calculated retrospectively 
(non-participating case) 
There are, unfortunately a number of difficulties involved 
in the use of Equation (5.9.1): both theoretical and 
practical. 
First of all, Equation (5.9.1) has very little 
application to the aggregate data of Chapter Six because 
of its dependence on the time since inception (t): it 
would be impossible to obtain an 'average' time-since- 
inception for all endowments in force at any one time. 
Since Equation (5.9.1) has little foreseeable practical 
value, the discussion of it will be kept to a minimum. 
Secondly, there are two alternative methods of cal- 
culating the policy reserve values tVx: -nl and tVX: I : 
the prospective and the retrospective. The prospective 
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method calculates the policy reserve as the amount by which 
the present value of future net premiums falls short of the 
present value of future claims payments. The retrospective 
method calculates the policy reserve as the accumulated 
value of past premiums less the accumulated value of past 
claims. If the 'calculation' and 'true' rates of interest 
and mortality are equal, then the two methods of valuation 
will produce the same result. If, however, the 'calculation' 
rates are more conservative than the 'true' then the retro- 
spective method will normally produce a greater reserve than 
the prospective. 
At first sight, it would appear that the retrospective 
method is more suitable for the purpose of determining the 
Financial Savings Stocks. This is because the method is 
compatible with the concept that savings stocks at time x+t 
are derived by the compounding up of premium saving flow over 
the t years since inception (see Equation (5.9.2) ). Further- 
more, the method of calculation implies that when t=0, the 
accumulated savings stock is also zero (this is not the case 
with the prospective method). However, the retrospective 
method has some drawbacks in comparison with the (more widely 
used) prospective method: 
a) it is quite possible that the policy reserve will be 
in excess of unity at the end of the policy term. 
This can cause difficulties when trying to allocate 
the savings content of the realised sum insured (plus 
bonuses) paid to the policyholder's estate. 
b) this method cannot be used to determine the value of 
any lump sum bonuses accumulated. Bonuses can only 
be properly treated by assuming that they are at a 
guaranteed rate. 
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APPENDIX 5.1 : The Financial Saving Ratio 
The financial saving ratio f(v, x, n) is given by 
f(v, x, n) 
-_ 
- 
Dx+n 
Mx Mx+n + 
x+n 
where v= 
,i is the rate of interest; I +: L 
x is the inception age; and n is the maturity term 
of the surrogate endowment policy. 
Then, assuming that the variables are continuous, 
ýht 
FV 
Now 
(Mx 
c+n + 
Dx+n)'ý6 Dx+n Dx+ri ýv- (Mx Mx+n + Dx+n) 
(fix Mx+n + Dx+n) 
D a' vx+n 
.Z 
(x+n) D Sv x+n = av x+n v x+n 
and 
ö 
vx+n+t+1 57v Mx+n c-v t_0 
dx+n+t 
x+n+t 
as (x+n+t+1) v" 
-ax+n+t 
t=0 
Now remembering that 
Rx+n 
- 
t0 
Mx+n+t 
M 
J0 (t+') Cx+n+t 
E (t+'1) VX+n+t+1 
t=O ' 
dx+n+t 
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we have Mx+n xvn Mx+n +v Rx+n 
Thus (Mx 
- 
Mx+n + Dx+n) 
= 
1/v ( x. M + Rx - (x+n). X+n x+n + (x+n). D +n ) 
= 
1/v ( x. (I Mx+n+D +n) n. x+n + n. D +n +x x+n 
Consequently 
1 Dx+n 
.(n. Mx - (Kx Rx+n) 
afAv 
= 
__ 
)2 
c c+n+D+n 
1 n-1 
v'D x+n 't 0(x x+t 
-M2 x x+n + 
Dx+n 
and since Mx > Mx+t for all t> 0, we have Z-V >0 
(for v> 0) 
. 
Now v therefore 
äi 
_ýý <0 (1+i) 
f 
Thus 
ýf ýýiv 
ie. the financial saving ratio decreases as the rate of 
interest increases. 
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CHAPTER SIX CONSUMPTION AND FINANCIAL SAVING IN 
UNITED KINGDOM NON-GROUP ORDINARY 
LIFE INSURANCE 1946/1968. 
6.1 Introduction 
The objective of this Chapter is to utilise the 
theory of Chapter Five to derive data on. consumption and 
financial saving from readily available information on 
UK non-group ordinary annual premium life insurance (over 
the period 1946/1968) 
- 
excluding annuities. 
Regrettably, because of deficiencies in the inform- 
ation available, it was not possible to compile a complete 
series 1946/1968 without making a large number of subsid- 
iary calculations and simplifying assumptions (which are 
explained in Appendices to this Chapter). 
Discontinuities in the time series data proved to be 
a major constraint on the eventual choice of the period 
1946/1968. The Insurance Companies (Accounts and Forms) 
Regulations 1968 substantially altered the reporting 
requirements so that the data on ordinary life insurance 
for 1969 and later years is not comparable with that for 
earlier years. In particular, much overseas business 
that had been included was excluded from 1969 onwards. 
Additionally, the post-1969 figures reported in the Annual 
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Abstract of Statistics (6) include capital redemption 
and long-term personal accident business (both of which 
were shown separately before 1969). Similarly, the 
Interest Income of Life Insurance Companies (Established 
in the UK) is shown Net of tax before 1968 and Gross 
afterwards. Data on mortality rates (from the Continuous 
Mortality Investigation (13)) also proved difficult to 
obtain beyond 1969. 
The decision to restrict this study of the purchase 
of life insurance to ordinary non-group annual premium 
business was made for several reasons: first, because 
industrial life insurance and group life insurance exhibit 
markedly different characteristics to those of ordinary 
life insurance (see R. L. Carter (4) Section 2.2, S. Wynn 
Ch. 2 (18) and B. Reitz (16) ). Secondly, because group 
life and single premium business has proved tobe much 
more volatile than ordinary life insurance (being heavily 
dependent on changes in tax legislation). Thirdly because, 
prior to the early 1970's, annual premium ordinary life 
insurance represented the dominant type of life insurance 
transacted. 
As stated in Section 5.9, we will only be concerned 
with an analysis of saving and consumption flows rather 
than with savings stocks. This is principally because, 
in theory, the savings stocks associated with a life 
insurance contract depend on the length of time since the 
inception of that contract. Additionally it is not pos- 
sible to separate PIA Savings stocks from Financial Savings 
Stocks unless that time is known. Consequently it is not 
sufficient simply to examine the reserves or funds of the 
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life office in order to ascertain the level of savings 
stocks 
(1) 
. 
It should also be noted that we are only interested 
with new saving and new consumption of life insurance. 
Thus attention will be focussed entirely on the New 
Business Premium Income of ordinary life insurers con- 
ducting business within the UK. The reasons for this 
concentration have already been discussed in Chapter 
Four: namely that premium income from contracts already 
in force exhibits a marked degree of stability because 
of its contractual nature (and is correspondingly less 
interesting). Additionally, an examination of the 
policyholder's decision to purchase (or the demand for) 
life insurance is intended and therefore the new busi- 
ness premium figures are most appropriate. 
Finally, although the majority of data used in this 
Chapter can be obtained from the Statutory returns to 
the DOT, a number of references are made to a 'survey' 
of fifteen of the largest individual life offices under- 
taken over the period 1975/6. This survey was under- 
taken by the author and a copy of the questions can be 
found in Appendix 6.3. Not all the fifteen respondents 
were able to answer all the questions for the entire period 
of study: in these cases the relevant number of respond- 
ent offices will be indicated. No indication can be 
given of individual replies although some of the data is 
available from the returns made to the Department of Trade. 
(1)As has been suggested, for example, by J. Kindahl (14). 
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The rest of this Chapter will be devoted to a des- 
cription and derivation of new business data on consump- 
tion and saving flows from UK (ordinary non-group, annual 
premium) life insurance statistics. The next Section 
re-examines the theoretical breakdown of Chapter Five 
and indicates how this may be applied to aggregate data. 
The following Sections investigate the principle deter- 
minants of consumption and saving (ie. inception age, 
mortality, interest, etc. ) while the last Sections produce 
and comment upon the results. 
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6.2 The Application to Aggregate Data 
The results of Chapter Five (when applied to an 
individual policyholder) indicate that Consumption 
Expenditure is made up of all temporary life insurance 
plus expenses loadings. Thus, 
( Temporary Life Insurance Office ( Premium Rate ( 
( 
Consumption (P, 
+E for NP and WP Expenditure x: nl ( Endowments 
(for NP and WP) Py: 3 + EL ( Whole Life 
where NP - Non Profit, WP - With Profit and P' denotes 
the temporary life insurance part of the pure premium (see 
Equations (5.5.4) and (5.7.6) ). However, if we wish to 
examine the expenditure on protection-based life insurance 
then only a proportion of the expenses loadings should be 
included (see Equations (5.5.6) and (5.5.7) ): 
( Temporary Life Office Premium Rate 
Expenditure on 
Protection- 
- 
( 
( t P+ P': njEj 'F (for NP and WP) 
based Life n -pte X: ( Endowments 
Insurance 
( 
ý 
P1 
P1 
+: EL (for NP and WP) a S= 0 ( Whole Life ) 
Similarly, the remainder of office premiums (after 
Consumption Expenditure) must constitute Financial Saving 
Flow, ie.: 
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"- 
- 
P'. 
- 
for NP Endowments X: x 
Px: 
rýi - Px: r1i + BL for WP Endowments 
Financial 
Saving Flow 
PX pt for NP Whole Life 
PX 
- 
P9;. a + BL for WP Whole Life 
where BL denotes the Bonus Loading. 
Likewise the remainder of office premiums (after 
'Expenditure on Protection-based Life Insurance' has been 
removed) must constitute 'Expenditure on Savings-based 
Life Insurance'. 
Now assume that a portfolio of Nt non-profit (NP) 
annual premium endowment policies were issued to UK policy- 
holders in year t. These Nt policies have office premiums 
given by the vector O Pt = (OP, t, ...., OPN t t) with 
sums 
insured given by St = (S1t' 
.... ' 
SN 
t t) and might 
appear 
in the official statistics in the following manner: 
New Endowment Non-Profit Policies (year t) 
Number 
New Annual Premiums : 
New Sums Insured 
Nt 
Nt 
E OPt =E OPA 
k=1 
Nt 
E St =E Skt 
k=1 
Thus, the financial saving flow generated by the Nt 
policies is given by 
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Nt 
Financial Saving 
_ in year t= kE1 
(opkt 
- 
Pkt 
- 
EI'kt) 
(6.2. ß) 
where Pkt = Sý. PX 
:n 
for the kth policy and 
kt 
EL kt is the expenses loading (in the office premium) 
of the kth policy. 
Now Equation (6.2.1) can be rewritten as(2): 
Nt 
Financial Saving 
=E (P P kt - kd 
k=1 (6.2.2) 
where P is the 'pure premium' associated with the kth 
policy (ie. Pi = OPkt 
- 
ELkt). In turn, Equation (6.2.2) 
can be represented as:, 
Financial Saving 
=E St 
. 
(APR 
t- APRt) (6.2.3) 
where APRt is the average pure premium rate per unit 
sum insured for the Nt policies and APRR is the 
corresponding average temporary life insurance pure 
premium 
N Nt 
ie. ESEPe APR EB kt P tt k=1 kt k=1 x: ntI (6.2.4) 
Nt 
Since in practice, E (Ph + EL kt) is unknown k=1 
(2) 
where ° kt - Pkt + EL kt 
=S" Xkt 
' nk + ELkt 
-259- 
the problems of aggregation boil down to those involved 
in the choice of (APRt - APRt). In actual fact, the 
problems centre on the appropriate choice of APRt so 
that APRR can be deduced directly. 
From Equation (6.2.4) it is apparent that APR' 
is derived from the formula: 
Nt 
I APR 
=ES. P tE St k=l kt xkt 
(6.2.5) 
which can be rewritten as: 
Nt Dxkt 
APR 
-ES kt + v-1 tE St k_1 
Nxkt N (xkt+ nkt 
Nt Dx 
S kt )+ V_, 
) EN St k=1 xkt (xkt +n kt 
(6.2.6) 
where xkt denotes the inception age of the kth policy- 
holder, nkt denotes the policy term and vý (1 + ic) 
(ic 
- 
the calculation rate of interest). 
However, Equation (6.2.6) is of no great value 
because, typically, the individual values of Skt, xkt 
and nkt will not be known. Consequently, an approxi- 
mation of APRt is required that can be computed from the 
overall average (or total) values of S (sum insured), 
x (inception age) and n (policy term) that are available. 
Let the 'weighted average' values of xkt and nkt 
be represented by xt and nt; then xt and nt are 
determined by the following relationship: 
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APRt 
= 
PX 
; tj`tl (6.2.7) 
where RX : n, will 
be termed the 'average' pure premium 
tt 
rate. By utilising Equations(6.2.6), (6.2.7) can be 
rewritten as: 
Nt DX Dx-t 
EE 
St k=l 
kt Nxkt (xkt +nkt) xt- N (xt + nt ) 
(6.2.8) 
(assuming that the same 'calculation' rate of interest 
(ic) is used for all Nt policies). 
Once the appropriate values of xt and Ft have 
been determined (this will be discussed in later Sections), 
the Financial Saving Flow arising from those Nt non-profit 
endowment policies can be expressed as: 
Financial Saving 
in year t 
St *( 
D(xt 
+l t) ) 
- Xt (3F + nt ) 
(6.2.9) 
while the Consumption Expenditure is given by: 
t Consumption +n Expenditure = EoPt - ES t "(N- 
-) in year t xt (xt + nt 
(6.2.10) 
A similar analysis can be conducted if we assume a 
portfolio of Nt non-profit annual premium whole of life 
policies issued to UK Policyholders in year t. The 
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Financial Saving Flow generated by the Nt policies is 
then given by 
Financial Saving 
N 
_t in year 
.t-k1 
(opkt 
- 
Pkt EI'kt 
where 
Pkt Skt Pykt; 
mk 
(see Equation (5.7.6) ) 
In exactly the same way as before, the above equation 
can be rewritten as: 
Financial Saving 
_ES (APR - APR') in year t-ttt 
where 
Nt 
APRt =E Skt PX = PX 
E St k=1 kt t (6.2.11) 
The 'weighted average' inception age xt is then deter- 
mined by the following relationship: 
Nt 
ESkt 
Dxkt. 
_ 
DX 
k=1 NN E St Xkt xt (6.2.12) 
Once the appropriate value of xt has been determined, 
the Financial Saving Flow arising from those Nt non- 
profit whole of life policies can be expressed as: 
Financial Saving 
_ in year tE St (l'x Pý t yt: mt I 
(6.2.13) 
while the Consumption Expenditure is given by: 
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Consumption Expenditure 
_-- in year t-E 
CPt ýSt'ýPx P 
t yt " 
E-tj 
(6.2.14) 
The change from non-profit policies to with profit 
policies is, in theory, easy to accomplish, simply by 
adding the total bonus loading (BLt = ENt BLkt) to 
k=1 
the Financial Saving equations ( (6.2.9) and (6.2.13) ) 
and deducting BLt from the Consumption Expenditure 
equations ( (6.2.10) and (6.2.14) ). However, in prac- 
tice, BLt is not observable for either endowment or 
whole of life contracts and an artificial construction 
is necessary in order to derive it. 
When it comes to calculating the 'weighted average' 
inception age xkt (endowment and whole life; non-profit 
and with-profit) and the 'weighted average' maturity 
term nt (non-profit and with profit endowment), little 
real assistance is given by Equation (6.2.8) because the 
vector (nit, 
...., 
nN 
t t) 
is entirely unknown., However, 
for years up to 1958, the Continuous Mortality Investigation 
(13) published annual figures on the Numbers of In Force 
(Duration 0) at each new inception age for the NP and 
WP contracts. Consequently if we were willing to make 
the assumption that Skt = Constant, for all k, then, 
since the inception age of every new policyholder is known, 
a value could be obtained for xt (in (6.2.12) )that 
satisfied: 
Nt DX D- 
E kt Xt 
k=1 NXkt Nx 
t (6.2.15) 
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(whole of life contracts only). But the value for xt 
so obtained from Equation (6.2.15) would have a number 
of serious defects: 
a) xt could be seriously underestimated if older 
policyholders purchased whole life insurance 
with larger sums insured than average; 
b) the calculation is obviously dependent on the 
rate of interest used to calculate the commuta- 
tion functions D and N. This rate of inter- 
est should theoretically correspond with the 
long-term yield expected to be earned on life 
office funds but obviously the industry-wide 
'average long-term yield' is not known with 
certainty, thus undermining the accuracy of the 
solution; 
c) the immediately preceding argument could simi- 
larly be applied to the mortality tables used 
to calculate D and N. Theoretically a mor- 
tality table should be used that epitomises the 
'long-term average' trends in mortality. 
Obviously, great difficulty is experienced in 
even an approximation and this again undermines 
the accuracy of the solution. 
In the light of the above arguments, it was felt that 
no feasible attempt to determine a meaningful value of xt 
(by solving Equation (6.2.12)) could be undertaken. 
Furthermore, no solution of Equation (6.2.8) was possible 
because of the existence of two unknowns in the endowment 
case. Consequently it was decided that an attempt should 
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be made to evaluate xt (whole life and endowment, NP 
and WP) and nt (endowment, NP and WP) directly 
(and independently of Equations (6.2.8) and (6.2.12) ). 
The various methods employed to derive xt and nt 
(and therefore, by implication, PX and PX 
.n) t t"tl 
are described in the following Sections. 
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6.3 The Application to UK Aggregate Data 
The purpose of this Section is two-fold: first to 
describe the actual UK aggregate data that is available 
(with an explanation of its deficiencies) and second to 
explain how the methods outlined in the preceding Section 
can be applied to the UK data (specifically when it comes 
to dealing with the troublesome bonus loading BLt on 
with profit policies). 
The greater part of the available information on 
the ordinary life insurance business conducted by companies 
operating in the UK is published in the Annual Abstract 
of Statistics (6). This information is compiled from 
statutory returns that are submitted, by each individual 
life office, to the Department of Trade. There are minor 
year-to-year differences in the accounting periods of the 
individual companies but these have no appreciable effect, 
on the comparability of the figures in successive years. 
The most detailed information available covers 'Life 
assurances in force (ordinary business)' for companies 
established in the UK. The figures for each year show 
the total number and amount (sum insured) of the policies 
in force at the date of the last valuation of each company, 
which may have been at any time within the preceding five 
years (to 1969). In the case of with profits policies, 
the 'sum insured' includes reversionary bonuses in force 
at the date of valuation but excludes any further bonuses 
allotted as a result of that valuation. The figures are 
split between the major classes of life insurance policy. 
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Table 6.3.1 'Description of Life Assurance In Force 
(Companies Established in UK) 
Non-Profits: Total 
Whole Life 
Endowment 
Joint life / Joint life endowments 
Other 
With-Profits: Total 
Whole Life 
Endowment 
Joint life / Joint life endowments 
Other 
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics (6) 
In the absence of further guidance, it has been 
assumed that 'Non-Profits Other' policies refer entirely 
to temporary life insurance while 'With. 
-Profits Other' 
is entirely composed of single premium policies (this 
simplifying assumption is not too drastic since 'WP Other' 
policies are almost of no consequence until the mid-1960's 
when unit-linked single premium policies were gathering 
strength). 
Unfortunately, the new business statistics are much 
less detailed in that they do not differentiate between 
the different classes of ordinary life insurance 
- 
not 
even between non-profit and with profit. However 'New 
Long-Term assurances (ordinary business)' do split the 
information according to the domicile of the vendor and 
purchaser of the life insurance. 
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Table 6.3.2 Description of New Long-term Assurances 
Companies established in UK 
(Number of Policies 
All business (Sum Assured (Single Premiums 
(Yearly Renewal Premiums 
(Number of Policies 
Business with UK 
(Sum Assured 
(Single Premiums 
(Yearly Renewal Premiums 
Companies established out of UK 
(Number of Policies 
Business with UK 
(Sum Assured (Single Premiums (Yearly Renewal Premiums 
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics (6) 
At this stage, it is sufficient to state that, if 
certain assumptions are made, then the information that 
we require (namely: Ordinary New Business Annual Premium 
Income and Sums Insured split by different classes of 
life insurance purchased by UK policyholders) can be 
obtained from the data described in Tables 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 
in conjunction with the survey information (see Appendix 
6.3). Table 6.3.3 below then illustrates the informa- 
tion that is available and the notation that will be used 
to describe it. 
-- 
268 
- 
Table 6.3.3 Notation for New Life Insurance Business 
for Annual (Renewable) Policies within 
the UK. 
New Sums New Premium 
Non-Profits Insured Numbers Income 
Whole Life SWLNP N` LNP OPWLNP 
Endowment SENP NENP OPENP 
Other (Temporary) ST NT OPT 
With Profits 
Whole Life SWLWP NWLWP OP WP 
Endowment SEWP NEWP OPEWP 
Overall Totals S N OP 
In this final part of Section 6.3 we jump ahead to 
assume that the 'average' pure premium rates of Equations 
(6.2.7) and (6.2.11) (P- 
: "ý and 
P) have been cal-t 
culated for both non-profit and  with-profit endowments 
and whole life policies (by making appropriate choices 
of xt and nt). The notation for these rates is set 
out in Table 6.3.4 below. 
Table 6.3.4 Notation for 'Average' Pure Premium Rates 
per unit sum insured (Business within UK) 
Non-Profits 
Whole Life 
Endowment 
With Profits 
Whole Life 
Endowment 
PWLNP C= PX 
, 
NP) 
t 
PENP 
=x:, NP) 
PWLWWP 
PEWP 
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By multiplying the 'average' pure premium rates by 
the appropriate sums insured we can then obtain values 
for the Aggregate Pure Premiums. Deducting these 
Aggregate Pure Premiums from the Aggregate Office Premiums 
(OP) we obtain the Aggregate Expenses Loading (for non- 
profit policies) and the Aggregate Expenses Loading plus 
Bonus Loading for with profit policies, ie., 
EI, NP = (OP - P. S)NP (Non-Profits, Endowment 
and Whole Life) 
and 
(EL + BL)WP = (OP - P. S)WP (With Profits, Endowment 
and Whole Life) 
(6.3.1) 
The remaining problem is then to strip out the 
Aggregate Bonus Loading from the With Profits New 
Business Office Premiums. This is possible, for example, 
if it is assumed that the quantity (Expenses as a propor- 
tion of Pure Premium) for non-profits policies is a fixed 
proportion, 02 of that for with-profits policies. The 
Bonus Loadings can then be derived from the following 
formulae: 
- 
P 
BLE = (EL + BL) EWP -0* pEWP ENP . 
EL 
g PAP ENP 
_ 
(oPEWP 
- 
PEWP'SEWP) 
- eP 
EW 
ENP 
P (OPENP 
- 
PENP'SENP) 
acid 
BL = (OP Wp - PWLWP 
. 
8WLWP) 
_ 
FWLWP 
8' PWLNP ' 
(ppw'N 
_PWLNP * SWLNP) 
(6.3.2) 
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We would normally expect 0> 1 since the life office is 
faced with greater risks in the non-profit case (as the 
claims payments are guaranteed) and this is reflected in 
the expenses loadings'included in Non-Profits Office 
Premiums (see Section 5.4). Similarly there is no 
reason why life offices should include a similar loading 
to cover shareholders' profits in the non-profit and with 
profit cases. 
The discussion on a suitable choice for e is con- 
tinued in Section 6.10. In fact, it was not possible 
to accurately estimate e and the alternative was to ' 
estimate the Bonus Loading directly by making an assump- 
tion about the method of with profits premium calculation 
(and using information obtained from the Survey). 
Finally, from Equations (6.2.9) and (6.2.13) the 
financial saving flow from UK ordinary renewable life 
insurance can be represented as: 
Financial Saving = Financial Saving from Endowments (NP and WP) + Financial Saving 
from Whole Life (NP and WP) 
(SENP 
' aENP + SEWP " aEWP + BLE) 
+ (SWLNP 
' 
aWLNP + SWLWP ' aWLWP + BLWL) 
(6.3.3) 
where D(xt+nt) 
aE is the ratio N_ 
-N 
ie. P- 
- 
P' 
xt (xt+nt xt"nt 3rt'yq 
and a WL is the ratio (PwL - P! ý yt: tl 
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Consumption Expenditure comprises the remainder of the 
New Business Premium Income: 
ie. Consumption Expenditure 
= 
OPENP + OPEWP + OPWNP + OP WP 
+ OPT 
- 
Financial Saving 
Similarly, the aggregate expenditure on savings- 
based life insurance can be represented as: 
Expenditure on Savings- 
_ 
Financial Saving based Life Insurance 
+ES. EL 
all 
types (6.3.4) 
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6.4 The Derivation of Ordinary Life New Business 
Renewable Premium Income. 
The objective is now to explain how figures for 
new renewal premium income were derived for the major 
classes of non-group life insurance (temporary, NP whole 
life, NP endowment, WP whole life and WP endowment). 
This explanation is necessary because none of the infor- 
mation described in Table 6.3.3 can be obtained direct 
from the Annual Abstract of Statistics, but has to be 
approximated from the information that is available (see 
Tables 6.3.1 and 6.3.2). 
Essentially the new business figures are derived by 
examining the change in number of policies and sums insured 
in force and then making an allowance for policies that 
become Claims and Cancellations during the year. The 
figures for new numbers and sums insured can then be con- 
verted into new premium income by examining the ratios 
New Numbers and New Sums Insured that were obtained New Premiums New Premium Income 
from the survey data. The resultant figures were then 
finally 'scaled' in order to correspond to life insurance 
business purchased in the UK (rather than that conducted 
by UK-based companies). 
The actual calculations involved in the derivation 
of the new-business premium income are explained in more 
detail in Appendix 6.1. However it is important, at this 
stage, to mention the specific assumptions that underpin 
the resultant figures: 
a) that the 'With Profits Other' policies (In 
Force) relate entirely to single premium 
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business; 
b) secondly, any remaining single premium business 
is distributed among the different classes of 
policy in the same manner as the non-single 
premium business (in terms of sums insured in 
force); 
c) that the numbers (or the sums insured) of 
policies which become claims or cancellations 
in year t are proportional to Numbers (or Sums 
Insured) In Force in year t; 
d) that with profits policies are composed entirely 
of the compound reversionary bonus type. The 
annual rate of bonus declared is given by bt 
- 
which in turn is obtained from the survey data 
(see Table A6.1.1) ; 
e) that the data obtained from the survey of major 
UK life insurers is representative of the overall 
life insurance industry. An example of the 
survey questionnaire is given in Appendix 6.3 
but unfortunately no specific details can be 
given in case individual life offices are identi- 
fied. The market share of those companies pro- 
viding the data used in this Section ranged 
between 10.3% and 15.5% of new business renewal 
premium income; 
f) that the distribution of new premium income over 
the different classes of life insurance is the 
same for business purchased in the UK and for 
business (both home and overseas) undertaken by 
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UK-established life offices. This assumption 
is necessary because In Force figures relate to 
UK-established companies while we require busi- 
ness purchased by UK policyholders. Note that 
for new business after the 23rd June, 1972, 
exchange control regulations were imposed by the 
Bank of England which prohibited the remittance 
abroad of life and endowment premiums by UK 
policyholders (see Bank of England (2) ); 
g) that the distribution of group life business 
(in terms of sums insured in force) among the 
different classes of policy is the same as for 
non-group business. Figures for Aggregate New 
Business Renewal Non-Group Office Premium Income 
are given in Table 6.4.1 : the group life insurance 
business has been largely excluded because, by 
definition, it constitutes single-premium busi- 
ness. Table 6.4.2 details figures on New Business 
Sums Insured: these figures must be interpreted 
carefully because the group life business cannot 
be stripped out separately. 
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Table 6.4.2 New Business Sums Insured (Business within 
the UK) £m. 
Non Profits With Profits 
Year Whole Life Endowment Other Whole Life Endowment 
1946 27.3 67.1 69.0 26.5 192.4 
47 39.7 76.0 80.8 42.7 265.6 
48 36.8 78.4 90.9 42.2 250.9 
49 44.3 94.5 116.9 50.4 196.8 
1950 40.7 147.4 121.1 41.8 199.2 
51 38.8 218.9 187.8 36.5 158.9 
52 46.1 162.2 135.0 66.9 243.7 
53 55.7 141.4 205.4 64.5 212.4 
54 52.4 258.9 227.3 51.8 204.4 
1955 77.1 241.5 235.6 78.3 281.8 
56 78.4 253.0 317.3 86.3 262.6 
57 60.0 245.0 390.7 85.6 284.5 
58 109.1 251.2 390.1 144.4 423.0 
59 79.5 301.4 670.3 120.6 333.9 
1960 93.3 332.8 756.8 126.7 476.0 
61 99.2 333.0 934.7 118.8 
62 146.0 249.4 1,132.4 188.6 608.6 
63 163.8 303.7 1,418.7 198.5 699.1 
64 241.9 400.4 1,564.2 295.7 945.1 
1965 210.0 215.0 2,080.3 323.4 1,024.8 
66 237.8 495.9 2,482.1 331.3 955.2 
67 333.0 354.8 2,780.2 471.0 1,237.9 
68 333.7 277.8 3,968.3 404.7 1,131.1 
Source: From calculations described in Appendix 6.1. 
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6.5 The Derivation of Average Inception Age xt 
The objective of this Section is to describe a method 
for determining a value for the average inception age at 
time t (xt) for with and non-profit endowment and whole 
of life policies. A possible theoretical basis for the 
determination of xt was given in Equations(6.2.8) and 
(6.2.12) but it was explained at the end of Section 6.2 
that these equations provided little practical help. 
Failing the theoretical approach it was felt that 
the next best alternative was to calculate the simple 
average inception age for all new policyholders (ie. at 
Duration Zero) based on numbers of new policyholders. 
Luckily, figures were available from the Continuous 
Mortality Investigation (13) giving the number of lives 
Exposed to Risk at each age. The figures up to 1958 
were split by class of policy, but after 1958, only the 
overall average (all classes combined) was available. 
Consequently a least squares polynominal curve fitting 
procedure was used to estimate the missing ten years figures. 
(The methodology and computer programme for this is given 
in Appendix 6.2). 
The average inception ages were obtained by the fol- 
lowing formula: 
75 
E x. E 
X=1 1 Cx] X= 
75 
X31 
E [x] 
where EN refers to the number of policies exposed to 
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risk, at duration zero (medical and non-medical com- 
bined). The summation was started at age 11 and term- 
inated at age 75 because data was only consistently 
available over those ages. It can be appreciated that 
the inception age range 11-75 encaptures the vast majority 
of new policyholders. 
It is realised that Equation (6.5.1) represents only 
an approximation of xt and that we might expect such 
values to be under-estimated since a calculation baaed 
on sums insured (rather than numbers) would attach greater 
weight to older new policyholders (who might be expected 
to have larger policies). 
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Table 6.5.1 Average Inception Ages (1946/1968) 
Non-Profit With Profit 
Year Whole Life Endowment Whole Life Endowment Average 
1946 39.69 37.94 41.45 36.26 36.67 
47 36.66 36.05 37.31 34.37 34.73 
48 35.98 36.21 36.94 34.51 34.89 
49 36.21 36.50 36.20 34.57 35.01 
1950 36.09 36.78 33.34 34.90 35.22 
51 35.45 36.84 32.76 35.01 35.25 
52 35.98 37.12 32.66 35.22 35.47 
53 36.11 37.05 31.96 35.11 35.30 
54 36.08 36.76 31.09 35.25 35.30 
1955 35.63 36.65 30.96 35.50 35.41 
56 35.14 36.52 30.82 35.64 35.41 
57 34.49 36.12 30.39 35.27 35.01 
58 33.44 35.60 30.19 34.37 34.18 
59 32.19 34.86 30.00 33.97 33.84 
1960 30.80 34.62 30.20 33.69 33.71 
61 29.33 34.03 30.03 32.99 33.22 
62 27.87 33.61 22.94 32.42 32.90 
63 26.56 33.03 29.53 31.69 32.42 
64 25.53 32.66 29.06 31.22 32.17 
1965 24.96 32.36 28.31 30.94 31.91 
66 25.03 32.06 27.10 30.88 31.66 
67 25.97 32.13 25.69 32.54 31.77 
68 28.00 32.01 23.40 32.50 31.65 
Source: Data from the Continuous Mortality Investigation (13). Calculations explained in Appendix 6.2. 
All figures for 1959 onwards (except overall Average) are 
estimated from the overall Average by a least squares poly- 
nominal curve fitting procedure. 
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6.6. The Derivation of Annual Mortality Tables (1945/1968) 
This and the following Section (on the calculation 
of 'true' interest rates)are a natural consequence of 
the discussion on pure premiums at the, end of Section 
5.4. where it was assumed that life offices use the best 
available forecast of long-term rates of interest and 
mortality at the time of the premium calculation. Thus 
the pure premium must be calculated using realistic assump- 
tions about-future long-term rates of interest and 
mortality. 
This redefining of pure premiums produces two prob- 
lems for the investigation: first, that 'calculation' 
mortality tables must be generated that are theoretically 
time specific (this involves the compilation of mortality 
tables reflecting mortality experience for each post-war 
year). Second, some decision must be taken on what 
constitutes a 'realistic' assumption about long-term 
future mortality. 
Any attempt to derive a rigorous solution'to the 
first problem would involve the researcher in an enormous 
task. This is because each time-specific mortality 
table would depend not only on the age of the (average) 
policyholder but also on the year of his birth. Thus 
the mortality rate for a policyholder aged 40 in 1960 
would differ from that of a policyholder aged 40 in 1961. 
This variation is of course in addition to the variation 
in mortality rates caused by the length of time since 
inception (encaptured in Select Mortality Tables). 
The second problem is equally difficult to resolve 
-281 - 
because in most cases it is impossible to predict long- 
term future mortality rates. Additionally, this pre- 
diction would only be sensible if time specific mortality 
tables were available (and used by life offices). 
In practice, life offices use mortality tables that 
are not time-specific. So, for example, the A1967/70 
Tables (11) illustrate the average mortality experience 
of policyholders alive (or dying) during the period 
1967/70 (irrespective of their year of birth). 
Because the details necessary to compile a time- 
specific mortality table are not available it was decided 
to solve both of the above problems in the way used by 
life offices ever since mortality tables were first com- 
piled. Thus mortality tables will be derived that 
reflect the mortality experience of policyholders alive 
and dying in year t with no attempt made to make those 
tables time specific(3). Furthermore, since mortality 
rates have consistently improved over the post-war period, 
it seems reasonable that a 'realistic' assumption about 
future mortality rates would involve year t pure premiums 
calculated on the basis of year (t-1) mortality tables. 
The remainder of this Section will be taken up with 
(3)In 
which case a separate mortality table would be needed 
for each age attained in year t. eg. for a 40 year old 
in year t, the mortality table would be of the form: 
Year A_e Mortality Rate 
t 40 qt 40 
t+1 y t+1 1 q41 
t+2 42 gt22 etc. 
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an explanation of the method of determining annual ulti- 
mate mortality tables for the period 1945/1969. 
An estimation of annual ultimate mortality tables 
over the post-war period is fortunately quite straight- 
forward because of the availability of (albeit rough) 
ultimate central mortality rates compiled by the 
Continuous Mortality Investigation and Government 
Actuary's Department and published by the Institute of 
Actuaries ((9) and (8) ). Additionally, full scale 
sophisticated ultimate mortality tables are available 
that cover the beginning (A19L+9/52 Tables (10) ) and the 
end of the period (A1967/70 Tables (11) ). 
At this stage, it is instructive to investigate 
briefly the main features of the above mortality features 
in-so-far as they affect the subsequent calculations: 
a) according to the Institute of Actuaries (12) 
p. 136, the two mortality 'A' tables were com- 
piled on slightly different bases with the 
emphasis of the former on 'smoothness' (through 
the process of graduation) and of the latter 
on 'fidelity'. In practice, this distinction 
revolves around the 'hump' in mortality rates 
for teenage males. From our point of view, 
the A1967/70 Tables provide the better basis 
because we are concerned with actual mortality 
experience; 
b) all tables refer to male policyholders only 
(age last birthday) and combine medical and 
non-medically examined lives; 
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c) the tables were compiled from data on whole 
of life and endowment policyholders only: 
this will not affect the calculations as it 
is only endowment and whole life policies 
that need to be examined; 
d) it has been assumed that the A1949/52 Tables 
yield mortality rates for the year 19501/19514 
while the A1967/70 Tables apply to the year 
19683/19694-; 
e) both the central mortality rates from the 
Continuous Mortality Investigation and the 
Death Rates from the Government Actuary's 
Department are only available for five-yearly 
age groups and refer to 'Ultimate' rather than 
'Select' figures : the former for ages 30-79 
and the latter for ages 10-30 and 80-84. 
Death Rates for age group 84-109 are also 
available; 
f) of course, the Death Rates obtained from the 
Government Actuary's Department refer to the 
Great Britain population as a whole rather than 
ordinary life insurance policyholders. However 
an attempt has been made to minimise any dis- 
torting effects; 
g) figures for the years 1967/1969 were only avail- 
able from the Government Actuary. 
The computer programme (written in FORTRAN that pro- 
duces the annual 'Ultimate' mortality tables for the years 
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1945/1969 is printed in full in Appendix 6.4. (see 
SUBROUTINE MORTALITYTABLE). Broadly speaking, 
SUBROUTINE MORTALITYTABLE can be divided into three 
main sections: the first changes the central mortality 
death rates (mx) into mortality rates qX, where 
2mx 
qx = mX 
and also calculates 'rough' 
(6.6.1) 
ZX figures (RALX) on the 
basis of a linear interpolation of male 'Ultimate' mort- 
ality rates between the A1949/52 and the A1967/70 Tables. 
The second main section calculates values for ZX 
in five-year age groupings corresponding to those group- 
ings in (8) and (9) ie. ages 10,15,20, 
.., 
85,109. 
Essentially, the programme uses the rough values of 
ZX (RALX) to calculate five-year 'average' mortality 
rates 
(4) 
and then compares these with those rates obtained 
from the data (see Equation (6.6.1) ). The final ZX 
are then obtained by adjusting RALX up or down depending 
on the results of the above comparison. 
The third main section of MORTALITYTABLE is con- 
cerned with filling in between the five-yearly values of 
ZX. This was done on the basis of the rough mortality 
rates of the first section,. weighted to agree with the 
(4)The five-year average mortality rates (comparable with 
the data in (8) and (9))were assumed to be calculated 
in the following way, 
(eg. for the average mortality rate for age group 30-34): 
RI 
'Average' q= 30 
RZ35 
where RZ30denotes 
E X30+i 
i=0 'rough' values 
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five-year values of Z X. 
The procedure was then repeated on an iterative 
basis using final figures as.. the rough RALX and repeat- 
ing. Three iterations were used. 
The ultimate mortality tables so calculated are 
given in full in an Appendix to this thesis; there are 
however, several features of interest: 
a) it was not possible to completely remove the 
effects of the five-year grouping of mortality 
rates. Thus, for younger ages, the final 
mortality rates still move in five-year steps; 
this is especially true for the immediate post- 
war years; 
b) the effects of the Second World War are partic- 
ularly noticeable on younger mortality rates for 
the years 1945/1948; 
c) the ultimate mortality tables have radix 999,999 
at age 10, and are not tabulated beyond age 100; 
d) the mortality tables represent the end of year 
mortality rather than some average of calendar 
years (ie. the rate for 1960 is an average from 
June 1960 to June 1961); 
e) the presence of a 'hump' in the mortality rates 
is most noticeable for the majority of years; 
f) in general mortality rates have been falling 
over time for most ages although the fall has 
not been continuous. As an example, Table 6.6.1 
below illustrates how mortality rates have changed 
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for selected ages. 
Table 6.6.1 Selected Mortality Rates (from 
SUBROUTINE MORTALITYTABLE) 
Year Age 
25 35 55 70 
1950 0.00121 0.00132 0.01083 0.04450 
1955 0.00089 0.00107 0.01023 0.04130 
1960 0.00080 0.00103 0.00984 0.03931 
1965 0.00077 0.00093 0.00938 0.03973 
1969 9.00073 0.00081 0.00863 0.04136 
Source: Calculated Ultimate Rates of Mortality (SUBROUTINE MORTALITYTABLE) (Males: 
Medical and Non-Medical combined). 
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6. ý The Derivation of Appropriate 'Calculation' Rates 
of Interest. 
It was explained at the beginning of'the previous 
Section that pure premiums must be calculated using real- 
istic assumptions about future long-term rates of interest. 
Again, there are two specific problems: the first on how 
to calculate this rate of interest and the second to do 
with what constitutes a 'realistic' assumption about long- 
term rates of interest. 
Following the argument of Section 5.4 we need to 
determine the long-term net of tax yield on invested life 
office funds. However, it is well known that an accurate 
calculation is virtually impossible in the United Kingdom 
because the market value of life office funds is unknown: 
only the book values are reported (over the period 19+5/ 
1968) 
- 
both in individual company accounts and in the 
submissions to the Department of Trade. 
An alternative method is available (on the lines of 
N. Barr (3) ) by compiling a theoretical life office port- 
folio and computing the yield and market value of the 
included assets. It was felt, however, that no attempt 
could be made to undertake a similar investigation (for 
the post-war period) with any accuracy. Consequently 
the annual yield on invested life and annuity funds (for 
companies established in the UK) has been computed on a 
book value basis using the following formula: 
Annual Net (('Interest etc. (less tax)' plus Yield - 'Miscellaneous' Income)) 3 (Ft_, + Ft) 
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where Ft denotes the end of year fund in book values 
(Government Securities in Nominal Values) and the data 
on 'Interest etc. (less tax)' and 'Miscellaneous' Income 
is obtained from the Annual Abstract of Statistics. 
The resultant yields 
- 
which are probably exaggerated 
because market values were generally in excess of book 
values (over the period) are given in Table 6.7.1 below: 
Table 6.7.1 Annual Yield on Life and Annuity Funds 
companies established in the UK) 
Year Yield (%) 
1945 3.8887 
46 4.5660 
47 3.5319 
48 3.6415 
49 3.4969 
1950 3.5029 
51 3.7871 
52 3.8153 
53 3.9355 
54 4.2725 
1955 4.4425 
56 4.3576 
57 4.5217 
58 4.7026 
59 5.1949 
1960 5.2713 
61 5.5488 
62 5.3711 
63 5.6182 
6`a 5.9356 
1965 6.1334 
66 5.8761 
67 7.2319 68 8.5906 
Source: Data from the Annual Abstract of Statistics (Book Values) 
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It seems reasonable to assume that a 'realistic' 
assumption of future interest rates would be based on 
previous experience of those rates. Furthermore, future 
expectations ought to be adjusted in the light of current 
experience. These conditions can be approximated if 
the estimated yield in year t (rt) is based on*a 
weighted average of previous annual yields. The common 
procedure is to form a Koyck-type distributed-lag rela- 
tionship: 
rt = brt-i + b(I-b)rt-2 + b(1-b)2rt-3 + 
.... 
which can be re-arranged to give 
rt = brt_i + (1-b)rt_I 
(6.7.1) 
The discussion then centres around a suitable choice of 
b (and a starting value for rt_k). If the value of 
b should be small then expectations tail-back into the 
past (ie. with a long memory). On the other hand, if 
b is close to unity then recent experience is the most 
important determinant of long-term expectations. Instinc- 
tively, it would seem that in order to take a long-term 
view of future yields, we should incorporate a long-term 
view of past yields (so that b is fairly small). On 
the other hand it can be argued that competitive pressure 
ensures that offices adapt fairly quickly to rising inter- 
est rates (thereby decreasing pure premium rates). 
The argument that competitive pressure forces life 
offices to use more 'realistic' calculation rates of 
interest is quite a persuasive one and applies particularly 
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to with profits policies (where the combination of inter- 
est and bonus should closely approximate to future long- 
term yields). Consequently, an annual examination of 
with profits premium rates (at a specific age and matur- 
ity term) should give an indication of movement in cal- 
culation rates of interest (if an allowance can be made 
for expenses loadings and changes in mortality). 
Survey data from seven of the larger life offices 
was collated showing with profit office premium rates 
(per unit sum insured) at inception age 45 and maturity 
term 10 years. This information is shown in Table 6.7.2 
below: 
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Table 6.7.2 Average Office Premium Rates for With-Profit 
Endowment and Whole of Life Policies from 
Seven Life Offices. (x 
= 
45, n= 10) 
Year Endowment Whole Life 
1946 0.1100 0.0382 
47 0.1100 0.0386 
48 0.1100 0.0386 
49 0.1099 0.0383 
1950 0.1089 0.0373 
51 0.1084 0.0373 
52 0.1091 0.0378 
53 0.1088 0.0376 
54 0.1088 0.0376 
1955 0.1087 0.0376 
56 0.1087 0.0374 
57 0.1087 0.0374 
58 0.1087 0.0374 
59 0.1085 0.0373 
1960 0.1084 0.0371 
61 0.1084 0.0371 
62 0.1086 0.0372 
63 0.1086 0.0372 
64 0.1096 0.0377 
1965 0.1096 0.0374 
66 0.1091 0.0376 
67 0.1097 0.0379 
68 0.1092 0.0376 
Source: Survey Data. 
It is immediately obvious that the premium rates of 
Table 6.7.2 do not exhibit the downward trend (over time) 
that we would expect if higher calculation rates of inter- 
est were being used. Furthermore, since we might also 
expect lighter mortality tables to have been used over 
time (thereby exerting a downward pressure on rates) the 
picture is even more difficult to interpret. There are 
only three conclusions to be drawn: 
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i) the seven life offices in the sample have 
not succumbed to competitive pressure on 
premium rates (or alternatively, that there 
is no competitive pressure). We note how- 
ever that this does not preclude competition 
over the levels of declared bonus rates; 
or ii) that a downtrend in pure premiums has been 
offset by increases in expenses loadings 
- 
however expenses loadings (expressed as a 
percentage of pure premiums) tend to remain 
unchanged for long periods; 
or iii) roughly the same calculation rate of inter- 
est has been used by the sample life offices 
each year. By comparing with the A1949/52 
Tables (10) and making reasonable assumptions 
about expenses loadings, it can be deduced 
that a calculation rate of interest of 
around 3% has been used. This ties in well 
with the situation up to and including the 
middle of the 1950's (Table 6.7.1) but not 
so well afterwards. 
One can only conclude from a comparison of Tables 6.7.1 
and 6.7.2 that, since the yield on invested funds has 
undoubtedly risen over time, competitive pressure does 
not force up the calculation rate of interest to any great 
extent for with profit policies. This seems a much more 
reasonable conclusion than the alternative 
- 
which is 
that the life offices (at least those in the sample) have 
assumed that the long-term rate of interest will remain 
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constant (at around 3%) or may even fall over time. 
Thus it turns out that Table 6.7.2 is not of great 
value in the problem of choosing a constant for Equation 
(6.7.1). All we can conclude is that, in the absence 
of competitive pressure, changes in the expected long- 
term interest rates are not necessarily reflected in 
office premium rates. 
In the absence of any further evidence, arbitrary 
figures for b were chosen in Equation (6.7.1) (b = 0.5 
for endowment and b=0.25 for whole life) and the 
resultant figures for rt are shown in Table 6.7.3 
below. A starting value of rý915 = 3.5% was taken 
in both cases. 
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Table 6.7.3 Long-term Expected Yield on Invested 
Life Office Funds (rt) 
Year (b 
= 
0.5) (b 
= 
0.25) 
1945 
46 
000 
3. jbq4.5 
000 
3.7 
47 4.1301 3.8393 
48 3,8310 3.7624 
49 3.7362 3.7322 
1950 3.6165 3.6733 
51 3.5597 3.6307 
52 3.6734 3.6698 
53 3.7443 3.7062 
54 3.8399 3.7635 
1955 4.0562 3.8907 
56 4.2493 4.0287 
57 4.3034 4.1109 
58 4.4125 4.2136 
59 4.5575 4.3358 
1960 4.8762 4.5506 
61 5.0737 4.7307 
62 5.3112 4.9352 
63 5.3411 5.0442 
64 5.4796 5.1877 
1965 5.7076 5.3747 
66 5.9205 5.5643 
67 5.8907 5.6423 
68 6.61 6.0397 
69 6.6774 
Source: Table 6.7.1 and Equation (6.7.1) 
A smaller value for b was chosen in the whole of 
life case because typically, these policies are of longer 
duration than the corresponding endowment policies for 
each year. Thus the life office must take a longer term 
view of future yields and it seems reasonable that the 
expected long-term yield rt would not be so responsive 
to short term changes in rt. 
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6.8 The Derivation of Average Maturity Term 
The objective of this Section is to describe a 
method for determining a value for the average maturity 
term at time t (nt) for with and non-profit endowment 
policies. A possible theoretical basis for the deter- 
mination of nt was given in Equation (6.2.8), but it 
was explained at the end of Section 6.2 that this pro- 
vides little practical help. In particular, the indiv- 
idual information on maturity terms (nkt) 
- 
on which 
Equation (6.2.8) relies 
- 
is simply not available. 
Unfortunately, further problems are encountered in 
formulating an alternative method of calculating nkt 
because no comprehensive information is available which 
could be used. There are however a small number of 
limited alternatives: 
a) keep Ft fixed at, say, 20 or 25 years; 
b) assume that the majority of endowments mature 
at retirement age; 
c) use any survey data available (eg. Southern 
Television (17) indicate that n1975 ý 23.5); 
d) attempt to relate nt to the average Building 
Society mortgage repayment period (since a 
large proportion of endowment policies are used 
for house purchase purposes); or 
e) attempt a rough approximation to Ft : for 
example, by using n New Sums Insured t New Office Premiums 
(for with profits policies). 
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It seems that alternative d) above is impracticable 
because of the paucity of detail published by the 
Building Societies' Association. In any case, the 
practice of extending the mortgage repayment period 
instead of increasing interest repayments (in the event 
of a rise in the rate of interest received on mortgage 
advances) makes alternative d) undesirable. 
Alternative e) was attempted by inverting the fig- 
ures to be found in the final column of Table A6.1.2: 
the answers are reported in Table 6.8.1 below. The 
final column of Table 6.8.1 shows the estimated age at 
maturity obtained by adding the estimated maturity term 
to the inception ages of Table 6.5.1. 
'able 6.8.1 stimated Maturity Term and 
With Profit Endowments 
Y New Sums Insured Estimated ear New Office Premiums Maturity Age 
1946 18.34 54.60 
47 18.34 52.71 
48 18.36 52.87 
49 18.42 52.99 
1950 18.34 53.24 
51 18.94 53.95 
52 19.05 54.27 
53 18.92 54.03 
54 18.76 54.01 
1955 18.85 54.35 
56 18.96 54.60 
57 19.62 54.89 
58 19.84 54.21 
59 20.30 54.27 
1960 20.80 54.49 
61 20.78 53.77 62 20.56 53.02 
63 20.60 52.29 
64 20.97 52.19 
1965 20.79 51.73 66 20.54 51.42 67 19.77 51.31 68 20.41 52.91 
Source: Table A6.1.2. 
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Now alternative e) is only a good approximation (for 
with profits endowments) if the other variables involved 
in the premium calculation remain constant over time. 
Table 6.7.2 shows that, as far as premium calculations 
are concerned, mortality, interest and expenses assumptions 
remain roughly constant. However Table 6.5.1 shows 
that average Inception Age generally declined over the 
post-war period for with profit endowments. Consequently, 
even if the average maturity term (nt) stayed constant 
over time, we would expect the ratio new sums insured 
over new premium income to rise. Thus it seems reason- 
able to conclude that nt is overestimated for the 
period 1956/1968. Similarly, since Average Inception 
Age increased over the period 1946/1956, it would be rea- 
sonable to assume that the Ratio figures are underestimates 
of nt. Consequently, it would appear that any ratio 
figures under 20.0 (approximately) are underestimates 
while any over 20.0 are overestimates. Thus in the 
absence of further guidance, it will be assumed that 
nt 
= 
20.0 for all t (1946/1968). In view of the above 
interpretation of Table 6.8.1, this does not seem an 
unreasonable simplification. 
Further, it will be assumed that Ft = 20.0 for 
all t in the case of non-profits endowment policies. 
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6.9 The Derivation of Annual Pure Premium Rates 
The purpose of this Section is to describe how the 
results of the preceding Sections were combined to pro- 
duce annual pure premium rates P- 
:n and PX and tt 
also the corresponding temporary life insurance elements 
P. and PL (see Section 6.3). The calcula- Xt +. 
tions involved are essentially very simple although com- 
plicated by the fact that for each year, a different 
mortality table, rate of interest, inception age (four 
types) and maturity term must be used (as described in 
the preceding Sections). 
The actual calculations were performed by a com- 
puter programme 
- 
MASTER SAVINGS 
- 
which was written in 
FORTRAN and is reproduced in full in Appendix 6.4. 
MASTER SAVINGS has four main sections: the MASTER 
section which reads the data and calls the other three 
Subroutines. One Subroutine calculates the annual 
mortality tables (SUBROUTINE MORTALITYTABLE); one 
calculates the commutation functions and final premium 
rates (SUBROUTINE COMMUTATION) and a third derives 
values for the expectation of life (FUNCTION EXPTN(X) ). 
The results of MASTER SAVINGS are set out in 
Tables 6.9.1 and 6.9.2 below showing true specific 
pure premium rates and the corresponding temporary pre- 
mium element. Tables 6.9.1 and 6.9.2 incorporate 
mortality tables, the Appendix to this thesis, inception 
ages from Table 6.5.1, rates of interest from Table 6.7.3 
and Ft = 20 over the period 1946/68. 
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Table 6.9.1 Pure Premium Rates (New Business purchased 
in the UK 1946/68). 
NON- PROFITS 
Endowment Whole of Life 
Year Pmt: PTt: PIrt P7t 
1946 0.035771 0.005226 0.016610 0.009140 
47 0.033704 0.004169 0.014008 0.007768 
48 0.034695 0.004179 0.013783 0.007571 
49 0.034939 0.003942 0.013465 0.007417 
1950 0.035413 0.004108 0.013696 0.007473 
51 0.035625 0.004164 0.013441 0.007310 
52 0.035225 0.004288 0.013979 0.007577 
53 0.034916 0.004070 0.013590 0.007438 
54 0.034404 0.003805 0.013260 0.007220 
1955 0.033565 0.003671 0.012715 0.007021 
56 0.032844 0.003516 0.012014 0.006630 
57 0.032545 0.003244 0.011496 0.006371 
58 0.032071 0.003025 0.010641 0.005960 
59 0.031414 0.002665 0.009812 0.005474 
1960 0.030350 0.002604 0.008762 0.005023 
61 0.029644 0.002398 0.007757 0.004445 
62 0.028803 0.002210 0.006912 0.004045 
63 0.028582 0.001980 0.006274 0.003690 
64 0.028141 0.001979 0.005807 0.003486 
1965 0.027447 0.001929 0.005312 0.003256 
66 0.026744 0.001794 0.005100 0.003167 
67 0.026822 0.001774 0.005173 0.003195 
68 0.024820 0.001626 0.005143 0.003244 
Source: MASTER SAVINGS 
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Table 6.9.2 Pure Premium Rates (New Business purchased 
in the UK 1946/68). 
WITH PROFITS (without Bonus Loading) 
Endowment Whole of Life 
Year P_ 
xt :q p! xt : 77t] p_ xt PL Yt :q 
1946 0.035536 0.004565 0.017989 0.009865 
47 0.033492 0.003621 0.014425 0.007979 48 0.034426 0.003526 0.014400 0.007902 
49 0.034657 0.003238 0.013459 0.007414 
1950 0.035127 0.003388 0.012134 0.006632 
51 0.035326 0.003416 0.011940 0.006504 
52 0.034887 0.003471 0.012053 0.006544 
53 0.034604 0.003295 0.011293 0.006189 
54 0.034163 0.003195 0.010611 0.005793 
1955 0.033383 0.003192 0.010308 0.005700 
56 0.032703 0.003177 0.009843 0.005449 
57 0.032424 0.002925 0.009505 0.005285 
58 0.031910 0.002621 0.009135 0.005135 
59 0.031314 0.002405 0.008846 0.004948 
1960 0.030244 0.002344 0.008512 0.004883 
61 0.029536 0.002141 0.008030 0.004595 
62 0.028691 0.001951 0.007664 0.004465 
63 0.028462 0.001709 0.007285 0.004250 
64 0.028022 0.001687 0.006945 0.004125 
1965 0.027343 0.001673 0.006301 0.003819 
66 0.026657 0.001586 0.005675 0.003497 
67 0.026768 0.001666 0.005097 0.003151 68 0.024849 0.001714 0.004014 0.002581 
Source: MASTER SAVINGS 
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6.10 The Derivation of Aggregate Annual New Pure Premiums, 
Expenses Loadings and Bonus Loadings. 
All is now ready to implement the theory developed 
in Section 6.3 so that aggregate figures can be obtained 
for financial saving flow from UK ordinary renewable life 
insurance. 
The first step is to multiply the pure premium rates 
of Tables 6.9.1 and 6.9.2 by the new sums insured 
(Table 6. k. 2) in order to obtain aggregate annual new pure 
premiums from renewable life insurance purchased in the 
UK. The resultant figures are given in Table 6.10.1 
below. The corresponding aggregate temporary pure prem- 
iums are shown in Table 6.10.2. 
The next step is to deduct the Aggregate Pure Premiums 
of Table 6.10.1 from the Aggregate Office Premiums of 
Table 6.4.1 (according to Equations (6.3.1) ). This 
yields the Aggregate Expenses Loading in the case of non- 
profits policies and the Aggregate Expenses plus Bonus 
Loadings in the case of with profit policies. The figures 
are set out in Table 6.10.3 below. Details of Aggregate 
Expenses plus Bonus Loadings expressed as a proportion of 
Pure Premiums are given in Table 6.10.4. 
An analysis of Table 6.10.4 *confirms the suspicions 
voiced in Section 6.3 that the loading for Expenses 
(which includes expenses, contingencies and shareholder's 
profit) is indeed greater for non-profit than with profit 
policies in the whole life case, ie. e>i where 
e 
(EI'/P)NP 
Wp (6.10. '1 ) 
- 
302 
- 
Table 6.10.1 Aggregate Annual Pure Premiums (New Business 
purchased in the UK 1946/68). 9,000 
Non-Profits With Profits 
Year Whole Life Endowment Whole Life Endowment 
1946 453.5 2,400.2 476.7 6,837.1 
47 556.1 2,561.5 615.9 8,895.5 
48 507.2 2,720.1 607.7 8,637.5 
49 596.5 3,301.? 678.3 6,820.5 
1950 557.4 5,219.9 507.2 6,997.3 
5* 521.5 7,798.3 435.8 5,613.3 
52 644.4 5,713.5 806.3 8,502.0 
53 757.0 4,937.1 728.4 7,349.9 
54 694.8 8,907.2 549.6 6,982.9 
1955 980.3 8,105.9 807.1 9,407.3 
56 941.9 8,309.5 849.5 8,587.8 
57 689.8 7,973.5 813.6 9,224.6 
58 1,160.9 8,056.2 1,319.1 13,497.9 
59 780.1 9,468.2 1,066.8 10,455.7 
1960 817.5 10,100.5 '1,078.5 14,396.1 
61 769.5 9,871.5 954.0 18,619.5 
62 1,009.2 7,183.5 1,445.4 17,461.3 
63 1,027.7 8,680.4 1,446.1 19,897.8 
64 1,404.7 11,267.7 2,053.6 26,483.6 
1965 1,115.5 5,901.1 2,037.7 28,021.1 
66 1,212.8 13,262.3 1,880.1 25,462.8 
67 1,722.6 9,516.4 2,400.7 33,136.1 
68 1,716.2 6,895.0 1,624.5 28,106.7 
Source: Tables 6.4.2 and 6.9.1 
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Table 6.10.3 Aggregate Expenses plus Bonus Loadings in 
Annual Office Premiums (New Business 
purchased in the UK 1946/68) x'. 000 
Non-Profits With Profits 
Year Whole Life Endowment Whole Life Endowment 
1946 127.1 967.2 247.7 3,680.7 
47 313.4 1,156.5 616.3 5,265.0 
48 298.0 1,051.8 634.9 4,655.1 
49 561.8 1,. 748.9 516.1 4,447.3 
1950 313.9 1,957.3 447.4 4,121.6 
51 675.7 4,623.6 549.4 4,249.3 
52 612.4 1,963.4 671.8 4,895.2 
53 912.4 1,877.3 744.9 5,059.7 
54 967.2. 2,925.1 576.0 4,404.1 
1955 1,213.9 2,753.0 891.8 6,115.1 
56 1,099.8 2,931.8 1,057.0 5,770.2 
57 706.9 2,366.7 1,056.5 5,981.7 
58 1,008.5 1,285.6 1,604.2 6,840.1 
59 1,119.8 3,690.7 1,837.0 8,063.6 
1960 1,449.3 4,736.7 1,967.7 11,444.3 
61 1,430.9 5,009.4 1,573.6 13,121.0 
62 2,616.8 5,850.9 2,942.4 17,389.9 
63 2,988.7 6,528.6 2,996.9 20,219.1 
64 3,885.7 6,190.8 3,769.3 21,398.1 
1965 3,786.6 3,896.1 4,722.4 28,278.1 
66 3,869.3 7,103.2 4,857.5 26,399.9 
67 3,478.7 2,921.3 6,451.4 30,585.9 
68 3,768.2 5,031.6 7,639.1 41,527.9 
Source: Tables 6.4.1 and 6.10.1 
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Table 6.10.4 Aggregate Expenses Plus Bonus Loadings 
expressed as a proportion of Pure Premiums 
(New Business purchased in the UK, 1946/68_) 
Whole Life Endowment 
Year Non-Profit With Profits Non-Profit With Profits 
1946 0.2803 0.5196 0.4030 0.5383 
47 0.5636 1.0006 0.4515 0.5919 
48 0.5875 1.0448 0.3867 0.5389 
49 0.9418 0.7609 0.5297 0.6520 
1950 0.5632 0.8821 0.3750 0.5890 
51 1.2957 1.2607 0.5929 0.7570 
52 0.9503 0.8332 0.3436 0.5758 
53 1.2053 1.0227 0.3802 0.6884 
54 1.3921 1.0480 0.3284 0.6307 
1955 1.2383 1.1049 0.3396 0.6500 
56 1.1676 1.2443 0.3528 0.6719 
1.0248 1.2985 0.2968 0.6485 
58 0.8687 1.2161 0.1596 0.5068 
59 1.4355 1.? 220 0.3898 0.7712 
1960 1.7728 1.8245 0.4690 0.7950 
61 1.8595 1.6495 0.5075 0.7047 
62 2.5929 2.0357 0.8145 0.9959 
63 2.9081 2.0724 0.7521 1.0161 
64 2.7662 1.8355 0.5494 0.8080 
1965 3.3945 2.3175 0.6602 1.0092 
66 3.1904 2.5836 0.5356 1.0368 
67 2.0194 2.6873 0.3070 0.9230 
68 2.1957 4.7024 0.7297. 1.4775 
Source: Tables 6.10.3 and 6.10. 
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The final problem then revolves around a suitable choice 
for e (assuming e constant over time) before substitution 
into Equations (6.3.2). 
Whether or not a value of e=1 is appropriate for 
the endowment policies (as it clearly could be) is another 
issue that must be decided. An examination of the break- 
down of the Expenses Loading should clarify the issue. 
As has been previously stated, the size of any 
Expenses Loading (and hence the appropriate choice of 0) 
depends on a number of factors: the size of shareholders' 
profits, management expenses and an allowance for risk 
caused by unforeseen contingencies (this is often called 
a 'contingency' loading although it is not usually included 
specifically 
- 
see Chapter Five, note (8) ). Management 
expenses are themselves often subdivided into three parts: 
initial expenses such as specific office expenses incurred 
at the commencement of the policy (including initial 
commission - expressed as a rate per cent of sum insured 
(up to October 1976)) $renewal expenses such as renewal 
commission 
- 
expressed as a rate per cent of office premiums 
and thirdly, miscellaneous expenses to cover investment, 
claims, data services etc. 
The following observations seem reasonable in the 
light of the preceding description: 
a) we would expect the loading covering 
shareholders' profits to vary (over time 
and between policies) depending upon the 
competitive situation; 
b) when expressed as a proportion of pure 
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premiums we would not expect non-initial 
management expenses to vary between with 
and non-profit policies or between whole of 
life and endowment; 
c) initial commission (expressed as a rate per 
cent of sums insured) as a proportion of 
pure premiums would cause variations between 
policies because of differing sums insured 
and inception ages (thus the greater the sum 
insured and/or inception age, the greater 
the Expenses Loading); 
d) a larger contingency loading would be expected 
for non-profits policies (since sums insured 
are then guaranteed); and 
e) a larger contingency loading for whole of life 
policies might be expected (in comparison 
with endowments) in view of the long time- 
horizon involved. 
Thus a figure for e in excess of unity can be caused 
by competitive pressure, initial commission or the contin- 
gency loading. However, it is only possible to investi- 
gate the effects of the initial commission (since commis- 
sion rates, sums insured) inception ages and rates of 
interest are known). 
In order to analyse the effects of initial commission, 
we need to know something about the level of the initial 
commission rates. These rates were fixed in 1954 (for 
Life Office Association members) at 92% of sums insured 
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(whole of life and endowment) and it will be assumed 
that they remained unchanged over the period 1946/1968. 
Consequently the aggregate loading to cover initial 
expenses is given by 
0.02 P. tj 
x (6.10.2) 
where S represents the aggregate sum insured and P 
the aggregate pure premiums. 
(5) 
Equation (6.10.2) can be rewritten as 
0.02 (1 + ('-V)) PX (6.10.3) 
where RX denotes the pure premium rates of Tables 
6.9.1 and 6.9.2 and v uses the rates of interest 
(100r) in Table 6.7.3. 
Aggregate Expenses Loadings to cover Initial Commis- 
sion as a proportion of pure premiums are detailed in 
Table 6.10.5, and it is immediately obvious that these 
only have a very marginal influence on the figures of 
Table 6.10.4. Since it is unlikely that the addition 
of a contingency loading would solely account for the 
differences of Table 6.10.4. (especially for whole life 
policies) we must conclude that the major determinant of 
the size of 0 >1 has been the effects of competitive 
pressure (or the lack of it) on the expenses loading to 
provide for shareholder's profit. Obviously the market 
for both with profits and non-profits endowment policies 
has been considerably more competitive than that for with profits 
(5)Using 
what is known as 'Spragues' formula', eg. see P. D. Bacon and L. J. New p. 178 (1). 
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Table 6.10.5 Aggregate Expenses Loadings to cover 
Initial Commission as a proportion of 
Pure Premiums (New Business purchased 
in the UK 1946/68). 
Whole Life Endowment 
Year Non-Profit With Profit Non-Profit With Profit 
1946 0.06180 0.05860 0.03992 0.04005 47 0.07279 0.07126 0.04354 0.04368 
48 0.07262 0.07036 0.04127 0.04144 
49 0.07344 0.07346 0.04062 0.04078 
1950 0.07174 0.07840 0.03971 0.03987 
51 0.07213 0.07870 0.03930 0.03946 
52 0.07065 0.07874 0.04012 0.04031 
53 0.07259 0.08329 0.04067 0.04086 
54 0.07471 0.08836 0.04150 0.04165 
1955 0.07891 0.09266 0.04323 0.04335 
56 0.08447 0.09869 0.04482 0.04493 
57 0.08869 0.10308 0.04535 0.04545 
58 0.09599 0.10852 0.04635 0.04649 
59 0.10470 0.11395 0.04775 0.04784 
1960 0.11935 0.12227 0.05064 0.05075 
61 0.13646 0.13250 0.05258 0.05270 
62 0.15608 0.14273 0.05502 0.05516 
63 0.17308 0.15183 0.05548 0.05563 
64 0.18986 0.16203 0.05692 0.05708 
1965 0.21204 0.18190 0.05934 0.05949 66 0.22671 0.20576 0.06180 0.06194 
67 0.22692 0.22957 0.06148 0.06156 
68 0.24149 0.30379 0.06962 0.06956 
Source: Tables 6.9.1,6.9.2,6.7.3 and Equation (6.10.3) 
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whole of life which, in turn, is more competitive than 
non-profit whole of life. 
None of the above conclusions help in the alloca- 
tion of with profit expenses loadings (although they do 
give an insight into the nature of the business). So, 
rather than make some kind of approximation which could 
not be anything but inaccurate it was felt that a better 
approach would be to calculate the bonus loading directly 
(hence revealing the with-profits expenses loadings). 
Bonus Loadings on with profit policies can be quite 
simply approximated in a direct fashion by utilising the 
Annual Average Rates of Compound Reversionary Bonus 
Declared (Table A6.1.1) obtained from the survey data. 
It seems reasonable to assume that life offices would 
compute a bonus loading which, if the yield on invested 
funds only equalled (rather than exceeded) the calcula- 
tion rate of interest, would provide a future reversionary 
bonus almost as large as that which was currently declared. 
This seems sensible for four reasons: first, in view of 
the apparently large expenses loadings that have been allo- 
cated (so that bonus loadings have obviously not been 
forced down to low levels by competitive pressure). 
Secondly, to quote from P. F. Hooker and L. H. Longley- 
Cook, p. 105 (7): 
"For ordinary assurances it is now customary 
to calculate with-_profits premiums from a 
formula which includes the cost of a bonus 
at a rate somewhat lower than that which it 
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is hoped to declare. " 
Thirdly, when with profits policies are sold, it is usual 
to quote an estimated benefit at maturity based on current 
bonus rates. Finally, where the comparatively recent 
'bonus-reinforced' policies are used for house purchase 
purposes, they have been set up on the basis that the 
maturity value will be adequate to repay the loan in full 
if bonus declarations during the term of the policy aver- 
age no more than 80% of the bonus rate in force when the 
policy was arranged. 
The rate of compound reversionary bonus (b per annum) 
was therefore obtained by multiplying the rates of Table 
A6.1.1 by a factor of 0.8. The pure premiums plus bonus 
loading is then given by: 
Aý 
x 
äX 
Ar 
x: Y] 
or äL 
x 
in the whole life case 
in the endowment case 
where i, denotes the use of the calculation rate of 
C-b interest and similarly r It is recognised that 
the same problems as before arise in the use of compound 
reversionary bonus in that no account is taken of those 
simple bonus with profits policies. 
Figures for the Bonus Loading per unit sums insured 
so obtained (ie. (A v- A`). 4 ) are given in Table 6.10.6 Xx ä4 
x 
and the resultant aggregate Bonus and Expenses Loadings 
are separated and shown in Table 6.10.7. Aggregate Bonus 
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and Expenses Loadings as a proportion of Pure Premiums 
are given in Table 6.10.8. 
A comparison of Tables 6.10.4 and 6.10.8 confirm 
the conclusions about the influence of competitive pres- 
sure on Non-Profits loadings. Table 6.10.8 shows that 
the Expenses Loadings for With-Profits policies have 
been fairly moderate in comparison with those for Non- 
Profits policies: this is especially true in the whole 
of life case. 
We are finally in a position to obtain figures on 
financial saving flow by utilising Equation (6.3.3). 
Thus Financial Saving Flow (out of Office Premiums) is 
given by Pure Premiums (Table 6.10.1) less the Temporary 
Elements (Table 6.10.2) plus the Bonus Loadings (Whole 
Life and Endowment combined) (Table 6.10.7). These 
details are summarised in Table 6.10.9. 
Similarly, it is possible to obtain aggregate fig- 
ures on premium expenditure on savings-based life insur- 
ance by utilising Equation (6.3.4). Thus aggregate 
expenditure on savings-based life insurance is given by 
Financial Saving Flow Plus a share of the Expenses Loadings 
of Tables 6.10.3 and 6.10.? obtained by multiplying 
these loadings by a factor of (OP - Tem ora. Element) 
where the Temporary Elements are from Table 6.10.2 and 
the Office Premiums (OP) are from Table 6.4.1. The 
results are given in Table 6.10.10. 
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Table 6.10.6 Bonus Loadings per unit Sums Insured 
(New Business purchased in the UK 1946/68) 
Year Whole Life Endowment 
1946 0.0067616 0.0083831 
47 0.0060849 0.0079782 
48 0.0067724 0.0089709 
49 0.0066622 0.0090630 
1950 0.0079443 0.0109155 
51 0.0085837 0.0116998 
52 0.0085671 0.0115527 
53 0.0091254 0.0123861 
54 0.0088636 0.0122529 
1955 0.0087999 0.0122388 
56 0.0091468 0.0128050 
57 0.0089015 0.0127234 
58 0.0102662 0.0145142 
59 0.0099371 0.0142776 
1960 0.0099415 0.0144475 
61 0.0099523 0.0148008 
62 0.0094060 0.0143962 
63 0.0100810 0.0156101 
64 0.0104724 0.0164438 
1965 0.0102076 0.0166905 
66 0.0095756 0.0164788 
67 0.0093305 0.0169353 68 0.0093151 0.0179587 
Source: MASTER SAVINGS 
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Table 6.10.7 Aggregate Bonus and Expenses Loadings 
(shown separately) in Annual New Business 
Office Premiums. £000 
Whole Life With Profits Endowment With Profits 
Year EL BL EL BL 
1946 68.5 179.2 2,067.8 1,612.9 
47 356.5 259.8 3,146.0 2,119.0 
48 349.1 285.8 2,404.3 2,250.8 
49 180.3 335.8 2,663.7 1,783.6 
1950 115.3 332.1 1,947.2 2,174.4 
51 236.1 313.3 2,390.2 1,859.1 
52 98.7 573.1 2,079.8 2,815.4 
53 156.3 588.6 2,428.9 2,630.8 
54 116.9 459.1 11899.6 2,504.5 
1955 202.8 689.0 2,666.2 3,448.9 
56 267.6 789.4 2,407.6 3,362.6 
57 294.5 762.0 21361.9 3,619.8 
58 121.8 11482.4 700.6 6,139.5 
59 638.6 1,198.4 3,296.3 4,767.3 
1960 708.1 1,259.6 4,567.3 6,877.0 
61 391.3 1,182.3 3,790.6 9,330.4 
62 1,168.4 1,774.0 8,628.4 8,761.5 
63 995.8 2,001.0 9,306.1 10,913.0 
64 672.6 3,096.7 5,857.1 15,541.0 
1965 1,421.3 3,301.1 11,173.7 17,104.4 
66 1,685.1 3,172.4 10 659.4 15,740.5 
67 2,056.7 4,394-7 9,621.7 2 20,964.2 
68 3,869.3 3,769.8 21,214.8 20,313.1 
Source: Tables 6.4.2,6.10.3 and 6.10.6 
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Table 6.10.8.. Aggregate Bonus and Expenses Loadings 
(shown separately) as a proportion of 
Pure Premiums. 
Whole Life With Profits Endowment With Profits 
Year EL BL EL BL 
'1946 0.1437 0.3759 0.3024 0.2359 
47 0.5788 0.4218 0.3537 0.2382 
48 0.5745 0.4703 0.2784 0.2606 
49 0.2658 0.4951 0.3905 0.2615 
1950 0.2273 0.6548 0.2783 0.3107 
51 0.5418 0.7189 0.4258 0.3312 
52 0.1224 0.7108 0.2446 0.3311 
53 0.2146 0.8081 0.3305 0.3579 
54 0.2127 0.8353 0.2720 0.3587 
'1955 0.2513 0.8537 0.2834 0.3666 
56 0.3150 0.9293 0.2804 0.3916 
57 0.3620 0.9366 0.2560 0.3924 
58 0.0923 1.1238 0.0519 0.4548 
59 0.5986 1.1234 0.3153 0.4560 
1960 0.6566 1.1679 0.3173 0.4777 
61 0.4102 1.2393 0.2036 0.5011 62 0.8084 1.2273 0.4941 0.5018 
63 0.6886 1.3838 0.4677 0.5485 
64 0.3275 1.5079 0.2212 0.5868 
1965 0.6975 1.6200 0.3988 0.6104 66 0.8963 1.6874 0.4186 0.6182 
67 0.8567 1.8306 0.2904 0.6327 
68 2.3818 2.3206 0.7548 0.7227 
Source: Tables 6.4.1 and 6.10.7 
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Table 6.10.9 Financial Saving Flow in UK Ordinary 
Renewable Life Insurance New Business £000 
Year Saving Consumption Total 
1946 10,219.7 5,662.3 15,882.0 
47 13,080.2 7,690.5 20,770.7 
48 13,184.7 6,790.3 19,975.0 
49 11,804.4 8,305.5 20,109.9 
1950 13,926.5 8,010.8 21,937.3 
51 14,566.0 12,314.7 26,880.7 
52 16,726.2 8,542.5 25,268.7 
53 14,902.9 9,941.6 24,844.5 
54 17,781.5 10,751.5 28,533.0 
1955 20,664.9 12,207.4 32,872.3 
56 20,126.9 13,346.1 33,473.0 
57 20,621.6 12,294.1 32,915.7 
58 28,395.7 10,429.2 38,824.9 
59 25,098.4 18,947.6 44,046.0 
1960 31,459.6 21,521.5 52,981.1 
61 37,592.2 20t657.2 58,249.4 
62 34,463.6 29,489.0 63,952.6 63 40,722.0 32,578.8 73,300.8 64 55,397.4 29,069.1 84,466.5 
1965 53,432.8 34 056.9 
, 
87,489.7 66 56,414.7 37 033.3 93,448.0 67 66,895.0 32,608.8 99,503.8 68 57,907.9 54,065.1 111,973.0 
Source: Tables 6.10.1,6.10.2,6.10.3 and 6.10. 
_31,7_ 
Table 6.10.10 New Premium Expenditure on Savings- 
based and Protection-based Renewable 
Life Insurance £000 
Year Savings-based Protection-based 
1946 13,097.6 2,784.4 
47 17,530.6 3,240.1 
48 16,839.7 3,135.3 
49 16,463.7 3,646.2 
1950 17,833.8 4,103.5 
51 21,803.8 5,076.9 52 20,971.9 4,296.8 
53 19,713.5 5,131.0 
54 23,086.4 5,446.6 
1955 26,772.9 6,099.4 
56 26,115.8 7,357.2 
57 25,775.7 7,140.0 
58 31,036.2 7,788.7 
59 33,087.9 10,958.1 
1960 42,003.7 10,977.4 
61 47,413.2 10,836.2 
62 5' 
, 63 9 367.1 13,933.7 64 70,767.3 13,699.2 
1965 72,417.4 15,072.3 
66 78,246.8 15,201.2 
67 83 457.8 
, 
16,046.0 
68 89 830.5 22,142.5 
Source: See Table 6.10.9 
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6.11 Conclusion 
The objective of this Chapter has been to split 
new renewable ordinary life insurance premium income 
into components defined by their financial saving 
and protection contents. This has been done in 
two ways: first, by differentiating between finan- 
cial saving and consumption (see Table 6.10.9) and 
second, by differentiating between savings-based 
premium expenditures and those which are protection- 
based (ie. those used to purchase life insurance for 
the purpose of protecting dependents). (see Table 
6.10.10). The general method has been to compare 
Office Premiums derived from figures available in 
the Annual Abstract of Statistics with Aggregate Pure 
Premiums derived from the theory of Chapter Five. 
Details of the importance of the Financial Savings 
content of Aggregate Office Premiums are given in 
Table 6.11.1. It can be seen that Financial Saving 
represents a fairly stable proportion of Office 
Premiums (with an average figure of 61.4%). 
Now that separate data on the Financial Savings 
content of life insurance is available it will be 
possible to accurately analyse the importance of 
saving via the medium of those models of Section 4.5. 
Similarly, now that a differentiation of life insur- 
ance premium expenditures into saving-based and 
protection-based categories is possible, a demand 
model of life insurance can also be attempted with- 
out the disadvantages of those of Section 4.5. 
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Table 6.11.1 The Proportion of Aggregate Office 
Premiums Allocated to Financial Saving. 
Year 
Financial Saving 
as a Proportion of 
Office Premiums 
1946 0.643 
47 0.630 
48 0.660 
49 0.587 
1950 0.635 
51 0.542 
52 0.662 
53 0.600 
54 0.623 
1955 0.629 
56 0.601 
57 0.626 
58 0.570 
1960 0.594 
61 0.645 
62 
63 0.556 
64 0.656 
1965 0.611 
66 0.604 
67 0.672 
68 0.517 
Source: Tables 6.4.1 and 6.10.9 
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APPENDIX 6.1. 
The Calculation of New Business Renewal Premium Income 
Let IFNt denote the number of non-single premium 
policies in force (companies established in the UK) at 
the end of year t and IFSt the sums insured plus 
accumulated reversionary bonuses in force at the end of 
year t (for non-single premium policies). Let the super- 
scripts Tr1LNP, ENP, T, WLWP, EWP and OWP denote 
the various classes of life insurance described in Table 
6.3.1 (OWP refers to 'With Profit Other' policies which 
are assumed to be single premium policies). 
The relationship between the renewal-premium in 
force in years t and (t-1) is then: 
IFNt 
= 
IFNt_1 + Nt 
- 
(NClt + NCat) (A6. 'I 
. 
'I ) 
and IFSt = IFSt_i + St + ABt 
- 
(SCIt + SCat) 
(A6.1.2) 
where Nt and St refer to new numbers and sums insured 
respectively; NC1t and SC1t refer to the numbers and 
sums insured (plus bonuses) deleted by claims and NCat 
and SCat refer to the numbers and sums insured (plus 
bonuses) deleted by cancellations. ABt refers to the 
accumulated reversionary bonuses declared in year t. 
Since, obviously, bonuses are only declared on with 
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profit policies, we can rewrite Equation-(A6.1.2) as 
IFSt 
= 
IFStPý + IFStPi(1+bt) + St 
- 
(SC1t + SCat) 
(A6. ß. 3) 
where bt is the average rate of (compound) bonus 
declared in year t. 
Equations (A6.1.1) and (A6.1.3) can be rewritten 
as 
(NC1t + NCat) = IFNt_1 + Nt - IFNt 
(A6.1. la) 
and 
(SClt + SCat) = IFSt_l + IFSt_, (1 +bt) + St - IFSt 
(A6.1.3a) 
where the right hand side of both equations can be obtained 
from the Annual Abstract of Statistics. The values of 
bt obtained from the survey are given in a table at the 
end of this Appendix in Table A6.1.1. 
The next step is to apportion the total values on 
the left hand side of the above Equations among the various 
classes of life insurance described in Table 6.3.3. This 
step uses the assumption that numbers (or sums insured) 
of policies which become claims or cancellations are 
proportional to IFNt (or IFSt). Essentially this 
means that the mortality and cancellation experience is 
the same (in proportion) for all classes of life insurance. 
In practice it turns out that this is not the case (with 
higher mortality and lower cancellations experienced by 
the protection-type policies. However, insufficient 
information is available to enable a more sophisticated 
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assumption). 
The claims and cancellations for any one class of 
life insurance (say EWP) is then given by: 
IFSEWP (SClt + SCat)EWP 
_ IFS (SClt +SCat) t (A6.1.4) 
(similarly for numbers) 
The only complication to Equation (A6.1.4) arises when 
IFS P< IFSt_ ; the fall in in-force must then be 
allocated solely to (SCl + SCa EWP. t t) 
Final values for new business numbers and sums 
insured (for business issued by UK-established companies) 
can then be obtained by re-arranging Equations (A6.1.1) 
and (A6.1.3) on an individual policy class basis, eg. 
for EWP we have: 
SEWP = IFS 
EWP 
- 
IFStýý., (1+bt) + (SClt + SCat)EWP 
(similarly for numbers) 
The final stage 
- 
to obtain new business renewal 
premium income (OP) 
- 
is to multiply each value of SEWP 
New Premium Income EWP by the ratio New Sums Insured ) (obtained from 
Survey non-group data and given in Tables A6.1.2 and 
A6.1.3 at the end of this Appendix). The resulting 
figures were then summed and scaled by the factor 
ýi 
where 5 is the ratio 
New Premium Income within UK New Premium Income : Companies established in UK 
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Obviously the new business renewal premium figures 
can be calculated by using either numbers or sums insured. 
It was found that figures computed on the basis of sums 
E S, i OP insured needed less scaling by the factor ý. ý-l 
and so the figures were calculated on this basis. 
This method of deriving new premium income figures 
is heavily dependent on the appropriate use of the ratio 
New Premium Income Naturally enough, we have to New Sums Insured 
assume that figures obtained from the survey data are 
representative of ordinary branch new business in general. 
There are however three main points to watch out for: 
i) that the average 'survey' inception age and 
the industry wide inception age are similar 
for each policy class; 
ii) that the 'survey' premium rates are reason- 
ably competitive, and 
iii) whether the whole of life premiums cease at 
some maximum age. In fact the majority of 
'. survey' whole of life office premium rates 
were calculated to cease at age 60 and conse- 
quently must be revised downwards since 
theoretically we assume that no such restric- 
tion exists. 
Unfortunately, not even an examination of the rele- 
vant Department of Trade returns can yield any information 
on the 'survey' inception ages so that no check is possible. 
A study of quinquennial 'survey' premium rates for selected 
policies reveals that, in a broad comparison with Table 
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6.7.2, they are much in line with general market rates 
(note: the 'survey' rates were not used in the compila- 
tion of Table 6.7.2). Although it would have been 
beneficial, not enough data was available to scale the 
'survey' ratios of Tables A6.1.2 and A6.1.3 to bring them 
into line with the general market rates. 
It was found necessary, however, to adjust the 
whole of life ratios of Table A6.1.2 to allow for cessation 
of premiums at age 60 (as reported in the relevant 
Department of Trade returns, Schedule 5). The whole of 
life pure premiums in this case is given by 
Premium at Mx rx 
inception age Nx 
-0 
Thus to convert the whole of life ratios of Table 
A6.1.2 they were multiplied by the factor (1 
-- 
0) 
x 
(0 < (I 
- 
N-6) ( 1) where inception age was obtained 
x 
from Table 6.5.1 and a 'calculation' rate of interest 
of 3% was used. The results are given in Table A6.1.3. 
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Table A6.1.1 'Average' Annual Compound Rate of 
Reversionary Bonus Declared bt 
Year bt 
1946 0.0140 
47 0.0140 
48 0.0151 
49 0.0151 
1950 0.0176 
51 0.0186 
52 0.0186 
53 0.0199 
54 0.0199 
1955 0.0203 
56 0.0215 
57 0.0215 
58 0.0243 
59 0.0243 
1960 0.0253 
61 0.0263 
62 0.0263 
63 0.0282 
64 0.0298 
'1965 0.0308 
66 0.0311 
67 0.0317 
68 0.0353 
Source: Survey Data 
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Table A6.1.3 The Ratio of New Premium Income to New Sums 
Insured, adjusted by the factor (1 
_ 
N60 
x 
Year Whole Life Whole Life 
NP WP 
1946* 0.021217 0.027241 
47* 0.022379 0.029530 
48 0.022504 0.030228 
49 0.024786 0.022454 
1950 0.022990 0.022317 
51 0.026229 0.022967 
52 0.026006 0.021090 
53 0.027112 0.020662 
54 0.030341 0.020802 
1955 0.027417 0.020907 
56 0.025133 0.021313 
57 0.022197 0.020830 
58 0.020838 0.021224 
59 0.021235 0.021391 
1960 0.021527 0.021301 
61 0.021200 0.020336 
62 0.021093 0.019756 
63 0.020744 0.018940 
64 0.020582 0.018531 
1965 0.020433 0.018298 
66 0.019167 0.018238 
67 0.015351 0.018471 
68 0.013081 0.018220 
*Estimated 
Source: Survey Data 
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APPENDIX 6.2 
The Calculation of Inception Ages 1959/1968 
Essentially, the method of estimating the unknown 
inception ages is a simple one involving a weighted 
least-squares polynominal curve fitting SUBROUTINE 
from the Nottingham Algorithms Group (NAG) Manual (15) 
(for use on an ICL 1906A computer). The subroutine 
uses Forsythe's Method (involving Orthogonal polynominals) 
(5) with weights inversely proportional to the square 
of the standard error of the dependent variable. 
The SUBROUTINE requires the explanatory variable 
to be input in a monotomically increasing sequence. 
For each class of policy, three different estima- 
tions were used, one using the overall Average Inception 
age as explanatory variable and the other two using 
time (to explain a) the inception ages and, b) the 
difference between a) and overall Average inception age). 
A copy of the computer programme 
- 
written in 
FORTRAN 
- 
used to calculate average inception ages 
(MASTER INCPTNAGE) is given at the end of this Appendix. 
- --- - ---"-- ._- --ý -" --- -"- -- . _..... _.. __. 
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k=0(J)-7 
IF(K. FQ. 1). U)GI) Ti d 
tS UV KK11)=(O(. 1) 
a% (KK+1)=1"'(I, J) 
XX(ýe+1)=x(t, J) 
lZ(J)=UZ(J)+ß00. U 
Z=1üä. 0 
Kk_KK+1 
IF(ýR. L. F. 13)Or) TO 5 
of. I \=GU (1 ) 
OI"'AX=(s0("') 
IIT(14)=23,0 
XXX(14)=XX(1) 
wt,: w(14, )=. 1(1) 
Du YC. P J=1,14 
IIT(J)=((IIT(J)-; 3)+(IIT("1)-1))122 
11ý(. 1)=("(1(. 1)-()r"ttX+(i)U(J)-(i: ýji: ))/(l; ý"1Xý1)ýj ", ) 14)r, u T+) )ti)il 
X(1(, I)=XXX(J)-0(J) 
Gfs To 9(, 0 
iitt X014=XKX1k 
9 ý, u CI)riTIUL. 
9 
1 ý' 
11 
111 
1> 
1S 
14 
1fill 
101 
2t: ß 
21-12 
ifl$ 
t, i) 13 K1=2,13 
CALL fý12C, fýF(; týt)ýliit: (ýWwýK1ýýr ST, P, ý_) 
MRjTE(b, 202)k1 
1)1) 10 J=1,23 
1YE: 4k=1945+. t 
UUt1=C(J) 
(tOU= ( (UU 0-J. "; %X) t ((; i)! i-UtS I r. )) / (UI-. R A-0 . 11 t. ) 
S=P(r; 1) 
DO 9 k=1 11' 
I1=.. 1-K 
S=S*u("u4 F (11 ) 
wKITt(h,? (º1) 1, IYFARPS 
wRITE(Gýli'l)ý1 
CALL EU2! 
"t'F(`, IiT, XX. i(ýýv't+ýK1, t: R, ST, nfý, l. ) 
CALL f(, 2ACF(. t, IIT, Xt), ýýU', k: 1, +: ý:, Sü, nEP, I. ) 
00 1t J-1,23 
1YfAh=1945+. I 
RTT=Flt, 4T(J) 
RTT=((kT1-2'c)+(RTT-1))/? 2 
+1 
,, ra1 ý I, +1 
SP2(tj1) 
5PPr ('=S 1) 
Uli 11 K=1, N? 
I1=f: 1-K 
S=S*klT+f^P(11) 
D[1 111 K=1, ýtiri 
I11=Nt: 1-K 
S1=S1*R TT+PAP(I11) 
s =S1+0(J) 
wPITE(,, 2: )3)1. IYEAR, S. Sc 
, Crº% T IUF 
CirTI'"(UF 
f(', t"AT (4F(1.1)) 
f R: 1AT(l3FU. ü) 
F1; R-AT(1n 
, 
/1/ýiýºý, 'pI 1101 tº [ CFPT10 A 
1'FIill ST i 1U)EL ººStS 01''; RAI 1. MVt, A(-r AGE, S1=CU, ' L) 
1. /110X. '1 
- , 
/i1tlXi'Z 
. 
rl! hý "/i1lýýý { 
3'. //) 
F41RC"A T(11rT1 15 r, 14.1tºX. FJtS. 5, ' AV p+Atr ) 
FIººti'AT(11< r//"6(, "ß'k1 EnU/LS 
USES T1. t' 
- 
Et. P'º/, 1OX, '4 
- 
FirP 
Ft)kr-AT(1H 
, 
I1,5X, I4,10X, Ft'. 5,1O), I 
.,, 
' 
STOP 
EN0 
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APPENDIX 6.3 The Survey Questionnaire 
Department of Industrial Economics 
University of Nottingham 
INFLATION AND LIFE INSURANCE 
The aim of this study is to build a time series demand model 
for life insurance and thus the data is required on an annual 
basis 
- 
hopefully for the past 25 years. 
The data should only apply to the business transacted by your 
company in your own country, please do not include any foreign 
business you transact. 
If-your company has altered the basis on which any of these 
figures are calculated could you please indicate the fact and 
the date/s when the alteration occurred. 
Only the figures for direct (ie. excluding reinsurance trans- 
actions) ordinary life insurance are required. 
Section A 
Per annum for the last 25 years. 
Types of ordinary life polici, 
a) New (renewable) premiums 
b) New (single) premiums 
c) Total premium income.. 
.0 
d) Total premium income from 
Group-life policies.. 400 
Section B 
Per annum for the last 25 years. 
a) Number of surrenders, lapses, 
voids (ie. voluntary 
terminations).. 
.. 
b) Number of new policies 
"" 
c) New sums insured 
*. 
Total Whole life Endowment Term 
WP NP WP NP 
_330_ 
Types of ordinary life policy 
Section C 
Per annum for the last 25 years. 
a) Management expenses 
.... 
b) Commission rates 
.... 
NB WP 
= with profit 
NP 
= non-profit 
Total Whole life Endowment Term 
WP NP WP NP. 
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Section D 
Certain information is required on some specific policies 
issued by your company, with the aim of calculating the 
'profitability' of these policies to the policyholder. 
Again, the data is required for the last 25 years (if 
possible); but if, say, valuations occurred every five 
years then there will only be five sets of figures. 
Premium and Bonus Rates are required on the assumption 
that this will save time when filling in the questionnaire, 
leaving the questioner to work out the required data. 
Non-Profit 
Endowment Temporary 
Age Whole Life Policy Term (Term) Date 
10 15 25 10 15 25 
1949 
1950 
25 
1973 
Annual 1974 
Premium 
Rates (% of SA) 1949 1950 
45 
1973 
1974 
1949 
1950 
25 
1973 
*Surrender 1974 
Rates (values) 1949 
1950 
45 " 1973 
1974 
*or for a specific policy. 
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With Profit 
-Endowment Temporary 
Age Whole Life Policy Term (Term) Date 
10 15 25 10 15 25 
1949 
1950 
25 
1973 
Annual 1974 
Premium 
Rates (% if SA) 1949 
1950 
45 " 1973 
1974 
1949 
1950 
25 
1973 
Surrender 1974 
Rates (values) 
1949 
1950 
45 " 1973 
1974 
- 
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Bonus Rates (Simple or Compound? ) 
Endowment Temporary 
Whole Life Policy Term (Term) Date 
10 T 15 25 10 15 25 
1949 
Reversionary 1950 (simple or 
compound) 
: 
1973 
1974 
1949 
Terminal 1950 
or special 1973 
1974 
APPENDIX 6.4 
FIASTFR SAVTtJUS 
Vi"1it0 td /AL (10o 25), R(? 
_3) #TERfl(23) oQ5(1(10(1), Q69(loo), CM(16#25), lGItC16,25), X(4,2_3). 4(23) 
PEAD(S, 100)(050(I), I=1,100) 
READ(5,100)(069(I), I0,100) 
DO 1000 J=125 
1001) READ(5,101)(CM(K, J), K--1.16) 
DO 1001 J_1,25 
1001 READ(5,101)((t1(K, J), Ks1.16) 
DO 1002 J=1,23 
1002 READ(5,1112)(X(IJ), Ia1,4) 
READ(5,103) (TERI1(J), J=1 ; 23) 
READ(5.103)(R(J). J»1,231 
READ(5,103)(P(J), J; 1.23f 
CALL 1-tORTALITYTARLE 
CALL CO Ur1UTAT! OM 
100 FORt1AT(100FO. 0) 
1 Al FORt1AT (16F0.0) 
102 FQRt1AT (4F0,0) 
103 FORFIAT(23F0.0) 
STOP 
END 
4 
ClURRMUTINF 1t(1RTAi iTYTAR'i'F 
DI J, NS UZ CU(1r6, z ), fU(1) 25RQ66(16), R ALX(1(10,25), EO(100,25) 
C014t10N//ALX (10b. 25)R(23), TERM (23), (l5(? cl 0r)Q69(Ion) rCM(16#25) 
1GM(16,25)"X(4,23) 
DO 2 K°1 , 16 
no I J=1,25 
CQ(K, J)= (2*Cf(K, J))/(2+CM(K, J)) 
1 G0(K, J)= (2*G?. '(K, J))/(2+GM1(K, J)) 
2 CONT I PWE 
DO 3 1=1,100 
FQ(I, 1)_050(I)-11º totSl) )-05n(1))/36 
DO J=2,25 
3 EQ(Isi)=EQ(1,1)+(, I-1)+ý(069(I)ý05(j(I))/1g 
NN=1 
30 b0 4 J-1,25 
RALX(1, J)=999999', A 
DO 4 I=2,100 
IF(NN. EQ. 1)G0 To 31 
RALX(I, J)=ALX(I, J) 
GO To 4 
31 RALX(TrJ)=RALX(I"1,,; )+tr(1nEti(ir, 1,. 1)) 
4 CONTI? Jl1E 
HtJ=PIPI+1 -- 
DO 42 K=1,16 
KKc(K+1)*5-9 
IF(K. E4.16)GO TO 40 ... '-V 
SUtIoPALX(KKr22)+RALX(KK+1,22)+RALX(KK+2,22)+RAL)C(KK+3r22)+ 
IRALX(KK+4,22) 
R066(K)c(RALX(KKr22)-RA1)c(KK+5r22))/sUht 
Gn Tn 42 
40 SU11=0.0 
. 
DO 41 JJ_0,23 
41 SUFI=SIJI4+RALX(KK}JJ, 22) 
. R066(16)=(RALX(KKr22)! RALX(100r22))/SUFI 
42 CONTINUE 
DO 10 K=1,16 
KK=(K+1)*5R9 
DO 9 J=1,25 
ALX(I, J):. 999999: p 
RA=ALX(KKiJ)/RALX(KK, J) 
IF((K. LE. 4). OR. (K. GE. 15), OR. (J. GF. 23))GO TO 5 
FM RQ66(K). CQ(K; J)/CQ(K; 22) 
IJK=5 
- GO TO 8 
5 IF(K. E0.16)GO TO 6. 
FtI: R066(K)*GQ(K, J)/GQ(K. 221 
IJK=5 
GO TO 8 
6 IJKa24 
ALX(100, J)=0,86+(ALX(76; J)-145389,3)*2,72/26331 
. 
IF(ALX(100rJ). GE. 0.0)G0 TO 30 
ALX(9n0, J)R0.0 
GO TO 80 
8 SUFI=RALX(KKB'1#J)*RALX(KK+2, J)+RALX(KK+3, J)+RALX(KK+4rJ) 
SU'"1-SIJt1*RA 
SUMS=((ALX(KK; j'jmR. A*RALX(KK+TJK; J))/Fý1)-ALX(KKPJ) 
SU'i (SUI1+S'JME)/2 
ALX(KK+IJK, rJ)=Ai: X(KK, J)* (1-F4)-"F+"1*SUMF 
80 EL=AI. X(KK. J) 
DO 81 JJ=O, (IJK-1) 
81 V EL=El. *(1-Etl(KK+JJ: J)) F=ALnG(At. X(KK+IJK. J)/ALX(KK. J))/ALOG(EL/ALX(KK. J)) 
DO 32 JJ=1r(IJK-1) 
82 ALX(KK+JJ. J)=ALX(KK+JJ-1 aJ)*((1, EA(KK+JJ-1, J))**F) 
9 CONTINUE 
10 CONTINUE 
IF (UUN. NE. 4) G0 TO 30 
RETURN 
END 
111 
I 
2 
zoo 
20 
Qtin ROIITTNF rnº4FaIrTAYtn, J 
I14ENSION ADX(1raC; 25)D(100; 25); C(100,25), AUUX(10o, 25), 
1AIIX(100,25), AK(1O0), AF: N(4,2) 
C0I"tt10N//ALX(1(10.25), R. (2-4) #TERtt(Z'; ), ()5n (1DA) r()b9(100), C! "1(16,25), 
1 Gt"t(16,25), X(4.23) , S(23) 
DO 6J =1 "23 
V=(1* R(J))**(r1 
VB--(1+O, 8*ll(J))%(1+R(J)) 
KKK=1 
IJ=1945+J 
SUf1D=ALX(1n0, J )w(V, t*1a)9) 
SUMC%ALX(100, J )*(V**110) 
no 1 1=1.99 
ADX(I, J )=ALX(1, J )MA'CX(I+1, J ) 
D(I, J )=ALX(I, J )*(V**(I+9)) 
C(I; J )-ADX(I, J )*(V**(I+10)) 
SUInD=SUr1D. D(I; J ! 
SUMO=SUFIC+C(IJ ! 
A! JX(1, J )=Still D 
ArtX(1. J )=SUNSC 
DO 2 1=2.100 
ANX(I. J )=ANX(I-1. J )D(I1. J ) 
AMX(I, J )=A7"1X(I-1, J )-C(1-1, J ) 
DO 5 I1=1,6 
IX=INT(X(II, J)) 
RXZX(II, J)P"IX 
AADX=RX*ADX(IX-9, J ) 
AALX=ALX(IXn9; J )-AADX 
DX=AALX*(V**X(II'J)) 
AANX=ANX(IX-9aJ )+Rx*(ANX(IX'! 8J )-ANXC! X-9, J )) 
AMIX'-A! 
-1X(IXrt9; J )+RX*(AMX(IXM3, J )-AMSX(IX-9, J )) 
TF(II. LE. 2)G0 To 20 
XT=X(II, J)+TERt1(J) 
IT_INT(XT) 
RTmX(! I, J)+TERtd(J)-IT 
AADT:: RT*ADX(IT-Q, J ) 
AALT=ALx(ITn9; J ')WAADT 
DT=AALT*(V**(X(II, J)+TER? i(J))) 
AANT_ANX(ITi4, J )+RT*(ANX(uTA. J )-ANX(IT-9, J )) 
AA! T=Alix(ITPQ; J )+RT*(AMx(IT"B, J )-AMMX(IT-9, J )) 
ANN(I! 
'KKK)=(AANXrAANT)%DX 
! F(KKK. EG. 1)Gn TO 200 
PER : (AAtIX-AA1 IT+DT) / (DX*ANN (I I , 1) ) 
WRITE(6,102)II, PFP 
GO TO 5 
pEz (AAPIX-AAIIT+DT) / (AAUX""AANT) 
PETa(AAt1X-AAMT) (AANX«AANT) 
WRITE (6,100) 11 #X(II , J) #TERH(, 1) ºPE, PET, I I 
GO TO 5 
FXIIEXPTN(X(II; Jit J) 
XEzX(II, J)+EX 
IE=IPJT(XF) 
RE=X(! I, J)+FX'+IF 
AADEnfE*ADX(TEf, n, J ) 
AALEýALX(IEM9. J )-AADE 
DEaAALF*(V**(X(IT J)+EXj) 
AAWE AFIX(IE: nq, J )+RF*(ANX(IF-3. J )-ANX(IE-9, J )) 
AAliF=Aº1X(IE"9. J )+RE*(Aº"1X(IE, B. J )*AMX(IE-9, J )) 
CXL=(AAItX*AANE/AAIJX)-AA? 
-iE+D1_ 14NnIY'Iii 
3 
4 
400 
5 
6 
n0 3 K-1 
. 
tJN 
AK(IX-9-K)=(AAt1X/AANX)+Ar1X(IXm9^K; J )"AMX(IX«9-K, J 
IF(AK(IX-()-K). GF. CXL)C() TO e4 
AK1aARS(AK(IXP-9-K)-CXL) 
AK2=ABS(AK(IXr$-K)-CXL) 
RA14X=(ANX(IX-9-K, J )*A42+APJX(IX-8-K. J 
BAº1Xz (AAI1X/AANX) *RANX, CXL 
ANIJ(II, KKK)=AANX/DX 
IF(KKK. E0.1)GO TO 600 
"PWLfl AAFIX/(GX*ANN(II, 1)) 
IJRITF(6,102)II, PWLB 
GO TO 5 
PWLGAAI, IX/AANX 
PWLT: (BAP)X-AAM-IE) / (BANX»AANE) 
WRITF(6,101)IJ, X(II, J)'FX, PtJL, PWLT, II 
CODUT I PJUE 
V ='I ll 
KKK=KKK+1 
IF(KKK. EQ. 2)GO TO 111 
tiRITF. (6,1Q3). 
CONTINUE 
) 
)*AK1)/(AK1+AK2) 
s 
100 FORMAT(IHH 
, 
I4; 5Y, F9.5,5x#F6.1,5x. F13.9,5X, F13.9,4X, ENRW'-IT 1,11). 
101 FORUUAT(1H , I4,5xºF9.5, SXPF6.3.5xºr13. c, 5xºF13.9,1X, IWI4ot. F LIFE 'ºi 
11) 
102 FfRrtAT (111 º77X, I1; 5x F1.1; 9) 
103 FORr; AT(1H º///) 
RETURN 
END 
Ftl'(TTntJ FXPT! J(T, J) 
pl(, iJ//ALX(100.25). R(23)ºTERM(23)ºQ5A(1On), Q69(100)ºCM(16,25) 
1rtI(16.25). X(4º23) 
SUMko. O 
IXsI? JT(T) 
RX=T«IX 
IT2IX«3 
ALIuALX(IX-() ºJ ), -RX*(AI'X(IX-9ºJ )-ALX(IX-33ºJ )) 
ro I T=ITs1OO 
SU!. J SU! i+ALX(I. J 
EXQTN_(S! )ti-RX*(ALX(IX,, 8 J ).. ALX(1OO, J )))/A1.1 
RETURR 
END 
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CHAPTER SEVEN : MODELS OF THE PURCHASE OF UK 
NON-GROUP LIFE INSURANCE : 
DESCRIPTION AND DATA. 
7.1 Introduction 
The objective of this Chapter is to build models 
of the purchase of UK non-group ordinary life insurance 
(excluding annuities) which will then be tested in 
Chapter Eight. Two main types of model will be exam- 
ined (corresponding to those described in Section 4.5) ; 
the first tests Financial Saving (Table 6.10.9) as a 
proportion of Personal Disposable Income in order to 
investigate the importance of new financial saving via 
the medium of life insurance. The second involves a 
Demand Model of the purchase of life insurance with dep- 
endent variables from Table 6.10.10 (ie. the sales of 
savings-based and protection-based life insurance). 
Both models are particularly concerned with the 
role of inflation expectations and these will be exam- 
ined in greater detail in Section 7.5. 
The starting hypothesis of the demand model is 
that life insurance is purchased for two main reasons: 
to provide protection of dependents against premature 
death and secondly, to provide a savings medium. Pur- 
chases of life insurance for these reasons will be 
- 
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influenced by several factors (such as income and infla- 
tion expectations) however, these factors vary in their 
importance and their effect depending on the reason for 
the purchase. 
There is one theoretical complication to all demand 
models)known as the 'identification problem'. Briefly, 
no demand model can be examined in isolation because it 
is just one determinant of market equilibrium: supply 
must also be investigated. The statistical solution 
to this problem involves the construction of a set of 
simultaneous equations which must be estimated in their 
reduced forms (by the method of Two Stage Least Squares). 
The financial savings model 
- 
using new financial 
saving as a proportion of Personable Disposable Income 
(PDI) as dependent variable 
- 
is analogous to those 
models described by the Bank of England (3). The 
objective is to test the responsiveness of semi-contractual 
financial saving to changes in certain economic variables 
(such as inflation expectations). Some attempt can be 
made to evaluate the various theories of saving in the 
context of new saving via life insurance. 
The Financial Savings and Demand Models are, however, 
fairly similar in that the same explanatory variables 
are involved. These variables include inflation expec- 
tations, income (permanent and transitory), the 'optimum 
stock' of life insurance and wealth as well as several 
socio-economic variables such as births and marriages. 
The explanatory variables will be described in later 
Sections but first, the two models must be examined. 
- 
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7.2 The Financial Saving Model 
By the term 'Financial Saving Model' I mean the 
model of new financial saving via ordinary, non-group, 
renewable life insurance using as dependent variable: 
Financial Saving (Table 6.10.9) as a proportion of 
P. D. I. (see Table 7.2.1). 
The figures of Table 7.2.1 show that (FS/PDI) 
(to be called FSR) was fairly stable until the mid- 
1960's when there was a sharp rise. It must be remem- 
bered however, that we are only concerned with a very 
small part of the aggregate saving ratio: for example, 
in the 1960's saving represented an average of 8.1% of 
PDI(1) whereas new financial saving via life insurance 
averaged only 0.2% (though, of course, total saving via 
life insurance was much higher). 
The theories of saving outlined in Section 4.3 
were originally formulated to analyse the effects of 
inflation on aggregate saving rather than new saving 
via life insurance (which by definition is long-term 
and semi-contractual). Hence some of them are unable 
to explain the variation in the dependent variable 
(/PDI) : for example, some of the theories only explain 
variations in one direction (Deaton (11) and Branson & 
Kievorick (5) cannot explain increases in (FS/PDI) be- 
cause of their emphasis on consumption as the comple- 
went of saving). Consequently, we are left with two 
(')See Bank of England (3) P. 53. The aggregate saving 
ratio includes saving by unincorporated businesses 
as well as households. 
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Table 7.2.1 Financial Saving (via New Life Insurance 
Purchases) as a proportion of Personal 
Disposable Income. 
(FSR 
= 
FS 
Year (FS/PDI) x 1000 
1946 1.3433 
47 1.5899 
48 1.5199 
49 1.2943 
1950 1.4516 
51 1.4048 
52 1.5025 
53 1.2508 
54 1.4140 
1955 1.5160 
56 '1.3779 
57 1.34L13 
58 1.7790 
59 1.4806 
1960 1.7238 
61 1.9227 
62 1.6846 
63 1.8716 
64 2.3691 
1965 2.1365 
66 2.1301 
67 2.4273 
68 1.9761 
Source: Table 6.10.9 
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main theories relating inflation'to financial saving 
in a life insurance context: 
i) the 'traditional' argument that inflation 
devalues the real value of maturity benefits 
paid to surviving policyholders (or death 
benefits paid to heirs in the financial 
saving whole of life case). An alternative 
viewpoint argues that inflation reduces the 
real rate of return on saving through life 
insurance (see M. J. Hamburger (24) ). How- 
ever it is not certain whether this will 
reduce or increase saving via life insurance; 
ii) the Juster and Wachtel (27) hypothesis that 
when nominal incomes change rapidly, expec- 
tations of prices 
- 
and hence of the standard 
of living in real terms 
- 
becomes more uncer- 
tain. This results in precautionary saving. 
Of course, as D. Barros (4) explains, the above 
hypotheses only attempt to explain marginal changes 
under special conditions of high inflation and do not 
attempt to replace the existing theories of the long- 
term determinants of personal saving. Thus we must 
still turn to traditional Keynesian theory, with its 
emphasis on the growth of real income, to provide the 
basis in the attempt to investigate the determinants 
of (FS/PDI). Barros also points out that: 
"Two additional elements may have helped raise the personal saving rate: (1) the spread of 
owner-occupation of housing and the associated increase in building society deposits and (2) the promotion of private pension funds, espec- ially after the introduction of state graduated 
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pensions and contracting-out in 1961. " (4) p. 32 
These two elements have a potential effect on saving 
through life insurance because first endowment policies 
are used to purchase houses (in conjunction with a 
building society loan) and secondly, there exists an a 
priori relationship between saving through life insur- 
ance and the provision of pensions (endowment maturity 
benefits are used to provide the single premium on an 
annuity). In addition the provision of compulsory 
state pensions does not necessarily lead to a lower 
individual use of private provision. The study of 
A. M. El-Mokadem (16) indicates that, on the contrary, 
increased provision of state pensions leads to a 
greater awareness of the need to save for retirement 
and hence to an increase in the provision of private 
pensions. 
Summarising then, the basic model used to explain 
the variations in the dependent variable (FS/PDI) 
should have the following features: 
i) real personal disposable income (per head of 
population) as an explanatory variable. 
Alternatively, following M. Friedman (19), 
a variable representing permanent income 
could be used; 
ii) an explanatory variable to allow for the 
effects of inflation expectations; 
iii) other explanatory variables that reflect 
the reasons for financial saving via the 
medium of life insurance (such as house 
purchase, pension rights etc. ). 
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Expressed mathematically, we have 
FSRt 
=()= F( DIt, Pty Xt12 
... 9 Xtk) t 
(7.2.1) 
where ß'. 6I' = real PDI per head of population 
Pe 
= 
the expected rate of inflation 
and XtI, 
..., 
Xtk denote the other explanatory var- 
iables. F will commonly denote a linear function 
ie., 
FSRt = a0 + a, DIt + a2Pt +Z bi Xtj + ut 
(7.2.2) 
where the term ut denotes that residual (of the 
dependent variable) that cannot be explained by the 
linear relationship. 
An alternative, and complicating version of 
Equation (7.2.2) splits ýDlt to differentiate between 
permanent (P) and transitory (T) income: 
lI + ý'Dr+aPe+ EbX FSRt = a0 + a1 t1t 2"t 0 to 
+ ut 
(7.2.3) 
A discussion of the determination of Mft and Pt 
will be deferred to Sections 7.6 and 7.5 respectively. 
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7.3 The Demand Model 
By the term 'Demand Model' I mean the model of 
new purchases of ordinary, non-group renewable life 
insurance excluding annuities. The dependent varia- 
bles used will be premium expenditures on 'protection- 
based' and 'savings-based' life insurance (as defined 
in Section 6.2) with data from Table 6.10.10: these 
of course, are only a surrogate for the 'quantity 
demanded' but this is not a major difficulty. 
The major explanatory variables of interest have 
been broadly outlined in the previous Section so that 
the potential demand model is of the form: 
D pr 
= 
pr 
a0 + 
P-n 
- a PDIt + 
Pr 
a Pt + 
Jr Xti + ut 
tg = a06 + aqg PDIt + a2g Pt + E bý6 X. + ut 
(7.3. ß) 
where Dr denotes the real expenditure on 'protection- 
based' life insurance and Dtg the real expenditure 
on 'savings-based' life insurance in year t. 
Equation (7.3.1) may be subject to the same modi- 
fications as Equation (7.2.2) in örder to include perm- 
anent and transitory income. Similarly, the determin- 
ation of these variables, as well as inflation expecta- 
tion Pt, may alter the format of the model by introducing 
lagged variables. We note that if a stock adjustment 
model is required (eg. Houthakker and Taylor (26) ) 
then one of the Xj will denote the amount of life 
insurance in force, 
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It has also been hypothesised (in Section 4.6) 
that there is a direct relationship between Dtg and 
Dt (S. Neumann (35) predicted a negative relationship 
while Lee and Whitaker (30) formulated the same kind of 
situation with different types of life insurance). 
Thus DS9 and Dpr (or their associated prices) 
should appear as explanatory variables in the model 
of Equation (7.3.1). 
The other explanatory variables that could be 
included in Equation (7.3.1) include unemployment, 
the change in unemployment (see Section 4.3), tax, 
births, marriages, wealth, house purchases and pension 
provisions. 
One further complication of Equation (7.3.1) is 
shared by all prospective demand models and that is 
the question of identification: the problem is that 
the time-series data represented in Table 6.10.10 
represents a series of market equilibria so that the 
figures for D and Dsg are synonymous with S 
and SSg - the 'supply' (in terms of premium expendi- 
ture) of 'protection-based' and 'savings-based' life 
insurance: 
"Market data register points of equilibrium 
of supply and demand at the price prevail- ing in the market at a certain point of 
time. A sample of time-series observations 
shows simultaneously the quantity demanded D, and the quantity supplied S, at the 
pre ailing price, P. If we use these data for estimation, we actually measure the 
coefficients of a function of the form Q= f(P). This equation may be either the demand function or the supply function (or 
even a 'bogus' equation). " 
A. Köutsoyiannis (28) p. 33-37 
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The solution to the identification problem is to 
specify a supply equation 
- 
in addition to the demand 
equation 
- 
in such a way that both may be estimated 
simultaneously (see A. S. Goldberger (20) Section 7). 
The complete model of the purchase of life insur- 
ance must then be of the following theoretical form: 
MK 
YM Ymt + ßk1 
' 
xkt + ult =0 
m=1 k=1- 
MK 
E Yra 
.Y+ k2 ' xkt + u2t =0 
M7-1 k=1 
MK 
EY Yf +E gk. Xkt + um =0 
M7-1 k=1 
for t=1, 
... ,T 
(7.3.2) 
using the traditional notation (see Goldberger p. 295) 
where there are T observations and: 
"Ymt is the tth observation on the mth 
jointly dependent (endogenous) variable 
(m 
= 
1, 
.., 
M); Xkt is the tth observa- 
tion on the kth predetermined (exogenous) 
variable (k = 1, 
.., 
K); Y and ß are 
the coefficients of the endogenous and 
exogenous variables respectively; umt 
is the residual of the tth observation in 
the mth structural equation (having the 
usual econometric properties of zero mean 
and constant variance). " (20) 
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More specifically we have: 
Dp 
= a(1)IP? + b(1)IPS6 + ttt 
Dtg 
= a(2) IP + b(2)IPtg + 
E1 c(! )X 
.+ um 
k1 
to t 
K2 
E c(2) X+ u(2) 
k=1 tj t 
Sp = a(3)IP + b(3)Ipsg + 
SS9 = a(4)IPA +b 
(4) Il'Sg + ttt 
Pr Pr Dt = St 
Dtg =SSg 
3 ý(3)X + u(3) 
k=1 
tj t 
K 
E 
c(k)X + u(4) k=1 i tj t 
(7.3.3) 
where the Yt5 represent the exogenous variables and 
Dt, St and IPt are the only endogenous variables. 
Equations (7.3.3) represent a complete system of 
simultaneous equations in that there are six equations 
in six endogenous variables: however, the system must 
still be checked to ascertain whether it is identified 
according to the rank and order conditions of identifi- 
ability (see Goldberger p. 316). 
Finally the inclusion of the price variables 
IP'Fr and IPtg deserve some comment. The supply 
equations of Equation C7.3.3) are only necessary if it 
is hypothesised that the supply and demand equations 
have at least one common endogenous variable and, of 
course, economic theory indicates that market price is 
the most important of these. It is noted that we do 
- 
347 
- 
not necessarily preclude the inclusion of a common 
exogenous variable in the demand and supply equations. 
However, when it comes to quantifying, say, the 
market price of protection-based life insurance there 
are several difficulties because the Office Premium 
rate depends on many factors (such as the age, health, 
sex and occupation of the policyholder as well as the 
type of contract and the individual life office under 
consideration). There are additional problems in 
formulating a price for savings-based life insurance 
because the price is inextricably tied up with the 
benefits (bonuses) provided by such policies: 
"It is essential 
.... 
when discussing 
the demand for life insurance to recognise 
that the life offices deal in a range of 
contracts with fundamentally differing char- 
acteristics. At the one extreme is the 
pure insurance contract for which demand 
will tend to vary inversely to the price (usually expressed as a rate per cent of 
the sum insured). At the other extreme 
is the (principally) savings contract for 
which, ceteris paribus, demand will tend 
to vary directly with the expected rate of 
return on premiums payable; in other words, 
again demand will tend to vary inversely 
to the price, now defined as a premium rate 
expressed as a percentage of the expected 
maturity value. " 
R. L. Carter (7) p. 93 
Furthermore, some discussion is necessary on what act- 
ually constitutes the price of life insurance. The 
price of insurance is generally argued to be the office 
less the pure premium (ie. the expenses loading) on the 
basis that: 
a) in the long-run, the potential buyer of 
insurance would pay losses equivalent to 
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the pure premium if he did not buy 
insurance (assuming that premiums are 
rated on a 'merit' basis); and 
b) again, in the long-run, the supplier of 
insurance would pay losses equivalent to 
the pure premiums collected. 
Thus, when talking about the price of non-life 
insurance, R. L. Carter and N. A. Doherty (8) p. 7.1-04 
report that: 
"If the pure premium is correctly cal- 
culated, in the very long run, the policy- 
holder will pay for his own losses. There- 
fore the price he pays to obtain protection 
against the random fluctuation in annual losses 
is the premium loading 
... 
" 
This same argument can be used to determine the 
price of non-profit life insurance because the 'average' 
policyholder 
(2) 
will pay pure premiums equivalent to 
the claims benefits that he receives. Note, however, 
that this only applies if the pure premiums have been 
` correctly calculated (as in Chapters Five and Six) and 
strictly is only feasible for a large number of policy- 
holders aggregated (we have seen in Section 2.5 that 
- 
for an individual policyholder 
- 
the price is compli- 
cated by his own intuitive idea of the correct pure 
premium). 
In the with profits case, some decision must be 
made about the bonus loading: one possible approach is 
to think in terms of an expected rate of return on the 
(2)Note that in this case, the equivalent meaning of the term 'long-run' (ie. over a large number of years) is the term 'average' (ie. over a larger number of policy- holders). 
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bonus loading (assuming again that pure premiums 
- 
ie. those to provide protection plus a lump sum insured 
at maturity in the endowment case 
- 
are estimated 
correctly). This approach was suggested by R. L. 
Carter (7) and adopted by P. Fortune (18) and A. M. 
El-Mokadem (16) p. 88 (although the latter does not 
incorporate the possibility of early death (in the 
endowment case) so that his is not a strict expected 
rate of return). (3) 
On the other hand, we must not lose sight of the 
fact that our concern is with life insurance in the 
marketplace and thus with the market price. The expected 
rate of return on the bonus loading is not part of a 
definition of market price but only affects it as a 
determinant of market demand. Consequently for our 
purposes, office premium less pure premium rates (inclu- 
ding bonus loadings) form the correct definition of 
'market' price. Table 7.3.1 illustrates the Office 
Premium rates: Table 7.3.2 
- 
the Pure Premium rates 
and Table 7.3.3 
- 
the Expenses Loading per £1,000 sums 
insured. 
Of all the models of Section 4.5 only one (Mantis 
and Farmer (32)) used a price variable in the demand 
model (although Fortune (18) included a variable denoting 
the implicit nominal yield on saving through life 
insurance). The Mantis and Farmer price variable was 
a 'composed price index' obtained from M. H. Spencer and 
(3)There is, in fact, a whole selection of literature on this subject, notably those articles by J. M. Belth and Stuart Schwarzchild. 
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L. Siegeluran (37). It seems reasonable (indeed it is 
the only alternative) to compute the price indices IPtr 
and IPtg in a similar fashion using office premium 
rates obtained from the survey Data and pure premium 
rates from MASTER SAVINGS. The price indices so 
obtained are exhibited in Table 7.3.4; however, cer- 
tain qualifications must be made: 
i) the indices were calculated according to the 
based-weighted Laspeyres index (for example, 
see E. Mansfield (31) Ch. 3) with quantities 
(ie. sums insured) from Table 6.4.2. (1963 = 100); 
ii) it was not possible to split the saving and 
protection parts of the data (for this pur- 
pose) so the price index of protection-based 
policies was based on the purchases of temp- 
orary life insurances ('Other' in Table 6.4.2); 
iii) the average office premium rates obtained from 
Survey Data refer to 45 year old policyholders 
with 10 year maturity terms (where necessary) 
which are assumed to be representative (these 
are shown in Table 7.3.1). The sums insured 
of Table 6.4.2 were applied to these rates; 
iv) because office premium rates are altered infre- 
quently, the rates of Table 7.3.1 show a 
certain 'stickiness'; 
v) because of the lack of more detailed information, 
no better way was found of combining the Survey 
Data (from the seven offices involved) than to 
take a straight-forward average. Of course, a 
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basic assumption incorporated in Table 7.3.4 is 
that rate changes in the chosen policy types 
(ie. inception age 45, maturity term 10) are 
representative of the overall rate changes; 
vi) the rates of Table ?. 3.1 make allowance for 
any policy charge made by individual survey 
companies and, in cases where the rate depends 
on the size of the policy, premiums were deter- 
mined according to a rough judgement on the 
UK average sums insured at that moment in time; 
vii) the pure premium rates of Table 7.3.2 were ob- 
tained from MASTER SAVINGS 
- 
these rates 
correspond to inception age 45 and maturity 
term 10. The with profit rates include an 
allowance for the bonus loading. 
The price indices of Table 7.3.4 are based on 
1963 
= 
100, calculated using the formula: 
g, J1 
Index in Year t=L 
5263 
t=3 
Ei SIi 'EL 
(7.3.4. ) 
where i runs over the various policy types (ie. 
Temporary for 'protection-based' and Whole Life (WP and 
NP) and Endowment (WP and NP) for 'savings-based' pol- 
icies) and SI refers to the sums insured of Table 6.4.2. 
The 'real-value' price indices of Table 7.3.4 have 
been adjusted by the Retail Price Index (1963 = 100). 
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7.4 The Supply of Life Insurance 
The set of Equations numbered (7.3.3) included a 
supply function of the form: 
Sp = a(3)ip? + b(3)IPtg + 
SS6 
= a(4) IPtr + b(4)IPtg + 
K3 
E c(3) x+ u(3) 
k=1 j tj t 
K4 
c(4) -t + u(4) k=1 jt 
where Str and Stg denoted the supply of 'protection- 
based' and 'savings-based' life insurance respectively 
(in terms of new premium expenditure). These two equa- 
tions were included in the demand model in order that the 
demand equations be properly specified and identified. 
The main explanatory variables of demand model have 
already been mentioned 
- 
in this Section, those variables 
corresponding to supply side will be examined. 
In addition to market price (which, of course, we 
would expect to have a positive effect) the following 
variables affect the supply of life insurance: 
a) Surplus 
b) Costs 
c) Investment Performance (including net of tax yield) 
d) Liability Structure 
e) Expectations, and 
f) Prices of Supply Alternatives. 
These variables (or their surrogates) are summarised in 
an Appendix at the end of this Section. 
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a) Surplus 
According to H. F. Fisher and J. Young (17) p. 21: 
"Surplus 
.... 
is the difference between 
the value placed upon the assets and the value 
of the liabilities, and it will vary according 
to the bases chosen for these valuations. It 
is derived in the main as a result of the actual 
experience in mortality, interest, expenses and 
asset values being more favourable than the 
experience assumed in the valuation. " 
Surplus has a three-fold effect on the supply of 
life insurance; first it gives a legal capacity to supply 
(ie. solvency), second, it acts as 'cushion' to protect=_- 
the office against adverse claims fluctuations and third, 
it provides for the distribution to policyholders and 
shareholders (in a proprietary company) of bonuses and 
dividends. In all of these three cases, we would expect 
the existence and size of surplus to have a positive 
effect on supply. 
Surplus has been imperfectly quantified in aggregate 
in the Annual Abstract of Statistics (22) under two items: 
'Shareholders' surplus and transfers to profit and loss 
account' and 'Miscellaneous, including transfers to 
investment reserves etc. ' (the larger item). Economet- 
rically, we would expect these items to be lagged by (at 
least) one year in order to represent the correct explan- 
atory relationship. 
b Costs 
The costs associated with life insurance (and indeed 
with all types of insurance) fall under two headings: 
claims costs and management expenses. However, because 
of their broad statistical base, the life offices are able 
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to estimate claims costs with a fair degree of accuracy. 
Moreover, large fluctuations in mortality experience occur 
infrequently (and are usually controlled by reinsurance) 
while the average mortality experience changes only very 
slowly over time. The most unstable element of claims 
costs 
- 
surrenders 
- 
is typically of no great concern 
(unless surrender values are guaranteed) because the 
amount so obtained by the policyholder is directly under 
the control of the life office. Consequently, although 
theoretically they influence the supply of life insurance, 
claims costs can be discounted as a significant deter- 
minant because of their invariability and predictivity. 
'Management expenses' is a collective term and in- 
eludes many separate items which can broadly be described 
under the sub-headings: initial, renewal and miscellan- 
eous (see Section 6.10). Undoubtedly the initial costs 
(ie. costs incurred at the inception of the contract such 
as medical expenses, initial commission, underwriting and 
paperwork) impose the greatest strain (called the 'new 
business strain') on the viability of the (traditional) 
life office 
- 
so much so that a life office in financial 
difficulties needs only stop writing business in order to 
rectify the position. The other major items of manage- 
ment expenses are wages, salaries and pensions: life 
insurance is a very labour-intensive business and this 
is reflected in the size of the item 'Expenses of manage- 
ment and transfers to staff pension funds' in the Annual 
Abstract of Statistics 
- 
up to 80% of which is normally 
associated with labour costs. It is important to note, 
especially when examining individual companies, that 
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labour costs differ depending on the structure of the 
sales force: thus to take an extreme example, an 
industrial life office will have proportionately larger 
labour costs because of the large number of employees 
necessary to service the business. Finally we note 
that labour costs are influenced to a great extent by 
inflation so that the life office must make an assess- 
ment of future wage and salary levels when attempting 
to fix premiums. 
Summarising, the following variable can be used to 
simulate the unit costs of life insurance and as such 
is expected to have negative effects on supply: 
- 
'Commission' 
plus 'Expenses of management and transfers to 
staff pension funds' (Annual Abstract of 
Statistics) expressed as a percentage of 
new sums insured (All Business by Companies 
established in the UK). 
c) Investment Performance 
The forces that shape the investment behaviour of 
life insurance companies have been described by many 
authors including G. M. Dickinson (13) and G. Clayton and 
W. T. Osborn (9). Essentially, the major concern of life 
office investment policy is to earn a net of tax yield 
that is sufficient to cover that rate of interest assumed 
in the premium calculations; this will enable the office 
to pay the sums insured to its non-profits and the sums 
insured plus at least the assumed rate of reversionary 
bonus to with profits policyholders. It should be noted 
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however, that this concern with 'yield risk' (which is 
made up of 'income risk' and 'default risk') must be 
viewed in the context of the effects of competitive 
pressure on the level of the expenses loading; if large 
expenses loadings are possible then the yield risk is 
reduced because effectively a lower 'calculation' rate 
of interest can be assumed. Thus, to some extent, the 
major effects of investment performance on supply have 
been captured in the price variable: the higher the 
yield on invested funds relative to the 'calculation 
rate of interest' the greater the expenses loading and 
hence the price of life insurance. 
d) Liability Structure 
In order to avoid imposing an overt strain on the 
assets of the life office, it is usual practice to have 
a 'balanced' liability structure without putting great 
emphasis on one particular type of contract. Consequently 
the typical life office will not want to undertake a 
disproportionate amount of business which offers certain 
guarantees (such as guaranteed surrender values, equity 
linked policies) 
- 
the most common form of guarantee, of 
course, is the non-profits policy. Fisher and Young (17) 
p. 153, comment that the proportion that the with profits 
business bears to the total (known as the 'gearing' of 
the office) is of considerable importance: 
"An office with the major part of its liabil- ities in a non-participating (non-profits) form 
must have a greater problem in maintaining sol- 
vency than an office in which the business is 
predominantly on a participating basis. In 
the latter case, the bonus loadings reinforce the estate, at least to the extent that any 
surplus arising from the bonus loadings has not 
vested as declared bonus. " 
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The obvious approach to the above problem would be 
to hypothesise a partial adjustment hypothesis (for 
example, see P. J. Dhrymes (12) p. 57) so that the life 
office is presumed to adjust its liability structure in 
order to achieve an 'optimum' gearing level. However, 
since this 'optimum' gearing level is unknown, this 
approach would involve the insertion of an additional 
equation in (7.3.3) in order to explain the level of 
this optimum. 
Thus if Gt denotes the gearing level given by the 
proportion of with profits in force to the total in 
force and Gt the optimum gearing level, then the gist 
of Fisher and Young's explanation is that Gt depends 
primarily on the amount of surplus. So we have: 
Gt 
= a. SPt-1 + Vt 
(7.4.1) 
and the partial adjustment hypothesis: 
Gt 
- 
Gt-i 
= X"(Gt - Gt-i) (7.4.2) 
(0<A<1) 
so that, by substituting from (7.4.1) to (7.4.2) we get 
Gt = (1-A )Gt-i + as SPt-'I + Avt 
(7.4.3) 
where vt - the random error term 
- 
is assumed to possess 
the usual econometric properties of zero mean and constant 
variance. 
The evaluation of a from Equation (7.4.3) then 
yields the correct value of Gt, so that we can form the 
variable necessary for the supply equations (G t-1 - Gt) 
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which is an indicator of the adjustment necessary in 
year t: 
- 
(Gt-1 Gt*) 1 
= x(G Gt) t-I - (7.4.4) 
Equation (7.4.3) was then estimated using Ordinary 
Least Squares techniques with data on surplus and gearing 
from the Annual Abstract of Statistics (20). The results 
of the regression are illustrated in Equation (7.4.5) 
below yielding a value for A of 0.02. 
Gt = 0.98Gt_i - 0.000074SPt_i 
(136.9) (0.373) (7.4.5) 
(t-values are in parenthesis); R2 = 0.98; R2 = 0.98; 
DW=1.88; n=23. 
The resultant values for the optimum gearing level 
Gt are given in Table 7.4.1. 
The negative values of Gt in Table 7.4.1, of course, 
are not feasible in practice. However, the variable 
(Gt_i 
- 
Gt) gives an indication of the adjustment neces- 
sary in year t to bring the actual gearing level in line 
with the life offices' optimum gearing level. 
Since (Gt_i 
- 
Gt) represents an adjustment term, 
we would expect it to have a negative effect on the supply 
of with profits business (with a positive effect on non- 
profits). Thus if the actual liability structure con- 
tains too much with profits business at the end of year 
t-1 (ie. (Gt_1 - Gt) positive) then we would expect a 
reduction in the supply of with profits policies (and 
thus a negative coefficient of (Gt_i 
- 
Gt) ). 
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Table 7.4.1 Optimum Gearing Level (Gt) 
Year Gt (Gt-1 
- 
Gt) 
1946 0.5890 0.0150 
47 0.8637 
-0.2600 48 0.6539 
-0.0450, 49 0.0548 0.5550 
1950 
-0.4063 1.0050 51 
-1.2714 1.8500 52 0.4416 0.1000 
53 
-0.0754 0.6150 54 
-0.7627 1.2900 
1955 0.0665 0.4350 
56 
-0.2872 0.7800 57 
-0.2278 0.7050 58 0.6631 
-0.2000 59 
-0.6829 1.1500 
1960 
-0.1059 0.5500 61 0.1431 0.2900 
62 0.1423 0.2850 
63 
-0.0184 0.4400 64 0.0428 
"0.3700 
1965 0.5054 
-0.1000 66 
-0.3126 0.7200 67 0.1680 0.2250 
68 
-0.4965 0.8850 
Source: Equations (7.4.2) and (7.4.4) 
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e) Expectations 
Expectations influence the supply of life insurance 
for the same reasons as they do demand; in particular 
the costs facing the life office (in terms of claims) 
cannot be known with certainty. Thus in order to deter- 
mine supply, the life office must make forecasts about 
the future levels of costs and general economic and 
investment conditions. The major expectational var- 
iable included in the supply equation is concerned with 
predicting future wage inflation. 
f) Price of Supply Alternatives 
The elementary theory of supply predicts that as 
the market price of supply alternatives increases, supply 
will decrease. Thus, if for example, we consider the 
supply of protection-based life insurance then the price 
(index) of savings-based insurance (IPt should also 
be included as an explanatory variable. 
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APPENDIX TO SECTION 7.4 
anatory Variables affecting the S 
variables in real terms 
Insurance 
SPt_1 Real Surplus, lagged one time period: 
'Shareholders' surplus and transfers 
to profit and loss account' plus 
'Miscellaneous, including transfers 
to investment reserves etc. ' 
Ct Costs in year t. 'Commission' plus 
'Expenses of management and transfers 
to staff pension funds' as a% of new 
sums insured. 
(Gt_*1 
- 
Gt) Adjustment necessary in Optimum Gearing 
level (with profits in force dividend 
by total in force). 
Iptg Real price of 'savings-based' Life 
Insurance. 
IPP, r Real price of 'protection-based' Life 
Insurance. 
YLDt Annual Yield on Life and Annuity Funds 
(companies established in the UK) based 
on Book Values. 
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7.5 Inflationary Expectations 
The objective of this Section is to explore the 
formulation of those variables simulating price/inflation 
expectations. These variables have appeared several 
times in the model: in Equation (7.2.3), in Equation 
(7.3.3) (as undefined exogenous variables) and in the 
previous Section where expected wage levels were under 
discussion. 
It has already been noted in Chapter Four that 
price/inflation expectations have played a significant 
role in the determination of saving and the purchase of 
life insurance. The theory of Chapter Three also indi- 
cates that inflation expectations are important in the 
purchase of 'protection-based' life insurance. However, 
the models of the preceding Chapters have indicated that 
inflation expectations,, in the context of the purchase 
of life insurance, must have several distinguishing 
features. 
First, expectations must be formed over the long- 
term because, obviously, most life insurance contracts 
are long-term ones (of typically over twenty years dura- 
tion) (this point was raised by D. E. W. Laidler and J. M. 
Parkin (29) ). A. E. Hofflander and R. M. Duvall (25) 
also recognised this fact and attempted to build an 
expected price (index) variable by including a trend 
element. The most common method of forming price 
expectations, however, is to use the adaptive expecta- 
tions hypothesis (eg. see S. Neumann (35) )- this is 
typically only suitable for forecasting a short period 
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into the-future because of the assumption that expecta- 
tions are revised in the light of past experience. 
Another method of obtaining price expectations is to rely 
on survey data (for example, J. A. Carlson and M. Parkin 
(6) and F. T. Juster and P. Wachtel (27) ). However, 
survey data is more widely used for short-term expecta- 
tions 
- 
Carlson and Parkin imposed a six months time 
horizon. 
Secondly, not only anticipated (expected) inflation 
but also unanticipated inflation is of interest: this 
point was made with some force by Juster and Wachtel. 
But the exact effects of unanticipated inflation are 
confused once predictions are made for more than one 
time period: it seems reasonable to assume that the 
consumer places less reliance on the correctness of pre- 
dictions made twenty years into the future than on one 
year hence. 
Thirdly, although the adaptive expectations hypoth- 
esis is widely used, some doubt has been expressed on 
the validity of the approach on the basis that little 
evidence exists to show that price expectations are formed 
in this way (eg. see J. A. Trevithick and C. Mulvey (40) ). 
Fortunately, (see Section 3.2) the work of Carlson and 
Parkin has restored confidence in'the error learning 
models (albeit only for the short-term case). 
The rest of this Section will be devoted to the 
formulation of a long-term adaptive expectations model 
which - as its name suggests 
- 
is established on the 
basis that the consumer modifies his price expectations 
in the light of recent experience. 
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40 
To this end, define 
nt 
Pt as the 'average' long- 
term expected rate of inflation over the next nt time 
periods (made at the start of time period t) where, for 
ease of exposition, it is assumed that compounding 
occurs continuously. Let Pt denote the level of the 
relevant price index (normally RPI - see Appendix 7.1) 
at the end of period t and Pt the rate of inflation 
that has occurred during time period t: again compounding 
is continuous so that we have 
(4): 
Pt = Pt_i. exp(Pt) 
(7.5. ß) 
Now from our definition of n Pt we get: t 
Pt+nt-1 
- 
Pt-i. exp(nt"ntPt) 
(7.5.2) 
where pt+nt_i denotes the expected price level at the 
end of time period (t+nt-1) and 'exp' is the exponential 
function (eX). 
Now the usual (short-term) adaptive expectations 
hypothesis would examine the course of inflation over 
the tth time period and revise the t+1th expectation 
in the light of that examination. The difference in 
this 'long-term' adaptive expectations model is that 
consumers revise their t+ith (long-term) expectation 
in the light of the price level at the end of time period 
(4) P should more properly be called the 'force' of 
lýflation (for example, see D. W. A. Donald (14) p. 11). 
Pt based on changes in the RPI is given in Appendix 7.1. 
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t+nt-i 
(5) by assuming that the 'force' of inflation 
in time period t continues for a further t+nt-1 
periods. Thus if Pt exceeds ne 
then the quantity 
t 
Pt. exp((nt-1). Pt) will exceed Pt+n 
t-1' 
The adaptive 
expectations approach then says that the t+ith forecast 
(n Pet+'i) will be 'adapted' by scaling 
n 
Pt by the 
t+1 
0At 
ratio (Pt. exp((nt-1). Pt) / Pt+n 
-'I) 
t" It is then a 
t 
simple matter to work backwards to obtain the t+1 long- 
term forecast. 
So let the average long-term forecast (over the next 
nt+1 time periods) at time t+1 be given by n t+1 
Pet+1' 
Then the expected price level at the end of period 
nt+t-1 is given by: 
Pt. exp((nt-1). 
n t+1 
Pt+1 
which we can equate to 
e 
Pt. exp((nt-1). Pt) 
At 
Pt+n 
-I scaled 
by [e 
t Pt+nt-'I 
where the parameter xt denotes the degree of 'adaption' 
of pe 
_ý according to the quantity Pteexp((nt-1)Pt)- t+n t 
So we get 
'e e 
Pt. exp((nt-1). Pt)t 
Pt. exp(Cnt'ý)'nt+1Pt+1) Pt+nt-1. 
pe t+nt-1 
(7.5.37 
(S)It 
seems reasonable to assume that an endowment olicy- 
holder (for example) would make some (subjective) 
evaluation of the real value of his maturity benefits. 
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Taking natural logarithms of Equation (7.5.3) : 
ln(Pt) + (nt-1)'n Pe t+1 = ln(Pt+n 
-1) + t+1 t 
Xt. (1n(Pt) + (nt-'1). Pt 
- 
1n(Pt+n 
-1)) t 
(7.5.4) 
Expanding Equation (7.5.4) (using Equation (7.5.2)): 
(nt-1). 
nt+lPt+1 = 
1n(Pt-i) + nt. 
ntPt - ln(Pt) + 
xt. (ln(Pt) + (nt-1)Pt 
- 
ln(Pt-, ) 
- 
nt. 
n 
Pt 
t 
(7.5.5) 
Equation (7.5.5) can be rewritten (noting from (7.5.1) 
that ln(Pt) = ln(Pt_i) + Pt) to get 
ete 
ON nt-1) 
. 
nt+l Pt+1 - (ntýI) _" ntPt + "'Zn _" Pt 
which can be abbreviated as: 
' 
nt+1 Pt 
where r= 
(1-r ). 
nt 
Pt +r 
. 
Pt 
xtnt-1 
n t-I 
and 0 <r <I in order to obtain convergence. 
(?. 5.6) 
(7.5.7) 
Finally, we note from Equation (7.3.3) that the 
variable ntPt is included as an explanatory variable 
in the two demand functions. Thus we get (for example): 
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D6 
= 
CONST + a(2). IP + b(2). IPSg + c(2). Pe ttt nt t 
K2 
+E di 
. 
Xtj + ut2ý 
k=1 (7.5.8) 
which, by incorporating (7.5.7), can be written as 
Dt6 = CONST + C(2)(1-r) n Pt_1 + c(2). r. Pt_1 t-1 
+E 
(2) 
+ u(2) tt 
(7.5.9) 
where Et(2) denotes the other explanatory variables. 
Lagging (7.5.8) by one time-period we get: 
D99 = CONST + c(2). Pe + E(2) + u(2) t-I nt-'I t-1 t-1 t-'I 
(7.5.10) 
e Finally, substituting nt-1Pt-1 from 
(7.5.10) into 
(7.5.9): 
Dtg = r. CONST + (I-r). (DtgI - E(2) - u(2) t- 
+ c(2). r. Pt-, + Et(2) + u(2) 
(7.5.11) 
It is interesting to note from Equation (7.5.7) 
that r<t for all t (since 0 <_ r< i). Further- 
more since (nt-1) r 
. +I Xt 
nt 
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the larger the value of nt, the smaller (ie. nearer to . 
the value of it. This latter characteristic is fully 
in line with what we would expect since it implies that 
the longer the time period involved the smaller the 
emphasis given to current experience. 
I scarcely need to mention that nt represents 
either the maturity term (in the endowment case) or the 
expectation of life in the case of whole of life insurance 
(these values have been used or calculated in MASTER 
SAVINGS). 
- 
373 
- 
7.6 Permanent Income 
In the analyses of Chapter Four it was noted that 
there were good a priori reasons for the inclusion of 
permanent income as an explanatory variable in the demand 
and financial saving models. The difficulty lies in 
choosing an appropriate method of calculating the 
permanent income of potential purchasers of ordinary 
life insurance (and hence its complement 
- 
transitory 
income). 
There are, in fact, several ways of determining 
permanent income: 
1) the most common approach is to form permanent 
income out of a weighted average of all pre- 
vious incomes. The geometric lag is the 
usual method(6) ie. yt =E Y(I Y)k"yt_k 
k=0 
(7.6.1) 
where yt denotes permanent income and yt-k 
real disposable income in year t-k (RPI = 
100 in 1963); 
2) a similar approach to 1) above was adopted by 
the Bank of England (3) p. 68 but instead of 
a geometric lag structure, an Almon lag struc- 
ture was used(? ) utilising third degree poly- 
nomials; 
(6)For 
example, see R. Stone (38) p. 127 or the Bank of 
England (3) p. 10. The former obtains a value of 
y=0.7, the latter assumes the same value. 
(7)See S. Almon (1) 
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3) there is the suggestion by Houthakker and 
Taylor (26) that the change in permanent income 
is proportional to the change in cux'rent income 
(see Equations (4.2.5) and (4.2.6)); 
4) the Bank of England (3) p. 62 noted that, in 
studies of aggregate consumption and saving, 
"it is difficult in practice to decide 
whether the lagged dependent variable 
represents habit or persistence in 
spending decisions, a partial response 
to current income or the adjustment of 
current to permanent income". (Also 
see M. J. C. Surrey (39)) 
Thus it turns out that, in practice, aggregate 
consumption lagged by one year is also a good 
indicator (but this is rather a 'rule of thumb' 
solution). 
Point 4) above also gives an insight into the fac- 
tors to be taken into account in choosing the appropriate 
measure of permanent income. The demand model will quite 
probably already include the lagged dependent variable as 
an explanatory variable but in order to simulate infla- 
tion expectations and not permanent income. Thus to 
avoid confusion, the safest solution is either 
. 
1) (with 
predetermined y), 2) or 4) above. It is also worth 
noting that, with only 23 time-series observations 
(1946-1968) there will be very little difference between 
the methods chosen. In addition the small number of 
observations cannot support a model that is too compli- 
cated. 
The Almon lag structure solution was discarded 
because of the problems involved (eg. see P. J. Dhrymes 
(12) p. 231) and because of the small number of 
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observations. Data on permanent income from the two 
remaining solutions is represented in Table 7.6.1. 
(8) 
A 
, 
value of y=0.5 was chosen because it was felt 
that Stone's figure of 0.7 was too large in the case 
of more long-term expectations (as was the figure of 
around 0.6 obtained by the Bank of England (3) p. 64 
for the purchase of non-consumer durables). 
(8)The income data is based on real Personal Disposable 
Income (1963 = 100) per head of UK population. 
Note that the formula for permanent income does, not 
include any trend elements. Formulations of this 
type have been suggested by M. R. Darby (10) who uses 
quadratic trended estimates of the form: 
INCt =b INCt + (1-b) (1 +c+2dt) INCt_1 
where b=0.1 and c and d are the estimates from the 
relationship log INCt 
=e+c. t + dt2 + ut. 
- 
376 
- 
N 
14 
0 
U 
H 
a) 
a) W 
r 
co 
H 
N 
-, to A1 "ri M Cd 0PA lo 
.A9 Cd ON U 
ý r U 
qb is b 
OO0 I 
" 
Lý N tIý CO 
- i1\ O i. 
O 
--M cm 9U- c\ tO c- (y\ 10 S Oý M 
r M Or .* cm N CV Co NMN O% UUp, 
H'd 
00 
"g". 
CC0-Ö 
"... 0ÖÖC\Ö """.. 
C 
M'NNN """"" ý % MU\ 
.". " M 0 a' 
r N KIMM MKýrc1N M t \ c MMMKIM t OLL - MMrcýMM C 0o 0 MMM 4-3 bo 
b0ý II 
a) Cu "d CH ýPa 0 
cd "M 
c' 
u'\ 
o 
q COOv- O ON0NL\ Co 'AC-OOze MNN[` MaOM Uqn "rl CV M lD tD V CYN tD CO co MM CO Or 
.. 
O CO tD W CO tl\ Lt\ 
H "ri )-O 
.... O' c0 Nc0 ."... O Co MO' L%- .... " lD KN00 C- c- 
".... NO t0 Lr. 
". "" 
ti tc\ 
+p 0 0 000 c-0CD 0c- NMM U1 10cocoC, % c-NNM b Cd 4' NMMM MMMMM K1MK1M MMMM 0 
_p 
WH 
20 
d) 
... P1 
PM 
"ri 910 ON 
A 
U 
93 N 
"rl 
u1MN ' 
uýCtiCý OM pct z- Q\ MO 
.' Ntc1O C' 
(Výp M0 CO ý" L ýN r<-% C) 
M U% OM c- Q'zt M0 L 
C% LA N to 
ßf1v v Lr% 
A0 CO C`%0 0\ MC`N uý Z- MA N Mc' lAO' 
Av 
lAC 
' 
N'ý Co 41 JZ: f 
P, ti 
Cä 
Q)a av 
Cd 1011 
ON o' oý r ý ý- r 
M 
N 
0 
cl- 
ON 
S 
U1 
U 
Co 
. ri 
4.3 
U) 
rn 
S 
N 
11 
W 
43 
V2 * 
'd 
00 
a> 
N 
0 
Co t 
- 
377 
- 
7.7 The Other Explanatory Variables 
Those explanatory variables which exclusively affect 
the supply of life insurance have already been examined 
in Section 7.4 while the price of life insurance, price 
expectations and permanent income were discussed in 
Sections 7.3,7.5, and 7.6. The objective of this 
Section is simply to summarise and evaluate those other 
explanatory variables in the demand model. Appendix 7.2 
shows the raw data corresponding to these variables and 
Appendix 7.1 summarises the notation and sources of this 
data. 
Following Neumann (35) Ch. VII, we can classify four 
pertinent groups of explanatory variables: 
1) Factors related to the ability to purchase life 
insurance. 
2) Factors related to the need for purchasing life 
insurance. 
3) Factors related to the willingness to purchase 
life insurance, and 
4) Factors related to the exposure of life insurance 
to potential purchasers. 
(Note that the variables in monetary values are 
expressed in real terms by discounting by the 
Retail Price Index (1963 
= 
100)). 
At this stage, I should point out that the explanatory 
variables described in the remainder of this Section are 
all deficient in one important respect: that, for the 
most part, they are aggregate variables relating to the 
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total population of the UK, and not just to those house- 
holds which represent potential purchasers of ordinary 
life insurance. Thus, for example, real permanent 
income per capita (INCP t) is used as a surrogate for 
that permanent income of purchasers of ordinary life 
insurance; yet recent surveys (eg. E. V. Morgan (33))have 
indicated that, not unexpectedly, ordinary life insurance 
is purchased by households in the higher social classes 
(with correspondingly higher incomes). 
Unfortunately, there is no easy solution to the 
aggregation problem (which arises in many areas where 
time-series data are used). Consequently, it may well 
be that the empirical analyses of Chapters Eight and 
Nine will suffer because the explanatory variables used 
are only surrogates and in many cases they may not be a 
close enough proxy to indicate the full significance of 
the underlying relationship. 
1) The Ability of Purchase 
Included under this heading are: 
a) Real Personal Disposable Income per capita (PDIt); 
Permanent (INCt) and Transitory (INCt); 
b) The Price of Life Insurance (IPtg and IP) 
c) Real Wealth per capita, and 
d) Real Holdings of Liquid Assets per capita (LIQt) 
a) and b) have already been discussed: it suffices to 
say that we expect the demand for life insurance to be 
strongly influenced by income (in a positive sense). 
Unfortunately, 
no direct measure of real per capita 
wealth is possible in a time-series context although 
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figures are available for shares and deposits in building 
societies (BSWt), holdings of liquid assets etc., as well 
as some indication of the level of indebtedness: building 
society advances on mortgages (BSAt), new hire purchase 
commitments (HPCt), etc. 
The wealth effects on the purchase of life insurance 
are quite complicated since protection-based insurance may 
be needed to protect wealth; on the other hand it could 
be argued that the greater the wealth of the policyholder, 
the less need to protect dependents against premature 
death 
. 
Protection-based life insurance is often used 
to cover the indebtedness of the policyholder (so that 
he does not leave a potentially negative bequest). 
It seems reasonable to hypothesise a negative wealth 
effect on the purchase of 'savings-based' life insurance 
on the basis that the presence of existing savings stocks 
will deter further saving. On the other hand, if the 
consumer has some idea of the 'desired' level of wealth/ 
assets (or, for example, of retirement income) then we 
cannot necessarily conclude that the existence of wealth 
will preclude saving (eg. see M. J. Hamburger (24)). 
Again, real holdings of liquid assets (per capita) 
can, hypothetically, have two main effects: first, any 
of the wealth effects described above and secondly an 
effect depending on the desired level of cash for trans- 
actions or precautionary motives (see Morgan Grenfell 
(34)). Data on liquid assets can be obtained from the 
Annual Abstract of Statistics (22). The variable LIQt 
uses data on 'Notes and coin in circulation with the 
public' plus 'Total deposits of London Clearing banks'. 
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It is realised that these data will include liquid assets 
held by the non-personal sector but the corresponding 
figures for individuals are not available over the period 
194+6/1968. 
2) The Need for Life Insurance 
The need to obtain life insurance can be divided 
into two parts: to obtain protection of dependents 
against the financial losses associated with premature 
death and second, to effect some savings. 
The first, and most obvious variables in this 
Section follows Hamburger (24) 
- 
the 'optimal stock' of 
life insurance already in existence. Thus it is of 
interest to know whether the purchase of life insurance 
is 'habit-forming' or alternatively whether - like the 
purchase of consumer durables 
- 
the existence of life 
insurance discourages further purchase. The 'stock' of 
protection-based life insurance will be represented by 
Temporary Sums Insured In Force (IFtr) and the stock of 
savings-based insurance by the complement (Total In Force 
minus Temporary Sums Insured In Force). (IFtg) 
So if we define IFt to be the 'optimum stock' of 
life insurance (either savings- or protection-based) 
then a commonly used adjustment process of the following 
form can be hypothesised: where 
IFt 
- 
IFt-, i = k(IF. - IFt-i) (7.7"ß) 
where 0<k<1 
The coefficient k measures the fraction of the 
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adjustment made towards equating the actual and optimal 
'stock' of life insurance in force. The larger is k 
the faster the adjustment. If k equals unity then 
the model implies that IF. = IFt and adjustment is 
completed during the period of observation. 
The usual subsequent procedure is then to provide 
a functional equation for IF. and hence an equation 
to determine IFt with (1-k)IFt_1 appearing on the 
right-hand-side. However, obviously, this method does 
not give us any information about the determinants of 
the demand for (new) life insurance. 
An alternative method which attempts to solve this 
problem is one which breaks down the term IFt - IFt_j 
into its component parts. Thus in the demand model 
case we can write, 
(IFt 
- 
IFt_i) 
= Dt - Clt - Cat (7.7.2) 
where Dt represents demand (new business), C1t 
- 
claims and Cat 
- 
cancellations in year t. Unfortunately 
this new method is again largely unsuccessful because 
it introduces further problems: 
a) the method cannot cope with an analysis. Of the 
financial saving ratio FSRt; 
b) the term Clt + Cat is not known separately 
for the protection and savings elements of life 
insurance. In fact, it is not even I mown sep- 
arately for non-single premium policies; 
c) furthermore, no entirely successful approxi- 
mation of Clt + Cat can be made without 
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introducing some specification error into the 
model (for instance, by hypothesising 
(Cit + Cat) = K. IFt_l where oc is a constant). 
Consequently the only remaining alternative is to 
include the term IF. in the model explicitly: this 
can be done by reworking Equation (7.7.1) to obtain, 
IFt 
=k (IFt - IFt_, ) + IFt_j 
k =Ft + 
kk_ IFt-1 
(7.7.3) 
where 0<k<1 (in this case, we preclude a zero 
value of k). The model can then be run with differ- 
ent values of k so that the 'best' value of k can 
be chosen by some appropriate method (see S. M. Goldfeld 
& R. E. Quandt (21)). 
The need for protection is also associated with 
the existence of dependents and thus we would expect 
births and marriages to be important variables (E. V. 
Morgan (33) reported a higher incidence of life insur- 
ance ownership among married persons (29.46 as opposed 
to 19.0% of unmarried in the sample) and also among two 
to four person households). We have already noted that 
life insurance protection is also needed to cover the 
risk of death with debts outstanding. Thus Morgan 
reports that, 
"savers who are buying their house on a 
mortgage loan were more likely to hold life assurance, presumably because of the links that often exist between the two transactions. 
" 
This implies that new mortgage advances would also be 
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an important explanatory variable. 
The need for savings is more difficult to simulate, 
but one would expect the following variables to be 
important: 
new mortgage advances 
- 
since endowment policies 
are often used for house purchase purposes (in 
conjunction with a building society); 
private pension 'wealth' 
- 
since endowment poli- 
cies are often used to save for retirement, 
membership of a private pension scheme might 
discourage any further provision. Unfortunately 
insufficient data of suitable quality prohibited 
the inclusion of this important variable in any 
further analysis; 
national insurance pension 'wealth' (see El- 
Mokadem (16)) 
- 
intuitively we might expect the 
existence of pension arrangements (whether pri- 
vate or state provided) to discourage saving 
for retirement. However, several authors have 
reported the opposite conclusion (eg. Morgan (33), 
Revell (34) and El-Mokadem (16)): presumably 
caused by what is known as the 'recognition' 
effect. Unfortunately, the series compiled by 
El-Mokadem was too short to be used in this 
study; however, figures are available for the 
total receipts of the National Insurance Fund 
(see Barros (4) Table 6) which includes employer 
and employee contributions, interest on government 
securities and government grants. Although the 
Fund provides other benefits as well as pensions, 
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Barros reports that pensions constitute an 
average of nearly two-thirds of the benefits 
paid during the years 1960/1975. 
3) The Willingness to Purchase 
The consumer's willingness to purchase life insurance 
can be explained in the context of three areas: the econ- 
omy, the savings 'industry' and the life insurance industry. 
In the context of the economy, the following factors 
might be expected: 
the long-term expected rate of inflation 
- 
we have 
seen from Chapter Three that expected infla- 
tion may have either negative or positive effects 
on sales of protection-based life insurance. 
Similarly, the effects of inflation on savings- 
based life insurance are uncertain although the 
authors listed in Chapter Four report that infla- 
tion discourages sales of this type of life 
insurance. However, the recent high levels of 
inflation have been proposed as the cause of the 
historically high saving ratios of the middle 
1970's. In particular it has been argued that 
consumers increase their saving in order to main- 
tain the real value of personal wealth (eg. see 
'Personal Savings level likely to Remain High', 
Financial Times, 17th August 1978, p. 6). The 
same arguments could be applied directly to the 
purchase of savings-based life insurance with 
increased saving in order to maintain the real 
value of retirement income; 
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the standard rate of income tax 
- 
by altering 
the rate of income tax, the government can 
effectively change the price of life insurance; 
the level of unemployment 
- 
Juster and Wachtel 
(2? ) found evidence that this variable influ- 
enced aggregate saving: they reason that a high 
level of unemployment may reduce saving in order 
that consumption be maintained; 
the change in unemployment 
- 
again, Juster and 
Wachtel argue that if unemployment is rising 
then fear of being unemployed is probably rising 
too. We would expect that this would lead to 
a decrease in the long-term commitments of the 
consumer. 
In the context of the savings industry it is possible 
that the sales of savings-based life insurance would be 
influenced by the success and performance of the other 
savings institutions (for example: the real yield on 
building society shares). 
In the context of the life insurance industry, it 
has already been explained that purchases of savings- 
based life insurance can influence those of protection- 
based insurance (and vice versa). Additionally, the 
'yield' on life insurance savings could also be import- 
ant; however, this can be measured in a variety of ways 
(for example: by the rate of declared reversionary bonus 
(Table A6.1.1) or by forming an index of the return on 
with profits policies similar to that of the Economist 
Intelligence Unit Ltd. (15)). 
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4) The Exposure to Life Insurance 
Variables under this heading relate to the class 
and education of individual policyholders and are, 
therefore, not really suitable for a time-series 
analysis (see D. R. Anderson and J. R. Nevin (2)). 
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APPENDIX 7.1 Abbreviations and Sources 
Abbreviation Description Source 
Bt Births in year t (000) Annual Abstract (22) 
BSAt. Real Building Society Annual Abstract (22) 
Advances on Mortga es 
per capita (1963 L) 
BSWt Real wealth in Building Annual Abstract (22) 
Society shares and 
deposits per capita (1963 L) 
C. Real Life Insurance see Appendix 7.4.1 
Supply Costs in year t (1963 9m) 
CONSt Real Consumer Expenditure Key Statistics (23) 
in year t 
DPr Real Demand for Protection Table 6.10.10 
-based Life Insurance per 1,000 head of population (1963 L) 
D g Real Demand for Savings- Table 6.10.10 t based Life Insurance per 
1,000 head of population (1963 L) 
FS Real Financial Saving via Table 6.10.9 t 
new Life Insurance 
Purchases (L000) 
FSR t Financial Saving via new Table 7.2.1 Life Insurance divided 
, 
by PDI (L000m) 
(Gt_1-Gt) Adjustment necessary in Table 7.4.1 Optimal Gearing Level 
HPCt Total Hire Purchase Key Statistics (23) 
Credit Outstanding per 
capita (1963 9) 
IFPr Real Protection-based Annual Abstract (22) 
sums insured in force 
per capita 
IFtg Real Savings-based sums Annual Abstract (22) insured in force per 
capita 
INCt Real Permanent Income in Table 7.6.1 
year t er capita (1963 9,5 
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Abbreviation Description Source 
INC Real Transitory Income t per capita (1963 £) 
IPtr Real Market price index Table 7.3.4 
of protection-based life 
insurance (1963 
= 
100) 
IPtg Real market price index Table 7.3.4 
of savings-based Life 
Insurance (1963 
= 
100) 
LIQt Real Li uid Assets per Annual Abstract (22) 
capita (1963 £) 
Mt Marriages in year t Annual Abstract (22) (000) 
NIF National Insurance Fund: Barros (4) t Total Current Account (only after 1945) 
Receipts per capita (1963 9) 
P Actual Rate of Inflation Equation (7.5.1) t 
of RPI over year t (Com- 
pounded Continuously) 
Pt Expected Rate of 
Inflation 
PDIt Real Personal Disposable Key Statistics (23) 
Income er capita (1963 £) 
POPt UK Population Key Statistics (23) 
BS 
rt Real yield on Building Annual Abstract (22) Society shares 
RPIt Retail Price Index Key Statistics (23) (1963 
= 
'100) 
Str Real Supply of Protection Table 6.10.10 
-based Life Insurance 
per 1,000 head of popu- lation (1963 £) 
SSE Real Supply of Savings- Table 6.10.10 based Life Insurance per 1,000 head of population (1965 £) 
SPt Real Surplus in year t see Appendix 7.4.1 (1963 Lm) 
Tt Standard Rate of Income Key Statistics (23) Tax (p in L) 
- 
389 
- 
Abbreviation Description 
Ut %Unemployment in UK in 
year t 
AUt Change in %Unemployment 
WNIt National Insurance 
Pension Wealth 
YLDt Annual Yield on Life 
and Annuity Funds (companies established 
in the UK) based on Book 
Values 
Source 
Key Statistics (23) 
El-Mokadem (16) (1952/1966 only) 
Table 6.7.1 
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Exogenous Variables : Supply Equations (Real Values) 
Year SPt-i Ot (Gt-1 Gtr Y'Dt 
1946 8.05102 4.5826 0.0150 4.5660 
47 4.73333 4.2642 
-0.2600 3.5319 
48 4.73148 4.7343 
-0.0450 3.6415 
49 8.17719 4.8548 0.5550 3.4969 
1950 12.34748 4.6354 1.0050 3.5029 
51 12.91148 4.5193 1.8500 3.7871 
52 38.40746 4.7114 0.1000 3.8153 
53 34.49315 4.7646 0.6150 3.9355 
54 8.74133 4.4134 1.2900 4.2725 
1955 10.11579 4.3165 0.4350 4.4425 
56 16.76000 4.3397 0.7800 4.3576 
57 41.17900 4.4975 0.7050 4.5217 
58 32.45915 3.9337 
-0.2000 4.7026 
59 13.90279 3.6984 1.1500 5.1949 
1960 16.09212 3.4906 0.5500 5.2713 
61 13.70000 3.3238 0.2900 5.5488 
62 11.98406 3.3184 0.2850 5.3711 
63 27.67755 3.1223 0.4400 6.6182 
64 16.87800 2.8472 0.3700 5.9356 
1965 14.11047 2.8336 
-0.1000 6.1334 66 20.10083 2.7402 0.7200 5.8761 
67 19.09698 2.6328 0.2250 7.2319 
68 26.78819 2.6050 0.8850 8.5906 
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CHAPTER EIGHT : MODELS OF THE PURCHASE OF UK 
NON-GROUP LIFE INSURANCE : AN 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS. 
8.1 Introduction 
The objective of this Chapter is to test empirically 
the various models and hypotheses described in earlier 
Chapters. The main hypothesis is that inflation (repre- 
sented mainly in the form of price expectations) has 
affected the purchase of new ordinary life insurance 
within the UK over the period 1946 to 1968. The influ- 
ence of the other variables that affect the purchase of 
life insurance is also measured. Two separate models 
of the purchase of life insurance are of interest: the 
Demand and the Financial Saving Ratio (FSR) Models. 
These will be examined in the subsequent Sections. A 
study of the demand model, in particular, enables further 
insight into the differences between the demand for and 
the supply of savings-based and protection-based life 
insurance. 
In Section 8.7 we will be concerned with an attempt 
to forecast the purchase of life insurance for the years 
1969/1975 inclusive. However, the success of this fore- 
cast is marred by several difficulties: 
- 
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a) the major discontinuity in the premium income 
data at 1969 means that post and pre-1969 data 
are not truely comparable (for example, annuity 
data is included in new business figures after 
1969 but excluded before); 
b) in some cases, data that is available before 
1969 is not yet available for the later years; 
c) the most obvious problem is that the period 
1946/1968 was one of comparatively mild infla- 
tion in relation to the early 1970's. Conse- 
quently, as Carlson and Parkin (4) report, the 
price expectations variable generated by the 
1946/1968 data may not be suitable (ie. not 
properly defined) for use on the later period. 
As with all studies using time-series data, this 
Chapter is affected by the statistical problems generated 
when highly multicollinear data is used; these are 
apparent in two main cases: multicollinearity and 
misinterpretation of lag-structure. 
The term multicollinearity is used to denote the 
presence of linear or near linear relationships among 
the explanatory variables. This condition is particularly 
prevalent in economic studies because of the general 
interdependence of economic phenomenon: thus, for 
example, income and positive wealth variables are often 
closely related as are income and negative wealth (ie. 
debt) variables (eg. building society advances). 
The close collinearity of the more important explan- 
atory variables is obvious in an examination of the zero 
- 
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order correlation matrix: 
Table 8.1.1 Correlation Matrix 
INCP BSW BSA IFS9 RPI 
INCP 1.0 0.972 0.913 0.984 0.963 
BSW 1.0 0.954 0.993 0.938 
BSA 1.0 0.940 0.814 
IFSg 1.0 0.945 
RPI 1.0 
A key to the abbreviations can'be found in Appendix 7.1 
The practical consequences of multicollinearity are 
uncertain but theoretically, a perfect linear relation- 
ship among explanatory variables produces estimates of 
the coefficients which are indeterminate and the stand- 
ard errors of these estimates become infinitely large. 
This means that we run the danger of ignoring possible 
significant factors because their standard errors have 
been affected. In many of the FSR models, multico- 
linearity manifests itself by causing certain instability 
- 
more often than not in the appropriate value of r in 
the inflation expectations variable. 
In an attempt to reduce the effects of multicollin- 
earity in the FSR model, several different alternatives 
were tried; initially, first differences were used in 
the place of current values but this proved unsatisfact- 
ory because the first differencing largely removed the 
explanatory power of the model. Secondly, the simple 
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solution of omitting highly correlated explanatory 
variables was tried. This produced reasonable results 
but has the obvious drawback of introducing specification 
error into the model. 
The problem of possible misinterpretation of the 
lag-structure evolved from the use of the expected 
inflation variable (see Equation (7.5.7)). Equation 
(7.5.11) demonstrates that this variable involves the 
inclusion of the lagged dependent variable on the right- 
hand-side of the equation. Furthermore, the co- 
efficient of this lagged variable (1-r) should be be- 
tween zero and unity. However, when this formulation 
was attempted in the financial saving ratio model, the 
coefficient (1-r) turned out to be consistently 
negative (at approximately 
- 
0.6) ; and a value of 
r= 1.6 implies that inflation expectations would diverge 
to infinity. The reasons for this behaviour were 
thought to lie in the stock adjustment model described 
in Section 7.7: in some way, the lagged dependent var- 
iable describes a stock-adjustment rather than an infla- 
tion-expectations model. The negative 
. 
coefficient is 
then easily explained since the previous purchase of 
life insurance discourages current purchase. Various 
methods of eliminating the 'lag-structure' problem were 
attempted in the FSR model but the only successful 
solution was to include the inflation expectations 
variable 'manually' (and disperse with the lag-structure 
of Equation (7.5.11)). Luckily, this problem did not 
occur in any of the demand models. 
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Finally, it should be noted that the explanatory 
variables are to a large extent derived from aggregate 
data and are therefore only surrogates for the under- 
lying variables which relate to the potential purchasers 
of ordinary life insurance. 
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8.2 The Financial Saving Model 
The objective of the financial saving model is to 
provide a comparison with recent models explaining the 
behaviour of the aggregate saving ratio (eg. see Bank 
of Ehgland (1)). However, these models differ from 
the ones presented in some important respects: 
a) quarterly rather than annual observations are 
often used thus providing a greater number of 
degrees of freedom: this enables the use of 
more sophisticated statistical techniques; 
b) the financial saving ratio (FSR) is only a 
very small part of the aggregate saving ratio 
(averaging 0.29 as opposed to 8.1% (1946/68)). 
Furthermore, since the FSR represents new 
saving via ordinary life insurance (excluding 
annuities), it exhibits less fluctuation than 
the corresponding aggregate saving ratio. 
Consequently, considerably less success was 
achieved by the conventional explanatory var- 
iables in explaining the variation of the FSR; 
c) one can only assume that other time-series 
studies were not adversely affected by multi- 
collinearity problems: unfortunately, these 
problems limited the scope of this Section. 
The models of this Section are of two main types, 
firstly, those based on Equation (7.2.3) (linear type) 
and secondly, a 109-linear type similar to that used by 
Branson and Klevorick (3) to test the existence of money 
-405- 
illusion. The difference between the models is that 
the former type includes an inflation expectations 
variable (Pt), based on Equation (7.5.7), whereas the 
latter uses the retail price index instead. 
Linear Models 
Different formulations of the linear model were 
used in order to minimise the disturbing effects of 
multicollinearity and misinterpretation of the lag- 
structure. These models can be summarised under the 
following headings: 
Adaptive Expectations Type 
FSRt 
= ar + (1-r)FSRt_, + b. rPt_l 
+ Et 
- 
(1-r) 
.E t-l + ut - 
(8.2.1) 
where Et denotes the other explanatory variables and 
ut is the random error term. 
Adaptive Expectations (First Difference) Type 
AFSRt 
= 
(1-r )nFSRt-i + br APt-1 + at -( 1-r)Azt-1 
+ nut 
- 
(1-raut-i (8.2.2) 
where o denotes the first difference operator eg. 
tFSRt = FSRt 
- 
FSRt-I' 
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Adaptive Expectations (Stock Adjustment) Type 
FSRt = ar + (1-r)FSRt_1 + brPt_. + cIF. 
+ c(1-r)IFt-1 + Et 
- 
(1-r )Et-1 
+ ut 
- 
(1-r)ut-1 
(8.2.3) 
where IF. denotes the optimal stock of savings-based 
life insurance. 
'Manual' Expectations Type 
FSRt 
=a+ bpe + Et + ut 
(8.2.4) 
where Pe denotes the long-term expected rate of 
inflation. 
Table 8.2.1 illustrates selected regressions from 
the Adaptive Expectations Type model using ordinary 
least squares. I have already commented on the out- 
standing features of this type of model, viz. the neg- 
ative coefficient of FSRt-1. 
The results of Table 8.2.1 are, in the main, dis- 
appointing although not entirely unexpected given the 
disturbing presence of multicollinearity. There are? 
however, a few comments that can be salvaged: 
a) although all the standard errors are large in 
relation to the corresponding coefficients, 
in most cases these coefficients have the 
expected sign. Thus Permanent Income (INCt) 
has a positive coefficient and the 'stock' 
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Table 8.2.1 FSR : Adaptive 
- 
Expectations Type Results 
Dependent Variable FSRt 
Sample Period 1946/1968 
Ordinary Least Squares 
Model No. 
I II III IV V VI 
CONST 0.693 -0.793 (0.261) (0.428) -0.970 (0.463) -0.900 (1.053) -0.928 (0.969) 
INCt 0.004 -0.026 0.007 0.002 0.005 (0.008) (0.115) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) 
P C 0.004 0.035 -0.002 0.007 0.004 t-1 (0.008) (0.115) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
INCT 0.020 t (0.117) 
T INC 0.006 t-1 (0.005) 
BSW t 
0.010 
(0.020) 
BSWt-1 -0.014 (0.022) 
BSAt 0.012 (0.022) 
BSA t-1 
0.033 (0.031) 
IFSg 
-0.088 (0.009) 
I61 0.009 (0.013) 
FSR t-1 
0.693 
(0.137) -0.221 (0.260) -0.296 (0.275) -0: 
434 
(0.285) -0.282 ( 0.297) -0-156 (0.290) 
' Pt-1 -0.040 (0.023) -0.003 (0.023) -0.005 (0.024) 
0.004 
(0.023) -0.010 (0.026) -0.005 (0.025) 
F 16.4 17.4 11.7 13.8 11.1 10.9 
R2 0.62 0.80 0.81 0.83 0.81 0.80 
, R2 0.58 0.75 0.75 0.77 0.73 0.73 
DW 2.39 1.95 2.02 1.86 1.92 1.99 
Standard Errors in () DW 
- 
Durbin Watson Statistic A key to the abbreviations can be found in Appendix 7.1 
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of savings-based life insurance (IFtg) has 
a negative effect; 
b) in the only case where all coefficients are 
significant (Model I), FSRt_I has a positive 
coefficient (indicating a value of r=0.3) 
and long-run inflation expectations have a 
negative effect on FSRt; 
c) the multicollinear situation is exacerbated 
by the presence of lagged explanatory vari- 
ables since obviously, these will be highly 
correlated with their present values; 
d) it is especially interesting to note that 
the coefficient of FSRt_, is negative even 
in Model V- which includes IFtg in order 
to pick up any stock adjustment effects; 
e) many of the explanatory variables suggested ' 
in Section 7.7 have been excluded because of 
the multicollinearity that their inclusion 
would entail. This is particularly so of 
the variables that are closely correlated with 
P (eg. NIF INCt (receipts by the National 
Insurance Fund), IF, LIQt and HPCt etc. ). 
Table 8.2.2 illustrates the results of the second 
main model attempted 
- 
the Adaptive Expectations (First 
Difference) Type. A comparison of Equations (8.2.1) and 
(8.2.2) shows that taking first-differences does not spoil 
the interpretation of the lag coefficient r. The 
object of the first difference model was the cure of 
- 
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the multicollinearity problem: unfortunately, as can 
be seen, first differencing removes virtually all the 
explanatory power of the right-hand-side variables. 
Again, the results of Table 8.2.2 are disappointing 
in that the value of R2 is consistently poor. 
Furthermore the only significant variable, FSRt-1, 
had an incorrect sign, giving a value of r between 
1.4 and 1.6. 
Equation (8.2.3) gives the formulation of the third 
main linear model attempted 
- 
the Adaptive Expectations 
(Stock Adjustment) Type. A comparison of Equations 
(8.2.1) and (8.2.3) shows that the only difference is 
the inclusion of the term c(1-r)IFt in the latter 
Equation. IFt denotes the 'optimum stock' of savings- V 
based life insurance and is defined by: 
IFt 
- 
IFt-1 
= g. (IFt - IFt-i) (7.7"ß) 
where 0<g <1. 
In Section 7.7 it was explained that the only 
sensible way to allow for adjustment to the 'optimum' 
stock of life insurance is to include IFt 'manually'. 
IFt is then obtained from Equation 
IF. 
=g IFt + E7-1 IF C7.7.3) 
and the model run with different values of g. 
The rationale for the inclusion of IFt is that 
a stock adjustment model should sort out the problems 
caused by possible misinterpretation of the lag-structure 
in the models of Tables 8.2.1 and 8.2.2 where the 
- 
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Table 8.2.2 FSR : Adaptive Expectations (First Difference) 
Type Results Dependent Variable AFSRt 
Sample Period 1946/1968 
Ordinary Least Squares 
CONST 
AINCt 
AINO 
-1 
&INCT 
eINCt_,, 
ABSWt 
ABSAt 
ABSAt-i 
frl.. '
E; 
tIFtg1 
SRt-1 
4-1 
F 
R2 
R2 
DW. 
VII 
0.062 
(0.050) 
-0.433 (0.229) 
-0.010 (0.021) 
2.3 
0.19 
0.10 
2.27 
MODEL NO. 
VIII IX X 
-0.020 -0.019 -0.001 (0.078) (0.082) (0.090) 
0.004 0.006 0.0004 
(0.014) (0.109) (0.017) 
0.007 0.006- 0.008 
(0.007) (0.107) (0.008) 
-0.006 (0.106) 
0.004 (0.007) 
-0.009 (0.011) 
0.012 
(0.012) 
-0.509 -0.531 -0.614 (0.225) (0.246) (0.255) 
-0.017 -0.016 -0.026 (0.024) (0.026) (0.027) 
2.1 1.3 1.5 
0.32 0.33 0.36 
0.17 0.08 0.12 
2.55 2.52 2.49 
xi 
-0.019 (0.094) 
0.004 (0.016) 
0.007 (0.008) 
0.009 
(0.021) 
-0.012 (0.021) 
-0.465 (0.249) 
-0.020 (0.026) 
1.3 
0.33 
0.08 
2.60 
Standard Errors in () 
DW 
- 
Durbin Watson Statistic 
A key to the abbreviations can be found in Appendix 7.1 
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coefficients of FSRt_i and e FSRt_, are significantly 
negative rather than positive. 
Unfortunately, the model of Equation (8.2.3) proved 
unsuccessful because no value of g between zero and 
unity induced a positive coefficient for FSRt_i. The 
results have not been tabulated. 
One further possible explanation for the behaviour 
of FSRt_i is that, theoretically, ordinary least 
squares is an inappropriate technique for estimating 
equations with an error term of the form ut 
-p. ut_,. 
This is because (i) the error terms are autocorrelated, 
(ii) the error term is not independent of FSRt_i; thus 
OIS yields biased estimates in small samples like ours, 
(iii) the estimates are inconsistent (ie. biased even 
with very large samples) and (iv) the Durbin Watson 
statistic will not necessarily detect the inherent auto- 
correlation (for proofs see Koutsoyiannis (11)). 
J. Johnson (9) shows that, in the absence of autocor- 
relation the bias referred to above is negative (ie.: the 
expected value of the estimate is less than the actual 
value of the coefficient) while if the residuals are 
autocorrelated then the bias may be positive. 
Although econometric techniques exist for the 
estimation of distributed-lag models (for example, see 
Houthakker and Taylor (8) ('Three Pass Least Squares') 
and Koutsoyiannis (11) p. 311) the simplest solution is 
to adopt Equation (8.2.4) instead 
- 
thus removing the 
troublesome FSRt-1 from the right-hand-side of the 
equation. Equation (8.2.4) is termed the 'Manual 
Expectations T 1el because Pt is included 'manually' 
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by computing it from Equation (7.5.7) for selected 
values of r. The 'best' value of r is then the 
one which yields the best statistical results (in terms 
of the highest values for F and 12). Of course, 
in order to calculate Pe in this way a suitable start- 
ing value must be chosen and in fact, a value of Pe = ý934 
_ 
0.0 was used. This seemed appropriate since 1934 had 
been preceded by two years of zero inflation and several 
years of slump before that. In any case, for r'o. o,,,, 
the effects of a minor error in the choice of starting 
value should have disappeared by 19+6. 
One further option is then available once the 
application of Equation (8.2.4) has yielded the best 
value of r, say r*. Equation (8.2.1) can be re- 
examined with the known value, r*, substituted for the 
unknown r ie. 
, 
FSRt 
- 
(1- r*)FSRt-1 b r*pt-1 + Et 
- 
C1-r*)Et-1 
+ ut 
- 
(1- T*) ut-l 
which can be rewritten as, 
e *FSRt =b r*Pt_1 + a* Et + A*ut 
(8.2.5) 
where p*FSRt =' FSRt 
- 
(1-r*)FSRt_1" 
Equation (8.2.5) can then be estimated by Ordinary Least 
Squares without any further difficulty (see Koutsoyiannis 
(11) P"311). 
Table 8.2.3 shows the results of the 'Manual' 
Expectations Typo of Equation (8.2.4). In each case, 
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the model was attempted with a variety of different 
values for r and the one appearing in the Table is 
the 'best' in terms of the highest F 
-score, R2 
and 172 figures. 
-4'14- 
Table 8.2.3 FSR : 'Manual' Expectations Type Results 
Dependent Variable FSRt 
Sample Period 1946/1968 
Ordinary Least Squares 
MODEL NO. 
XII XIII XIV XV 
CONST -1.015 (0.322) 
0.682 (0.742) -0.429 (1.649) -0.826 (0.755) 
e 
-1.169 -0.115 -0.126 -0.225 Pt (0.635) (0.081) (0.085) (0.127) 
P 0.009 0.003 0.005 0.009 iNCt (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
-0.002 BSWt (0.006) 
BSAt 0.020 (0.016) 
0.010 (0.020) 
Tt 0.016 (0.022) 
r 0.005 0.145 0.135 0.035 
F 45.3 29.5 21.6 28.8 
R2 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.82 
R2 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.79 
DW 2.58 2.52 2.55 2.58 
continued 
..... 
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Table 8.2.3 FSR : 'Manual' Exp ectations Type Results continued 
MODEL NO. 
XVI XVII XVIII XIX 
CONST -1.060 -0.761 -0.500 -0.995 (0.801) (1.475) (1.176) (2.089) 
e P -0.224 -0.041 -0.055 -0.067 t (0.127) 
. 
(0.104) (0.060) (0.062) 
P INC 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.002 t (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
BSWt 
-0.011 (0.010) 
BSA 0.043 0.042 0.041 t (0.026) (0.019) (0.030) 
IFS9 -0.003 -0.009 t (0.005) (0.006) 
T t 
0.058 
(0.031) 
B 0.002 t (0.001) 
M -0.006 t (0.003) 
U -0.004 t (0.135) 
DUt -0.040 (0.086) 
r 0.035 0.145 0.250 0.350 
F 29.3 22.8 23.4 12.3 
R2 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.88 
R2 0.77 0.80 0.80 0.80 
DW 2.60 2.70 2.66 2.78 
Standard Errors in () 
DW 
- 
Durbin Watson Statistic 
A key to the abbreviations can be found in Appendix 7.1 
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The inclusion of the inflation expectations term 
'manually' side-steps the problems of autocorrelation 
and inconsistency that are present when ordinary least 
squares is used on an Adaptive-Expectations Type model. 
However, the problem of multicollinearity is still 
present and consequently the models of Table 8.2.3 
have been specifically formulated so that they do not 
include a large number of collinear variables. Other 
models with greater numbers of explanatory variables 
were attempted but proved to be very badly affected. 
The models of Table 8.2.3 show up the following points: 
a) the Inflation Expectations variable Pt turns 
out to be largely significant (at just below 
the 95% level in most cases) and consistently 
negative in its effect on new saving through 
life insurance; 
b) Permanent Income (INC') also turns out to 
be largely significant with a positive effect; 
c) Building Society Advances (BSA) again appear 
to be positively associated with FSR; 
d) the Stock of savings-related life insurance 
in force (IFSg) again appears to discourage 
new saving; 
e) although neither of the coefficients of BSW 
is significant both indicate that Building 
Society Wealth has a negative effect (ie. as 
a substitute). However Models VI and XI 
indicate a positive effect; 
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f) the effects of the other possible explanatory 
variables are much in line with those that 
were expected: the standard rate of Income 
Tax (T) has a positive effect on FSR as does 
Births (B) while the coefficients of Marriages 
(M), Unemployment (U) and the Change in 
Unemployment (AU) are negative; 
g) again, because of multicollinearity problems, 
certain variables (eg. LIQt, HPCt, NIFt) 
were omitted; 
h) the 'best' value of r is of interest: when 
BSA is included as an explanatory variable r 
is of the order of 0.14; when BSA is excluded, 
r is much smaller (around 0.03). Now, since 
a smaller value of r could be interpreted 
to mean that the consumer takes a more long- 
term view of inflation, it looks as if a 
shorter-term view is taken when savings-based 
life insurance is purchased in conjunction with 
a building society advance for house purchase 
purposes. In fact, this result is not sur- 
prising because, as Revell (17) reports, 
"very few mortgages run to their full 
term: the average 'life' of a building society 
mortgage is less than ten years". (p"381) 
Several of the models including BSA as an explan- 
atory variable have been reworked using Equation (8.2.5) 
(by transforming the variables with d*) with a value of 
r* = 0.14: the results are illustrated in Table 8.2.4 
below. 
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Table 8.2.4 FSR : Adaptive Expectations Type ( r* = 0.14) 
Results Dependent Variable e*FSRt 
Sample Period 1946/1968 
Ordinary Leas t Squares 
MODEL NO. 
X. x XXI XXII XXIII XXIV 
CONST 0.439 0.351 0.329 0.247 0.240 (0.519) (0.533) (0.601) (0.568) (0.603) 
" P -0.035 -0.038 -0.032 -0.035 -0.045 t-1 (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.034) 
*INCP -0.002 0.002 0.0005 -0.002 -0.002 e (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) 
e*BSW -0.005 (0.013) 
d*B3A 0.034 0.043 0.038 0.043 0.051 (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.042) 
e*IFSg -0.007 (0.008) 
e*T 0.031 0.072 (0.036) (0.043) 
e*B 0.002 (0.002) 
A*M 
-0.008 (0.007) 
e*U 0.061 (0.210) 
e *e U -0.062 (0.128) 
F 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.1 0.94 
R2 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.35 
yE2 0.02 0.009 
-0.022 -0.010 -0.023 
DW 2.71 2.86 2.79 2.64 2.79 
Standard Errors in () 
DW 
- 
Durbin Watson Statistic A key to the abbreviations can be found in Appendix ?. I 
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Table 8.2.4 confirms the signs of most of the 
important explanatory variables although it will be. 
noted that the semi-differencing has destroyed the 
explanatory power of the models. The only conclusive 
results from Table 8.2.4 are that the coefficient of 
Pt_, is consistently negative while that for BSAt 
is positive: both these variables show some degree 
of significance. 
Log-Linear Models 
In addition to the linear models of Equations 
a log-linear model along the lines 
suggested by Branson and Klevorick (3) was used: 
log FSRt 
=a+b log RPIt +E cilog Xit + Vt 
(8.2.6) 
If the 
-coefficient of log RPIt is then insignifi- 
cantly different from zero we can conclude that FSRt 
only depends on the real value of INCP, BSW, BSA, 
etc. On the other hand, if b#0 then money illu- 
sion exists in the Patinkin sense. (see D. Patinkin 
(15)) 
- 
Unfortunately, the taking of (natural) logarithms 
does not spoil the collinearity of the explanatory 
variables so that, once again, strongly multicollinear 
models have been avoided. The results of the various 
log-linear models are given in Table 8.2.5. 
Table 8.2.5 tells much the same story as the other 
models of the financial saving ratio but has, on the 
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Table 8.2.5 FSR : Log-Linear models Dependent Variable 
loge FSRt 
Sample Period 1946/1968 
Ordinary Least Squares 
MODEL NO. 
CONST 
log RPIt 
log INCt 
log BSAt 
log BSWt 
log IFtg 
log rBs t 
log Bt 
log Mt 
log Tt 
log Ut 
*log Ut 
XXV XXVI XXVII XXVIII 
-9.515 
-8.334 -11.040 -10.288 (1.445) (3.243) (4.247) (3.790) 
-0.349 -0.296 -0.292 -0.330 (0.190) (0.234) (0.244) (0.214) 
1.972 1.704 2.285 2.187 (0.371) (0.759) (0.900) (1.042) 
0.065 (0.159) 
-0.139 (0.364) 
-o. 118 (0.532) 
4 4.1 28.3 28.2 28.0 
F 
R2 
0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 
R2 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.79 
2.61 2.64 2.61 2.62 DW 
*Actually log (AUt +2.0) 
Standard Errors in () 
DW 
- 
Durbin Watson Statistic 
A key to the abbreviations can be found in Appendix 7.1 
XXIX 
-12.330 (4.409) 
-0.275 (0.489) 
2.157 (I. A79) 
-0.062 (0.082) 
0.491 (0.704) 
-0.938 (0.763) 
1.030 
(0.784) 
0.084 
(0.124) 
-0.088 (0.072) 
11.1 
0.86 
0.79 
2.78 
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other hand, some additional facets: first, although the 
log-linear method has certain theoretical drawbacks (eg. 
see A. Deaton (5) Ch. 2 and H. A. J. Green (7)), it has the 
advantage that the various elasticity coefficients can 
be observed directly (ci in Equation (8.2.6)). Thus 
Models XXV to XXIX show that the (permanent) income elast- 
icity settles around a value of 2.0 (and this variable 
is also consistently significant). 
Secondly, the position regarding the existence of 
money illusion seems inconclusive: in Models XXV and 
XXVIII, the coefficients of log RPI seem almost signif- 
icantly negative (at around the 90% level). However, 
in Models XXVI, XXVII and XXIX, the coefficients are not 
significant (although still negative). The correspond- 
ing elasticity coefficient-averages out around -0.3 and 
thus a 1% increase in the Retail Price Index produces a 
0.39 fall in FSR. 
Finally, the remaining explanatory variables show 
a disappointing lack of significance although, as has 
been pointed out before, this insignificance is, in part, 
a consequence of the multicollinearity in the model. 
However, the signs of the coefficients are in agreement 
with those illustrated in the previous tables. 
In order to summarise the models of Tables 8.2.1 to 
8.2.5, the following points can be noted: first, both 
the retail price index (Table 8.2.5) and inflation 
expectations (Tables 8.2.1 - 8.2.4) have a negative 
effect on the new long-term financial saving ratio. 
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Furthermore, despite all the multicollinearity problems 
log RPI, Pe and Pt_j are often significant (ie. with 
small standard errors). It is, therefore, possible to 
conclude that the existence of inflation definitely dis- 
courages new long-term saving via life insurance, even 
though the inflationary experience of 1946/1968 was 
comparatively mild. 
Secondly, the following variables have a negative 
effect on FSRt: 
- 
Building Society Wealth (BSWt) ie. shares and 
deposits in building societies: thus, as ex- 
pected, building societies act as a substitute 
alternative for personal saving. However, 
since no model shows a significantly negative 
effect, we might conclude, albeit tentatively, 
that BSWt is not a strong substitute for new 
long-term savings; 
- 
Savings-based Sums Insured In Force (IF8tg): 
thus existing 'stocks' of life insurance dis- 
courage the purchase of further savings-based 
life insurance; 
- 
holdings of Liquid Assets (LIQt): although 
the evidence is slight (and the results have 
not been reported), it does indicate that LIQt 
discourages FSRt. However, it is not possible 
to determine whether this is because of a 
'wealth effect' or the 'transactions effect' 
described by Morgan Grenfell (14); 
_ 
marriages in year t (Mt): this study is not 
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unique in the revelation of a negative coefficient 
for Marriages (eg. see Neumann (15) and Mantis 
& Farmer (13)). There seem to be two possible 
explanations for this result : first of all that 
a simple budget constraint prevents a newly- 
established household from purchasing savings- 
based life insurance in the first year of marriage. 
Secondly, it may be that short-term saving rather 
than its long-term counterpart is more important 
for newly-marrieds. 
The third main conclusion relates to those variables 
which have a positive effect on FSRt: 
- 
the most important of these variables is Permanent 
Income (INCt) which has a consistently positive 
and often significant effect. Furthermore, the 
elasticity figures of Table 8.2.5 show that FSRt 
is fairly responsive to changes in INCt; 
- 
Building Society Advances (BSAt); although 
Revell (17) notes that only 15% of building 
society mortgage advances are associated with 
endowment policies, BSAt seems to have a reas- 
onably important effect on new long-term saving 
via life insurance. In view of this result, it 
is anticipated that BSAt should be an import- 
ant determinant of the purchase of protection- 
based life insurance. Finally, we note again 
that when the value of r was determined (Table 
8.2.3), a much larger figure was obtained when 
BSAt was included in the model; 
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- 
the Standard Rate of Income Tax (Tt): the higher 
the rate of income tax, the greater is the tax 
relief on 'qualifying' policies: this effect- 
ively reduces the net of tax 'price' of life 
insurance (or alternatively improves the net 
yield obtained on savings); 
- 
Births (Bt): not surprisingly the birth of a 
child encourages the purchase of savings-based 
life insurance. 
The figures for the Durbin Watson Statistic in the 
extreme right-hand column of the above Tables consistently 
reject the hypothesis of positive autocorrelation of res- 
iduals. However, in some Models, the DW figure is quite 
high so that the hypothesis of negative autocorrelation 
of residuals cannot be rejected. Additionally, a high 
value of the DW Statistic is also to be found in Tables 
8.2.2 and 8.2.4 when models using first-differenced and 
semi-first-differenced variables were attempted. This 
seems to imply that any autocorrelation that is present 
does not necessarily follow a first-order autoregressive 
scheme. 
The traditional solution to the problem of auto- 
correlation involves first differencing (and may be sub- 
sequent differencing) of the variables in the model. 
However, the results of Tables 8.2.2 and 8.2.4 make it 
abundantly clear that no real value is to be gained by 
first-differencing because, in this case, the cure is 
more harmful than the disease. The results must, there- 
fore, be interpreted in the light of possible negative 
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autocorrelation which may have the following effects: 
a) the variance of the parameter estimates are 
under-estimated and thus, the significance of 
these estimates is over-estimated. However, 
the standard errors of most of the variables 
are already so high that it is difficult to 
believe that autocorrelation has had any harm- 
ful effects; 
b) any predictions based on ordinary least squares 
will be inefficient. 
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8.3 The Independent and Dependent Demand Models 
The objective of the demand model is to analyse and explain 
the demand for protection-based and savings-based life 
insurance: thus the demand of these two elements of life 
insurance are analysed separately (although not independently 
in general). A notable feature of all the demand models is 
that they are part of a system of equations which describe 
the market equilibrium (assuming that such an equilibrium 
occurs) and so, as Section 7.3 explained, we have to include 
the corresponding supply equations in order to guarantee 
that the demand model is properly identified. The method of two 
stage least squares must then be utilised. 
The factors that affect the supply side of the model were 
described in Section7.4. Unfortunately, it was not possible 
to separate those factors affecting the supply of-life 
insurance into the savings-based and protection-based elements. 
We would expect the variable representing the adjustment to 
the optimum gearing level to have a negative effect on 
savings-based life insurance but a positive effect on 
protection-based policies. This is because if the optimum 
gearing level (Gt) represents a proportion of with profits in 
force greater than the actual level in the previous year 
(Gt_i) then we would expect the adjustment variable (Gt_i 
- 
Gt), 
which is negative, to induce first an increase in the supply 
of with profits policies (ie. (Gt_i - Gt) having a negative 
coefficient) and second a decrease in the supply of non- 
profits policies (ie. (Gt_i - Gt) having a positive coefficient). 
The large number of different demand models that are 
subsequently analysed can be separated into two main groups: 
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first those with. the protection-based models independent of 
the savings-based ones and secondly those models which are 
not independent. We can say that the protection-based and 
savings-based models are independent if no one protection- 
based equation contains a savings-based endogenous variable 
and vice versa. The independent models then form sets of 
pairs of demand and supply equations which can be estimated in 
isolation. The dependent models, on the other hand, form sets 
of four equations with each equation determining the behaviour 
of the other three. 
In all of the subsequent demand models, demand and 
supply are measured in terms of premium expenditure (as 
explained in Chapter Six). This, of course, is not the usual 
demand relationship which plots price (ceteris paribus) against 
quantity (there is, however, no clear concept of the quantity 
demanded of life insurance). The use of expenditure causes no 
problems though: it can be readily demonstrated that the 
expenditure/own price elasticity is just (1 +n) (where 
(< 0) is the quantity/own price elasticity) while-the other 
elasticity coefficients have their usual interpretation (ie. 
are not altered by using premium expenditure as a surrogate 
for demand). Similarly, instead of quantity supplied, the 
following supply relationships are formulated in terms of 
expenditure supplied. 
The Independent Models 
The simplest independent model is the case where demand 
depends solely on Own Price (IPt) and Permanent Income (INCt) 
in both the savings-based and protection-based cases. The 
supply equations include the normal supply exogenous variables 
(Spt_11 pt, (Gt-1 - Gt) and YLDt) as well as the endogenous 
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Own Price. The results from this model are illustrated in 
Table 8.3.1. 
Table 8.3.1 shows that the model is by no means complete: 
in particular, Equations A, C and D indicate significantly low 
values for the Durbin Watson statistic (ie. positive 
autocorrelation of residuals) which could be caused by the 
omission of important explanatory variables from the model. 
A more complex version of the independent model is 
described in Table 8.3.2 which is basically the same as that 
of Table 8.3.1 with the addition of the exogenous variables 
IFtg, BSAt in the demand for savings-based equation and IF', 
BSAt, in the demand for protection-based equation. The 
structure of the supply equation remains unaltered. 
The improving qualities of Table 8.3.2 are mainly 
reflected in the supply equations which (in comparison with 
those of Table 8.3.1) indicate a better degree of explanation 
and better Durbin Watson statistics. The addition of Building 
Society Advances (BSAt) to the demand for savings-based 
equation (A) seems to be beneficial as it has a significantly 
positive effect. It is interesting to note that the same 
variable is much less significant in the protection-based 
case (B). 
The Dependent Models 
Once we move from the use of the independent to the 
dependent models, the problems of identification become 
more acute because there are now four endogenous variables in 
the model (requiring all four equations) rather than two 
before (with two pairs of equations). Specifically, the 'order 
condition' of identification (see Koutsoyiannis (11) p. 342) 
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Table 8.3.1 Independent Demand Model 
A. Demand for 
Savings based 
(Dtg) 
B. Demand for 
rr otect on-based 
r (Dt) 
CONST -1777.815 (201-582), -157.859 (99.602) 
9 I 
- t (0.533) 
I (0.106) 
INCt 6.901 1.040 (0.413) (0.231) 
g2 0.96 0.91 
E2 0.96 0.90 
F 267.5 98.6 
DW 1.067 1.671 
Sample Period 1946-1968 
Two Stage Least Squares 
Equilibrium condition: 
Dtg 
= Stg 
Pr Pr Dt 
= 
St 
Standard Errors in () 
DW Durbin Watson Statistic 
A key to the abbreviations 
can be found in Appendix 
7.1. 
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Table 8.3.1 Independent Demand Model (Cont. ) 
C. Supply of 
Savings-based ased 
(SStg) 
CONST 
IPtg 
IPr 
SPt-1 
at 
CGt_'1 
- 
Gt 
YLDt 
R2 
R2 
F 
DJJ 
1965.257 (867.883) 
-6.966 (3.231) 
-14.961 (7.089) 
-48.949 (69.821) 
-218.580 (122.795) 
62.545 (70.058) 
0.60 
0.48 
5.06 
1.090 
D. Supply of 
Protecti-on---Uased 
(Str) 
170.123 
(80. ß+3'I ) 
-o. 394 (0.125) 
-1.278 (0.637) 
1.434 
(8.156) 
-o. 129 (11.234) 
21.794 
(9.025) 
0.88 
0.84 
24.61 
1.283 
Sample Period 1946-1968 
Two Stage Least Squares g Sg Equilibrium condition : t St 
Pr Pr Dt = St 
Standard errors in () 
DW 
-Durbin Watson Statistic 
A key to the abbreviations can 
be found in Appendix 7.1. 
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Table 8.3.2 Independent Demand Model 
A. Demand for 
avin s-ase 
(Dtg) 
CONST 
IPtg 
IPPr 
INCt 
BSAt 
IFPr 
IFtg 
R2 
-1442.102 (300.266) 
0.633 (0.559) 
6.375 (1.390) 
20.058 (9.170) 
-2.264 (2.3-7) 
0.97 
R2 
F 
0.97 
166.2 
B. Demand for 
Protection-based 
(DS ) 
-1.391 (155.18'1) 
-0.161 (0.109) 
0.591 (0.467) 
-1.572 (3.995) 
0.433 (0.379) 
0.91 
0.89 
46.1 
DW 1.389 1.476 
Sample Period 1946-1968 
Two Stage Least Squares 
Equilibrium Condition : Dtg = Stg 
DPr 
_ 
SPr t-t 
Standard Errors in () 
DW 
- 
Durbin Watson Statistic 
A key to abbreviations can be 
found in Appendix 7.1. 
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Table 8.3.2 Independent Demand Model(Cont. ) 
C. Su 17 of 
Savings-based 
(Sr) 
CONST 87 +. 313 (L11.491) 
IPsg 
-2.080 (1.298) 
Ip r 
SPt-1 
-6.524 (3.469) 
Ct 
-72.438 (41.689) 
(Gt-1 
- 
Gt) 
-90.695 (63.722) 
YLDt 134.357 (36.560) 
R2 0.85 
g2 0.81 
F 19.7 
DW 1.478 
D. Supply of 
Protection-based 
A 
129.356 (63.101) 
-0.306 (0.084) 
-1.008 (0.519) 
0.079 (7.123) 
2.933 (9.617) 
26.570 
(6.994) 
0.91 
0.88 
32.5 
1.4'14 
Sample Period 1946-1968 
Two Stage Least Squares 
Equilibrium Condition: Dtg 
= 
Stg 
Dpr SPr tt 
Standard Errors in () 
DW 
- 
Durbin Watson Statistic 
A key to abbreviations can be found in Appendix 7.1. 
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means that we now need at least two more exogenous variables 
in the demand equations. 
The solution to the problem of identification creates 
its own additional headaches: the model now requires a minimum 
of seven exogenous variables (four in the supply equations 
and three for demand). Thus although the structural equations 
may only have a moderate number of variables, the corresponding 
exogenous variables in the reduced form-of the model quickly 
become much more numerous. Since, of course, the method of 
two stage least squares uses the reduced form to calculate 
initial estimates of the included endogenous variables this 
means that the model can quickly become 'strained' with too, 
few degrees of freedom. With a sample of only twenty three 
observations this means that a very strict control must be 
kept on the number of exogenous variables. This problem is 
particularly noticeable when distributed-lag type structures 
are used for inflation expectations (because these structures 
can effectively double the number of exogenous variables 
in the model). 
Table 8.3.3 illustrates virtually the simplest dependent 
model: this has more exogenous variables than is strictly 
necessary but these are important because of the difficulty 
involved in computing the 'second stage' equations accurately, 
when there are two included endogenous variables. 
The supply equations of Table 8.3.3 are simply those of 
Tables 8.3.1 and 8.3.2 with the addition of the price of the 
supply alternative. The demand for savings-based equation 
is similar to Equation 8.3.2 A with the addition of IPI 
However the demand for protection-based life insurance 
includes both IPtg and Births (Bt) as additional variables. 
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Table 8.3.3 Dependent Demand Model 
A. Demand for B. Demand for 
Savings-base Protection-b9sed 
(Dr) (Dt ) 
CONST 
-1848.626 (951.885) 
21.212 
(391.003) 
ig 
-0.578 (3.79'+) -0.175 (1.703) 
IpFr 0.864 
-0.147 (2.236) (0.880) 
INCt 7.450 (3.222) 0.127 (1.434) 
BSAt 12.863 (14.292) -2.640 (4.878) 
Bt - 0.174 (0.238) 
IFp - 0.686 (0.438) 
ISg -1.468 - (2.348) 
R2 0.97 0.92 
IZ2 0.97 0.89 
F 129.8 30.8 
DW 1.521 1.604 
Sample Period 1946-1968 
Two Stage Least Squares 
Equilibrium Condition : Dtg= Stg 
DPr SPr t 
Standard Errors in () 
DW Durbin Watson Statistic 
A key to the abbreviations can be 
found in Appendix 7.1. 
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Table 8.3.3 Dependent Demand Model (Cont. ) 
C. Supply of D. Supply of Savings- ased ýtection-based 
(Stg) (Str) 
CONST 259.963 
-2.506 (465.415) (75.369) 
IPtg 13.057 2.486 (5.949) (0.963) 
IPtr 
-5.989 -1.222 (2.457) (0.398) 
SPt-i 1.246 0.474 (4.482) (0.726) 
Ct 
-53.304 2.191 (48.318) (7.824) 
(Gt-i 
- 
Gt) 97.763 36.207 (96.635) (15.649) 
YLDt 32.864 13.533 (62.108) (10.058) 
g2 0.82 0.90 
R2 0.75 0.86 
F 12.2 22.7 
DW 1.388 1.846 
Sample Period 1946-1968 
Two Stage Least Squares 
Equilibrium Condition: Dtg 
= 
Stg 
Pr Pr Dt 
= 
St 
Standard Errors in () 
DW Durbin Watson Statistic 
A key to the abbreviations can be 
found in Appendix 7.1. 
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The inclusion of non-own-prices should clarify the effects 
of the own price for a number of reasons, since it could be 
argued that savings-based and protection-based life insurance 
are so closely connected that they are bound to influence 
each other. In practice the most common forms of ordinary 
non-group life insurance include both savings-based and 
protection-based elements and the market price actually 
paid is a 'composite' price reflecting both. 
') Thus the 
two elements are almost complementary to the extent that they 
are almost always purchased in conjunction with one another 
(in practice, only pure endowments exclude the savings-based 
element). On the other hand, the two elements are demand 
substitutes if only to the extent that they represent 
alternative ways of spending disposable income. Additionally 
a life insurance policy with a high savings content (eg. a 
with-profits endowment) is a substitute for an alternative 
with little or no savings content (eg. a temporary life insurance 
policy). 
The same broad description can also be applied to the 
supply of savings-based and protection-based life insurance: 
that although the 'characteristics' of savings and protection 
are complementary, the actual products in which they are 
combined are substitutes. 
We can conclude therefore that there are strong theor- 
etical conclusions to indicate that the non-own-price should 
not be omitted for either the demand or supply equations. It 
is by no means certain, however, what the sign of the coefficients 
(1) It should be remembered that the price indices IPtg and IPtr 
do not exactly correspond to the saving and protection elements 
in ordinary life insurance (see Section 7.3). 
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of these various variables should be. 
The next point of interest is the low values of the 
Durbin Watson statistic (particularly in Tables 8.3.1 and 
8.3.2): this phenomenon could be caused by the omission of 
the non-own-prices.. A comparison of the supply of protection- 
based equations shows that the DW figure is substantially 
increased when IPtg is included. However it is only fair to 
say that the low values of the Durbin Watson statistic have 
not been completely removed in Table 8.3.3 (the dependent 
model): the null hypothesis of autocorrelation cannot therefore 
be completely rejected. 
Next, we note that in some of the equations, there is a 
tendency for some of the standard errors to be large. This, 
of course, is a symptom of multicollinearity and it seems to 
be more prevalent in the demand equations: the sources of this 
multicollinearity will be examined in Section 8.4. 
Finally, the explanatory variables denoting the stocks 
of life insurance (Ig and IFpr) have interesting effects. 
The coefficient of 
Ig is consistently negative in the 
demand for savings-based equations (Tables 8.3.2 and 8.3.3) 
although not significant at the 5% level. Thus existing-stocks of 
savings-based life insurance may discourage the purchase of 
further similar policies. However the coefficient of IFPr 
is consistently and more significantly positive so that 
existing stocks of protection-based life insurance encourage 
a further purchase. Several reasons can be forwarded for this 
latter result. 
a) the Houthakker & Taylor analysis (8) speaks of habit 
forming consumption and while it is doubtful if purchases 
of protection-based insurance can be so described, it may 
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be that once consumer resistence has been initially 
broken down (by the first purchase) consumers are more 
receptive to further purchases; 
b) a more currently popular argument might be that 
consumers are updating their protection cover to allow 
for the eroding effects of inflation. If this is the case 
then any inflationary expectations variable introduced 
at a later date should show a positive coefficient as 
well; 
c) the effects of frequent changes in mortgage arrangements 
mean that owner occupiers are continually purchasing 
new mortgage protection cover. This seems, intuitively, 
to be the most acceptable reason but the models of 
Tables 8.3.1,8.3.2 and 8.3.3 indicate that BSAt is 
not a significant explanatory factor (BSAt should have a 
positive effect on the purchase of protection-based 
life insurance): there may, however, be econometric reasons 
which explain this apparent anomaly. 
Tables 8.3.4,8.3.5 and 8.3.6 illustrate some results 
from a number of other dependent models and introduce the 
variables BSA, B, BSW, M, T, U, A U, and LIQ into the demand 
equations. The supply equations, of course, remain unaltered. 
The four dependent models examined so far show up some 
important results about the nature of the demand and supply 
relationships. The most outstanding feature of Tables 
8.3.3 to 8.3.6 is the insignificance of the price variables 
in the demand equations: none of the demand equations (for 
either savings-based or protection-based life insurance) 
attribute any significance to the coefficients of IPr and IPtg. 
On the other hand, the price variables in the supply equations 
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Table 8.3.4 Dependent Demand Model 
A. Demand for 
Savings-based 
i tg ) 
CONST 
-2458.751 (874.471) 
1p$g 
-4.229 (4.451) 
IP 2.624 (2.237) 
INV, p t 
8.513 
(3.391) 
BSAt 15.339 (17.083) 
BSWt 
-7.501 (6.7-3) 
Bt 0.202 (0.705) 
IF Pr t _ 
IF :, g 
R2 
R2 
F 
DW 
3.010 (3.899) 
0.97 
0.96 
77.3 
1.946 
B. Demand for 
'rotect on-Eased 
CDt 
579.856 (972.925) 
1.685 
(3.703) 
-1.436 (2.251) 
-0.850 (2.544) 
7.015 (14.478) 
-6.731 (7.813) 
0.121 
(0.354) 
2.438 (2.135) 
0.84 
0.77 
11.5 
1.712 
Sample Period 19.6-1968 
Two Stage Least Squares SS Equilibrium Condition Dtg = St6 
Pr Pr Dt 
= 
St 
Standard Errors'in () 
DW Durbin Watson Staistic 
A key to abbreviations can be found in Appendix 7.1. 
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Table 8.3.4 Dependent Demand Model (Cont. ) 
C. Su 1 of D. Su ly of 
Savings-based otection-based 
(SS t G) NSt ) 
COPZST 357.304 (46.817) 
14.806 
(66.687) 
IPtg 9.921 (5.078) 
1.928 
(0.812) 
Ip 
-4: 684 (2.096) -0.990 (0.335) 
SPt-i 
-0.165 (3.970) 0.223 (0.635) 
Ct 
-58.261 (43.553) 1.310 (6.968) 
(Gt-I 
_Gt) 60.973 (84.815) 
29.664 
(13.570) 
YLDt 57.392 (54.389) 17.895 (8.702) 
R2 0.85 0.91 
R2 0.80 0.89 
F 15.5 29.2 
DW 1.214 1.609 
Sample Period 1946-1968 
Two Stage Least Squares 
Equilibrium Condition: Dtg = St9 
Dpr 
- 
-SPr tt 
Standard Errors in () 
DW 
- 
Durbin Watson Statistic 
A key to the abbreviations 
can be found in Appendix 7.1. 
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Table 8.3.5 Dependent Demand Model 
A. Demand for 
Savings-Eased 
t 
CONST 
IPtg 
Ip r 
INCt 
BSAt 
Mt 
Tt 
Ut 
AUt 
Bt 
IFPr 
IFtg 
R2 
R2 
F 
DW 
-1298.619 (1170.467) 
3.169 (7.030) 
-1.518 (3.142) 
0.909 (5.175) 
23: 444 (16.266) 
-2.543 (2.972) 
27.549 (19.698) 
-46.470 (61.075) 
-25.117 (40.677) 
1-174 
(0.889) 
2.351 (3.226) 
0.98 
0.96 
61.1 
1.718 
B. Demand for 
15rtection- ased 
(Dt ) 
308.342 (1039.367) 
-2.140 (3.519) 
1.090 
(1.721) 
1.066 
(3.433) 
-7.438 (7.706) 
0.142 (1.509) 
-11.605 (8.030) 
13.586 
(34.835) 
-5.238 (16.628) 
-0.004 (0.465) 
1.095 (1.167) 
0.93 
0.86 
15.0 
2.906 
Sample Period 1946-1968 
Two Stage Least Squares 
A key to the Equilibrium Condition Dtg = Stg 
abbreviations can 
Dpr 
` 
Spr be found in tt Appendix 7.1 Standard Errors in () 
DW 
- 
Durbin Watson Statistic. 
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Table 8.3.5 Dependent Demand Model (Cont. ) 
C. Su 1-7. of D. Supply of Savings-based Protection-based 
(Stg) (St ) 
CONST 459.679 23.286 (386.587) (65.404) 
Ig 7.979 1.940 (4.422) (0.748) 
IP 
-3.966 -1.014 (1.853) (0.314) 
spt-l 
-1.318 0.170 (3.625) (0.613) 
Ct 
-59.934 1.624 (41.630) (7.043) 
(Gt-l-Gt) 35.023 29.144 (76.801) (12.993) 
YLDt 67.656 16.760 (50.669) (8.572) 
g2 0.87 0.91 
R2 0.82 0.88 
F 17.2 28.5 
DW 1.109 1.608 
Sample Period 1946-1968 
Two Stage Least Squares 
Equilibrium Condition: Dtg 
= Stg 
Dpr 
= 
SPr tt 
Standard Errors in () 
DW 
- 
Durbin Watson statistic 
A key to the abbreviations can be found in Appendix 7.1. 
- 
443 
- 
Table 8.3.6 Dependent Demand Model 
CONST 
IPtg 
Ip r 
INCt 
BSAt 
LIQt 
Bt 
IFPr 
IFSg t 
R2 
R2 
F 
Did 
A. Demand for 
Savings-based 
(D ) 
-2339.710 (673.719) 
-3.343 (2.968) 
-0.661 (1.394) 
5.413 (2.087) 
10.960 (9.591) 
7.099 (4.858) 
0.548 
(0.498) 
-2.319 (2.1'19) 
0.98 
0.98 
129.9 
1.750 
B. Demand for 
Protection-based 
(Dtr) 
-394.163 (436.639) 
-1.881 (2.145) 
-0.999 (0.910) 
-0.760 (1.480) 
-8.954 (7.423) 
4.704 
(3.201) 
0.379 (0.389) 
0.809 (0.667) 
0.83 
0.?. 
10.1 
1.311 
Sample Period 1946-1968 
Two Stage Least Squares 
Equilibrium Condition: Dtg = Stg 
Dpr SPr tt 
Standard Errors in () 
DW 
- 
Durbin Watson statistic 
A key to the abbreviations 
can be found in Appendix 7.1 
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Table 8.3.6 Dependent Demand Model (Cont. ) 
C. Supply of 
Savings-based 
(Stg 
D. Supply of F-o ction- ased 
(S ) t 
CONST 291.946 (417.428) 
1.202 
(69.179) 
Iptg 9.854 2.144 (4.913) (0.814) 
iP 
-4.510 -1.050 (1.982) (0.329) 
spt-i 0.253 (3.972) 0.359 (0.658) 
Ct 
-60.611 (43.125) 
1.344 
(7.147) 
(G 
-Gt) t-'I 65.244 (84.124) 32.437 (13.942) 
YLDt 65.826 (51.423) 
17.355 (8.522) 
g2 0.86 0.91 
R2 0.80 0.88 
F 15.7 27.4 
DW 1.251 1.691 
Sample Period 1946-1968 
Two Stage Least Squares 
Equilibrium Condition: Dtg = Stg 
Pr Pr Dt y St 
Standard Errors in () 
DW 
- 
Durbin Watson Staistic 
A key to the abbreviations 
can be found in Appendix 7.1. 
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are all largely significant (at the 5% level). The most 
immediate explanation of this behaviour lies in the 
multicollinearity present in the demand. equations (as 
evidenced by the consistently large standard errors 
throughout). This is particularly so since we would not have 
expected the inclusion of the non-own-prices to have had any 
improving effect upon the equations if their coefficients were 
actually insignificantly different from zero. On the other 
hand, a comparison of the coefficients of IPtg and IP? in the 
demand equations shows that there is considerable variability 
among Tables 8.3.3 - 8.3.6 whereas the coefficients of the 
other explanatory variables vary less. Furthermore an 
examination of the t-values (obtained by dividing the 
coefficients by their corresponding standard errors) shows 
that IPtg and IP? are among the least significant of all the dem- 
and explanatory variables. Consequently we can very tentatively 
conclude that the two demand equations only seem to be 
marginally affected by changes in either their own price or 
the non-own-price so that all expenditure/price elasticities 
seem to be very small. An examination of the signs of the 
demand equation own prices shows that, with the exception of 
Table 8.3.5 
, 
the coefficients have a negative sign which is 
consistent with a downward sloping (quantity) demand curve. 
The coefficients of the non-own prices do not exhibit any 
consistent pattern at all. 
An examination of the protection-based demand equations of 
Tables 8.3.3 to 8.3.6 shows up many puzzling peculiarities 
(such as the large standard errors, the variations in the 
signs of coefficients and the low R2 and 172 values). Consequently 
it seems as if this part of the model needs further examination 
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so that comments on the protection-based demand equations 
will be deferred until Section 8.4. 
The effect of Building Society Advances (BSAt) on the 
savings-based demand equations is also of interest. BSAt 
seems to have a reasonably strong consistently positive 
influence on Dtg 
. 
Because of the multicollinearity in the 
equations an examination of the standard errors could be 
misleading but BSAt is reasonably significant in at least 
one model (Table 8.3.5). Thus there is some evidence to suggest 
that Building Society Advances are complementary to Dtg : 
this was only to be expected since savings-based life 
insurance is used for house purchase purposes. However, 
examination of the corresponding 'average' elasticity coefficient 
shows that a 1% rise in BSA produces only a 0.2% rise in 
Dsg t 
Similarly, Permanent Income (INCt) has a consistently 
positive, strongly significant (above the 5% level with the 
exception of Table 8.3.5) effect on Dtg. Not surprisingly 
therefore, Permanent Income turns out to be the major 
determinant of the demand for long-term savings-based life 
insurance. The size of the coefficient of INCt is also 
relevant because we can then deduce the (permanent) 
income elasticity of demand: Table 8.3.7 below gives the 
959ä Confidence Intervals for the coefficient and the 
corresponding 'average' income elasticity. 
(2) 
Table 8.3.7 shows that the mean (permanent) income 
(2) The 'average' Income Elasticity is approximated by the 
formula 
=C Elasticity 
. 
NI CF where NCY and g 
dNCp 9 
the mean values, are £352.61m and £821.19m respectively. 
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Table 8.3.7 Savings-based Income Elasticit 
Interval Interval 
Source for Coefficient for Elasticity 
Lower Mean Upper Lower Mean Upper 
Table 8.3.3 0.652 7.450 14.248 0.280 3.199 6.118 
Table 8.3.4 1.290 8.513 15.736 0.554 3.655 6.757 
Table 8.3.6 0.968 5.413 9.858 0.416 2.324 4.233 
elasticity of demand for savings-based life insurance is 
around 3.0, that is, quite highly elastic. 
The other exogenous variables in the demand equation 
for savings-based life insurance exhibit few surprises: BSWt 
has a negative coefficient (Table 8.3.4) so that Building 
Society Wealth (Shares and Deposits) represents a substitute 
(in the savings market) for long-term life insurance. However, 
the 'average' elasticity coefficient shows that a 1% rise in 
BSW produces only a 0.54% fall in Dtg 
. 
It is interesting 
therefore to note that if the Building Societies received a 
I% rise in BSW and consequently increased their lending by 1% 
then the net effect would be a 0.3% fall(approximately) in the 
demand for new long term savings-based life insurance. The 
explanatory variable Bt (Births) has a positive effect on 
Dtg as does the Standard Rate of Income Tax (Tt). Both Ut 
and AUt have a negative effect as also does the number of marriages 
(Mt) : this latter result only serves to confirm the comments 
made towards the end of Section 8.2. 
We now turn to an examination of the supply equations 
which, although not producing as high R2 and R2 values, seem much 
more stable than the corresponding demand equations. In terms 
of the Durbin Watson statistic, the savings-based supply 
equation yields a small DW figure (although not small enough 
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to accept positive autocorrelation). 
The savings-based supply equations all exhibit positive 
own price and negative non-own price coefficients with 
corresponding 'average' elasticities of around 1.5 and -1.00 
(although by 1969, these had worsened to 0.7 and 
-0.2 
respectively). Thus the corresponding expenditure supply 
curve is upward-sloping and protection-based life insurance 
is regarded as a supply substitute. 
The protection-based supply equations indicate a 
rather peculiar relationship because the own price is 
consistently and significantly negative (with a coefficient 
very close to -1.00) while the non-own price has a positive 
coefficient (which is very near 2.0). Thus it would appear 
that the expenditure--supply curve for protection-based life 
insurance is downward-sloping while savings-based life 
insurance has a complementary relationship with Str 
. 
Now, 
of course, any re-examination of the demand for protection- 
based life insurance will also imply a closer look at the 
supply curve so that it is possible that the underlying 
instability in the demand behaviour is also adversely 
affecting supply. On the other hand the downward-sloping 
expenditure supply curve can be explained by stressing the 
complementary nature of the savings and protection-based 
elements. Thus it could be argued that as IP' rises, 
although initially Spr might rise, once Ißt reaches a 
certain level the life office starts to switch its protection- 
based business from temporary policies to endowment and whole 
life policies (which of course have a small protection element): 
this involves an overall decrease in Str but an increase in the 
supply of the more heavily savings-orientated policies. 
-4 49 - 
Of the"other supply variables YLDt has the expected 
positive coefficient and is also significant at the 5% level 
in most cases. The coefficient of Ct is negative in the savings- 
based equations but highly insignificant in the protection- 
based case. The coefficient of SPt-i is largely positive 
but not at all significant in any equation. Finally, the 
coefficient of (Gt-i-Gt) is significantly positive in the 
protection-based case as expected but insignificantly 
different from zero in the savings-based case. 
So it would appear that the major determinants of the 
supply of savings-based life insurance are IPtg 
, 
IPPr 
, 
Ct and YLDt while those for protection-based contracts are 
IPtg IPtr 
, 
(Gt-iGt) and YLDt. 
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8.4 Using Ordinary Least Squares 
The dependent models of the preceding Section show up 
some peculiar points that require some further attention. 
In particular, the following phenomena of the demand equations 
deserve attention: 
- 
the large standard errors in the protection- 
based equations 
- 
the insignificance of the own price and non-own 
price variables 
- 
the instability endemic in the equations 
The demand equations were retested without any price 
variables to see whether their exclusion appreciably harmed 
the explanatory power of the equations. Of course, since, 
there are no included endogenous variables ordinary least 
squares can be used. The best results are summarised in 
Table 8.4.1. 
A comparison of Table 8.4.1 with any of the dependent 
demand equations of the previous Section shows that the 
omission of the price variables has, if anything, improved 
the demand equations: especially in terms of the R2, R2, F and 
DW statistics. (An examination of the residuals gives no 
indication of any autocorrelation). 
It can be seen from the savings-based equation that the 
most significant explanatory variables are Permanent Income 
(INCt), Building Society. Advances(BSAt) and Wealth (Shares 
and Deposits BSWWIt ) and the Standard Rate of Income Tax 
(Tt). A study of the corresponding 'average' elasticity 
coefficients indicates values of 3.48,0.41, 
-0.58 and 0.98 
respectively. Thus a 1% rise in Building Society Wealth 
and hence Mortgage Advances has a net effect of a 0.17% 
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Table 8.4.1 The Demand Equations 
CONST 
INC 
BSAt 
BSWt 
Bt 
Mt 
Tt 
Ut 
AUt 
R2 
R2 
F 
Did 
Demand for 
Savi-n-g-7s--Z-ased 
(Dtg) 
-2803.026 (555.773) 
8: 094 (1.511) 
28.342 (7.145) 
-8.146 (2.830) 
0.294 
(0.252) 
-0.379 (0.787) 
18: 918 
(6.139) 
0.99 
0.98 
216.6 
1.818 
Demand for 
Protect onrbased 
(D-pr 
t 
82 569 (141.950) 
1.213 (0.154) 
-0.208 (0.095) 
0.091 
(0.287) 
-5.183 (2.988) 
25.080 
(12.480) 
-8.619 (8.737) 
0.94 
0.92 
42.9 
2.186 
Sample Period 1946-1968 
Ordinary Least Squares 
Standard Errors in () 
DW 
- 
Durbin Watson Statistic 
A key to the abbreviations 
can be found in Appendix 7.1. 
- 
452 
- 
decrease in the demand for savings-based life insurance (the 
effects on protection-based contracts are negligible). 
Similarly a 1% rise in the Standard Rate of Income Tax 
produces a 0.98% rise in new savings-based business; however, 
a 1% rise in Tt also produces a fall in INCt of about 0.7% 
so that the net result is. a decrease in DS6 by around 1.5%. 
Similarly, it can be seen from the protection-based 
equation that the most significant explanatory variables 
are Permanent Income, Births (Bt), the Standard Rate of 
Income Tax and the percentage rate of Unemployment (Ut). 
Neither BSAt nor BSWt figured as significant variables in 
any of the attempted models. The elasticity coefficients 
corresponding to INCt and Ut are 2.28 and 0.25 respectively. 
Both Bt anf Tt have significantly negative coefficients 
which indicate that these both discourage the purchase of 
new protection-based life insurance: this could be because of 
the effect on Disposable Income of the 
-latter and in the case 
of Bt 
, 
because of arguments similar to those used to explain 
the negative coefficient of Marrages in Section 8.2. 
The import of Table 8.4.1 is that the removal of the 
price variables IPtg and IPtr has no appreciable effect on 
the equations so that we can indeed confirm that the 
coefficients of these variables are likely to be insignificantly 
different from zero. We can therefore conclude that all 
expenditure/price elasticities are zero, ie. a change in 
price produces no corresponding change in premium expenditure. 
Consequently, the own demand curve (using quantity instead 
of expenditure) will have unit quantity/own price elasticity. 
Finally the problems caused by any large standard errors 
seem to have disappeared: it seems, therefore that the inherent 
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multicollinearity in the demand model was primarily caused 
by the price variables themselves. 
A number of other models were attempted including NIFt 
(total current account receipts of the National Insurance 
Fund) and LIQt (Liquid Assets). The results showed that neither 
LIQt nor NIFt demonstrated any significance. The insignificance 
of NIFt is perhaps a little surprising since Barros (2) 
intimates that there might be a substitutory relationship 
between the demand for savings-based life insurance and 
state pensions provisions. In a recent lecture 
(3), 
Professor Feldstein summarises the possible relationships 
between private financial saving and social security and 
concludes that, on balance, the existence of social security 
seems to substantially depress private saving (in the USA). 
Although it is dangerous to apply such results across 
international frontiers, Feldstein does provide in the early 
part of his paper, a possible explanation for the insignificance 
of our NIFt variable. Since the national insurance scheme 
formerly provided only a minimum level of benefits, the 
more affluent members of the community would have to supplement 
their pensions with private savings of their own: this would 
then offset the depressing effect of NIFt because ordinary 
life insurance is generally purchased by higher income 
families in the UK. 
Table 8.4.2 shows the results of including the In Force 
variables IFtg and IFpr with those significant variables of 
(3)'The Effect of Social Security on Saving'. Presented to 
the Association Internationale pour l'Etude de 1'Economie 
de 1'Assurance, Paris, 16 Jan. 1980. 
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Table 8.4.2 The Demand Equations 
Demand for 
avings- ased 
(DSg) 
Demand for 
Protection-based 
(D-Ljr ) 
CONST 
-3208.168 CONST 598.892 (397.032) (252.616) 
zNCt 930 INCt 0.038 ) (0. (0522) 
BSAt 31.968 Bt 
-0.087 (4.388) (0.079) 
BSw t -19.065 Tt -9.493 (2.967) (2.714) 
T t 23.062 ut 3.737 (4.693) (10.345) 
IF t 6.973 IFPr t 0.744 (2.039) (0.324) 
R2 0.99 0.95 
2 0.99 0.94 
F 425.6 66.5 
DW 2.230 2.106 
Sample Period 1946-1968 
Ordinary Least Squares 
Standard Errors in () 
DW Durbin Watson Statistic 
A key to the abbreviations 
canbe found in Appendix 
7.1. 
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Table 8.4.1. Both In Force variables are significantly 
positive thereby implying that (according to Houthakker and 
Taylor (8) ) the new purchase of both types of ordinary life 
insurance is habit forming. 
Since it has been conclusively established that the 
coefficients of IPtgand IPtr are insignificantly different 
from zero in the, demand equation 
the corresponding supply 
equations can also be estimated by ordinary least squares. 
The results of this estimation are given in Table 8.4.3 and 
the coefficients are of similar size and sign to those 
reported in the preceding Section. However both models 
indicate the presence of positive autocorrelation (with low 
values of the Durbin Watson statistic and a definite pattern 
in the residuals): no attempt has been made to try alternative 
formulations since we are primarily concerned with the 
demand equations. 
- 
456 
- 
Table 8.4.3 The Supply Equations 
Supply of supply o Savings- ased rIý otect of n-based 
(Stg) (Str) 
CONST 427.397 CONST 29.430 (309.119) (33.493) 
IPtg 5.126 IPtg 1.091 (2.335) (0.424) 
IP 
-2.526 IP 
-0.623 (1.090) (0.187) 
ct t (37.889) G- G* t-1 t 20.449 (9.225) 
YLDt 99.912 YLDt 25.434 (39.651) (5.945) 
R2 0.87 0.93 
$2 0.84 0.91 
F 30.7 59.9 
DW 1.063 1.276 
i 
Sample Period 19k6-1968 
Ordinary Least Squares 
Standard Errors in () 
DW Durbin Watson Statistic 
A key to the abbreviations 
can be found in Appendix 
7.1. 
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8.5 Inflationary Expectations 
In this Section, we introduce the last in the 
selection of demand and supply models under discussion 
in Chapter Eight. These models incorporate a first- 
order distributed-lag type inflationary expectation 
variable in exactly the same manner as those of Section 
8.2. In order to keep down the number, of explanatory 
variables, the recommendations of the previous Sections 
will be incorporated so that no price variables will be 
included in the demand equations and SPt_1 excluded from 
the supply equations. Ordinary least squares is used 
to estimate both the demand and supply equations. 
The models of this Section are of two main types: 
the first includes an inflationary expectations variable 
in the demand equations only, the second includes such 
expectations in both the demand and supply sides. 
Tables 8.5.1 and 8.5.2 represent the best results 
from fitting the inflationary expectations model of 
Chapter Seven to the demand equations. 
The demand for savings-based equation in Table 8.5.1 
shows that rsg is approximately equal to unity. The 
coefficient of Pt-1 also seems insignificant which 
indicates that inflationary expectations have no effect 
on the purchase of savings-based life insurance. 
Permanent Income, on the other hand, has a significantly 
positive effect (at the 95% level although multicollin- 
earity acts to reduce the significance of the estimates). 
The coefficient of INCt (10.861) reveals a slightly larger 
average income elasticity figure (at around 4.6) than 
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Table 8.5.1 Inflationary Expectations (Demand Equations Only) 
Demand for Demand for 
avings-based orb tection-based 
-iDýt CDPr 
CONST 
-3106.947 ' 
-0.175 (1736.217) (0.317) 
D. 6 t-I 0.086 p 
'1 -2.401 (0.349) t- (2.801) 
. 
Pt-1 
-7.548) INCt 0.416 
(2.106) 
INCt 10.861 INCt_ý 1.131 
(4.152) (2.046) 
INCt_1 
-1.932 Bt 0.038 (2.904) (0.206) 
BSAt 28.485 Bt_1 
-0.298 (7.686) (0.185) 
BSAt_1 0.953 Ut 10.753 (13.515) (12.694) 
Tt 20.652 U t-1 23.981 (8.938) (11.637) 
Tt_1 2.174 Tt 
-1.226 (15.597) (3.983) 
BSW t -13.481 T t-1 -2.107 (7.025) (3.943) 
BSWt-1 3.635 (5.224) 
R2 0.99 0.96 
R2 0.98 0.93 
F 132.6 32.4 
DW 1.948 2.312 
Dependent Model 
Sample Period 1946-1968 
Ordinary Least Squares 
Standard Errors in () 
DW Durbin Watson Statistic 
A key to the abbreviations 
can be found in Appendix 7.1 
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Table 8.5.2 Inflationary Expectations (Demand Equations Only) 
Demand for Demand for 
Savings-based otect on-based 
(t (Dtr), 
CONST 
-3180.512 Pt-1 -3.375 (474.079) (2.133) 
P t-1 -8.733 INCP t . 1.252 (4.517) (0.109) 
INCP t 9.469 U t 21.412 (1.023) (9.234) 
BSA t 30.234 Bt -0.181 (5.204) (0.070) 
BSW t -10.560 Tt -2.776 (1.904) (0.799) 
Tt 22-535 ( 5.792) 
x2 0.99 0.94 
0.99 0.93 
F 306.7 74.0 
DW 1.659 2.357 
Dependent Model 
Sample Period 1946-1968 
Ordinary Least Squares 
Standard Errors in () 
DW Durbin Watson Statistic 
A key to the abbreviations 
can be found in Appendix ?. 1. 
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those described in Tables 8.3.7 and 8.4.1. The effects 
of Building Society Advances (BSAt) and the Standard 
Rate of Income Tax (Tt) are much in line with those of 
Table 8.4.1 (with almost identical coefficients). The 
present coefficient of BSWt is smaller than those previously 
reported. The conclusion that inflation does not affect 
DS-9 is an interesting one which is difficult to accept 
on a priori grounds. The explanation. may lie in the role 
played by the declared rates of reversionary bonus which, 
if they keep pace with inflation, preserve the real 
value of policyholders' savings stocks. This hypothesis 
is tested in Table 8.5.3" 
The demand for protection-based equation shows first 
that rpr = 'I (since the coefficient of DtrI is 
insignificant and of incorrect sign) ie. that, as in the 
savings-based case, future inflation expectations depend 
entirely on the immediately preceding rate of inflation 
(Pt_1): the consumer has no long-term memory and does not 
make any allowance for past trends of inflation in his 
future expectations. Unfortunately no further analysis 
of DPr can be undertaken because of the strong 
multicollinearity present in the model; Table 8.5.1 was 
therefore reworked omitting all lagged variables since 
both DtgI and Dj proved to be insignificant 
- 
the 
results are reported in Table 8.5.2. 
Table 8.5.2 considerably clarifies the effects of 
inflation expectations: in both equations the coeffiecient 
of 
k-I is marginally significant (at the 90% level for 
Dtg and 85ö for Dtr ). This is a surprising result for 
the savings-based case and Table 8.5.3 tests the hypothesis 
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that inflationary expectations are partially offset by 
expected increases in the rate of reversionary bonus 
declared. Otherwise Table 8.5.2 exhibits no surprises 
and confirms the signs and coefficients bf the other 
variables. 
Table 8.5.3 replaces 
k-1 by the Net Rate of 
Inflation NRIt_i in the savings-based demand equation, 
where NRIt = Pt-bt 
(4) 
and bt, the rate of compound ý
I+ Pt 
reversionary bonus declared, is obtained from Table A 6.1.1. 
If inflationary expectations are indeed modified by 
bonus anticipations then we would expect the coefficient 
of NRIt_j to be more significantly negative than that of 
Pt-1 : this is because a positive value for NRIt implies 
a fall in the net real value of life insurance savings 
and should therefore discourage such saving. On the other 
hand, a negative value of NRIt implies a rise in the 
real value of savings since reversionary bonus rates 
are expected to be higher than the rate of inflation: 
life insurance savings should then be encouraged. Table 
8.5.3 illustrates two models : the first is the full 
expectations model which shows an insignificant 
coefficient of DS, 6. The second model therefore 
excludes Dtgj and all the other lagged explanatory 
variables and provides more stable results. 
A comparison of Tables 8.5.2 and 8.5.3 shows a 
remarkable similarity between the coefficients of the 
various explanatory variables. However the coefficient 
(4) Strictly we require NRIt to be compounded continuously- 
so that the formula given here is only an approximation. 
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Table 8.5.3 Net Inflationary Expectations 
(Savings-based Demand Equations) 
CONST 
-3018.000 
-3190.848 (1724.002) (469.645) 
Bý6 t. 1 115 (0.347) 
NRIt-l 
-9.263 -9.856 (8.432) (4.846) 
INC 10.464 9.420 t (4.152) (1.011) 
INCt-1 
-1.854 (2.851) 
BSAt 28.864 30.831 (7.477) (5.122) 
BSAt-1 3. 9 (1 39 ) 
BSWt 
-13.294 -10.781 (6.893) (1.889) 
BSWt-1 3 545 
. 150) (5 
T t 
20.772 22.892 (8.832) (5.770) 
Tt-1 1.752 (15.420), 
R2 0.99 0.99 
R2 0.98 0.99 
F 135.7 312.6 
DW 2.015 1.685 
Sample Period 1946-1968 
Ordinary Least Squares 
Standard Errors'in () 
DW Durbin Watson Statistic 
A key to the abbreviations 
can be found in Appendix 7.1 
NRIt 
- 
Net Rate of Inflation 
(ie. NRIt Pt-bt where 
I+ Pt 
b is the rate of compound 
rtversionary bonus from 
Table A 6.1.1. ) 
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of NRIt_i 
-9.856 is slightly more negative and (L+. 846) 
significant than that of Pt_j 
-8.733 (with t-values (4.5'7) 
2.03 and 1.93 respectively) and moreover, the R2, R2, 
F and DW statistics are all improved in the former case. 
In the absence of more rigorous tests of significance, 
we can only tentatively conclude that the incorporation of 
NRIt_l gives more concrete results so that inflationary 
expectations are partially offset by anticipated 
increases in the rate of reversionary bonus declared. 
Finally Table 8.5.4 illustrates the results of 
including inflationary expectations in the supply models. 
Although the results should be treated with caution 
because of the obvious presence of multicollinearity it 
seems that the coefficient of Stg1 is certainly less than 
unity indicating a strongly significant r=0.1. 
Inflationary expectations have a significantly negative 
effect on Stg - due no doubt to the effects of inflation 
on future administration costs. It seems therefore that 
life offices are more concerned about inflation (with a 
longer 'memory') than their policyholders. The results 
in the protection-based case are not strong enough to 
draw any conclusions. The Durbin h statistic (see J. 
Durbin (6) ) indicates the absence of positive 
autocorrelation'in the Stg case (the Durbin Watson 
statistic cannot be used because of the presence of the 
lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of the 
equation). 
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Table 8.5.4 Inflationary Expectations (Supply Equations) 
Supply of Supply of Savin s-based rotection-based 
(Stg) (Sr) 
SSg t-1 0.894 (0.195) 
SPr 0.332 t-1 (0.210) 
Pt-1 
-22.617 Pt-1 
-2.663 (8.117) (1.808) 
IPtg 0.383 IPS9 
-0.712 (2.275) (0.621) 
IPtg, 1 -0.840 IPtgI 0.006 (2.114) (0.494) 
IPF t 0.139 IPF 0.063 t (2.059) (0.434) 
IPF t-1 0.505' IPF 0.153 t-1 (1.087) (0.319) 
Ct 
-0.535 (Gt_i-G. ), " 8.528 (19.096) (9.103) 
C t-1 -4.903 (Gt_2-G*_ )-18.858 t1 (16.486) (8.920) 
YLDt 
-23.279 YLDt 8.836 (37.114) (7.805) 
YLDt-1 
. 
88 62 1 YLDt-1 1 9 ( ) 
. 
23 ( 4.8 8) 
x2 0.97 0.97 
-92 0.96 0.95 
F 54.6 43.9. 
DW 2.056 1.990 
h 
-0.379 - Sample Period 1946-1968 
Ordinary Least Squares 
Standard Errors in () 
DW Durbin Watson Statistic 
h Durbin h statistic 
A key to the abbreviations 
can be found in Appendix 7.1 
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8.6 Conclusion 
This Chapter has attempted to analyse and explain 
the purchase of UK non-group life insurance by examining 
the determinants of the Financial Saving Ratio and the 
Demand for Life Insurance. Although the Section on 
forecasting is still to come, it seems sensible to 
draw together the existing results of Chapter Eight at 
this stage. 
Chapter Eight has not been without its econometric 
problems and both multicollinearity and autocorrelation 
have caused difficulty in places. However the former has 
been largely combatted in a variety of ways by reducing 
the number of collinear variables in the models. 
Autocorrelation is a far more difficult problem to solve 
and no real solution has been adopted so that some of the 
results should be interpreted in the light of unconfirmed 
positive autocorrelation of residuals. 
The analysis of the financial saving ratio (FSR) 
given in Table 7.2.1 shows up several points, the first 
demonstrating that inflation expectations have a 
significantly negative effect on FSR. Expectations are 
generally fairly long-term and longer if BSAt is omitted 
as an explanatory variable. The value of r=0.14 
(when BSAt is included) indicates that the immediately 
preceding rate of inflation Pt_j only contributes 14% 
towards future inflationary expectations. Permaneht 
Income has a positive effect on FSR with a constant 
income elasticity figure of around 2.0. Both BSAt and Tt 
also have positive influences on FSRt. 
The results of the demand models were generally more 
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conclusive than those of the financial saving ratio. 
The primary observation to note is that the demand 
expenditure for both savings based and protection-based 
life insurance was not affected by either own price or 
non-awn price. While this may be because of the 
construction of the price indices involved (which were based 
on expenses loadings rather than 'market place' prices 
(which in turn were fairly constant over the sample period) ) 
it is felt that the demand expenditure for life insurance 
is genuinely unresponsive to price. 
The demand for savings-based life insurance is 
primarily affected by Permanvät Income, Building Society 
Advances and Wealth (Shares and Deposits), and the 
Standard Rate of Income Tax: all but BSW making a positive 
contribution. The average permanent income elasticity 
coefficient comes out at around 3.5 to 4.0. The 
inflationary expectations model for Dtg showed that these 
have little effect in the savings-based case. No strong 
evidence was found for the hypothesis that inflationary 
expectations are partially offset by expected increases 
in the rate of reversionary bonus declared. 
The demand for protection-based life insurance is 
determined mainly by Permanent Income (with an average 
elasticity coefficient of around 2.5), Births, Tax and 
the Unemployment Rate. Bt and Tt have negative effects 
while U. has a strongly positive effect (thus Juster 
and Wachtel's results (10) carry over to the consumption 
of life insurance). The inflationary expectations 
model for D? (and Dtg) showed that these had a negative 
effect with an adjustment coefficient of r=I: thus 
purchasers of ordinary life insurance have a very short 
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memory concerning inflation. 
The supply models both show that prices affect supply 
producing the conventional upward-sloping expenditure 
supply curve in the savings-based case (protection- 
based life insurance is observed to be a supply substitute). 
Administrative costs (Ct) and the yield on invested funds 
have a negative and positive effect on Stg respectively; 
including. life office inflationary expectation shows 
that these have a strongly negative effect on Stg 
The supply of protection-based life insurance 
exhibits more unconventional characteristics : all the 
models attempted indicate a negative coefficient for IP 
(with a positive coefficient of IPtg). It is 
hypothesised that this indicates the case of a backward- 
bending supply curve. YLDt again has a positive effect on 
S as does (Gt_i 
-Gt) indicating that the life offices 
vary Spr in order to maintain an optional gearing ratio 
of with-profits to total business. Inflationary 
expectations do not appear to figure strongly in the 
supply of protection-based life cover. 
The remainder of the explanatory variables mentioned 
in Section 707 that have not already been mentioned 
were either insignificant (such as Ut, rBS ), highly 
collinear with other more important variables (such as 
IFFrand IFtg ) or not available for the full sample periodo 
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8.7 Forecasts of Demand 
In this Section, an attempt is made to use the 
demand models of the previous Section to predict the 
demand for new ordinary life insurance for the years 
1969-1977. However a number of problems hinder this 
forecast, not the least of which is that 1969 saw a 
major discontinuity in the aggregate ordinary life 
new business figures. Consequently the prediction cannot 
be properly judged against figures comparable with the 
1946-1968 series. Additionally, no split can be provided 
for new business figures by class of policy (whole life, 
endowment etc. ). Consequently it is expedient to use a 
different series as the basis of comparison 
- 
with figures 
from the Life Offices Association and the Associated Scottish 
Life Offices (12). These figures 
- 
for New Ordinary Life 
Assurances in the UK (not including linked business) 
- 
are given in Table 8.7.1 below. 
Table 8.7.1 New Yearly Premiums (1 
1967 966.3 
68 918.5 
69 910.5 
1970 1080.2 
71 1105.7 
72 1221.6 
73 16. 0 
, 
-74 1 68.2 
1975 1061.2 
76 1071.0 
77 1020.7 
values per 1,000 
Sources: LOA / ASLO contributors (12). 
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The figures in Table 8.?. 1 cover business transacted 
by member offices within the UK and so do not include 
the UK business of non-member overseas based offices. 
The figures which form the basis of the predictions 
are given in Table 8.7.2. 
Predictions can then be made using two separate 
models: with and without the inflationary expectations 
model. These two models can then be evaluated by 
comparing the relative 'success' of the predictions 
using the standard techniques developed for this purpose 
(eg. see Koutsoyiannis (11) Ch. 20). 
The predictions and percentage changes from the two 
models (Tables 8.5.2 and 8.4.1 respectively) are shown in 
Table 8.7.3 below: 
Table 8.7.3 Forecast Values for (Dtg + Dp) 
Actual Value Predicted Predicted (UK Co ls. only) Value I Value 2 
%A ýO 
Year 
1968 966.3 
- 
1675.4 
- 
1691.6 
- 
69 918.5 
-4.9 1624.3 -3.1 1605.3 -5.1 
1970 1080.2 17.6 1716.4 5.? 1690.6 5.3 
71 1105.7 2.4 1865.5 8.7 1808.8 7.0 
72 1221.6 10.5 2167.5 16.2 2104.4 16.3 
73 1363.9 11.6 2047.4 
-5.5 1960.2 -6.9 74 1068.2 
-21.7 1994.5 
-2.6 1933.5 -1.4 
1975 1061.2 
-0.7 2362.8 18.5 2286.4 18.3 
76 1071.0 0.9 2501.3 5.9 2343.1 2.5 
77 1020.7 
-4.7 2324.0 
-7.1 2199.0 -6.1 
Source: Tables 8.4.1 and 8.5.2 
(Predicted Value I is from Table 8.4.1 ie. no inflation 
expectations) (Predicted Value 2 is from Table 8.5.2) 
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A comparison of the predicted values is obviously limited 
because the comparable data for the actual values is not 
available. The only data available does not include the UK 
business transacted by overseas companies so that a straight 
comparison with this information is meaningless. However, 
if we make the assumption that the value of new business 
obtained by overseas companies (not contributing to the 
LOA/ASLO figures) is a constant proportion of the total 
then some analysis is possible using data on the percentage 
changes. We should note that the existing data on new 
business figures (for the years 1946-1968) shows that the 
above assumption is not really a very good one, moreover 
there is some evidence to show that the proportion of 
business obtained by overseas companies was increasing 
throughout the 1960's. If this trend continued into the 
early 1970's, then the forecasts would be better than they 
appear in Table 8.7.4. 
Table 8.7.4 An Evaluation of the Forecasts 
Method Prediction I Prediction 2 
PSSEof %o. 141.5 147.3 
Correlation of %A0.28 0.33 
Thiel's Inequality 1.087 1.109 
Coefficient U 
On the basis of Table 8.7.4 it seems as if Prediction 1 
is the more accurate of the two : the evaluation methods 
of minimised mean squared errors (MSE), the correlation 
coefficient of actual and predicted percentage changes and 
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Thiel's Inequality Coefficient (19) pp. 26-36 
, 
all 
tend to favour Prediction 1. We note, however, that the 
period 1969-1977 was a very difficult one for forecasting 
purposes and even the more sophisticated forecasts of 
such economic indicators as consumer spending, price indices 
and unemployment proved to be unreliable (see Society for 
Business Economists (18) ). 
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CHAPTER NINE : AN ANALYSIS OF SURRENDERS 
IN UK ORDINARY LIFE INSURANCE 
9.1 Introduction 
The-emphasis on the purchase of new contracts in 
Chapter Eight does not properly cover the effects of the 
explanatory variables (and especially inflation) on the 
demand for contractual savings-based policies. The 
reason is that it is not until several payments have been 
made that these come to be regarded as contractual - 
obviously some discretion is involved at the inception 
of the contract. 
Other authors (such as S. Neumann (11)) have tackled this 
problem by analysing total premium payments on contracts 
in force rather than just looking at new purchases. 
However, such an approach has several pitfalls and will not 
be adopted here because: 
i) the contractual nature of business in force 
means that the situation changes very slowly 
over time. Additionally, declared 
reversionary bonuses are added to the 
sums insured in force and this further 
emphasises a trend element; 
ii) an analysis of in force figures cannot 
differentiate between discretionary and 
contractual elements. In any case, an 
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attempt to remove the effects of new 
business is only partially successful 
because claims (either on death or 
maturity) and surrenders must also be taken 
into account; 
iii) United Kingdom in force 
obtained separately for 
single premium business 
problem in any analysis 
insurance purchases). 
As an alternative this Chapter wi: 
figures cannot be 
non-group, non- 
(this is always a 
of UK life 
Li concentrate on the 
surrenders of ordinary life insurance and, as a result of the 
method of calculating the dependent variable, focusses 
particularly on the surrender of contractual savings- 
based insurance. A study of surrender rates is much more 
interesting than one of in force premium income because 
surrenders are more unpredictable ( eg. see D. J. Ward and 
C. O. Kroncke (14)) and are not so dominated by trend elements. 
In general, it would be better to talk about 'voluntary' 
withdrawals' rather than surrenders because the former includes 
those withdrawals where no surrender value is paid: 
"The expression 'withdrawal' is used to denote 
a policy removed from the live file, due to premature 
termination of the contract by the policyholder, with 
or without payment of a surrender value. It does 
not include a policy which is converted to a paid- 
up amount or continued with a reduced premium and 
sum assured". (F. D. Patrick and A. Scobbie (12)). 
However, the term 'surrenders' will continue to be 
used because no information is available on the number 
of withdrawals - only on surrender values paid out. 
Consequently no analysis can be conducted on contracts 
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that do not pay a surrender value 
- 
which commonly include: 
- 
all temporary life insurance policies, and 
- 
all savings-based contracts of less than two 
years in force. 
The next Section develops a theoretical framework 
for the study of voluntary withdrawals and 
. 
Section 
9.5 attempts to apply a quantitative analysis of the 
dependent variable (whose calculation is described in 
Section 9.3). 
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9.2 
-A Theoretical Framework 
Because of the important difference between contractual 
and discretionary saving it is necessary to distinguish 
between those withdrawals from policies that are still 
regarded as part of discretionary saving and those from 
policies that have been in force for long enough to be 
considered contractual. 
Those policies whose premium payments are still 
regarded by the policyholder as discretionary will be 
called Not Yet Contractual (as opposed to Contractual) 
policies; the premiums paid out while the policy is still 
regarded as Not Yet Contractual will be called NYC premiums. 
The term 'not yet contractual' is preferred to 
'discretionary' because it emphasises that eventually 
after the payment of an unspecified number of renewal 
premiums, the policy-will be regarded by the purchaser 
as a contractual commitment. 
As Neumann(II) pointed out, we would expect withdrawals 
from NYC policies to exhibit a different pattern to those 
from contractual policies. It would also be reasonable 
to assume that the reasons for withdrawal would have 
differing importance depending upon whether or not the exit 
came from a NYC policy. These two points underline the 
reasons why the NYC/Contractual split is a meaningful one: 
it provides part of a useful framework to analyse the 
determinants of voluntary exits. Some of these determinants 
will only apply to withdrawals from NYC policies and this 
should enhance the isolation and analysis of these factors. 
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We would expect th&t withdrawals from NYC policies would 
be more common than from contractual policies for several 
reasons, arising from the fact that the NYC policies 
have not been in force for so long: 
- 
since the expenditure is not contractual 
(by definition) the decision to purchase life 
insurance is reviewed every time the renewal 
premium is paid. Once the expenditure is 
regarded as contractual, consumption 
decisions are made on the basis of disposable 
income net of contractual payments (eg. see 
P. L. Cheng (3)); 
- 
the policyholder may reconsider his decision 
to purchase life insurance in the first few 
days of the contract. Thus the Insurance 
Companies Act 1974 suggested a 'cooling off' 
period (Section6.5) of ten days when the 
policyholder could change his mind after the 
initial purchase (eg. see Post Magazine 14th 
April 1977, 'Cooling off life insurance'). 
The factors influencing the decision to terminate a 
life insurance policy can be categorised under four headings: 
the policyholder has no further need for the policy; 
the policy would still be useful but is terminated because 
a 'better buy' substitute exists elsewhere; a cash lump sum 
is required by the policyholder and to avoid the expenditure 
on premiums. 
In the first case, the need for the services provided 
by the policy has disappeared. The main uses of life 
insurance are: family protection, mortgage repayment, 
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tax avoidance, partnership protection, to cover school 
fees and for special savings and investment plans. 
(1) 
So, for example, if the mortgage arrangements of the 
policyholder change, then the associated policies 
(mortgage protection and/or house purchase policies) may 
be superfluous. The'Scott' Committee (9) recognised, 
in 1973, that the policyholders may realise within the 
'cooling off' period that they no longer need a life 
insurance policy if firstly they have been induced to 
take out policies on the basis of wrong, misleading 
or incomplete information or secondly where inducement, 
via pressure selling, results in the purchase of policies 
unsuited to their circumstances. 
In the second case, the substitute may just be another 
policy offering better terms; however it is possible that 
in this case the policyholder may be a victim of heavy 
sales pressures by a salesman for commission purposes. 
On the other hand, the policy may be terminated in favour 
of another 'financial' savings institution; alternatively, 
in times of extreme uncertainty, the money could be held 
in cash or near-money balances. 
Reason four is basically concerned with the relative 
expense to the policyholder of the premium; it can be further 
subdivided into two: first, where the premiums were beyond 
the means of the purchaser from the very start of the policy 
(this is likely to be a case of heavy 'sales pressure' by 
the broker or salesman) and second, where the economic 
circumstances of the policyholder change so that the 
(1) See R. L. Carter (2) part 2.1.3. 
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policy becomes too expensive (for example with sickness or 
unemployment). 
A questionnaire was circulated to twelve of the 
largest ordinary life offices in the country in May 1975. 
In this, the companies were asked why some policyholders 
surrender or lapse their ordinary life insurance policies. 
Table 9.2.1. below represents a summary of the replies: 
the percentages add up to more than 100 because most 
offices mentioned more than one category. 
Table 9.2.1 Reasons for Voluntary Exit 
(the % of offices mentioning this category) 
1 2 3 4 
No further Substitution Cash To Avoid 
need Required Expense 
73% 55% 45% 73% 
We are now in a position to combine the different 
elements into a framework which will aid the analysis 
of voluntary exit rates. This framework is pictured 
diagrammatically in Table 9.2.2. 
Table 9.2.2. An Analysis of Voluntary Exits 
1. Need 2. Substitution 3. Cash 
. 
Expense 
N, Y. C. ______ Not 
--------------- 
--------------- 
importan 
Cont- 
ract- 
ual =_______ 
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The category NYC/Need as already been discussed 
since it includes those cases where a 'cooling off' 
period might apply. Similarly NYC/Expense comes under the 
aegis of the 'cooling off' argument since one would 
expect the policyholder to quickly discover if the 
premiums were too expensive. The two remaining NYC 
categories are not expected to be so important since 
in the case of NYC/Substitution, the policyholder will 
probably not discover that a better buy exists elsewhere 
until the premiums have come to be regarded as contractual. 
The case NYC/Cash is not an important one because of the 
common practice of not declaring a cash value in the early 
(normally two) years of the contract (assuming, of course, 
that the NYC period is less than two years). 
The category Contractual/Expense is particularly 
interesting because it seems reasonable to assume that 
once the policy has been in force for some time, the 
policyholder will try to avoid discontinuing it. 
This is particularly pertinent because a penalty is paid 
by those policyholders who surrender their contract. The 
theory of Section 2.12 shows that a small surrender value 
will have an adverse effect on the decision to surrender. 
As the need for the policy continues the policyholder can 
either cut back on some other form of expenditure or convert 
the policy to 'paid-up' (see P. D. Bacon and L. J. New (1)): 
"For some, the chief reason for thinking 
of surrender is simply the increasing difficulty 
of meeting the regular premium...... For 
somebody in this position, getting his hands on 
the cash may not be so important as avoiding the 
regular payment of premiums. 
.... 
A compromise 
'solution' to that problem could be to make the 
policy 'paid up'. " 
_(2) 
(2) J. Drummond. "Sums to do before cashing in a policy" The Times 
, 
8th March 1975" 
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In fact, policies that are paid-up can only be 
analysed in the context of the Contractual/Expenses 
combination: this fact serves two useful purposes, first 
it makes surrenders in this category more unlikely and 
second it shows that some future analysis of paid-up 
policies may throw some light on the Contractual/Expense 
combination. 
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9.3 The Dependent Variable (SURRt) 
The basis for the dependent variable was derived 
from the figures 'surrenders' (from the ordinary life 
file of companies doing business in the United Kingdom) 
available under the heading 'outgoings of life assurance 
companies' in the Annual Abstract of Statistics C7). 
The figures 'surrenders' relate to surrender values 
paid on policies that are withdrawn and therefore give 
no indication of the number of voluntary exits from 
policies that have not yet acquired a surrender value. 
Obviously, it would be incorrect to analyse the surrender 
data as it stands, without making any allowance for the 
volume of business from which the surrenders spring; 
therefore, it was necessary to make an approximation to 
the 'original population' from which the surrenders in 
year t could have come. This 'original population' 
was then used to form what will be known as the Surrender 
Rate. 
Let Et represent the 'volume' of new ordinary life 
policies issued in year t and let St represent the 
'volume' of voluntary exits in year t. Let It represent 
some form of cost of living index for year t. We use 
the results from the paper by F. D. Patrick and A. Scobbie 
(12) which are represented in their first table. 
Thus wj represents the probability of withdrawal 
between the start of policy year j and the start of 
policy year (j + 1). The cumulative probability of 
withdrawal (Wk) is then given by 
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Vlk (i 
- 
wj) and represents the 7kT j=0 
probability of withdrawal after k curtate policy years. 
Table 9.3.1 Crude Rates of Withdrawal 
Curtate duration (i) Rate (w 
0 0.067 
1 0.056 
2 0.053 
3 0.042 
4 0.039 
5 0.033 
6 0.030 
7 0.027 8 0.023 
9 0.021 
Cumulative Rate (Wk) 
0.067 
0.119 
0.166 
0.201 
0.232 
0.258 
So, if we ignore the possibility of withdrawal by 
death, the'original population' in year T is given by 
N 
ET-k-('-Wk-1) + ET where, theoretically 
N should be very large. In effect, we are defining the 
'original population' as the cumulative volume of new 
policies issued for up to N years preceding year T less 
those that are voluntarily withdrawn prior to year T. 
The voluntary exit rate in year T in real terms is then 
given by 
100 * sT/IT 
N 
ET-k (1-1"1k-1) + ET i 9.3 " 1) 
rT-k 
T 
For no better reason than that it suits the available 
data, N was chosen to equal 6: this limits the validity 
of the-results so that the rates are only useful in 
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comparison with each other. In addition, since the 
mortality experience has been ignored, the rates are 
underestimated; however, since mortality experience 
only changes very slowly through time, this under- 
estimation should not affect the inter-rate comparisons. 
I have had to assume that the crude rates of withdrawal 
produced by Patrick and Scobbie for 1965 are time- 
invariant. 
Since ST must be represented by the volume of 
surrenders paid out in year T this means that lapses 
with no surrender values are ignored. In other words, 
the use of surrender values ignores those withdrawals 
in the early (normally first two) policy years; 
therefore, the 'original population' must be adjusted to 
allow for this omission. Similarly, it is not usual 
practice to allow a surrender value on temporary life 
insurance so that these must not be included in the 
'original population'. 
The eventual 'original population' is then given by: 
6k 
" 
(1-wk-l) (9.3.2) 
k=2 T-k 
To be theoretically correct, the appropriate 
measure of ET -the volume of new ordinary life policies 
issued in year T- should be the new sums insured issued 
in year T. However, aggregate sums insured data from 
the Annual Abstract of Statistics does not differentiate 
between single and renewable premium policies. 
Presupposing that most surrenders in the period 1946 to 1968 
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were from renewable premium policies, 
(3)it 
was decided to 
use new renewable office premiums (excluding temporary 
life business) to represent Et (see Table 6.4.1). The 
resultant Surrender Rates are illustrated in Table 
9.3.2 below. 
Table 9.3.2 Surrender Rates (%) (SURR%) 
1945 24.8220- 
46 41.1060 
47 36.1261 
48 32.3579 
49 28.5692 
1950 26.4393 
51 25.8361 
52 25.9527 
53 27.6890 
54 29.0254 
1955 30.4203 
56 33.8196 
57 36.7746 
58 36.6655 
59 36.8648 
1960 40.3890 
61 46.0081 
62 46.8713 
63 42.1100 
64 43.0160 
1965 41.4119 
66 41.3658 
67 42.6244 
68 43.5737 
Source: Equations (9.3.1) and (9.3.2) 
An initial examination of the surrender rates of 
Table (9.3.2) shows up the following points: 
a) from a high level immediately after the War, the 
rates dropped to a low of 25.8361 in 1951. Since 
then rates have been on an upward trend, peaking 
in 1962 at 46.8713. 
C3) This is obviously a simplification since single premium bonds may also be surrendered. However single premium 
bond business was most volatile in the early 1970's 
after the end of our period of interest. 
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b) the high level of 41.1060 in 1946 is 
understandable in view of the pent-up demand 
that had accumulated during the war years. 
However, it is interesting that surrender rates 
subsequently passed this level after 1961. 
Whether this is due to the operation of 
'economic' factors or alternatively simply due 
to the method of calculating the rate must be 
investigated. 
The problem associated with the construction of 
the surrender rates referred to above has to be overcome: 
it arises because surrender values paid have been used as 
the dependent variable instead of the number of surrenders. 
Thus, what could appear to be a rise in surrenders could 
just be an increase in the value paid per surrender in 
that year. It is impossible to offset this effect by 
juggling with the dependent variable and, consequently, 
an explanatory variable must be inserted to cover this 
possibility. 
A change in the value paid per surrender could be 
caused by two different factors: first, an increase in 
the generosity of the individual life offices and second 
by a shift in the composition of life business to 
contracts that offer differing surrender values. An 
increase in the generosity of life offices in their 
treatment of surrenders can be caused both by a gradual 
change in life office attitudes towards surrendering 
policyholders and also by the increasing success of 
investment departments. An examination of the surrender 
values paid out on standard policies by the offices 
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contributing to the Survey (see Appendix 6.3) showed, 
however, that there was very little change in the basis for 
calculating surrender values over the period 1946-1968. 
We must, therefore, come to the conclusion that any increase 
in 'generosity' has been caused nbt by a change in the method 
of calculating the surrender values but through an 
increase in the value of surrendered reversionary bonus. 
Consequently, an attempt can be made to 'pick-up' the 
effects of changes in generosity by including the Rate 
of Reversionary Bonus Declared (Table A 6.1.1) as an 
explanatory variable (RBt). 
It is hoped that the effects of a shift towards policies 
with different surrender values (either by a movement 
towards endowment (with profit) policies or alternatively 
by any increase in average inception age) will be offset 
by using new renewable office premium income (excluding 
temporary business) in the denominator of Equation (9.3.1). 
This offsetting effect arises because the policies with 
higher surrender values normally involve higher office 
premium payments. 
- 
490 
- 
9.4 The Explanatory Variables 
Basically, the relevant explanatory variables fall 
into the four categories which are illustrated in 
Table 9.2.1: 'No further need,?, 'Substitution', 'Cash 
Required' and 'To Avoid Expense'. 
No Further Need 
If an endowment policy was used for house purchase 
purposes, then 
- 
in certain circumstances 
-a change of 
house might involve the surrender of the associated 
house-purchase policy. Thus we would expect an increase 
in housing turnover to cause surrenders to rise and 
since New Mortage Advances (BSAt) are a surrogate for 
housing turnover (which itself is not available on an 
aggregate level), the coefficient of this variable should 
be positive. 
Other variables which could reflect a change in the 
need for life insurance (both for savings and protection 
purposes) include: 
- 
the number of divorces DIVt ; 
- 
the number of business partnerships dissolved; 
- 
the mortality rate of dependents (say children 
under 14) DRDt ; 
-a change in the structure of taxation (eg. the 
admissibility of certain types of life insurance 
for tax-exemption). 
Substitution 
Surrenders in this category may either be in favour 
of another form of life insurance or alternatively (and 
more probably) in favour of the product of another savings 
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institution. Unfortunately, the existing data is 
insufficient for the inclusion of a variable relating to 
previous business: this would have been of interest 
because the 1956 Finance Act and the 1959 National 
Insurance Act both substantially increased the membership 
of superannuation/pension schemes. However some idea of 
the increased importance of private pension schemes can 
be obtained from the pattern of new Considerations for 
Annuities purchased from life insurance companies 
established in the U. K. (ANN t). 
We might also expect surrenders to increase if 
consumers anticipated a decrease in the real value of their 
savings. Consequently an increase in inflation expectations 
should increase the surrender rate. The effects of 
inflationary anticipations can be incorporated by including 
a lag-structure similar to that described in Section 7.5. 
Other variables which exhibit a substitute 
relationship to life insurance include: 
-a change in Building Society Wealth (Shares and 
Deposits) (ABSWt); 
-a change in the Real Net of Tax Return from Unit 
Trusts (AUTYt) (ideally net sales from Unit Trusts 
are required but figures are not available back 
to 1946). This information can be obtained from 
Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd. (5); 
-a change in the holdings of liquid assets by the 
personal sector (ALIQt). 
Cash Required (for consumption) 
Surrenders in this category are used to finance the 
purchase of extra consumption goods and consequently the 
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explanatory variables should reflect any changes in this 
propensity to consume. Suitable variables are thus: 
- 
the change in the ratio of consumption to disposable 
income (ACONS t) 
- 
the change in the amount of Hire Purchase Credit 
outstanding (AHPCt) 
To Avoid Expense 
We would expect any surrenders in this category to 
occur if the consumer's income decreased in relation to 
his level premium payments. Consequently suitable 
explanatory variables include: 
- 
the change in personal disposable income (APDIt); 
- 
the change in unemployment rate (AUt) ; 
- 
the change in the standard rate of income tax (ATt). 
Before we move onto a description of the actual analysis 
and results, it ought to be pointed out that, once again, 
problems of aggregation mean that the variables described 
above are only surrogates for the underlying explanatory 
variables. Unfortunately in some cases, the aggregate 
variable (pertaining to all UK residents) does not 
adequately reflect the situation of those individual 
holders of life insurance. So, for example, the variable 
APDI is intended to pick up those surrenders by policy- 
holders who experienced a fall in disposable income (in 
relation to the constant premium payments). But an 
examination of the aggregate figures for Real PDI per 
capita shows that a year-to-year drop only occured in 
six of the post-war years. Thus in the majority of 
post-war years the aggregate figures do not adequately 
reflect those individuals (the minority) who experienced 
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an overall drop in PDI. 
The implications of the aggregation problem are that 
the explanatory variables involved may well prove to be 
insignificant because they are inadequate surrogates for 
the underlying variables. If no better surrogate can be 
found then the results must obviously be interpreted in 
the light of this defect. 
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9.5 A Quantitative Analysis 
Before conducting a multiple regression analysis of 
the surrender rates derived in Section 9.3 
,a potential 
problem first outlined in Sections 2.10 - 2.12 must be 
examined. The theory (although not applying directly to 
the surrenders of savings-based policies) indicates that 
for the individual consumer, the decision on surrender 
exhibits a certain 'stickiness'. 
(4) It is therefore a 
matter of importance whether, on aggregate, this situation 
can be adequately replaced by a formulation which implies 
that marginal changes in the explanatory variables produce 
marginal changes in the aggregate surrender rate. 
For the ith individual policyholder, one might 
hypothesise the following relationship (at time t): 
k 
Sit = jE 1 
bý 
. 
Xijt + uit (9.5.1) 
_I 
if surrender occurs 
where it 0 if no surrender occurs 
Xýt is the jth explanatory variable (at an individual level) 
and uit is the random residual element. 
Then, aggregating Equation (9.5.1) for Nt policyholder, 
we get 
Nt k Nt 
nt =EEb.. Xi 
.t+ uit (9.5.2) i=1 j 
=1 i=1 
(4)In fact, it was hypothesised in Section 2.11. that no 
surrender would take place until T J> U* ie. until underlying 
circumstances changed to such an elxtefit that the expected lifetime utility after surrender (ti ) exceeded that expected lifetime utility obtained from continuing the old insurance 
arrangements (UT ). 
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where nt denotes the number of surrendering policyholders. 
Equation (9.5.2) can be rewritten as 
k 
nt 
bj. Xjt + Vt Nt j 
=1 
Nt 
whereXitti1 Xijt 
Nt 
and vE ui t Nt i=1 t 
(9.5.3) 
The term nt then represents the probability of 
Nt 
surrender at time t (which is essentially the dependent 
variable (SURRt) that Section 9.3 attempts to approximate). 
The dependent variables Xjt correspond to per capita 
aggregate values of Xýtbut it has already been pointed 
out that the pertinent characteristics of Xjt 
N(=1 
Et Xijt ) may be destroyed by approximating Nt i=1 
Xjt by the corresponding UK aggregate (which includes 
non-holders of ordinary life insurance) (5). Equation 
(9.5.3) then indicates that the process of aggregation 
has replaced the sticky 'switch-type' Kronecker delta 
n 
with the continuous variable Nt 
. 
Although theoretically 
n tt is bounded above by unity and below by zero this should 
C5) Thus, for example, 
where POP denotes Nt POP the population of 
EQ PDIit ýAE PDIlt the UK. 
i=1 i=1 
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Table 9.5.1 Linear Model of'Surrender Rates 
SURRt =-5.098 (26.069) 
- 
0.134 DIVt (0.245) 
+ (920.232)ßt + (45.1 2)DRDt 
+ 1.742 nU-1.379 BSA (2.095) t (0.934) t 
+ 0.0045 ANNt (0.0032) 
+ 0.271 A UTYt (0.588) 
- 
0.733 eT (1.001) t 
R2 
= 
0.883 
f2 
= 
0.678 
F = 4.322 
DW = 1.692 
+ 4.928 CONS t 0.211 t (78.243)" Dt (0.636) 
- 
1.041 AHPC + 0.165 &LTQ (0.660) t (0.360) t 
+ 0.546 n BSW 
- 
0.147 t PDI. t (0.918) (0.322) 
Dependent Variable: SURRt 
Sample Period 1946-1968 
Ordinary Least Squares 
Standard Errors in () 
DW Durbin Watson Statistic 
A key to the abbrevaitions 
can be found in Appendix 
9.1. 
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not cause any difficulties (see Goldberger (6) p. 251). 
Thus the potential problem referred to above has been 
resolved by the process of aggregation. This aggregation 
however has caused further problems. Initially the 
straightforward Ordinary Least Squares technique was applied 
to a linear function of the explanatory variables detailed 
in Section 9.4 but not including a lag structure of 
inflation expectations. The results of this first attempt 
are illustrated in Table 9.5.1 and a point of immediate 
interest is that the Durbin Watson statistic (D. W. ) 
indicates a significant degree of autocorrelation of 
residuals. This autocorrelation has dangerous consequences 
for the interpretation of Table 9.5.1 (eg. see 
Koutsoyiannis (10) ); in particular, the reliability of the 
estimates may be overstated with the result that 
explanatory variables may be accepted as significant when 
in fact they are not. 
Table 9.5.1 indicates that the coefficient of the Rate 
of Reversionary Bonus (RBt) is significantly positive. 
This can be interpreted in two ways: 
i) the method of calculating surrender rates 
described in Section 9.3 is indeed 
deficient and does not take account of 
changes in generosity on the part of life 
offices in the surrender values paid by 
them, or 
ii) that increases in the reversionary bonus 
rate declared (which obviously increase the 
surrender values paid) increase the 
probability of surrender. This, of course, 
was one of the major (but not surprising) 
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conclusions of Sections 2.10 
- 
2.12. 
Obviously, the results of Table 9.5.1 are disappointing 
and difficult to interpret (because of the inherent 
positive autocorrelation of residuals). Additionally 
the doubts that have been expressed about the suitability 
of tPDI have essentially been confirmed (by the insignificance 
and incorrect signs of this variable). Consequently, in 
future p PDI will be replaced with another surrogate for 
ePDI* which is a better indicator that the policyholder 
may be experiencing hard times: the number of bankruptcies 
(in England and Wales) per million of UK population (see 
Annual Abstract of Statistics (7)) BUSTt 
. 
Further attempts were made to remove the positive 
autocorrelation inherent in the model of Table 9.5.1 
- 
even to the extent of utilising Durbin's 'Two Step', 
method to estimate the degree of residual autocorrelation 
(see J. Durbin (1)). 
However, no significant success was experienced 
using these methods and the results are not reported. 
It seemed logical to conclude that the autocorrelation 
of Table 9.5.1 was therefore caused by some other factor 
such as the omission of an important explanatory variable. 
Consequently, more complicated models were attempted 
using a lag structure to incorporate inflationary 
expectations into the model. Although an ordinary least 
squares technique was used it should be pointed out again 
that there are certain drawbacks to this technique when the 
lagged dependent variable is included on the righthand side 
of the explanatory equation (see' Section 8.2). 
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Two separate models incorporating a lag structure 
were used, the first utilising the simple first-order 
adaptive expectations lag of Section 7.5. The second 
model uses a more sophisticated error-learning mechanism 
taking account of both the recent rate of inflation and also 
its rate of change. As D. E. Rose (13) suggested, this 
behaviour can be captured by postulating that people 
adapt to the size of two previous errors in inflationary 
expectations. These two linear models can be represented 
by the following equations: 
First Order 
SURR t= SURRt (SURRt-1, Pt-1, Xit, Xit-1, U t, 
. 
t-1 ) 
and 
Second Order 
(9.5.4) 
SURR t-= SURR t (SURRt-1, SURRt-2. , Pt-1, Pt-2. x it, 
xit-1' Xit-2' ut' ut-1' ut-2 
(see Appendix 9.2) 
(9.5.5) 
A notable disadvantage of both these models is that 
the lag-structure necessitates a large number of 
explanatory variables (especially for Equation (9.5.5)). 
Thus, as we saw in Chapter Eight, the only effective solution 
is to maintain a small number of right-hand-side variables: 
Tables 9.5.2 and 9.5.3 therefore concentrate on the 
variables: RB, DRD, ANN, A UTY and BUST. 
An analysis of the F statistic shows that all the models 
of Tables 9.5.2 and 9.5.3 have something to contribute in 
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Table 9.5.2 First Order Inflationary Expectations Model 
A B 
CONST 8.711 11.053 (3.119) (15.524) 
SURRt_l 0.220 0.271 
(0.251) (0.199) 
Pt-1 
-0: 470 -0.465 (0.596) (0.555) 
RBt 
-296.806 -15.994 (1038.210) (908.782) 
Rt-1 1237.623 1348.239 (1018.161) (889.663) 
DRD t 39.005 
48.848 
(35.559) (29.200) 
DRDt_i 
-22: 234 -4093 (40.306) (29.482) 
t ANN 0-0055 (0.0052) 
0.0023 
(0.0027) 
ANNt_i 
-0.0030 (0.0037) -0.0039 (0.0029) 
AUTYt 
-0.316 (0.459) -0.303 (0.392) 
DUTY t 0: 436 (0.399) 
0.536 (0.352) 
BUSTt 0.0873 (0.2378) 
. 
BUSTt_i 
-0.249 (0.351) 
R2 0.87 0.86 
R2 0.71 0.75 
v 5.5 7.5 
DW 1.853 1.860 
Dependent Variable SURR 
Sample Period 1946-'19681 
Ordinary Least Squares 
Standard Errors in () 
DW Durbin Watson Statistic 
A key to the abbreviations 
can be-found in Appendix 9.1 
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Table 9.5.3 Second Order Inflationary Expectations Model 
A 
CONST 68.549 BUST 
-0: '133 t (28.586) (0.071) 
SURRt_I 0.354 BUSTt-1 0.178 (0.169) (0.118) 
SURRt_2 0.098 BUSTt-2 
-0.545 (0.316) (0.150) 
Pt--1 
-0.245 R2 0.999 (0.133) 
Pt-2 0.011 R2 0.991 (0.130) 
RBt 
-1383.750 F 127.1 (343.509) 
PBt-1 
-417.836 DW 3.133 (348.926) 
RBt-2 1279.741 (417.541) 
DRDt 
-17.362 (44.205) 
DRDt_1 
-7.678 (12.322) 
DRDt_2 
-55.985 (5.507) 
ANNt 0.0043 (0.0034) 
ANNt_j (0.0017) Dependent Variable SURRt 
Sample Period 1946-1968 
ANNt_2 0.0010 
(0.0019) Ordinary Least Squares 
Standard Errors in () 
DUTYt 
-0.0107 (0.114) DW Durbin Watson Statistic 
A key to the abbreviations 
AUTYt_i 0.022 can be found in Appendix (0.109) 9.1. 
AUTYt_2 0.687 
(0.086) 
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Table 9.5.3 Second Order Inflationary Lxpectations Model 
(Cont. ) 
B C 
CONST 
-21.678 3.389 (9.928) (5: 4 5) 
SURRt-i 
-0.125 0: 151 (0.138) (0.145) 
Sit-2 0.788 (0.211) 0.320 (0.158) 
pt-i 
-0.480 -0.367 (0.186) (0.247) 
Pt-2 0.219 0.259 (0.179) (0.233) 
RBt 
-441.751 -210.349 (349.514) (421.224) 
RBt-i 445.147 191.705 (413.043) (491.796) 
RBt-2 1598.301 (524.777) 
628.724 (525.970) 
DRDt 110.677 57.015 (26.377) (21.790) 
DRDt-1 
-19.425 8.784 (18.099) (19.256) 
DRDt-2 
-46.705 (7.553) -48.402 (8.875) 
ANNt 
-0.0041 (0.0017) 
ANNt-1 0.0021 (0.0013) 
ANNt-2 
-0.0047 (0.0015) 
o UTYt 
-0.208 -0.045 (0.145) (0.169) 
MUTYt-1 
-0.102 0.165 (0.168) (0.193) 
AUTYt-2 0.789 
(0.130) 
0.835 
(0.171) 
R2 0.993 0.982 
R2 0.975 0.955 
F 55.? 0. 37.0 
DW 3.009 2.142 
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explaining the variation of SURRt. All models have reasonable 
values for f2 and the pattern of residuals reveals that 
none seem to be troubled by autocorrelation (the DW figure 
is overestimated in these cases). Moreover a comparison 
of Tables 9.5.2 and 9.5.3 indicates some interesting results: 
i) the second order models seem to behave better 
than their fist order counterparts (in certain 
respects): they have better-. R2 and F figures. 
Furthermore, either the coefficient of SURRt_, 
or that of SURRt_2 is always significant (at 
the 5% level) in Table 9.5.3, whereas Table 
9.5.2 does not show a significant coefficient 
for SURRt_1; 
ii) the coefficients of SURRt_i are largely positive 
and those of SURR. t_2 (Table 9.5.3) also have a 
positive sign. Thus by reference to Equation 
(A 9.2.7) we see that 
nt_1 
.c 1- 
nt-i -i 
0<X <1 
But als o 
1 
1> -at . 
nt-2 
nt-1 -1 
>0 so that approximately 
0 so that approximately 
0> at > 
-1 
We must therefore conclude that the addition of the 
second order adaptive expectations reduces the 
expected rate of inflation (although the first 
order will still have a positive effect). 
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Consequently, it would seem that, over the period 
1946-1968 (when inflation rates were comparatively 
moderate), policyholders generally took 
. 
an 
optimistic view of the course of future inflation 
so that the rate of change of inflation had a 
negative effect on expectations; 
iii) the coefficient of Pt-1 is consistently negative 
in both Tables 9.5.2 and 9.5.3 although only 
significantly so in the latter case (at the 5% 
level in Model B). Again, the coefficient of 
40 Pt-2 in Table 9.5.3 is consistently positive. 
Both of these results imply a negative 
coefficient for 'a' in Equations (A 9.2.7) and 
(A 9.2.3) 
. 
Thus inflationary expectations 
discourage surrenders of life insurance. 
There may be several reasons for this result 
but first the possibility that Pe is consistently 
negative may. be discounted since the coefficient 
of SURRt_2 is generally smaller than that of 
SURRt_I. 
Of course, if surrenders were largely because 
there was 'No Further Need' for the life insurance 
arrangements then we would not expect inflation 
expectations to have any effect. But inflationary 
expectations may well prevent surrenders in the 
'To Avoid Expense' category since the real value 
of premiums paid is reduced. Another factor of 
importance occurs in connection with with-profits 
policies (which form the major part of savings- 
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based life insurance). If positive inflation 
expectations are closely linked with expectations 
of an increase in the reversionary bonus rate 
then surrenders may well be discouraged because. 
of the increased competitiveness of the life 
insurance policy. A similar point arises 
because of the relationship between inflation 
and the rate of interest: if interest rates are 
expected to rise then correspondingly capital 
values are expected to fall. This may reduce 
surrender rates since the surrender values 
paid are related to the market value of the 
underlying securities. 
A final possible explanation lies in the protection 
element incorporated into most savings-based 
life insurance policies. It may be that if 
inflation has a positive effect on the demand for 
protection-based life insurance then this will 
discourage surrenders. Chapter Eight, however, 
gives no indication that inflationary expectations 
have this effect on protection-based policies; 
iv) the coefficients of RBt (which are negative) 
and RBt_i and RB t-2 (which are positive) all 
indicate that, contrary to the results of Table 
9.5.1, an increase in reversionary bonus 
discourages surrenders. We would not expect this 
result if surrenders were taking place to obtain 
cash (in fact none of the 'Cash' variables are 
important). On the other hand, if surrenders 
were occurring as a result of competitive 
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Table 9.5.4 Second Order Inflationary Expectations Model 
A 
CONST 12.636 (6.731) 
suRxt-l (ö. 227) 
SURR t-2 0.122 (0.262) 
Pt-ý 
-0.345 (0.306) 
Pt-2 
-0.305 (0.308) 
RBt 
-528.779 (657.207) 
RBt-, 247.242 (799.207) 
RB t-2 584 
918 
(814.142) 
DRDt 32 340 (35.563) 
DRD t-1 16.588 (32.705) 
DRDt-2 (14.903) 
R2 0.93 
R2 0.87 
F 15.4 
DW 2.027 
Dependent Variable SURRt 
Sample Period 19+6-1968 
Ordinary Least Squares 
Standard Errors in () 
DW Durbin Watson Statistic 
A key to the abbreviations 
can be found in Appendix 
9.1. 
507 
Table 9.5.4 Second Order Inflationary Expectations Model 
B (Cont. ) 
CONST 17.684 (23.803) 
SURRt-1 1.336 (0.447) 
SURRt-2 
-1.044 (0.606) 
Pt-1 0.841 (0.614) 
Pt-2 0.060 (0.533) 
RBt 
-436.232 (1018.840) 
RBt-1 476.942 (750.264) 
RBt-2 65.252 (875.440) 
DRDt 
-61.140 (104.810) 
DRDt_j 83.304 (70.537) 
DRD t-2 67.977 (75.406) 
BSAt 1.554 (1 
-151) 
BSAt_j 1.290 (0.890) 
BSAt-2 0.355 (0.718) 
DIVt 
-1.248 (0.509) 
DIVt_1 
-0.262 (0.417) 
DIVt_2 
-0: 440 (0.350) 
R2 0.97 
x2 0.91 
F 14.4-. 
DW 2.808 
Dependent Variable SURRt 
Sample Period 1946-1968 
Ordinary Least Squares 
Standard Errors in () 
DW Durbin Watson Statistic 
A key to the abbreviations 
can be found in Appendix 
9.1. 
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Table 9.5.4 Second Order Inflationary Expectations Model 
(Cont. ) 
C 
CONST 1.424 
(1.391) 
SURR t-1 0.203 (0.308) 
SURRt_2 0.447 
(0.479) 
Pt-1 
-0.746 (0.511) 
Pt-2 0.539 (0.853) 
RBt 
-760.068 (1133.463) 
RBt-1 
-14.366 (985.298) 
RB t-2 1385.390 (984.664) 
DRDt 56.174 (47.721) 
DRDt_1 16.042 (35.982) 
DRDt-2 
-57.360 (36.231) 
ABSWt 
-0.528 (0.412) 
ABSWt_1 
-0.561 (0.667) 
tBSWt_2 0.801 (1.168) 
R2 0.94 
Dependent Variable SURRt 
R2 0.86 Sample Period 1946-1968 
Ordinary Least Squares 
F 11.5 Standard Errors in () 
DW Durbin Watson Statistic 
DW 1.870 A key to the abbreviations 
- can be found in Appendix 
9.1. 
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Table 9.5.5 Second Order Inflationary Expectations Model 
A 
CONST 18.715 (16.274) 
Sit_l 0.447 (0.306) 
SURR t-2 
0.5'10 
(0.456) 
' Pt-1 
-0.049 (0.486) 
k-2 0.468 
(0.664) 
RB t -243.017 (932.604) 
RBt-1 412.286 (1093.156) 
t-2 -50204 (1262.755) 
DRDt 29.078 (43.982) 
DRDt-1 
-12.325 (54.371) 
DRDt-2 
-54.862 (23.749) 
cam ) ( (94.204) 
t 
(CD) 
t_I (101.539) 
(CONS) (67.196) 
t-2 
p gpCt -0.800 (0.803) 
n HPCt-j 0: 588 (0.680) 
At 
-2 
1.181 
(0.058) 
Dependent Variable SURRt 
Sample Period 1946-1968 
Ordinary Least Squares 
Standard Errors in () 
DW Durbin Watson Statistic 
Ä key to the abbreviations 
can'be found in Appendix 
9.1. 
R2 0.96 
R2 0.84 
F 8.3 
DW 2.348 
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Table 9.5.5 Second Order Inflationary Expectations Model 
(Cont. ) 
B 
CONST 5.987 (8.277) 
SURRt-1 (0.339) 
SURRt-2 0.110 (0.321) 
Pt-1 0 358 
. (Ö 496) 
Pt-2 
-0.031 (0. x+13) 
RBt 807. 3 ( 9 4) 
RBt_l 
-184.682 (922.302) 
RB t-2 (9615-519 59.2 ) 
DRDt 79.824 (46.644) 
DRDt-1 -8.610 (41.704) 
DRDt-2 
-79.050 (23.135) 
Aut 
-2.724 (2.103) 
-AU t-1 -3.259 (2.045) 
put-2 0.280 (1.443) 
BUSTt 
-0.129 (0.244) 
BUSTt_l 0.265 (0.314) 
BUSTt_2 
-0.372 (0.227) 
R2 0.96 
R2 0.86 
F 9.6 
DW 2.623 
Dependent Variable SURRt 
Sample Period 1946-1968 
Ordinary Least Squares 
Standard Errors in () 
DW Durbin Watson Statistic 
A key to the abbreviations 
can-be found in Appendix 
9.1. 
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pressure then this result is quite acceptable 
(note that this is the same type of conclusion 
as in iii) above) (6); 
v) the variable DRDt (Death Rates of Dependents) 
has a consistent significantly positive effect 
on SURRt ; 
vi) again contrary to the indications of Table 9.5.1, 
the variable DUTY has a negative effect on 
surrenders. This result cannot really be explained 
in terms of the competitive effects of Unit 
Trusts. A possible interpretation may be that 
the variable DUTY reflects the change in the 
yield earned by the life office on its own 
investments. AUTYt would then have a positive 
effect ( tUTYt_1 and AUTYt_2 negative) for 
similar reasons to those of iii) above. 
To finish this Section, a number of other explanatory 
variables were applied to the model of Table 9.5.3 
(second order). t UTY was omitted because of its similarity 
to RB. ANN and BUST were largely omitted because of the 
insignificance exhibited in Tables 9.5.2 and 9.5.3. The 
results of these final models are explained in Tables 
9.5.4 and 9.5.5. 
The results from these final models show very few 
(6) Dryden Gilling-Smith notes that, before-the tax 
regulations were changed in the late 1960's, a policyholder 
contemplating the surrender of bonus might have been 
better advised to obtain a loan against the policy (see Carter (2) p. 2.1.3 
-24) 
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surprises and by-and-large, they correspond to those 
from Table 9.5.3. Thus, for example, the coefficients of 
SURR t-1 and SURR t-2 are predominantly positive (with those 
of SURRt_1 exhibiting a reasonable degree of significance 
- 
generally at around the 5% level). 
The coefficients of Pt_j and Pt_21 typically have the 
same signs as before although none of them exhibits any 
degree of significance. Similarly, the signs of RBt, 
RBt_l and RBt_2 correspond to those of Table 9.5.3 but 
again without the same level of significance. 
In Table 9.5.4, Model B includes those variables in 
the 'No Further Need' category of Section 9.4. BSA t 
does indeed show a positive coefficient but it is not 
particularly significant. The coefficient of DIVt, on 
the other hand, is significant at the 5% level but has 
a negative sign (this same sign is born out in other 
models containing DIV but not reported). Thus it would 
seem that Divorce discourages surrender: a priori, this 
seems a difficult conclusion to accept. However, the 
results of Model B (Table 9.5.4) must be treated with 
suspicion because of the peculiar behaviour of SURR t-1 
and SURR t-2* 
In Table 9.5.4 
, 
Model C includes ABSW in an attempt 
to examine surrenders in the 'Substitution' category. 
The negative coefficient of e BSWt implies that as the 
shares and deposits held by building societies decrease, 
so surrenders of savings-based life insurance increase. 
Although this behaviour cannot be explained by the effects 
of competitive pressure, it may be that as the general 
level of prosperity falls, more money is withdrawn from 
- 
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the building societies and, at the same time, 
withdrawn from the life offices. 
Table 9.5.5 
, 
Model B attempts to characterise the 
situation where surrenders occur because the premiums 
are too expensive. None of the coefficients of 
or BUST are significant at the 5% level and the only 
indication that these variables might positively 
explain surrenders is given by A Ut_j and BUSTt-2 
(significant at the 20% level). 
Finally, Model A (table 9.5.5) includes those 
variables in the 'Cash Required' category of the 
previous Section. Again, the results are disappointing 
with none of the coefficients of A(CONS) or 'HPC 
significant at even the 10% level. However the signs 
of A(gDICONS)t-and tHPCt (positive and negative 
respectively) show some indication that the desire for 
cash (for spending) cannot be ignored. 
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9.6 Conclusion 
Section 9.2 was concerned with describing a theoretical 
framework for the analysis of voluntary exits from 
ordinary life insurance contracts. Four main reasons 
for termination were explained: 'No Further Need', 
'Substitution', 'Cash Required' and 'Expense'. The 
framework indicated that terminations for the purpose 
of obtaining cash would not normally occur until the 
policyholder regarded the premium payments as 
contractual. The framework also indicated that 
terminations because of the expense of the (contractual) 
premiums would most likely be in the form of policies 
converted to 'paid up'. 
Section 9.3 was devoted to a description of how 
the dependent variable SURRt was derived. Since the 
only data available related to surrender values paid, 
the surrender rate so produced (SURRt) applies only 
to the surrender of savings-based life insurance 
whose premiums are more then likely to be regarded by 
the policyholder as contractual. 
Section 9.5 attempted a variety of models of analysis 
on SURRt and most success was met with the use of the 
second order inflationary expectations model (described', 
in Appendix 9.2). 
Most of the explanatory variables described in 
Section 9.4 were tested to see if they contributed 
anything to the explanation of SURRt. The results of 
Section 9.5 
, 
although unfortunately not very conclusive, 
show that as suspected, the 'Expense' motive is not 
important as an explanation of surrenders. The 'No 
- 
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Further Need' motive appeared to be moderately 
important with the variables DRDt and DIVt showing 
some significance. The 'Cash Required' motive did 
not show up as very important but the variables 
reflecting the 'Substitution' motive did, on the other 
hand, show themselves to contribute to the explanation 
of SURRt. Furthermore, the behaviour of the variables 
RBt and Pt_i also indicated that surrenders have taken 
place because of the effects of competitive pressure. 
On the whole, inflationary expectations do not seem 
to encourage surrenders, and in some models (Table 
9.5.3) they seem to have the opposite effect. This 
behaviour may be for the reasons described in Section 
9.5 or may be caused by the fact that if prices are 
expected to increase then, as wages too are expected to 
rise, the policyholder will be better able to afford 
to pay the premiums. Another explanation may lie in 
the fact that consumers generally seem to take anoptimistic 
view of the rate of increase in future 
inflation 
- 
expecting increases in inflation to 
'tail-off'. 
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Appendix 9.1 Abbreviations and Sources 
Abbreviation Description Source 
ANN t Surrender Rates (as a percent- Table 9.3.2 
age of 'original population') 
BSAt Real Building Society Advances Annual Abstract 
on Mort ages per capita of Statistics (1963 £) (7) 
_, 
BSWt Real Building Society Shares Annual Abstract 
and Deposits per capita C7) (1963 £) 
BUSTt The Number of Bankruptcies Annual Abstract 
Declared in England and Wales C7) 
per million UK population 
CONSt Real Consumers Expenditure Ke Statistics ý 
per capita (1963 9) (8 
DIV The Number of Divorces in Annual Abstract t England and Wales (Decrees C7) 
Absolute Granted) 000's 
DRD Death Rate of Dependents Annual Abstract t (Deaths as a% of UK C7) 
population under 15) 
HPC Total Real Hire Purchase Annual Abstract t Credit Outstanding per C7) 
Capita (1963 £) 
LIQt Real Liquid Assets per capita Annual Abstract (1963 £) (7) 
Pt Actual Rate of Inflation of Equation (7.5.1) 
RPI (compounded continuously) 
PDIt Real Personal Disposable Ke Statistics 
Income per capita (1963 £) (8) 
RBt The Rate of Compound Table A 6.1.1 
Reversionary Bonus Declared 
SURR t Surrender Rates 
(as a percent- Table 9.3.2 
age of 'original population') 
Tt Standard Rate of Income Tax Ke Statistics (p in £) (85 
Ut % UK Unemployment Ke Statistics ý (8 
UTY Real Net of Tax Yield on Economist t Unit Trusts Intelli ence 
.. 
Unit C5) 
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Appendix 9.2 The Derivation of the Second Order 
Inflation Expectations ocess 
Using the notation developed in Section 7.5 we now 
assume that the consumer's adaptation to inflationary 
expectations has two components: first according to the 
error in their previous expectations of pt+nt_ý (as 
before) and secondly according to the error involved 
in the expectations of the preceding future price 
level Pt_1+nt_1_1 
So instead of Equation (7.5.3) we now have 
Pt 
. 
exp( (nt 1) 
. 
Pt+1 
nt+l 
A0 o Al 
Pe 
Pt exp( (nt l). Pt )t Pt-1 exp( (nt_1-1). Pt-1 
.t 
t+nt-l ' 
ee Pt+-1 
LPt+nt-1 2 -j L 
(A 9.2.1) 
Substitution for using Equation (7.5.2) and 
t-1 
Pt using Equation (7.5.1) yields the following 
relationship: 
10 
e Pe ( 
-a 
0 )-al e P 
nt+l t+l 
t1 
nt t 
nt t. nt t. nt-1 nt_l t-1 
+ Pt ( 
. 
nt -1)+ Pt-1 
- 
Jet 
. 
nt-1 
(A 9.2.2) 
Equation (A 9.2.2) can then be incorporated into the 
demand function Dt = Dt( t, X1t, ut) in the following 
ntp 
way: 
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Let the demand function be 
Dt = OONST + a. 
nt 
Pt +E bi 
. 
Xlt + Ut 
(A 9.2.3) 
then from Equation (A 9.2.2), this can be written as 
Dt = OCNST +a 
-1 
.( nt-i t-1 n t-1 - 
0n 
n`t-I 
l 
- 
7lt 
.n t-2 . nt-2Pt-2 
+ Pt-1 (at. nt-1 -1) 
+P 
.X .n)+ Eb.. Xit +U t-2 t t-2 it 
(A 9.2.4) 
Lagging (A 9.2.3) by one and two time periods 
respectively we get 
Dt_1 = OONST + a. Pe-t1 +E bi . Xit-1 +u nt t-1 
(A 9.2.5) 
and 
Dt_2 = CONST + a. Pe + nt_, 2 t-2 
E bi 
. 
Xit-2 + t-2 U 
(A 9.2.6) 
Finally, substituting for n 
-lPi-1 
and nt-2Pt-2 in t 
Equation (A 9.2.4) (from (A 9.2.5) and (A 9.2.6) ): 
nt-1°(1-AO) 
Dt = QONST + Dt_l - CONST -E brit-1 ut-1) 
nt-1 -1 
_ 
ýt 
" 
nt-2 
. 
(.. D 
- t-2 
SONST 
-E b. X. - 1 it-2 u) t-2 1 nt-1 - 
.(( +a 
ý. 
n 
_ 
ý`t tl - 1). P + t-1 .n_. al tt2 Pt_ 2 
nt- -1 
+E bi 
. 
Xit + U (A9.2.7) 
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CHAPTER TEN : SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study has attempted to analyse the demand for 
life insurance and the factors which influence that demand. 
The analysis has been both theoretical and practical; the 
latter aspect using data on UK ordinary life insurance 
over the years 1946 to 1968. The demand for life insurance 
has been examined on the basis of new business premium 
income and also business in force (by looking at the 
surrenders of existing life insurance contracts). Some special 
attention has been devoted to the effects of inflation 
(mainly in the form of inflationary expectations) on the 
various aspects of demand. 
Chapter Two examines the consumer's motives for the 
purchase of protection-based life insurance and begins by 
breaking income down into it's component parts: current 
consumption, lifetime saving and bequesting flow. The 
bequest made at the end of the consumer's lifetime can 
in turn be split into two parts: to provide protection 
and to provide non-lifetime savings stocks: consequently 
the corresponding bequesting flows count as consumption 
and non-lifetime saving respectively. The argument is 
extended to show that bequests for protection purposes 
yield satisfaction at every instant in the consumer's 
lifetime and are not conditional upon his death: this is 
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a major departure from the standard Yaari 'life cycle' 
models. 
The model restricted to lifetime saving only, with 
any bequest solely via life insurance (for protection 
purposes), shows that the bequest plan can be 'humped' 
shaped. However the greater the inception age, the more 
likely a downward sloping bequest plan becomes. It is 
contended that this is more realistic than the corresponding 
'life cycle' result (with bequests independent of inception 
age) because protection is most needed (and desired) when 
uncertainty about death is greatest (ie. at younger ages) 
and--when premature death would do most harm to dependents. 
The models which describe non-lifetime saving do so in 
two ways, first by treating it as precautionary saving and 
secondly by dropping the restriction of 'lifetime' saving 
only (although a bequest for protection purposes is still 
provided by the purchase of life insurance). The former 
type does not alter the basic pattern of consumption or 
bequest although each bequest is smaller than it would 
have been in the absence of precautionary saving. The 
latter type alters the pattern of consumption and 
concentrates it more towards the younger ages. 
Finally, Chapter Two extends the existing theory to allow 
the consumer to experience unanticipated changes in his 
circumstances which might lead him to surrender his 
protection-based life insurance contract. The results show 
first that there will be a certain stickiness in the 
consumers' reactions to these changes and secondly that 
the higher is the surrender value the more likely that 
surrender becomes. 
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Chapter Three extends the theory of Chapter Two to 
describe the eLtects of anticipated and unanticipated 
inflation on the purchase and surrender of protection- 
based life insurance. The major conclusions are that 
both anticipated and unanticipated inflation may effect 
the bequest by bringing forward the bequest plan to younger 
ages. Whether or not this reduces the overall purchase of 
life insurance depends on the extent of the offsetting 
'income' effect but it seems that if P> d then that new 
purchase may well be increased by older policyholders. 
An examination of the effects of unanticipated 
changes in P at time T shows that surrender is more likely 
if ' is revised in an upward direction. Furthermore, 
surrender becomes less likely with a decrease in the size 
of the surrender value paid and also if consumers are not 
highly 'impatient' for early consumption and/or bequest. 
Chapter Four is mainly devoted to a review of the 
literature concerning saving and the purchase of savings- 
based life insurance. The major points of interest concern 
the criticisms of the alternative models: that little 
consideration has been given to an appropriate distinction 
between new and in force business and also between saving 
and protection-based policies. 
The objective of Chapter Five is to split the savings 
and protection elements of the new business premiums on 
standard life insurance contracts. Temporary insurance 
premiums are allocated entirely to protection as are the 
temporary elements in endowment and whole of life contracts. 
The results show that the financial saving ratio (financial 
- 
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saving as a proportion of premium) is a declining function 
of inception age as well as the calculation rate of interest. 
The addition of the bonus and expenses loadings has the 
effect of 'swivelling' the endowment ratio in an 
anticlockwise direction: the effect on the whole of life 
ratio is more simply limited to movements up (dependent 
on the size of the bonus loading) and down ( depending 
on the size of the expenses loading). Finally a discussion 
of policyholder savings stocks shows how these depend on the 
time since inception so that a more rigorous analysis 
cannot be conducted. 
Chapter Six is concerned with the application of 
Chapter Five's theory to differentiate between protection- 
based and savings-based new business premium income for UK 
ordinary life insurance over the period 1946 to 1968. 
This is done by calculating, for each year, an appropriate 
pure premium rate (based on realistic assumptions about 
interest and mortality) and then using this rate to derive 
aggregate pure premiums and hence the desired information. 
The data is then utilised to provide the dependent variables 
for the analysis of Chapter Eight. 
Chapter Seven is basically devoted to a description 
of the sources and derivation of the many explanatory 
variables to be used in Chapter Eight. A series is derived 
for a measure of permanent income and a theory of long- 
term inflation expectations is developed which is similar 
to the basic adaptive-expectations hypothesis. 
Chapter Eight is the first of two chapters applying 
econometric techniques to analyse the influences on the demand 
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for ordinary UK life insurance. For a number of reasons, 
the results of Chapters Eight and Nine are not as clear-cut 
as perhaps one would like: there are problems with data 
that are common to most time-series econometric studies 
(eg problems of aggregation, surrogation and availability) 
as well as those particular to this work (mainly caused by 
the only approximate methodology described in Chapter Six. 
A similar study conducted in a few years time would have 
less trouble because of the greater availability of data 
(both reported to the Department of Trade and retained by 
the individual life offices)). Additionally, the usual 
econometric problems of autocorrelation and multicollinearity 
have been encountered and sometimes their appropriate 
solutions have limited applicability. 
The first part of Chapter Eight is devoted to an. 
analysis of the Financial Saving Ratio (that is, new 
financial saving via ordinary life insurance expressed as 
a proportion of personal disposable income). The thinking 
behind this study developed along two lines: reflecting 
first the similar work conducted on the aggregate Saving 
Ratio (reported in Chapter Four) and secondly examining 
specifically the new semi-contractual saving via life 
insurance (rather than the demand for this characteristic 
in life insurance contracts). No real success was obtained 
with any form of adaptive expectations model allowing 
automatically for inflation and the best results were found 
using a 'manual expectations' formulation (by choosing that 
22 
model yielding the best R, `and F coefficients). The 
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major results indicated that inflation expectations have 
a negative effect on new contractual saving (via life 
insurance) whereas permanent income has a positive effect. 
Building Society Advances were positively associated with 
FSR and, additionally, the inclusion of this variable seems 
to shorten the saver's time horizon for inflation expectations 
(an alternative view could be that mortgagees are less 
worried about the effects of inflation because of the 
fixed-price nature of the mortgage). Models that were 
linear in the logarithms were also attempted and these 
indicated much the same results giving a (constant) 
permanent income elasticity figure of around 2.0. 
The second part of Chapter Eight is concerned with 
testing a demand model for the protection-based and savings- 
based elements of new life insurance (new premium 
expenditures were used as a surrogate for these quantities). 
Because the demand equation is just one part of the Demand 
and Supply model the method of Two Stage Least Squares 
was employed to avoid simultaneous equation bias and 
identification problems. 
Initially models were attempted that had only Own-Price 
as the included endogenous variable but these proved tob 
simplistic to be of any use. Consequently, all. equations 
subsequently included both prices as endogenous variables; 
however one of the major results is that the coefficients 
of these prices are insignificantly different from zero 
in both Demand equations (ie the expenditure/price 
elasticities are zero). 
- 
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The most important demand explanatory variable 
turned out to be Permanent Income (with 'average' 
elasticity figures of around 3.5 and 2.5 for the savings- 
based and protection-based cases respectively). Building 
Society Advances, Building Society Wealth (a negative effect) 
and the Standard Rate of Income Tax were the most important 
savings-based (demand) variables. Inflationary expectations 
were bound to have a marginal negative effect on demand 
( DS9). The demand for protection-based life insurance 
is negatively influenced by Births and Tax whereas 
Unemployment has a positive effect. Inflationary 
expectations again had a negative effect and policyholders' 
memories of inflation in both savings and protection-based 
cases are very short. 
The Supply models both show that Prices affect Supply 
producing the conventional upward-sloping Expenditure 
Supply curve in the savings-based case: administrative costs, 
the price of protection-based insurance and inflationary 
expectations have a negative effect while the coefficient 
of yield on invested funds is positive. The supply of 
protection-based life insurance is more unconventional 
because there is strong evidence that the supply (expenditure) 
curve is backward bending; the price coefficient for 
savings-based insurance is now positive. Inflationary 
expectations do not appear to have any effect and the major 
explanatory variables are yield on invested funds and the 
adjustment to the optimum gearing level. 
Chapter Nine represents the results of an econometric 
analysis into the demand for in force savings-based life 
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insurance: this is undertaken via study of surrender rates. 
Inflationary expectations are incorporated by the use of 
a second-order adaptive expectations approach which 
indicates that policyholders generally took an optimistic 
view of the trends in future inflation. The major conclusions 
are that inflation and the reversionary bonus declared 
have a negative effect on surrender rates while divorces 
and the deaths of dependents have a positive effect. 
Consequently, the main reasons for surrender appear to be 
in the categories of 'No Further Need' and competitive 
pressure. 
The main results of this study can hence be summarised 
as follows: 
a) life insurance is purchased for three main 
motives 
-- 
lifetime saving, non-lifetime saving 
and the provision of protection. These three 
functions are primarily undertaken by endowment, 
whole of life and temporary life insurance contracts 
respectively. Non-lifetime saving and the provision 
of protection for dependents are provided by making 
a bequest; 
b) a life-cycle model explaining consumption and 
protection-based bequest plans, shows these to be 
determined by the force of interest, the rate of 
impatience and (in the latter case) by the force 
of mortality, which depends on the age at inception 
of the insurance contract; 
c) the theory predicts that the decision to surrender 
a protection-based life insurance tends to be 
- 
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'sticky'. Any consumer who wishes to revise his 
insurance arrangements may well put up with a 
sub-optimal situation because of the penalty 
involved in the termination of a contract; 
d) inflation, both anticipated and unanticipated, 
can affect the purchase of life insurance by 
bringing forward consumption and bequests in time. 
The actual effect of inflation on premium 
expenditures is clouded by the reduction in the 
cost of the bequest plans; 
e) because most life insurance contracts include 
elements of both saving (whether lifetime or 
non-lifetime) and protection (for dependents), 
an analysis of aggregate premium expenditures 
cannot properly be conducted without separating 
these two elements. An indication has been given 
of how this may be achieved and the method is 
implemented on UK data over the period 1946 
- 
1968; 
f) an analysis of data has indicated that new 
financial saving via life insurance was adversely 
affected by inflation expectations over the period. 
However, this saving represents only a very small 
part of Personal Disposable Income (0.2% average, 
: 1960 
- 
1968) ; 
g) the premium expenditure on new renewable life 
insurance demanded does not seem to depend 
on price but is mainly affected by income. The 
-530- 
(permanent) income elasticity of demand averages 
around 3.5. Inflationary expectations have a 
marginally negative effect; 
h) surrenders of existing contractual savings-based 
life insurance seem to have been caused mainly 
by either a lack of need or by competitive 
pressure. Second-order inflationary expectations 
play a negative role in discouraging surrenders. 
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